(Institute for the Study of War)
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia’s rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees.
The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 – a significant intensification of Russia’s three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space.
Russia’s ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels- a key constraining factor on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.
NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Hulyaipole, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2026 | ISW
