After the federal elections of 2022 and 2025, a certain supposed truth is taking root in Australian political discourse—namely, that discussion of potential conflict involving China is politically disadvantageous, because it is likely to have an adverse impact in electorates with many Chinese Australian voters. Political scientists and psephologists will no doubt further study and test this hypothesis. At least 1.4 million residents in Australia identify as ‘Chinese Australian’ of whom 536,000 were born in mainland China (as at the 2021 Census). At a time when geopolitical tensions are rising, it should be assumed, even in the absence of research, that sensitivity will increase among Chinese Australians. Many will experience anxiety, uncertainty and even fear as a consequence of discussion of war. Many would be concerned about the risk of rising anti-Chinese racism, and some may even be concerned about the possibility of collective internment should war break out. How might we best conduct a rational policy discussion about rising geopolitical tensions and the prospects of conflict without adding unduly to these anxieties, uncertainties and fears?
Thinking about Chinese Australians: how to mention the war | The Strategist
