(Kendy Hau – ASPI The Strategist) In January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told the World Economic Forum something that Western democracies have long known but rarely said in public. The rules-based international order, he observed, was always a pleasant fiction. The strongest exempted themselves when convenient. Trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. International law applied with varying rigour depending on who was accused and who was the victim. The speech received a standing ovation. It deserved one. The contest is already underway. State actors have quietly acquired agricultural land near Australian defence facilities, seeded our universities with research partnerships that migrate intellectual property, and used economic coercion – most visibly in trade restrictions targeting our barley, wine and coal – to demonstrate that the instruments of statecraft now precede the instruments of war. Russian disinformation has colonised the same digital infrastructure we built for democratic participation. The grey zone is not a category of future threat; it is the operating environment we are already inside, poorly mapped and barely understood. Australia’s response has been earnest, technically serious and conceptually misaligned. This isn’t because of policy negligence – many of the vulnerabilities were the intended outcomes of good policy. Rather, it’s because we keep designing answers for a fight our adversaries are not fighting. But for those of us who have spent careers at the intersection of information warfare and national security, Carney’s honesty prompted a harder question, one that his speech approached but didn’t answer. If we always knew the story was partially false, why have we built our entire grey-zone response architecture on the assumption that it was true? – Australia’s grey-zone problem is a thinking gap, not a capability gap | The Strategist
Australia’s grey-zone problem is a thinking gap, not a capability gap
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