Complex research (by Marco Emanuele):
Disumanità / Inhumanity | The Global Eye
From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Armenia-Azerbaijan; Australia-Japan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Gaza and beyond; Gulf States; Iran; Israel-United Arab Emirates; Landlocked Developing Countries; Lebanon-Hezbollah-US; MENA Energy Markets; Nuclear Non Proliferation (US-Iran); Russia-Baltic Sea; Syria; Tunisia-US; US-China; US Dollar
Armenia – Azerbaijan
(Mehriban Rahimli – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev are due to meet in the White House in Washington on Friday, reportedly to sign a memorandum of understanding toward concluding a peace agreement. However, President Donald Trump’s wish to be seen as helping bring about what he recently called a diplomatic “miracle” between the two countries with US mediation could be harder to realize than some seem to expect. – Is an Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Agreement Really Close? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Australia – Japan
(Sam Roggeveen – Lowy The Interpreter) Australia’s selection of the Japanese Mogami design for the next generation of general-purpose naval frigates is a welcome fillip for an ageing Royal Australian Navy surface fleet. The Albanese government deserves credit for edging away from the repeated insistence across successive years that major warships be built in Australia. The first three Mogamis will be built in Japan. It seems Australia is also prepared to accept a more generic design without too many expensive add-ons, although the Australian Mogami design will still have some bespoke elements that create more risks for the project. The sale is being rightly marked as a breakthrough for Japan’s defence industry. This is a big and prominent deal for a Japanese military-industrial complex which, while highly advanced, has never had export success on this scale. – Why Japan’s Mogami frigates can’t protect Australia’s trade | Lowy Institute
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(UN News) Hopes for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been shaken by a surge in brutal attacks on civilians by armed groups, including the Rwandan-backed M23 militia, in the country’s troubled eastern region. The UN human rights office (OHCHR) said it had received first-hand accounts indicating that at least 319 civilians were killed by M23 fighters, aided by members of the Rwanda Defence Force, between 9 and 21 July in North Kivu province. Most of the victims, including at least 48 women and 19 children, were local farmers camping in their fields during the planting season. – Ceasefire in doubt as Rwanda-backed rebels kill hundreds in eastern DR Congo | UN News
Gaza and beyond
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) The unresolved crises unfolding on the Israeli-Palestinian front — a growing humanitarian disaster inside of the Gaza Strip, the horrific images of emaciated Israelis held hostage by terrorists in the coastal strip, and ongoing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank fueled by religious extremists of all stripes — represent one of the biggest strategic challenges to stability facing the Middle East. With Israel now openly contemplating a full occupation of Gaza, this set of issues serves as an obstacle to broader regional peace and normalization efforts. The usual blame game and finger pointing that occur at dark moments like this are already in full effect, especially in America and Israel, which both suffer from a political-and-media-industrial complex that fuels division and discord rather than facilitates pragmatic solutions centered on building broader coalitions. – The current Israeli-Palestinian nightmare is a result of multiple failures of leadership | Middle East Institute
(UN News) UN data published on Wednesday underscores the tiny amount of cultivable land that remains in the Gaza Strip, contributing to the famine-like conditions now being endured by more than two million people there. A new report from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Satellite Centre (UNOSAT) reveals that just 8.6 percent of cropland in Gaza is still accessible, while only 1.5 per cent of cropland is both accessible and undamaged, as of 28 July. More than 86 per cent of cropland is damaged, while 12.4 per cent is undamaged but out of reach, as fighting between Israeli forces and militants from Hamas and other armed groups continues. – Just 1.5 per cent of Gaza’s agricultural land remains accessible and undamaged | UN News
(UN News) Aid agencies warned on Wednesday that most partner organizations providing vital relief across Gaza will likely have to shut down their operations within weeks, unless Israel withdraws its demand that they provide sensitive information about Palestinian employees. – Gaza: Alarm over Israeli move to deregister NGOs | UN News
Gulf States
(F. Gregory Gause, III – Middle East Institute) The monarchical Arab Gulf states emerged on the other side of last June’s Israeli and US attacks on Iran largely unscathed, with the important exception of a limited, retaliatory Iranian missile strike on the American airbase in Qatar. However, in a larger sense, this short war, part of the broader regional conflict that began with the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, reinforced the precariousness of the Gulf monarchies’ security situation. Despite their efforts over recent years to normalize relations with Iran, this did not prevent Tehran from threatening to hit back against US forces stationed on their territory — a threat actually carried out against Qatar. Their close relations with the United States, displayed during President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in May 2025, proved to be of little use in their efforts to urge restraint on Washington during the conflict. When Trump praised Iran for being “very nice” in its limited strike on Qatar, rather than responding to an attack on an ally that hosts the largest American military base in the region, Gulf leaders may well have harked back to the US president’s first term, when, in September 2019, Iran struck Saudi oil facilities but the United States likewise took no retaliatory action. In June 2025, the Gulf monarchies had little influence with any of the combatants — Israel, Iran, or the United States — but were on the conflict’s front lines. When the missiles started to fly, they proved themselves to be non-player characters, not actors. Despite spending huge amounts of money on their militaries, the Gulf monarchies are not effective actors in war. However, with the guns largely silenced in the Gulf (though not elsewhere in the Middle East), Saudi Arabia and its monarchical neighbors can once again exploit their financial and diplomatic resources to be active regional players rather than bystanders. The United States can usefully partner with them in efforts to stabilize Syria, engage Iran in a new diplomatic push to limit its nuclear ambitions, and alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. However, productive cooperation with the Gulf monarchies on these important initiatives requires that Washington understand how the Gulf leaders assess the changed power realities in the region in the wake of these recent conflicts. Gulf views of Israel, the Palestinian issue, Syria, and Iran are much changed from President Trump’s first term and even from the eve of the Hamas attack on Israel. – The Gulf states in a fluid post-war Middle East | Middle East Institute
Iran
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first year in office was defined by Iran’s familiar political structural constraints, external crises, and a moderate-reformist base forever frustrated with his cautious pragmatism and unfulfilled promises. His July 2024 election was undeniably a setback for hardliners, halting their full consolidation of power at a time when they already dominated the parliament and virtually every other key state institution. Yet it was Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who ultimately cleared the path for Pezeshkian’s presidency, helping him to emerge as a regime-insider candidate of “change,” serving as a carefully calibrated safety valve for simmering public anger. One year later, the assessment is sobering: While Pezeshkian has in some ways perhaps helped in slowing the hardline march, he has not made any fundamental difference in how the Islamic Republic is run. Every decision requires second-guessing Khamenei’s next move; and even as a president with limited powers boxed in by the system, he is constantly under the sword of Damocles. During the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, his hardline critics accused him of wanting to mount a “coup from within” and of showing disloyalty to Khamenei. Even small moves, such as giving an interview to US political commentator Tucker Carlson, have triggered calls for his impeachment or even assassination. – One year of Pezeshkian: The scapegoat-in-waiting | Middle East Institute
Israel – United Arab Emirates
(Elizabeth Dent – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Since Israel and the United Arab Emirates normalized relations by signing the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords on September 15, 2020, the two countries have rapidly expanded their economic cooperation and trade, even amid the war in Gaza. Both countries have also committed to working together to “advance security and stability” in the region with the goal of allowing their respective states to prosper. Now, a reported deal in which the UAE’s Edge Group would procure the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from the Israeli company Elbit Systems—including transfer of technology and localized production—would be the first major defense-industrial partnership between the two countries. If finalized, it would mark a significant step in deepening strategic alignment, defense cooperation, and regional deterrence, potentially shifting the geopolitical balance in the Gulf. For Washington, this potential deal can serve as a proof of concept for a U.S.-aligned—not U.S.-dependent—security model. More specifically, multilateral air-defense coalitions have become key to the post–October 7 Middle East defense landscape, with countries sharing radar, intelligence, and early warning systems. The challenge for U.S. officials will be encouraging Israel and the UAE to ensure their bilateral agreements can be scaled out to include additional partners when appropriate, while simultaneously ensuring that increased Israel-UAE security cooperation and technology sharing adhere to international export-control regimes. The United States can thus leverage Gulf interest in Israel’s unmatched missile defense capabilities as it encourages Israel to transition away from military campaigns and toward diplomacy—and affirms its support for building regional defense capacity. – Israel-UAE Defense Cooperation Grows Under the Abraham Accords | The Washington Institute
Landlocked Developing Countries
(UN News) Trapped by geography and squeezed by global market forces, the world’s 32 landlocked developing countries remain among the poorest – and most overlooked. At a major UN conference underway this week in Awaza, Turkmenistan, calls are growing to tackle the high trade costs, investment gaps and growing digital divide that continue to hold these countries back. Despite progress in some areas, landlocked nations – from Bolivia to Bhutan and Burkina Faso – account for just 1.2 per cent of global exports, even though they represent over seven per cent of the world’s countries. Their populations face some of the highest levels of poverty, food insecurity and economic vulnerability anywhere. “These countries are invisible to much of the world,” not able to draw the attention needed to their unique challenges, said Rebeca Grynspan Secretary-General of the UN trade and development body, UNCTAD, speaking to UN News on the margins of the third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3). Without international attention and coordinated action, they will remain stuck in structural limbo, she emphasised. – Landlocked nations ‘invisible to much of the world’: UN trade and development chief | UN News
Lebanon – Hezbollah – US
(Soufan Center) Trump officials have given Lebanon’s government an ultimatum to take control of Lebanese Hezbollah’s arsenal of heavy weapons or forgo U.S. efforts to compel Israel to withdraw from its positions in southern Lebanon. U.S. officials expect Lebanon’s cabinet, at a meeting this week, to issue an Executive Order on Hezbollah disarmament that satisfies core U.S. demands without triggering conflict with Hezbollah’s supporters and Lebanese Shia Muslims more broadly. Hezbollah argues the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) does not have the means to secure itself from Israel if the group’s militia dissolves, a public position that masks the group’s intent to remain a key political and military force within the country. The U.S.-Lebanon plan relies on providing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with substantial funding to rearm, reform, and expand its ranks. – Lebanon Comes Under Pressure to Disarm Hezbollah – The Soufan Center
MENA Energy Markets
(Middle East Institute) “The first half of 2025 has been a whirlwind for global energy markets,” says MEI Senior Fellow Colby Connelly. The 12-day war between Israel and Iran this past June briefly sent oil prices into the $80 per barrel range, while growing uncertainty around trade policy under President Trump has greatly complicated Middle Eastern actors’ investment decisions. Connelly breaks down these developments and outlines what to watch in the months ahead. – How have recent events affected MENA energy markets? | Middle East Institute
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (US – Iran)
(Soufan Center) The June U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites mark a turning point in global nuclear proliferation, potentially undermining the credibility of existing non-proliferation frameworks. Operation Midnight Hammer has likely altered Iran’s strategic calculus, incentivizing a shift from latent nuclear capability toward completed weaponization as a means of ensuring regime survival and reestablishing deterrence. By unilaterally employing force against a sovereign state’s nuclear infrastructure, the U.S. risks undermining confidence in its security guarantees, prompting renewed interest in autonomous or regionally coordinated nuclear deterrents amongst partners. Operation Midnight Hammer risks establishing a precedent wherein nuclear-armed powers may justify preventive military strikes against existing and aspiring nuclear powers. – Unraveling the Regime? How the 12-Day War Could Impact Nuclear Non-Proliferation – The Soufan Center
Russia – Baltic Sea
(Larissa Doroshenko, Sophie Arts, Jana Ondraskova – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Following an uptick in incidents damaging and threatening Northern European countries’ undersea infrastructure—nine disruptions within a year—the EU, NATO, and their member states have made important operational and policy adjustments to protect their assets and the Baltic and North Sea environment against damage from commercial vessels. This has included launching NATO “Baltic Sentry” and the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force’s (JEF) Nordic Warden in January 2025 and introducing the EU joint communique outlining steps to prevent, detect, respond to and deter threats against undersea infrastructure in February 2025. These measures have sought to address threats from Russia’s shadow fleet of mostly old, uninsured oil tankers and other commercial vessels with obscure ownership structures that violate international law and seek to evade sanctions against Russia. – Russian Sabre-Rattling in the Baltic Sea | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Syria
(Erik Yavorsky – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Recent clashes in Syria’s Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda, which left more than 800 dead and 900 injured, mark a significant flashpoint in Syria’s governmental transition and its relations with minority communities. On July 11, armed Bedouin robbed a Druze vegetable seller along the Damascus-Suwayda highway, taking him prisoner, and other Druze then abducted a Sunni man in retaliation, setting off a spate of tit-for-tat kidnappings that soon escalated into fierce clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin groups. What began as a local incident soon drew in government forces and tribal factions and led to Israeli airstrikes, dramatically expanding the conflict’s scope and reinforcing Druze fears about escalation and the threat of violence by government forces and their allies. It also confirmed Druze fears that Damascus will not protect them in the event of a clash, and cemented a division in the Druze leadership’s approach to Damascus. – Implications of the Recent Violence in Suwayda | The Washington Institute
(UN News) Hostilities have continued in Sweida, Syria, despite a ceasefire agreement, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in an update published on Wednesday. The 19 July truce followed weeks of sectarian clashes, Israeli airstrikes and grave human rights violations in the southern governorate, also known as As-Sweida. As a result, more than 190,000 people have been displaced there and in neighbouring Dar’a and Rural Damascus governorates. The fighting also caused severe damage to infrastructure and to livelihoods. Electricity networks, water production assets including wells, and key public facilities were impacted. – Syria: Ceasefire under strain as violence and aid access issues persist in Sweida | UN News
Tunisia – US
(Sabina Henneberg – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) From the beginning of this month, the US started imposing a 25 percent tariff on all goods imported from Tunisia. In a formal letter sent on July 7, Washington cited the North African state’s “long-term and very persistent” trade surplus with the US as the reason for the levy. While Tunisia is not a major trading partner of the US, this decision highlights a broader shift in American trade policy, one that prioritises short-term bilateral balances over long-standing economic and security relationships. For smaller economies like Tunisia, the implications are significant. – In Tunisia, U.S. Tariffs Will Be Felt Across Many Fronts | The Washington Institute
US – China
(German Marshall Fund of the United States) A conversation between Dr. Scott Kennedy and Bonnie Glaser discussing the future of US-China trade talks. – After Stockholm: What’s Next for US-China Trade Talks? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US Dollar
(Stephen Grenville – Lowy The Interpreter) The US dollar’s role as pre-eminent global currency is under pressure. Enthusiasts of BRICS (the grouping of economies that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) hope to displace it. The Mar-a-Lago thought-bubble hoped to diminish the dollar’s international role. Russia and Iran have made alternative payments arrangements to bypass American sanctions. China has plans to internationalise the renminbi. Now some are arguing that digital currencies – Bitcoin, stablecoins or one issued by central banks – will erode the dollar’s role. Banks have traditionally dominated the international payments system, making a tidy profit by skimming off a tiny fraction of every transaction as it passes through their hands. Non-banks have worked themselves into the payments system by offering extra services, providing credit or convenience. Amex, Visa, Mastercard, Apple Pay, Wise, Afterpay, Alipay and WeChat have all found a niche. – Battle of the currencies: The dollar versus digital | Lowy Institute
