Water and Cognitive Warfare

(Nick Loxton – RUSI) On 7 March 2026, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi began the enabling information operation to set conditions for future offensive action against what should be an inviolable target – water desalination – posting on X that the US had struck a desalination plant on Qeshm Island, followed by the key framing narrative for events to follow: ‘The US set this precedent, not Iran.’. Both the US and Israel denied any strike on Qeshm. No satellite imagery, photographs or independent corroboration of the alleged attack has been published. The Qeshm claim remains, two months later, a single-source Iranian government assertion. The following day, an Iranian drone struck a desalination plant in Bahrain, in what was a clear Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) signal. There were no fatalities, and backup capacity held, but the demonstration of force was clear. This tactical action was the force multiplier that Iran’s information operation needed to amplify the strategic message. In the space of 48 hours, Iran brought into scope for kinetic targeting a strategic vulnerability of the Gulf states, signalling its intent, opportunity and capability to do so. It established a narrative framework in which attacking Gulf desalination infrastructure was recast from a prohibited act under Additional Protocol I, Article 54 to a justified, proportionate, retaliatory response to an American first strike. – Water and Cognitive Warfare | Royal United Services Institute