From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Australia; Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic; Central Asia-South Caucasus-Middle East; Chad; China; Cuba; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Gaza; Global Health; Global Order; Guatemala; Human Rights; International Criminal Court; Iran; Nuclear Proliferation; Russia; Space; Sudan; UN Police; US; US-China; US-Indo Pacific; US-Iran-Oman; US-Sahel; US-Venezuela
Australia
(Hamed Zakikhani – The Strategist) Australia’s food and energy security strategy needs to move beyond stability-based planning and instead address sustained volatility in the Indo-Pacific. Current policy thinking often treats disruption as episodic and recoverable. But the strategic environment shaping food and energy systems is now characterised by overlapping climate stress, geopolitical rivalry, export controls, supply-chain concentration and information uncertainty. For Australia, these are no longer peripheral economic risks; they increasingly shape national security, strategic autonomy and regional influence. – Design for disruption: Australia’s food and energy security | The Strategist
(Chris Taylor – ASPI The Strategist) For the first time in its 47-year history, Australia’s Office of National Intelligence (ONI, previously Office of National Assessments [ONA]) is led by a woman: Kathy Klugman, senior diplomat and prime-ministerial adviser. Today’s deteriorating strategic environment means Klugman and ONI face significant challenges but also important opportunities. But responding effectively will require a boldness for which ONI/ONA is not renowned. Klugman’s appointment was not uncontroversial, given her closeness to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. But that’s unreasonable. Her predecessor Andrew Shearer, now ambassador-designate to Tokyo, was similarly close to the government that appointed him. In fact, in addition to Shearer, who worked for John Howard and Tony Abbott, several former ONA heads were senior advisers to prime ministers. These include Nick Warner (Howard), Peter Varghese (Howard), Alan Gyngell (Paul Keating) and Richard Maude (Julia Gillard). Klugman’s limited experience in intelligence is also not unusual. It’s akin to most of the recent directors-general, excepting Warner, who led the Australian Secret Intelligence Service for almost a decade. – Ten issues facing the new director-general of national intelligence | The Strategist
(Jennifer Parker – ASPI The Strategist) The release of the Defence Estate Audit on 4 February marks another milestone in the government’s effort to reshape Australia’s defence posture. It seeks to rationalise the commonwealth’s largest infrastructure portfolio and is a long-overdue step in that reform agenda. Much of its logic is sound. But taken as a whole, the review entrenches three strategic mistakes that risk weakening our defence preparedness. Much of the attention will rightly focus on the 67 Defence-owned sites slated for divestment or partial divestment, the sustainment funding the government expects to recoup and future capital returns from property sales. History suggests, however, that some of these returns may take decades to materialise. There will also be reflection on the history of the bases being lost. While the government is correct that history should not determine the structure of the defence estate, these decisions will land hard for many who have served. Service is not easily reduced to financial incentives. – Defence land policy should reflect mobilisation and reserves planning | The Strategist
Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is—with Baku’s approval—moving to drop references in its constitution to the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which made Moscow and Ankara guarantors of the non-contiguous Azerbaijani territory. These moves effectively abrogate the Moscow and Kars treaties and put the borders and status of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic under Baku’s sole discretion, potentially opening the way for future changes in either. Türkiye is unlikely to be upset because more recent agreements secure its standing with Azerbaijan, but Russia may oppose these developments as an additional sign of Baku’s increasing independence from Moscow. – Moscow and Ankara to Lose Status as Guarantors of Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan – Jamestown
Central Asia – South Caucasus – Middle East
(The Soufan Center) Leaders in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, once considered outliers answerable only to Moscow, are emerging as actors in the political and security dynamics of the core Middle East. Kazakhstan has established itself as a Middle East player by joining the Abraham Accords and Trump’s Board of Peace, and it reportedly will announce this week that it is contributing personnel to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza. Azerbaijan has become a key Israeli and U.S. partner in the fight against Iran, and Trump is pressing the country to join the Abraham Accords. U.S. influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus has expanded as Moscow’s faltering war on Ukraine has stretched the Kremlin’s resources and capabilities. – Central Asia and the South Caucasus Become Stakeholders in the Middle East – The Soufan Center
Chad
(UN News) Amid the ongoing war in Sudan, Chad, the country receiving the most refugees in Central Africa, saw slight improvements in its humanitarian situation last year, but as one of the most vulnerable nations on the African continent, it is still struggling to support four million people in need. – Chad: Africa’s refugee haven struggles with its own stark challenges | UN News
China
(Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Truly Tinsley – CSIS) China is rapidly modernizing and building up its military and paramilitary forces, providing Beijing with greater capacity to challenge and intimidate its neighbors. This report leverages open-source data to analyze observable trends in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities in 2025 with a focus on key developments in the Indo-Pacific region. – Tracking China’s Increased Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific in 2025 | ChinaPower Project
Cuba
(UN News) The UN on Wednesday warned of potential humanitarian “collapse” in Cuba, following Washington’s attempt to block oil supplies from reaching the island. The United States has threatened to impose tariffs on any country providing oil to Cuba, increasing pressure on the island nation following a decades-long trade embargo and the US seizure of Venezuela’s leader Nicolás Maduro last month. Venezuela had been the main supplier of oil to Havana but Washington has been ratcheting up pressure on Cuba in recent weeks, including an executive order last Thursday threatening to impose additional tariffs on countries that sell oil to Cuba, including Mexico. “I can tell you that the Secretary-General is extremely concerned about the humanitarian situation in Cuba, which will worsen, and if not collapse, if its oil needs go unmet,” said UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric. The UN chief noted that the General Assembly has been calling for an end to the US embargo for more than three decades: “The Secretary-General urges all parties to pursue dialogue and respect for international law.” – Cuba: UN warns of possible humanitarian ‘collapse’, as oil supplies dwindle | UN News
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(UN News) The United Nations has welcomed signs of progress in talks aimed at reducing violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Qatar is facilitating discussions between the Congolese government and the M23 armed group, which controls large areas of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. The latest developments follow months of intense fighting that has displaced civilians and destabilised the region. However, the UN warns that despite diplomatic momentum, the security situation on the ground remains volatile. M23, also known as the March 23 Movement, controls large areas of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. In January 2025, after a rapid offensive, the group seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu. Weeks later, it captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Since then, the rebels have set up parallel administrations in areas under their control. The UN says the group is supported by the Rwandan armed forces, an allegation Kigali has repeatedly denied. – M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists | UN News
Gaza
(Ghaith al-Omari – The Washington Institute) Last month’s establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza—the name given to the “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” mandated under President Trump’s twenty-point peace plan—marks an important step in the transition to postwar stabilization efforts. The Trump plan envisions the NCAG as the only entity tasked with implementing governance in Gaza. And in addition to the typical challenges faced by similar transition authorities, it will face challenges specific to the Palestinian context, whether related to operational obstacles, political delegitimization efforts by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or the need to secure efficient, responsive cooperation from Israel. The NCAG’s credibility will hinge on its ability to surmount these challenges and promptly provide tangible deliverables to the people of Gaza. In the immediate term, the Board of Peace—the U.S.-led entity that will oversee the entire transition process, including the NCAG’s activities—should focus on providing the political space the committee needs to operate, as well as the tools it needs to make an impact on the lives of Gazans and establish credibility. If the NCAG fails, it would jeopardize the entire twenty-point plan. – What the New Gaza Administrative Committee Needs to Succeed | The Washington Institute
Global Health
(UN News) The UN agency leading the global effort to end HIV/AIDS worldwide welcomed legislative approval from the United States on Thursday for a $6 billion spending package to help tackle the disease, following nearly a year of sharp aid cuts. “This US investment will provide lifesaving support for millions of people in partner countries and help to ensure that the global HIV response remains efficient, data-driven and delivers results,” said Winnie Byanyima, Executive Director of UNAIDS. “I thank President [Donald] Trump and the US Congress for their continued commitment to HIV and global health.”. The UN agency said the $5.88 billion spending package approved on Tuesday “reinforces the continued commitment and leadership of the United States in the global response to HIV”. – UN lauds $6 billion US funding approval towards ending HIV/AIDS | UN News
Global Order
(Jolyon Ford – ASPI The Strategist) The rules-based international order may yet benefit, in net terms, as countries respond to disruptive US policy. Indeed, we could see other states choosing not to double down on the existing order, instead working to reconceive and construct a transformed one. One possible scenario is an outright collapse of multilateralism: not just of the post-1945 institutions but also of the norms, principles and values-based commitments underpinning them. In that scenario, seeing the US approach abandon rule-based frameworks, states would dispense with the notion of a quasi-constitutional order with the United Nations Charter at its apex. They wouldn’t even bother with the usual lip-service to these features. Instead, they would reorganise relationships and postures to fit a highly transactional and pragmatic scene: a flat, decentred and open-ended sphere-of-influence situation reminiscent of imperial eras. – US disruption might revitalise the global rules-based order | The Strategist
Guatemala
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza – Just Security) President Bernardo Arévalo announced a 30-day “state of siege” in Guatemala on Jan. 19 that was quickly approved by the Congress. The emergency measure restricts some civil liberties and allows security forces to detain people without warrants. While the move on the surface looks similar to longstanding states of emergency in El Salvador and Honduras, the underlying dynamics and potential outcomes differ. Unlike in El Salvador, where the ongoing “state of exception” since March 2022 has allowed President Nayib Bukele to consolidate his authoritarian regime, in Guatemala it seems to be part of a struggle by Arévalo and aligned democratic forces to finally move forward on reform of the justice system, as opponents seek to secure their continuing control over these institutions. As in El Salvador, the immediate trigger was a spate of prison riots and assassinations carried out by street gangs. In the case of Guatemala, imprisoned leaders of the Barrio 18 gang asked for improved prison conditions (including air conditioning and king-sized beds). When they were (unsurprisingly) denied, they provoked uprisings and took hostages in three prisons. As these were contained, they unleashed, via their cohorts outside, a wave of assassinations of police officers, leaving 10 dead. Also as in El Salvador, the public overwhelmingly supports the president’s drastic action against the Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha gangs, who extort and threaten people and control local illicit markets. During the past year, the government has stepped up anti-gang measures, including limiting the use of phones by gang leaders behind bars, declaring the gangs terrorist organizations, and building or refurbishing new maximum-security prisons. In December, the interior minister resigned after a prison breakout went unnoticed for weeks. – Guatemala’s New State of Emergency Isn’t Just About Gangs
Human Rights
(UN News) UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk launched a $400 million appeal on Thursday in Geneva, as his office (OHCHR) continues to operate “in survival mode”. He warned Member States that with crises mounting, the world cannot afford a human rights system in crisis. “The cost of our work is low; the human cost of underinvestment is immeasurable,” he said. “In times of conflict and in times of peace, we are a lifeline for the abused, a megaphone for the silenced, a steadfast ally to those who risk everything to defend the rights of others.” – ‘Human rights cannot wait’: Türk launches $400 million appeal for 2026 | UN News
International Criminal Court
(Alyssa Prorok – Just Security) As the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) annual meeting opened on Dec. 1, Judge Tomoko Akane, ICC president, vowed to stand firm against international threats and coercion. The Court is currently facing the greatest challenge of its 23-year existence, weathering unprecedented attacks from powerful States. In November 2024, Moscow issued arrest warrants for ICC officials in response to the ICC’s investigation of Russian behavior in Ukraine. And this year, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on multiple judges and the Court’s Chief Prosecutor in retaliation for the Court’s investigations of U.S. and Israeli officials. These overt attacks on the ICC follow years of increasingly hostile rhetoric by adversaries of the Court and withdrawals by State parties who found themselves in the Court’s crosshairs. While political battles over the ICC rage, it’s easy to lose sight of its intended purpose and, more importantly, to what extent it has achieved that purpose over the past 23 years. The Rome Statute established the ICC in 2002 as a permanent international court tasked with pursuing justice for the world’s worst atrocity crimes when domestic courts fail to act. Although the Court is primarily a judicial body, the ICC’s early proponents argued that creating this permanent institution would not only promote justice but would also deter human rights abuses and facilitate peace in the world’s war-torn regions. Twenty-three years on, we can look back on the ICC’s record and empirically assess such optimistic claims. The empirical record shows that neither the Court’s proponents nor its detractors are fully correct: although ICC intervention does appear to deter atrocities, on balance, its involvement in ongoing civil wars fails to facilitate peaceful settlement in most cases. – International Criminal Court Intervention in Civil Wars
Iran
(Nik Kowsar – Atlantic Council) Unrest that began in Tehran’s Bazaar in January spread nationwide in recent weeks, and turned deadly. Early reports described security forces using live fire in multiple Zagros belt towns, including the Ilam province, and nearby communities such as Lordegan. Violence eventually escalated dramatically during the government’s nationwide crackdown of January 8 to 9, when by some accounts over thirty thousand protesters were killed in possibly the worst massacre in Iran’s modern history. Many of these protest hubs overlap with areas where severe water shortages in recent years have made life increasingly difficult. The pattern matters: these are not isolated security incidents, but repeated episodes of escalation in regions already under acute water stress and economic strain, where basic service failure has been eroding public tolerance for years. Iran is approaching what its own meteorological authorities describe as “water day zero”—the point where supply systems simply stop functioning. In that frame, “shortage” is the wrong word; this is system failure. Many scientists describe this as “water bankruptcy”—a condition, associated with researchers including United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health’s Kaveh Madani, in which the damage becomes effectively irreversible on human timescales. And when system failure shows up at the tap, it turns a long-term resource crisis into an immediate legitimacy crisis—especially in provinces where people already live on the edge of service collapse. The unifying force in these protests is not ideology. It is the erosion of dignity. When officials demand “endurance” while connected networks profit from scarcity, the issue stops being technical. It becomes a judgment about whether the state considers citizens worth serving. That is when water stress becomes a political risk-multiplier: it raises baseline pressure, broadens participation beyond organized activists, and shifts perception from temporary hardship to systemic neglect. – How Iran’s water bankruptcy seeped into the protest movement – Atlantic Council
Nuclear Prolieferation
(Kelsey Davenport – Just Security) With the risks of new nuclear-armed States on the rise, the nuclear non-profileration regime is in danger of collapse. In 2026, Iran will continue to dominate the headlines as the most likely country to exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or develop nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty obligations. Beyond Tehran, however, additional countries are likely to move closer to weaponization as debates about the security value of nuclear deterrence intensify and technical barriers to proliferation erode. For decades, since the NPT entered into force in 1970, international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons proved remarkably successful. Although three countries—India, Israel, and Pakistan—developed nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT, only North Korea developed the bomb in violation of its NPT obligations. Several factors contributed to the success of nonproliferation efforts, including unity among the nuclear-weapon States in responding to proliferation threats, sustained efforts to limit the spread of technologies necessary for weaponization, and the perceived security value of the NPT. The U.S.-led international order created a geopolitical environment conducive to these multilateral efforts to prevent proliferation. That order, however, is collapsing. In its place, a new, more dangerous geopolitical environment is emerging. Marked by fraying alliances, aggressive great-power competition, and a U.S. retreat from multilateralism, this new order could lead to a new era of proliferation, as additional States debate the value of nuclear weapons. – In 2026, a Growing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
Russia
(Vadim Shtepa – The Jamestown Foundation) Kremlin officials have been actively promoting “Siberianization” to pivot Russia away from the West, proposing new capitals and industrial clusters to shift the country’s geopolitical and economic focus eastward. These ambitious development plans clash with grim realities, as Russia’s war against Ukraine drains the necessary financial resources and accelerates Siberia’s already rapid demographic decline. Microelectronics and resource projects in Siberia and the Far East face structural constraints, reliance on the People’s Republic of China, and geopolitical risks, casting doubt on whether “Siberianization” can deliver sustainable growth or genuine strategic independence. – Plans for the “Siberianization” of Russia Remain Unrealized – Jamestown
(The Jamestown Foundation) Russia’s nuclear posture is shifting in ways not seen since the Cold War, marked by new signaling, international partnerships, and technological ambitions. With New START expiring today, Moscow’s use of nuclear power, both civil and military, has become a central tool to challenge global security structures and advance its geopolitical goals. – Special Report: Russia’s Nuclear Posture in 2025 and Beyond – Jamestown
Space
(Adam Bartley – ASPI The Strategist) The biggest and most immediate threat to space systems isn’t anti-satellite weaponry; it’s hacking. In October 2025, a group of computer scientists from the University of California, San Diego and the University of Maryland undertook a study to eavesdrop on geostationary satellites in orbit. Expecting to find some flaws in space systems during their scanning of internet traffic, they instead intercepted vast quantities of private and potentially sensitive communications. Some of these were from government and military sources. In August 2025, German researchers at a Black Hat computer security conference in Las Vegas demonstrated how software and encryption libraries used by NASA and Airbus could be exploited to shut down, move or crash the flight software of a satellite. Additional software flaws in open source app OpenC3 Cosmos were found to allow remote code execution (where arbitrary codes are run on a target system from a remote location) and cross-site scripting attacks (where malicious scripts are injected into a trusted website) on ground stations. – Hack-proofing our space infrastructure | The Strategist
Sudan
(UN News) Acute malnutrition among children has reached catastrophic levels in parts of Sudan’s North Darfur and Greater Kordofan, UN-backed analysts warned on Thursday, as conflict, mass displacement and denials of aid push the country deeper into a famine-risk emergency. According to an alert from the IPC, a global food security monitoring system, thresholds for acute malnutrition were surpassed in two new areas of North Darfur – Um Baru and Kernoi – following the fall of the regional capital, El Fasher, in October 2025 and a massive exodus. December assessments found acute malnutrition levels among children of 52.9 per cent in Um Baru – nearly twice the famine threshold – and about 34 per cent in Kernoi. The IPC stressed that the alert does not constitute a formal famine classification but warned that conditions are deteriorating rapidly – and action is urgently needed. “These alarming rates suggest an increased risk of excess mortality,” the experts said, adding that many other conflict-affected or inaccessible areas may be facing similarly catastrophic conditions. – Child malnutrition hits catastrophic levels in parts of Sudan | UN News
UN Police
(UN News) The head of UN Peacekeeping on Thursday called for greater support for international police officers deployed to field missions at a time when financial resources are dwindling and multilateralism is waning. Jean-Pierre Lacroix was speaking in the UN Security Council during the annual briefing by heads of police components of UN peace operations. “Despite severe constraints, our police personnel continue to serve with dedication, professionalism and courage,” he said. “They operate in environments of persistent insecurity, political volatility and growing operational risks.” – UN Police ‘indispensable’ to fulfilling peacekeeping mandates, Security Council hears | UN News
US
(Paul Friedrichs, J. Stephen Morrison, Michaela Simoneau, and Sophia Hirshfield – CSIS) Congress and the executive branch have a responsibility to defend the United States against a growing range of biological risks from natural, accidental, and deliberate origins. These threats can affect humans as well as U.S. agricultural industries. In the fall of 2025, the CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security (CSIS Bipartisan Alliance) launched a working group to develop a prioritized list of critical, near-term policy solutions to address gaps in U.S. biodefense capabilities. The working group identified strategic risks that could be quickly mitigated, examined numerous preexisting biodefense reviews, and generated a prioritized set of practical recommendations for the U.S. government to modernize biosurveillance, ensure biosafety and biosecurity, reverse the decline of the biodefense enterprise, and strengthen response and recovery. Together, these commonsense, immediate actions provide a vision for a feasible and affordable bipartisan path forward to improve U.S. biopreparedness. – Protecting Americans from Biological Threats
(Inu Manak, Allison J. Smith – Council on Foreign Relations) In his second term, President Donald Trump has set out to fundamentally restructure U.S. trade policy. On April 2, 2025, he announced sweeping tariffs on nearly all U.S. trading partners in what he branded Liberation Day. When markets reacted negatively, he backtracked on implementing those tariffs, and instead threatened to reimpose tariffs on countries that failed to secure a trade deal with the United States within ninety days. The move kicked off a scramble among U.S. trading partners to negotiate deals. Even though only two preliminary deals were reached by the ninety-day deadline, Trump did not ratchet up tariffs. Instead, he modified many of the Liberation Day tariffs to lower rates on July 31, 2025, noting progress in trade negotiations. Many of those modified rates were enshrined in subsequent deals. Although Trump may have hoped to rewrite U.S. trade policy with a single executive order, the reality has been much more complicated. In fact, even though a higher overall baseline tariff is in place, the specifics of trade relations with the rest of the world are slowly being adjusted, one deal at a time. To push those deals along, Trump created additional exemptions in September 2025, Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners, which cover items such as aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, natural resources unavailable in the United States, and some agricultural products. On November 14, 2025, Trump took further action to exempt certain agricultural products from reciprocal tariffs due to growing concerns over affordability. Therefore, despite high average tariff rates, the actual rate that is applied is much lower, and varies considerably by country. This tracker breaks down the content of the deals to date. We include only those deals that have a written text to analyze. Most are so-called framework agreements that outline areas for future negotiation, while implementing a temporary tariff truce. Those agreements are eventually expected to become finalized reciprocal trade deals, which more closely resemble traditional U.S. trade agreements. Unlike those traditional agreements, Trump’s reciprocal trade deals exclude any role for Congress. Furthermore, all agreements include language that suggests room for constant modification and quick termination. The message is clear: a trade agreement no longer guarantees predictability in trade relations with the United States. The frameworks and agreements mix both traditional features of U.S. trade policy and novel elements. – Tracking Trump’s Trade Deals | Council on Foreign Relations
(Council on Foreign Relations) “The United States will not secure its critical mineral future through traditional mining and processing alone,” argues a new report—Leapfrogging China’s Critical Minerals Dominance: How Innovation Can Secure U.S. Supply Chains—from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Silverado Policy Accelerator. “The most promising way to leapfrog China’s entrenched position is for the U.S. government to maximize breakthrough materials engineering, advanced extraction and processing technologies, waste recovery, and recycling.”. The coauthors of the report—Heidi Crebo-Rediker, senior fellow for geoeconomics at CFR, and Mahnaz Khan, vice president of policy for critical supply chains at Silverado Policy Accelerator—assert that the United States can overcome China’s critical minerals dominance not by out-mining it but by out-innovating it. To do so, the United States needs to work with its allies to pursue pragmatic policies and deploy creative technologies. “This report highlights the most promising technologies and practical steps the United States and its allies can take to secure the material foundations of economic and strategic strength,” said Shannon O’Neil, senior vice president of studies and Maurice R. Greenberg chair at CFR. “China’s mineral dominance is well known, but Heidi and Mahnaz provide practical policy recommendations for how the United States can secure critical minerals going forward.” – New CFR Report Outlines How the U.S. Can Leapfrog China’s Critical Minerals Dominance | Council on Foreign Relations
(Isabella Ulloa, Abby André – Lawfare) “Unless you drop out of the race … the next pipe bomb will be live.” That’s the message a local town supervisor running for county clerk received alongside an inactive pipe bomb thrown into her home while her family slept. It was far from an isolated incident. We’re in a national crisis: Public service in the United States is more dangerous today than in recent history. Threats against the U.S.’s nearly 40 million current and former public servants span vitriolic statements, doxxing (publishing private information online with malicious intent), swatting (falsely reporting a serious event to law enforcement or emergency responders), harassment, stalking, assault, and even murder, and they’re increasingly happening at every level of government, including at the local level. Between May 2024 and March 2025, calls for impeachment and violent threats against judges rose by 327 percent across social media and fringe platforms—and by 537 percent on TikTok. From Oct. 1, 2024, to June 16, 2025, the U.S. Marshals Service said it investigated 408 threats against 297 judges. By mid-September 2025, the U.S. Capitol Police reported it was on track to investigate 14,000 threats to members of Congress, their families, and their staff, spanning political parties. – Public Service in America: A Decade of Danger and the Choice to Fix It | Lawfare
US – China
(Justin Sherman – Lawfare) On Jan. 23, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration has pushed out two key officials at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)—specifically, in its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS). The Journal rightfully called the departures “the latest dismissals of key personnel working on national security issues tied to Beijing.”. Certainly, the office in question may be less known outside of technology and national security circles. But the impact of its work to date—and the potential impact of its work in the future, if the office were to be appropriately staffed, resourced, and operated—is significant. Its sidelining is also the latest in a series of regulatory- and staffing-focused changes since January 2025 that have either shut down or effectively undermined the U.S. government’s ability to bolster national security protections for the technology supply chain. This piece outlines the history of the ICTS office, its authorities, and its key actions to date. It then argues that the recent personnel moves must be contextualized within broader U.S. shifts in the past year. These include rollbacks of key cybersecurity regulations, staffing cuts at other technology- and national security-focused agencies, and the U.S. government’s expressed willingness to let certain national security and regulatory authorities sit on a shelf. In total, these decisions represent the collective weakening of a regulatory apparatus configured to address critical national security risks to the U.S. technology ecosystem—with effects that, in many cases, will be difficult to quickly unravel or sufficiently mitigate. – Another Misstep in U.S.-China Tech Security Policy | Lawfare
US – Indo Pacific
(Joshua Kurlantzick – Council on Foreign Relations) Over the past fifteen years, at least until 2025, U.S. strategic policy had gradually shifted, at least rhetorically, toward a primary focus on Asia, also known as the Indo-Pacific. After the George W. Bush presidency, which was centered on the war in Iraq and the Middle East, the Obama administration launched what it called a “pivot” to Asia in 2011, with the aim of developing stronger military, diplomatic, and economic ties with the region. Overall, the pivot was supposed to make clear that Asia was increasingly the center of U.S. economic and strategic interests, and would only become more so in the future, and Washington needed to recognize this shift. As part of the pivot, the Obama White House deepened engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It also, in its National Security Strategy, made clear that Asia would become the center of U.S. interests, and promised to move a higher percentage of U.S. military assets to the region. The administration also upgraded alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and created a much closer partnership with Vietnam, despite ongoing major human rights concerns about Hanoi’s human rights record. It planned to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a massive, region-wide trade deal. The White House expanded defense exercises with many regional partners. – Trump Is Abandoning the United States’ Indo-Pacific Partners | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Iran – Oman
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) The decision by Washington and Tehran to shift their long-anticipated meeting, set for February 6, from Istanbul to Muscat is not merely a logistical detail. It is the latest reminder that when US-Iran diplomacy is on the verge of breaking down completely, Oman is the regional player the Iranian regime trusts most to step in and mediate. What has changed in 2026 is not the nature of Oman’s involvement but the stakes: The risk of miscalculation is rising, Iran and the United States might be reading the moment in opposite ways, and quiet facilitation is no longer enough. Oman must now take on a more assertive mediating role — not against Iran, but for Iran’s own strategic survival and for the stability of the entire Persian Gulf region. – With the US and Iran on a knife-edge, can Oman once again step in to mediate? – Middle East Institute
US – Sahel
(Ebenezer Obadare – Council on Foreign Relations) The first indications that the Trump White House was seeking to restore relations with the three Alliance of Sahel States countries emerged last December when U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) deputy head, General John Brennan, dropped a hint that the United States was exploring “targeted, limited intelligence sharing” with them as part of a “more aggressive” AFRICOM focus on regional security. Last week, any lingering doubts as to the seriousness of the newfangled rapprochement were laid to rest following the State Department’s announcement that Nick Checker, head of its Bureau of African Affairs, was on his way to Mali “to convey the United States’ respect for Mali’s sovereignty and desire to chart a new course in the bilateral relationship and move past policy missteps.” While the statement did not explain what those “missteps” were, it did make clear that the United States was also looking forward to “cooperating and consulting with other governments in the region, including Burkina Faso and Niger, on shared security and economic interests.” – A Dubious Turn in the Sahel | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Venezuela
(Roxanna Vigil – Council on Foreign Relations) It has been more than a month since Operation Absolute Resolve led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, but neither President Donald Trump nor his administration have clearly outlined next steps for the country—or the United States’ involvement there. The president has only consistently stated his intention to control Venezuela’s vast oil resources. To do so, he appears comfortable working cooperatively with the current Venezuelan government under interim President Delcy Rodríguez, a longtime Chavista and Maduro’s vice president. Trump did meet with opposition leader María Corina Machado (and accepted her Nobel Peace Prize) on January 16 and vaguely indicated he was considering getting her involved in the country’s future somehow. However, he also dismissed Machado, claiming she did not have sufficient support to lead in Venezuela despite the opposition’s victory in the most recent election. Both Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress balked at this treatment of Machado, but Trump did not address these concerns by committing to a timeline for elections or democratic transition process in Venezuela. – Trump’s Venezuela Policy Isn’t Any Clearer a Month After Maduro’s Capture | Council on Foreign Relations
(Katherine Yon Ebright – Just Security) U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio rejoined his former colleagues in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on Jan. 28 to testify on the Trump administration’s military operations in and around Venezuela. As far back as September, when the administration began striking alleged drug boats in the Caribbean, lawmakers had called for Rubio to appear before Congress to account for the administration’s use-of-force policies. Their demand for a hearing reached a fever pitch after the administration bombed Venezuelan territory and captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3 — without prior congressional authorization or even notice. The Senate’s hearing with Rubio, however, offered little solace to those concerned about the White House’s buildup of military assets in the Caribbean, killings at sea, and use of force against Venezuela. The key takeaways from the hearing are that the executive branch and its congressional allies believe the president can undertake bombings and ground operations at will, without meaningful constraints from Congress, domestic laws such as the War Powers Resolution, or international treaties that are part of U.S. law. – Five War Powers Takeaways from the Senate’s Venezuela Hearing
