For the first time in more than a decade, the European Commisson’s 2025 enlargement package radiates a sense of momentum, even hope. Commissioner Marta Kos spoke of a ‘realistic possiiblity’ for successful enlargement in the next few years, while HR/VP Kaja Kallas described it as both a ‘political priority and a geopolitical investment’. Montenegro aims to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026, Albania by 2027, and Moldova and Ukraine by 2028, timelines that the Commission has openly endorsed. For the first time in years there is a sense that Brussels is excited about enlargement, while making it clear that momentum will not blur the distinctions among candidates or the rigour of the process. Regrettably, this enthusiasm is not shared by all Member States. The long-awaited pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews on the EU’s side, designed to assess how a larger Union would function and be financed, have been quietly deferred. Enlargement is back as a geopolitical necessity, yet it remains institutionally adrift, constrained by the absence of unanimous agreement among Member States to open accession talks with Ukraine, and by extension with Moldova, whose process remains tied to Kyiv’s. The EU must do its part to get ready. As candidates advance, so too must the EU: institutional adaptation, resource allocation and renewed public backing are the real tests ahead. Without such internal preparedness, enlargement risks stalling, and in cases like Ukraine, may never take off.
The 2025 enlargement package signals a shift from rhetoric to resolve – at least for some (Bojana Zorić – EUISS)
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