From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Greenland-Europe-US; US; US-Venezuela; US-Venezuela-China; US-Venezuela-Russia
Greenland-Europe-US
(Justina Budginaite-Froehly-Atlantic Council) In responding to recent rhetoric from the White House about “taking” Greenland, European leaders need to look beyond the legal infeasibility. The White House is correct that Greenland and the waters around it are a strategic asset—one that Europe has failed to recognize in recent years. If Europe wants to ensure that no outside power can exercise control over Greenland, then it must expand its military presence in the region. – Greenland is Europe’s strategic blind spot—and its responsibility – Atlantic Council
US
(Alexander B. Gray-Atlantic Council) The recent US capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro is consistent with the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy. While the new strategy is primarily about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, it is also committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. The White House should next expand its concept of “hemispheric defense” and increase its military presence, further reducing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the hemisphere. – The Trump Corollary is officially in effect – Atlantic Council
US-Venezuela
(Crisis Group) In this special episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard speaks with Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson about the U.S. military operation in Venezuela that led to the capture of President Nicolás Maduro, President Trump’s stated plans for the country, and what may come next. – Special Episode: What Next for Venezuela? | International Crisis Group
(The Soufan Center) The U.S. operation that resulted in the arrest and removal of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife was a tactically sophisticated and operationally disciplined mission, but many questions remain about the strategic impact. Oil and natural resources are clearly central, but they are not sufficient on their own to explain the scope, tone, and ambition of U.S. involvement. For many in the U.S. foreign and security policy community, the parallels with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 are difficult to ignore. Venezuela’s size, institutional decay, regional linkages, and ideological symbolism make it likely that this intervention marks the opening phase of a broader and less predictable contest in the Western Hemisphere. – Venezuela After the Maduro Capture: Tactical Success, Strategic Risk – The Soufan Center
(Jon B. Alterman-CSIS) “Weak nations,” the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in 1990, “will hope that strong nations will be law-abiding.” Moynihan was no apologist for weak nations. An avowed Cold Warrior whose political career was grounded in his loud and unsuccessful opposition to a 1975 UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism, he entitled his memoir of his time as UN ambassador A Dangerous Place. Even so, Moynihan would have been deeply alarmed at U.S. actions in Venezuela last weekend. His alarm would not have come from any sympathy for Maduro or his ruling clique, nor any embarrassment at a display of U.S. power. In fact, he would have taken pride that the weekend’s events in Venezuela once again made clear that the United States has capabilities—military, intelligence, and otherwise—that other countries can only dream about. Instead, his alarm would have come from how U.S. adversaries and allies alike are likely to respond over the long term, and the dangers of the United States going it alone. – The United States Cannot Go It Alone in Venezuela
(Mark F. Cancian-CSIS) The capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife has electrified the world and generated immense discussion about its impact on the future. In thinking about that future, it’s important to separate the military, political, economic, and legal strands. The military operation was brilliantly executed. However, this was a raid, which means that all U.S. forces withdrew. Maduro’s officials, including his vice president, remain in charge of Venezuela. The Trump administration proposes to work through these officials, not through the Venezuelan opposition. This will likely fail, requiring additional air and missile strikes. President Trump wants a revival of oil production, but stability is a prerequisite. In the background, the courts will decide the constitutional issues raised by this operation. Those decisions will shape future U.S. operations but will have little effect on the situation in Venezuela. – The Maduro Raid: A Military Victory with No Viable Endgame
(Brookings) On January 3, 2026, the United States launched a special operation to exfiltrate Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Caracas. Below, Brookings experts consider the immediate implications of this operation for the United States and Venezuela. – Making sense of the US military operation in Venezuela | Brookings
(Jason Marczak-Atlantic Council) The biggest gamble of this weekend was the Trump administration blessing Delcy Rodríguez, who is closely tied to the Maduro regime, to run the country. The administration should continue to press for free and fair elections, so the Venezuelan people decide their next leader. In the interim, the administration must set clear, enforceable benchmarks for Rodríguez when it comes to the economy, security, and foreign influence. – Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future – Atlantic Council
US-Venezuela-China
(David Sacks-Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Venezuela and capture president Nicolás Maduro ignited a flurry of commentary in the United States about what this would mean for China’s ambitions vis-à-vis Taiwan. Some worried that China could invoke Trump’s unilateral actions as a precedent to snatch Taiwan’s president, while others argued that the United States had lost its moral high ground to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. In reality, Trump’s actions in Venezuela will have little impact on Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s calculations. First, and most fundamentally, China has not refrained from attacking Taiwan because it was waiting for the United States to set a precedent it could follow. Instead, China has not attacked Taiwan because it lacks confidence that it can succeed at an acceptable cost. If China develops a military that it believes can overrun Taiwan and defeat a U.S.-led coalition, then cross-Strait dynamics will fundamentally change. Until that day comes, though, China will continue with its strategy of employing coercion to wear down Taiwan’s people, with the aim of forcing Taiwan to the negotiating table. The U.S. strikes on Venezuela do not change this dynamic. – Trump’s Strikes on Venezuela Will Not Embolden China to Invade Taiwan | Council on Foreign Relations
US-Venezuela-Russia
(John E. Herbst-Atlantic Council) The US operation in Venezuela reduced Russian President Vladimir Putin to bluster, because the war in Ukraine is Moscow’s priority and its military has little ability to project power. As Ukraine peace negotiations continue, Putin will avoid doing anything to provoke Trump over Venezuela. If oil prices come down because of US actions in Venezuela, it will only weaken Russia further. – The US capture of Maduro reveals Russia’s weakness – Atlantic Council
