The following is an excerpt from prepared remarks submitted to the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.
In the wake of Israel’s blistering reprisal attacks against Hezbol lah, the group is facing a cash shortfall just when it needs more money. On top of that, Hezbollah has to contend with a new Lebanese government that is beginning to do its part to implement the November 2024 ceasefire, which ended over a year of near-daily Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli communities and Israeli reprisal strikes that severely degraded the group. Hezbollah lost key lead ers, fighters, weapons, stockpiles of cash and gold, communication systems, and infrastructure. As it seeks to recover, Hezbollah is certain to look to criminal enterprises—including laundering the proceeds of narcotics trafficking—to fill the gap, as it has in the past after less severe financial cri ses. Nor is the risk limited to terrorist financing alone. Many Hezbollah networks involved in narcotics trafficking have had operational ties as well. Coming on the heels of the beating Israel inflicted first on Hezbollah and then on its patron, Iran, U.S. authorities worry about the prospect of reprisal at tacks by Iran, Hezbollah, and their allies. For these reasons, today’s hearing focused on Hezbollah’s Latin American drug trafficking opera tions is extremely timely. Hezbollah has a long history of engaging in fundraising, logistics, and op erational activity in Latin America, and over time it has developed a niche role in narcotics traffick ing—in particular laundering the proceeds of narcotics trafficking. All too often, these activities overlap with one another in dangerous ways. More often than not, Hezbollah’s illicit financial activi ties tend to take place in one or more of Latin America’s free trade zones (FTZs).
Global Gangsters: Hezbollah’s Latin American Drug Trafficking Operations | The Washington Institute
