From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Armenia
(Onnik James Krikorian – The Jamestown Foundation) Last month, Armenia arrested several individuals accused of recruiting others to stage a coup in the country. The group has a history of recruiting Armenian citizens as foreign fighters in Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Armenian government faces a potential vulnerability from militant groups as progress occurs in the normalization process with Azerbaijan following the 2020 44-day war and recent conflict in Karabakh, fueling discontent among many Armenians. Armenia continues to contend with the problems arising from almost 20,000 unregistered weapons, informal militia units, and radicalized individuals abroad who oppose the government’s position and could take direct action against any or all perceived enemies. – Militant Groups Resurface in Armenia’s Struggle Against Radicalization – Jamestown
Asia
(Intifar Chowdhury – East Asia Forum) East Asia’s youth are increasingly disappointed with traditional politics, leading to diverse patterns of political disengagement across the region. In Japan, young people are turning away from politics altogether. In Taiwan, they are embracing populist and technocratic alternatives. In South Korea, sharp ideological divides are emerging between young men and women. Economic challenges, social inequalities and a lack of representation fuel this discontent, threatening social cohesion and the stability of East Asia’s democracies. As these trends deepen, they signal a shift in the political landscape, with young people charting new, unpredictable paths for the region’s future. – Why young people in Asia are disengaging from democracy | East Asia Forum | East Asia Forum
Canada
(Daniel Araya, Shirley Anne Scharf – Centre for International Governance Innovation) Amid the continuing debate about Canada’s lacklustre record on productivity and innovation, one issue that stands out is the lack of vision on infrastructure. Aging industrial infrastructure and the absence of needed investment in new technologies, such as telecommunications, high-speed rail, clean technologies and industrial automation, have significantly undermined the country’s competitiveness. If Canadian policy is to be realistic about broaching advanced manufacturing — including electric vehicles (EVs) — our country will need a strategic vision that moves us up the global value chain. – Canada Needs a New Vision for Infrastructure – Centre for International Governance Innovation (cigionline.org)
China
(Angela Huyue Zhang – ASPI The Strategist) When it comes to economic slowdowns, things often get worse before they get better. This is being borne out in China, following the government’s introduction in late September of its biggest stimulus package since the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s announcement took many by surprise, but abrupt policy shifts are nothing new for China. The regulatory crackdown on the internet sector in 2021, the end of the zero-COVID policy in 2022, and the changes to fertility rules since 2014 were similarly sharp reversals. – Governance reform is key to reviving China’s economy | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
(Jake Rinaldi – The Jamestown Foundation) The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations. The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations. Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions. – Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines – Jamestown
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) Xi Jinping’s address on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) highlighted risks and challenges ahead and included a lengthy segment on unification with Taiwan. The speech was accompanied by relatively muted celebrations on October 1, which passed with minimal fanfare. Continuities in the PRC’s pitch to the wider world are evident when comparing Xi’s address to that of his predecessor Jiang Zemin on the PRC’s 50th anniversary, especially regarding the PRC’s leadership of the Global South and its position as an opponent of the Western-led international order. Many voices from inside and outside the PRC have made critical and troubling assessments of the country’s current condition. One blog by a prominent PRC-based writer published an article to coincide with the National Day holiday that analogized the current moment to the collapse of the Ming dynasty, echoing critiques that are apparently widespread among other PRC citizens and external observers. – PRC at 75: Xi Makes Dour Address While Critics Articulate Bleak Outlook – Jamestown
Japan
(East Asia Forum) After four unsuccessful attempts, Shigeru Ishiba was sworn in as Prime Minister of Japan on 1 October. He has called a snap election for 27 October which the LDP is almost certain to win. But Ishiba’s long-term survival will depend more than usual on his public standing as he straddles a divided party. That will be determined by how he handles reforms to deal with the slush fund scandal that brought down his predecessor, Fumio Kishida, and his commitment to economic policy with clear goals towards wealth redistribution and wage growth. – Ishiba takes the prize but faces big obstacles in steering Japan’s political future | East Asia Forum | East Asia Forum
Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Gulf
(Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO – Chatham House) Some people may have thought the Gaza war was all about Palestine. The dramatic events of the last two weeks suggest it was always really about Iran. For two decades there has been a new Middle East struggling to emerge, with Gulf States in the driving seat. They want a stable and prosperous if authoritarian political order that encompasses old Arab nation states such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, their own tribally-based modern welfare states – and both Iran and Israel. They see this as the essential condition for economic transformation and stability. But this order does not yet exist and cannot be born out of conflict. Both the Gulf States and Israel see Iran as the major obstacle. That reality must shape any new regional peace effort. – Lasting Israel–Palestine peace will not be possible without a new policy to neutralize the Iranian threat | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(IISS) One year into the conflict, IISS experts assess the impact of the war on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and its regional and international reverberations. – The Israel–Hamas war one year on (iiss.org)
(Mohammad Alzghool – Emirates Policy Center) Over the past three decades, Iran’s landscape has been shaped by two competing approaches: the “revolution mind” and the “state mind.” The “revolution mind,” represented by Iran’s deep state, has often emerged victorious in this ongoing competition. However, there have been moments when the “state mind” has temporarily prevailed. The “state mind,” operates within the framework of Iran’s political structure, perceives regional expansion and militia networks as key components of Iran’s deterrence theory, providing strategic depth, and serving as critical tools in the pursuit of its regional hegemony project. Successive Iranian governments, following the “state mind” approach, position militias outside the core of strategic deterrence, treating them instead as regional instruments to pressure adversaries – useful leverage that can be exchanged for tangible benefits, including strategic interests. The internal struggle within Iran’s deep state has led to reluctance to support militias within the “axis of resistance,” including Hezbollah, especially in light of an escalating all-out Israeli war against the Lebanese group. While this reluctance might grow in the future, it does not necessarily indicate the dominance of the “state mind” over the “revolution mind.” – Emirates Policy Center | Struggle Between ‘Revolution Mind’ and ‘State Mind’ in Iran: Will it Reshape Regional Geopolitics? (epc.ae)
(Michel Wyss – Combating Terrorism Center) Hours after the Hamas attack of October 7 began, they were widely attributed to an apparent Israeli intelligence failure, with pundits pointing to several possible sources, including a misunderstanding of Hamas’ intentions, cognitive biases, and an overreliance on the country’s technological superiority. To date, however, there have been few systematic analyses that examine in detail the various causes of the apparent inability of Israel’s intelligence services to provide warning before the attack. This article reviews the relevant data that has since become publicly available. Building on previous literature on surprise attacks and intelligence failures, it examines both Israel’s political level and intelligence level prior to October 7, 2023. Drawing some preliminary conclusions, its findings suggest that the attack was likely not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the accumulation of several problems at both levels. – The October 7 Attack: An Assessment of the Intelligence Failings – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
(Nimrod Goren – Middle East Institute) One year has passed since the deadliest day in Israel’s history – the Hamas terror attack of October 7, 2023 – and the trauma lives on. “We are still living on October 7”, goes the common Israeli saying. But beyond the cliché, this is a genuine reflection of how people feel. Thousands are still grieving for families and friends who were killed. Tens of thousands are still evacuated from their homes near Israel’s southern and northern borders. Many are worried about their loved ones doing military service – including reservists, separated from their families for months. Society at large is yearning for the return of the 101 hostages still held by Hamas, as concern about their fate rises by the day. A large part of the population finds itself facing the threat of missile fire. And the list goes on, impacting countless elements of daily life throughout the country. – One year on, Israeli society still grapples with Oct. 7 | Middle East Institute (mei.edu)
(Paul Salem, Nimrod Goren, Khaled Elgindy, Brian Katulis, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) While Israel is winning on the battlefield, it does not have a sustainable vision for any of the days — or months or years — after in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, or the region; for the Palestinians, the last year has been an unmitigated disaster, causing devastation and displacement comparable with that of the Nakba of 1948. In the past three weeks, Israel has dealt a near-knock-out blow to Hezbollah; for the immediate future, Tehran’s primary strategic asset cannot deter Israeli or American attacks on Iran, leaving the Islamic Republic vulnerable. – Special Briefing: A year of after-shocks since Oct. 7 | Middle East Institute (mei.edu)
(Michael Knights – The Washington Institute) The Iran-backed Houthi movement has delivered a strong military performance in the year of anti-Israel and anti-shipping warfare since October 2023. They seem to be aiming to be the ‘first in, last out,’ meaning the first to cross key thresholds during the war (for instance, attack Israel’s major cities) and the last to stop fighting (refusing to be deterred by Israeli or Anglo-American strikes inside Yemen). Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation. – A Draw Is a Win: The Houthis After One Year of War | The Washington Institute
(Matthew Levitt – The Washington Institute) As early as the 1980s, the U.S. intelligence community documented the ways in which Iran deployed chemical weapons for tactical delivery on the battlefield. Nearly 40 years later, U.S. officials formally assessed that Iran was in non-compliance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations, pointing specifically to Tehran’s development of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) that attack a person’s central nervous system as part of a chemical weapons program. Over time, concern about this program has increased, with reports to the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), statements by multilateral groups such as the G7, and a variety of U.S. government reports and sanctions. Today, with Iran’s proxies wreaking havoc throughout the region, officials worry Tehran may have already provided weaponized PBAs to several of its partners and proxies. Such a capability, tactically deployed on the battlefield, could enable further October 7-style cross-border raids or kidnapping operations. With the region on edge following the targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, followed by an Israeli ground campaign targeting Hezbollah infrastructure along the border, and the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel, concern about the use of such tactical chemical weapons is high. – Tehran’s Tactical Knockout: Weaponized Pharmaceutical-Based Agents | The Washington Institute
(The Washington Institute) On October 2, The Washington Institute held a virtual Policy Forum with Dennis Ross, Dana Stroul, and David Schenker. Ross, the Institute’s William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, served in senior Middle East posts with four presidential administrations. Stroul is the director of research and Kassen Senior Fellow at the Institute and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East in the Biden administration. Schenker is the Institute’s Taube Senior Fellow, director of its Rubin Program on Arab Politics, and former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the Trump administration. – U.S. Policy in the Post-October 7 Middle East: Looking Back, Looking Forward | The Washington Institute
Russia – Middle East
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) The first anniversary of the war in Gaza has revealed the near-total disappearance of Russia’s influence in the Middle East, as it has not been able to partner with those averse to US positions. Moscow hopes to exploit the shift in international attention toward the Middle East and away from the war in Ukraine to expose the United States’ inability to manage the escalation of multiple violent crises. Russia invests substantial effort in presenting itself to the Global South as a champion against a Western-dominated world order, but its support for violent disruptors in the Middle East reveals the deficiencies of this posturing. – Russia’s Eroding Influence in the Middle East – Jamestown
Russian War on Ulraine
(Vladimir Socor – The Jamestown Foundation) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented a “victory plan” to the Joe Biden administration and two US presidential candidates. The plan envisages arming Ukraine adequately for negotiating “peace through strength” with Moscow as well as strengthening economic sanctions on Russia.
The military situation, damaged energy systems at the onset of winter, and seeming fatigue on the part of some Western partners are causing Kyiv to accept negotiating with Russia. Kyiv has apparently dropped its earlier conditions, namely the withdrawal or eviction of Russian forces from Ukrainian territories, Russian reparations for war damages, and prosecution of war crimes. Zelenskyy envisages a three-month timetable for the delivery of Western military aid that would turn the tide of war in Ukraine’s favor and commence negotiations with Russia in the framework of a world peace summit. – Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan Attempts to Redefine Victory and Defeat – Jamestown
Subsea Communications Cables
(Jocelinn Kang – ASPI The Strategist) Most people never think of undersea communications cables. Well, the people of Tasmania were thinking of them in 2022, when the state’s two main subsea cables were both severed within hours of each other. The disruption caused widespread outages, affecting flight schedules, cash machines and payment systems, even forcing some businesses to close. – Subsea communications cables: vital but vulnerable | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
Transatlantic Relationship
(Atlantic Council) This year marks a critical moment for the transatlantic relationship. Elections on both sides of the Atlantic will usher in new governments, administrations, and commissions for some 785 million people across the United States and European Union (EU). Transition and turnover for a new US administration and European Commission specifically offer a chance to reflect on what’s working in US-EU relations and to adapt what’s not. – Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond – Atlantic Council
United Kingdom – NATO
(Malcolm Chalmers – RUSI) If the UK is serious about prioritising NATO in the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, it should consider five interlinked shifts in the balance of its military effort. – What Does ‘NATO First’ Mean for UK Defence? | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)
