Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; Council on Foreign Relations; Just Security; The Jamestown Foundation
Lebanon/US
(Nadim Houry – Just Security) If the United States wants peace on Israel’s northern border, it should stop treating Lebanese state-building and Hezbollah disarmament as competing agendas. They are the same agenda. A durable ceasefire will not come from giving Israel a freer hand in Lebanon, nor from demanding that the Lebanese army do under bombardment what no state army has ever done successfully: forcibly disarm a deeply embedded armed movement in the middle of an external war. It will come through a political process that strengthens the Lebanese state, restores a monitored cease-fire, and gradually brings Hezbollah arms under official authority. The United States already has the outline of such a framework. It should return to it and display more strategic patience. – Washington Is Backing the Wrong Lebanon Strategy
Piracy
(Saby Martinez – Just Security) On Nov. 6, 2025, pirates attacked the tanker Hellas Aphrodite approximately 560 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, in international waters. Under fire, the crew implemented its security measures and sheltered in the ship’s citadel (a reinforced or fortified secure room designed to protect against entry and protect the ship’s crew). Within 30 hours, naval forces in the region rescued the crew and secured the tanker. The pirates slipped away toward Somali territorial waters. A similar pattern played out in the Gulf of Guinea, but with one critical difference: the violence occurred much closer to shore. In March 2025, pirates carried out abductions in quick succession. Specifically, on March 17, ten crew members were kidnapped from the tanker Bitu River approximately 40 nautical miles from São Tomé and Príncipe. The ship’s citadel was breached, and the pirates likely moved the hostages to a camp in the Niger Delta. Ten days later, the fishing vessel Mengxin 1 was attacked approximately 16 nautical miles south of Accra. Around the same period, there was separate reporting of seven crew abducted from three Ghana-flagged fishing vessels operating off Ghana. These are not isolated events. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), one of the major organizations that compiles statistical data on piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea, recorded 116 incidents from January to September 2025. Seventy-three of those occurred in the territorial waters of the Singapore Strait. This is not a backwater you would expect. It is one of the world’s busiest waterways, exactly the kind of place where security ought to be strongest, and where the consequences of “routine” maritime crime ripple quickly into commercial risk. And yet, a majority of criminal incidents took place there in the covered time period. This pattern—serious maritime crime clustering near-shore—exposes a gap in the law of the sea framework. Piracy is not a historical curiosity. It is a modern and recurring operational risk that adapts quickly. The core legal framework is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Often called the constitution of the oceans, this treaty sets the legal boundaries of maritime zones and the enforcement authorities that come with them, including when piracy triggers universal jurisdiction. In other words, it draws the lines that determine who can do what, where, and when – and pirates have learned to operate in the spaces that press on the weaknesses of the framework. – Where the Law Gets Thin: The Jurisdictional Gap Pirates Exploit
Russia
(Uran Botobekov – The Jamestown Foundation) The March 12 verdict delivered by Moscow’s Second Western District Military Court in the case of the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack reinforces that the attack was carried out by ISKP-linked Tajik militants, underscoring the expanding operational reach of the group’s Central Asian networks. The ruling also weakens earlier politically charged claims advanced by the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service (FSB), which sought to attribute the attack to Ukraine as well as to U.S. and UK intelligence services. Russia’s Ukraine-centered security posture—combined with coercive migration enforcement and restrictive religious policies widely perceived as hostile toward Islamic practices—risks deepening alienation within Central Asian migrant communities, inadvertently creating conditions conducive to further radicalization. – Crocus City Hall Terrorism Trial Exposes Russian Counterterrorism Gaps – Jamestown
Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism
(David Scharia – Just Security) Terrorist organizations rarely lead in technological innovation and are not early adopters of emerging technologies. Their incorporation of technological advancements into operational activities is typically measured and gradual, influenced by organizational structure, resource limitations, opportunities for learning and concerns that new technologies may increase their exposure to counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, terrorist organizations have demonstrated considerable skill in exploiting widely available commercial technologies to advance their operational objectives. Their strength stems from strategically adapting universally accessible technologies to suit their needs. They have become particularly adept at utilizing social media and artificial intelligence for propaganda dissemination, recruitment, and the orchestration of terrorist activities. The capacity to exploit commercially available technologies for nefarious purposes poses substantial challenges for governance of these technologies. Policymakers and security agencies must maintain constant vigilance and address these evolving threats while simultaneously incorporating advanced technologies into counterterrorism strategies. For instance, biometric technology is systematically utilized at borders and airports to detect suspected individuals. Surveillance technologies enable monitoring and situational awareness. Signal intelligence is deployed to intercept communications across a range of digital channels. Blockchain technologies are increasingly leveraged to trace illicit financial transactions, while artificial intelligence facilitates predictive analytics, behavioral pattern recognition, the processing of large datasets and the rapid removal of terrorist propaganda. Collectively, these technologies constitute a multilayered counterterrorism architecture that demonstrates a profound reliance on emerging technologies. – Emerging Technologies and Counterterrorism at the UNSC
(Rueben Dass – The Jamestown Foundation) Lone-actor terrorists and small cells—including Islamic State (IS) affiliates and right-wing extremists—are increasingly attempting to use commercial drones for remote surveillance, weapons transport, and attacks. The threat is worsened by the easy procurement of drones, commercial 3D printers, and detailed online instructional manuals distributed by terrorist groups that lower the technical barriers to weaponization. Although commercial drones have limited payload capacities, their use can generate substantial psychological panic, necessitating comprehensive countermeasures such as tighter legislation, user tracing mechanisms, and intelligence-led operations. – Persistent Threat of Drone-Enabled Lone Actor Terrorism – Jamestown
Tunisia
(Dario Cristiani – The Jamestown Foundation) In January, Tunisian security forces conducted two counterterrorism operations in Kasserine governorate, disrupting localized networks—including an Islamic State (IS)-affiliated cell—that use the western mountains near Algeria as refuges. Jihadist networks in Tunisia remain fragmented and localized, reflecting a residual militancy and featuring small cells lacking the capacity for coordinated large-scale attacks or national-level destabilization. Tunisia’s deeply institutionalized security architecture maintains operational superiority through enhanced surveillance and preemptive sweeps. This strategy prevents militant expansion, ensuring critical infrastructure remains a theoretical vulnerability rather than an active battlefield. – Residual Threats from Tunisian Jihadists – Jamestown
Ukraine
(Brian Dooley and Suchita Uppal – Just Security) April 4th is the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, a reminder of the obligation to protect civilians from one of war’s most indiscriminate threats. But in Ukraine, there is no end in sight to the crisis caused by mines. Across the country, posters of Patron the Jack Russell Terrier warn adults and children of the danger of landmines. The dog, a bomb-sniffing specialist, has become an unlikely national icon in recent years, with nearly 375,000 followers on Instagram, and millions of views of his animated adventures. It is easy to see why Patron’s message is needed. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world. Over 20 percent of its territory is contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance — explosive weapons such as bombs, rockets, shells, or grenades that failed to detonate and remain highly dangerous. That’s an area of approximately 139,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of New York state. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 6,279 people were killed or injured by mines and explosive remnants of war in 2024; approximately 90 percent were civilians, and nearly half were children. Approximately 3.7 million people remain internally displaced, with the fear of explosives being a primary deterrent to return. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using mines. To make matters worse: the war in Ukraine and other threats of Russian aggression have further weakened legal efforts to ban the use of mines altogether. Sadly, therefore, this April 4th does not mark progress in the campaign to limit the harm done by mines to civilians around the globe. Quite the opposite. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Human Rights First, including one of the authors, has visited the frontline region of Kharkiv dozens of times. In March 2024, Human Rights First visited minefields in the region, speaking with civilians supporting mine clearance work, including demining specialists, and documented ongoing demining efforts. – Ukraine’s Long-Term Landmine Problem
US
(James M. Lindsay – Council on Foreign Relations) The midterms are now seven months away. The election basics remain the same as a month ago. Democrats look poised to retake control of the House of Representatives, while Republicans are favored to retain their majority in the Senate. The one big change since last month was the start of Operation Epic Fury. Could it scramble the conventional wisdom on what will happen in November? The answer to that question depends on how long the fighting lasts and how it ends. As things stand now, a majority of Americans opposes Operation Epic Fury. Should the war end in two to three weeks with gas prices quickly falling to pre-war levels, as President Donald Trump predicted in his address to the nation Wednesday night, then Operation Epic Fury will likely be quickly forgotten by most voters. They care far more about what happens at home than about what happens overseas. As George H.W. Bush discovered firsthand with the Gulf War, even a decisive U.S. victory would not alter that dynamic. – Will Operation Epic Fury Affect the Midterm Elections? | Council on Foreign Relations
US/Kenya
(Jacob Zenn – The Jamestown Foundation) In January, the United States and Kenya initiated a $71 million upgrade to the Manda Bay airfield to target al-Shabaab and regional terrorist groups. Kenya serves as a vital regional security anchor for the United States, providing stability and the potential to hedge against the expansion of Chinese military influence in Djibouti. Enhanced by joint legal training, this partnership has the potential to significantly shape East African counterterrorism efforts over the coming decade to prevent further regional destabilization. – United States Expands Counterterrorism Partnership with Kenya – Jamestown
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump delivered an important address to the nation this week about the status of the war with Iran. Now, a month into this phase of the conflict, I thought it would be useful to take stock of the United States’ progress toward achieving its initial military objectives, the state of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the potential economic consequences, particularly as it relates to the Strait of Hormuz. The damage to Iran’s military capabilities is unquestionable. When I sat down with senior Pentagon official Elbridge Colby at CFR last month, he told me that the president directed the U.S. military to “conduct a military campaign with a focus on degrading and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ability to project military power in the region, and potentially beyond.” That translated into targeting its navy, its missile and drone capabilities (including both its existing arsenal and its ability to produce these weapons), and its capacity to protect its nuclear program. – Taking Stock of the War in Iran | Council on Foreign Relations
(Roxanna Vigil – Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump’s war on Iran has triggered the largest oil supply disruption in history. Around twenty million barrels of oil normally flow through the Strait of Hormuz each day—about 20 percent of global oil supply—but this critical waterway is now effectively closed. As a result, Brent crude prices have soared from around $70 to over $120 per barrel. Additionally, Gulf producers have cut production by approximately ten million barrels of oil per day as they’ve run out of storage capacity, according to the International Energy Agency. By starting this war, the Trump administration has created a supply shock that has forced the United States to provide temporary sanctions relief to Iran, the country it is fighting against, as well as a belligerent Russia. Despite the administration’s attempt to downplay the benefits the two countries will receive, sanctions relief will likely result in increased revenue for Iran and could result in Russia receiving $3.3 to $5 billion in additional oil revenue in March. The White House’s frantic unwinding of U.S. sanctions on two adversaries to contain the fallout of its own war should prompt a hard reassessment of the costs of oil sector sanctions, which have failed to produce their intended objectives. Instead, the temporary sanctions relief comes with real costs that directly undermine U.S. national security interests. The administration’s stated objective was to drive down Iranian oil exports to zero through maximum pressure sanctions, and yet Iran found ways to sell its oil on the black market anyway. Now the United States has issued sanctions relief that might deliver Tehran a windfall to fund the very war machine it is fighting against. The Russia case is similarly paradoxical. The Trump administration claims to be pressuring Russia to reach a peace deal with Ukraine, but it has now handed Moscow a financial lifeline the Kremlin can use to prolong the war. – Trump Gambled by Easing Oil Sanctions on Iran and Russia. Will It Pay Off? | Council on Foreign Relations
(Thomas S. Warrick – Atlantic Council) The US president wants to force Iran to concede to his demands, and he has threatened additional strikes on Iranian infrastructure if no deal is reached. US attacks on Iran’s infrastructure would almost certainly succeed—but so would Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure, and Iran would remain unlikely to open up the Strait of Hormuz. In that scenario, Iran would likely seek to portray itself as the winner and Trump as the loser. The Trump administration needs a different strategy. – Attacking Iran’s energy and water infrastructure is not a winning strategy – Atlantic Council
