From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: European Union-Mercosur; Gulf States; Iran-Russia-Syria; Middle East; Myanmar; Uganda; US-Venezuela
European Union – Mercosur
(Atlantic Council) Is free trade making a comeback? European Union (EU) member states voted on Friday to approve a trade deal with South America’s Mercosur trade bloc, which will create one of the world’s largest free trade areas when the two sides formally sign the agreement in the coming days. The deal—which has been under negotiation since 1999—passed over objections from several member states, including France, that raised concerns over how lowering trade barriers with Mercosur nations will affect domestic agriculture. What impact will this deal have on European competitiveness and South American export markets? And what details remain to be ironed out as the deal moves onto the European Parliament for final approval? – The EU and Mercosur are creating one of the world’s largest free trade areas. What’s next? – Atlantic Council
Gulf States
(Bader Mousa Al-Saif – Chatham House) The recent dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Yemen is a stark reminder that the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) each have their own foreign policy approaches and interests, despite often being lumped together. Saudi Arabia and the UAE tend to be more assertive, Bahrain and Kuwait less so, with Qatar and Oman in between. Since the Arab Uprisings, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha in particular have attempted to claim a more central role in shaping the regional order. The returns have been mixed. There have been some successes: the slow but steady return of Lebanon and Syria to the Arab fold, normalization with Iran and Turkey, and the recognition of Palestinian statehood by several key western countries following an international push in which Riyadh in particular played a key role. – Amid Yemen tensions, how can the Gulf states avoid another rift? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Iran – Russia – Syria
(Noam Raydan – The Washinton Institute) This month, shipping data showed a U.S.-sanctioned oil tanker arriving in Syria with a load of Russian crude oil—hardly a surprise given that sanctioned vessels involved in trading oil for Moscow called on Syria numerous times last year. Notably, however, when the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the latest tanker—the Aether (IMO identification number 9328170)—last summer, it cited the vessel’s connection to a “high-profile” Iranian shipping network. The details of the case highlight the risks of long-term Russian involvement in Syria’s beleaguered oil sector, which Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other bad actors could readily exploit without closer U.S. government monitoring. – Iran-Linked Tanker Delivers Russian Crude to Syria: Assessing the Risks | The Washington Institute
Middle East
(The Soufan Center) The Middle East region could transition in 2026 to peace and stability or, perhaps more likely, backslide into regional conflagration. Conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, as well as political divisions in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, are unlikely to fully resolve in 2026 and will require consistent attention from U.S., regional, and global diplomats. The Trump team will struggle in 2026 to “pivot” from the Middle East to other regions, in part because the U.S. has become the broker, mediator, and guarantor of ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza, and security cooperation between Israel and Syria. The potential threat of additional military action by Israel and the U.S. against Iran will loom in 2026, but Iran might emerge as a bright spot for regional stability if expanding protests there unexpectedly oust the regime. – Middle East Forecast for 2026 – The Soufan Center
Myanmar
(Rudabeh Shahid – Atlantic Council) On January 11, Myanmar will conduct the second phase of its general election, which began in December and will continue in a third phase later this month. When completed, it will have been the first such election in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup there. But what the ruling junta touts as a return to democratic governance is, in reality, a carefully managed exercise in self‑preservation by the generals who seized power almost five years ago. The elections, staged amid civil war and repression, will neither restore genuine democracy in Myanmar nor stabilize its fractured society. Instead, the electoral charade threatens renewed regional instability with implications for Bangladesh, India, and South Asia as a whole. – Neither free nor fair: What Myanmar’s ‘sham’ elections mean for the country and its neighbors – Atlantic Council
Uganda
(Fergus Kell – Chatham House) Ugandans will go to the polls on 15 January. Two weeks after election day will mark the 40th anniversary since incumbent president Yoweri Museveni first took power in 1986. The 81-year-old Museveni is widely expected to celebrate this milestone from inside State House as president again. Bidding for a seventh consecutive term in office, his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) is campaigning under the slogan ‘protecting the gains’. This defensive posturing captures not only the NRM’s familiar appeals to stability and legacy, which have helped to consolidate its primary support base in rural areas, but also its ability to use state machinery to protect its own authority by suppressing alternative centres of power. As with the 2021 elections, supporters of Museveni’s leading challenger Robert Kyagulanyi (a musician-turned-politician widely known as Bobi Wine) have reported abductions, arbitrary detention and violence at the hands of security forces. Another opposition figurehead, Kizza Besigye, remains detained in a Ugandan prison on treason charges after his abduction in Nairobi in 2024. Ahead of an expected new term for Museveni that could include major economic milestones, this election campaign has so far generated little fresh clarity on how the NRM will manage his succession, amid longstanding speculation over the positioning of his eldest son. Neither has it offered much for Uganda’s discontented young urban population, who have seen seismic demonstrations elsewhere in East Africa in recent years. – Uganda election: Museveni’s expected win will deepen succession and Gen-Z challenges | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Venezuela
(Ryan C. Berg, Mark F. Cancian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jennifer Jun, Henry Ziemer, and Chris H. Park – CSIS) In the early morning hours of January 3, 2026, more than 200 U.S. special operations forces (SOF) surged through Caracas to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in Operation Absolute Resolve. Extensive intelligence collection—overhead and on the ground—built a “pattern of life” on Maduro and provided the foundation for a successful mission: Maduro and his wife were captured, and no U.S. personnel were killed. It was an extraordinary military and intelligence achievement. Using satellite imagery, combined with details that have emerged since the operation, CSIS was able to estimate the military activity and battle damage at four sites: the Fort Tiuna Military Complex, La Carlota Air Base, La Guaira Port, and El Higuerote Airport. The picture that emerges from these images is that of a military operation in furtherance of a law enforcement mission—an operation laser-focused on the capture of Maduro with minimal collateral damage. This was not a “shock and awe” campaign intended to bring the entire Venezuelan security apparatus to heel with overwhelming force, although that too would be within U.S. capabilities given the force posture in the southern Caribbean. It was thus unlike the U.S. air attacks against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, where the objective was to shut the country down via a broad set of attacks on electrical, communications, and transportation infrastructure, thus forcing capitulation. No such targets were struck here. In addition to these four sites, open-source reporting has confirmed that, at a minimum, additional strikes were carried out against communications infrastructure in El Volcán as well as air defenses in Catia La Mar and Fort Guaicaipuro. – Imagery from Venezuela Shows a Surgical Strike, Not Shock and Awe
