Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shocked Europe into the realization that war had returned to the continent, Europeans are now reeling from a second tremor: the United States may no longer be there to protect it. The reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president shows that his first term was not an aberration. Trump’s extortionate, retribution-focused style of foreign policy, disdain for the transatlantic alliance, and apparent inclination to normalize relations with Russia could permanently damage the credibility of NATO in its current form. Europeans are now faced with the challenge of replacing the U.S. role as security guarantor for Europe and main military backer of Ukraine. They are ill prepared. The significant investments and force posture adjustments of the past few years assumed that Washington would continue to provide strategic leadership and military backup. Even those who advocated for more European autonomy did not prepare for an abrupt rupture. Europeans must not only spend drastically more money; they must also agree on how to spend it strategically and cooperatively. Will the EU step into the breach to lead this effort? Judging from a much-anticipated “White Paper for European Defense” and “ReArm Europe” proposal, it does not look like it. With these proposals, the European Commission (EC) signaled its willingness to essentially get out of the way of member state defense efforts, pledging to reduce bureaucracy around European defense market integration and make it easier for capitals to spend more money. It reiterated a commitment to strengthening Ukraine through increased military assistance and further integrating the Ukrainian defense industry into European initiatives. But the EC is careful not to overreach. In this moment of crisis, it keeps member states “in the driver’s seat.” Now they must deliver.
Who’s Going to Unite Europe on Defense? | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
