From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Bangladesh; China-Taiwan; Europe-US-Russia-Ukraine; IMF-World Bank-US; Iran; NATO; Nuclear Risk; Poland; Russia-Ukraine; Taiwan; Ukraine; US
Bangladesh
(Wahiduzzaman Noor – Atlantic Council) A year ago, Bangladesh exhaled. Students and citizens, armed with nothing but courage, swept through Dhaka’s streets like a cleansing monsoon, washing away Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s fifteen-year reign. The world watched as a seemingly impossible revolution unfolded before its eyes. Now that the monsoon has evaporated, citizens find their revolution pickpocketed while they were still celebrating. Extremists are emboldened, minorities are oppressed, political rivals are targeted, and the economy is wobbling. Bangladesh isn’t just faltering; it’s performing a painful autopsy on its own revolutionary aspirations. Without a free, fair, and inclusive election—soon—the nation teeters not at democracy’s threshold but at anarchy’s precipice. Warning signs flared in the weeks after Hasina’s fall on August 5, 2024. Religious extremists demolished sculptures and artworks across the country. Soon after, As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s official media wing, released a twelve-page message hailing the events as a victory for Muslims, praising the destruction of sculptures and portraying Bangladesh as the beacon of hope for the victory of Islam in the region. Then in March, Hizb ut-Tahrir, a terrorist organization designated in Bangladesh since 2009, paraded through Dhaka’s streets with its “March for Khilafah,” with advance publicity and without meaningful government interference. – Bangladesh’s revolution is at a crossroads. Open elections are the best way forward. – Atlantic Council
China – Taiwan
(Emerson Tsui – The Jamestown Foundation) Beijing is operationalizing its cross-Strait unification strategy through bureaucratic embedding and military-civil fusion, with Fujian Province as the central staging ground. The 17th Straits Forum in June served as a propaganda instrument to showcase apparent Taiwanese grassroots support, while parallel PLA developments contradict Beijing’s peace narrative. The absence of official engagement by Taipei and low support for unification in Taiwan highlight the enduring disconnect between Beijing’s unification goals and Taiwan’s political and societal realities. – Straits Forum Puts Fujian at Center of Cross-Strait Integration Campaign – Jamestown
Europe – US – Russia – Ukraine
(Liana Fix – Council on Foreign Relations) It’s no secret that U.S. President Donald Trump has long harbored friendly feelings for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has waged a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine for three years now. Trump likes to quote what the Russian president allegedly once told him: “If you are my friend, I would hate to think of you as my enemy.” He publicly commiserates with Putin, saying that they “went through the ‘Russia, Russia, Russia’ hoax” together. Trump was equally moved by the Kremlin’s cleverly crafted story that Putin prayed for him after the assassination attempt on his life last summer—and by the gift Putin gave Trump’s chief negotiator, Steve Witkoff: a portrait of Trump himself. Now, however, it appears that these friendly feelings are fading. – For Ukraine, Europeans Need to Play Checkbook Diplomacy With Trump | Council on Foreign Relations
IMF – World Bank – US
(Martin Mühleisen – Atlantic Council) As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank prepare for their summer recess, their employees’ minds will not be far from what is happening during their absence in Washington. The two institutions are entering a critical period over the coming weeks, awaiting the outcome of the Trump administration’s review of US membership in international organizations this month. The Republican Party’s isolationist wing would certainly relish a decision by the president to withdraw from the international lenders. But there are also moderate voices within the administration, notably Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who struck a supportive line in a speech earlier this year. Given their large war chest to fight financial crises, leveraging US contributions by a ratio of five to one, it remains unlikely that the United States will withdraw from the institutions it was critical in founding eighty years ago. However, it would also be surprising if the White House does not try to extract some major concessions from the multilateral lenders, prompting insider talk of the Bretton Woods institutions facing their own multilateral “liberation day.” – Trump’s review of US membership in the IMF offers a rare chance for reform – Atlantic Council
Iran
(Darya Dolzikova, Matthew Savill – RUSI) More than a month after the Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and scientists, the full extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear programme remains unclear. Intelligence assessments vary. Despite the Trump White House’s assertions that the military strikes ‘obliterated’ Iran’s nuclear programme, US and even Israeli intelligence assessments are more conservative. The Pentagon and Israeli officials have estimated that the programme has been set back by up to two years; another US intelligence assessment suggests that Iran could start enriching uranium again in a matter of months. Broadly speaking, the consensus appears to be that the programme has not, in fact, been definitively destroyed. Yet, the exact extent of the material damage to the programme is secondary. As others have detailed, Iran does not have to reconstitute the whole of its programme to be able to produce a nuclear weapon and could, in fact, probably do so relatively quickly, should it decide to. The more important – and, arguably, more challenging – question is over the impact of the ‘twelve-day war’ on Iran’s assessments and decision-making as to the value and feasibility of developing a credible nuclear deterrent. – Will Iran Get the Bomb? | Royal United Services Institute
NATO
(Justin Bronk – RUSI) Since 2023, first-person view (FPV) uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and one-way attack (OWA) drones have played an increasingly critical role in Ukraine’s successful defensive efforts against Russia’s grinding offensives. Russian forces have also scaled up their UAS and OWA manufacturing and development capabilities by many orders of magnitude since the start of the full-scale invasion. As a result, the war in Ukraine in 2025 is overwhelmingly characterised by the use of millions of FPV UAS on the battlefield and thousands of OWA drones supplementing conventional cruise and ballistic missiles for long range strike campaigns. This has led many in Western military, political and journalistic circles to proclaim that what we are witnessing in Ukraine is a revolution in military affairs that renders previously core Western equipment and doctrinal notions such as air superiority and armoured manoeuvre warfare irrelevant or obsolete. Increasingly, for many in Defence, things that involve ‘drones’ in large numbers are tacitly or explicitly assumed to be a gateway to greater combat mass, lethality and efficiency compared to ‘legacy’ platforms such as artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft and submarines. It is certainly essential for European NATO members to prioritise rapid expansion of their own counter-UAS capabilities, as Russian forces would certainly use UAS on a vast scale and fire large salvos of Geran-2/3 OWA drones in any future direct clash. However, there are several reasons why it would be a mistake for NATO forces to rely heavily on massed small UAS and long range OWA drones to replace traditional weapons systems in pursuit of improved lethality and thus deterrence against future Russian aggression. – NATO Should Not Replace Traditional Firepower with ‘Drones’ | Royal United Services Institute
Nuclear Risk
(Marion Messmer, Georgia Cole – Chatham House) This week marks the 80th anniversary of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US at the end of the Second World War, the first and to date only use of nuclear weapons. Almost a century on, it is easy to forget the devastating impact of the attacks. Between 110,000 to 210,000 people were killed by the bombs and their immediate aftermath. Entire communities were wiped out in seconds, while emergency services collapsed and hospitals were obliterated. Tens of thousands more died over the following decades from radiation-induced illnesses and cancer. For survivors of the bombings, known as hibakusha, the psychological and social toll spanned generations. Many of them faced not only chronic health issues, but also social stigma and discrimination. Some survivors struggled to find employment or romantic partners due to physical disfigurement or fears of genetic illness. To this day, Japan remains the only country where long-term, intergenerational impacts of nuclear weapons have been studied in depth. – Eighty years on from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world should not forget the devastation wrought by nuclear weapons | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Poland
(Marek Magierowski – Atlantic Council) Karol Nawrocki, who takes over as Poland’s president on August 6, owes his rapid ascent to a significant shift in voters’ political opinions and ideological preferences, some of which have echoes in the political scene in the United States. Those trends, and Nawrocki’s approach to politics, could serve the new head of state well in his dealings with US President Donald Trump—and help keep both countries aligned in the contest against Russia. Nawrocki’s narrow win in June came as a surprise, as his opponent, the liberal mayor of Warsaw Rafal Trzaskowski, was largely regarded as a shoo-in. However, Trzaskowski’s poor campaign and apparent detachment from vast segments of Polish society led to his failure. – Poland’s new president could become a major European ally for Trump – Atlantic Council
Russia – Ukraine
(Clayton Seigle – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Ukraine resumed its drone strikes on Russian oil refineries last weekend, the latest salvo in a nearly 18-month military campaign to crimp Russian fuel supplies. The attacks are expected to further increase Russian retail gasoline prices, which are already nearing record highs, though not to a politically untenable level for President Putin. However, the pump price escalation could serve as a contributor to rising pressure on Putin, in conjunction with looming new measures threatened by President Trump, to compel Putin to end his war on Ukraine. – Pressure at the Pump: Ukraine Resumes Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries
Taiwan
(Richard C. Bush, Ryan Jass – Brookings) Taiwan’s 2024 election delivered a split government, with the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) standard-bearer, Lai Ching-te, winning the presidency and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party forming a majority coalition in the Legislative Yuan. This distribution of power generated political gridlock. In the period since, President Lai and his supporters grew increasingly frustrated with legislative efforts to change the institutional balance of power between the Legislative Yuan and the executive branch, as well as with the Legislative Yuan’s unwillingness to pass a government-wide annual budget bill, which included a proposed increase in defense spending. Lai’s supporters began questioning whether opposition legislators were acting at the behest of the Chinese Communist Party and whether they should be removed from office for the sake of Taiwan’s national defense. For their part, KMT legislators argued they were providing necessary oversight to ensure fiscal discipline and guard against the misuse of taxpayer funds. This frustration coalesced in a grassroots campaign to recall KMT legislators. The first recall vote occurred on July 26, with the next round of recall votes scheduled in August. In the end, not a single KMT legislator was recalled in the first round, and all 24 KMT legislators retained their seats. This result was a rebuke to Lai and his DPP supporters, even though Lai himself did not instigate the recall effort. Voters demonstrated through their vote that they did not subscribe to the recall proponents’ arguments that KMT legislators were obstructing Lai’s agenda at Beijing’s direction. Voters instead favored allowing elected KMT legislators to fulfill their terms in office. Not even accusations of treason were enough to galvanize Taiwan public opinion against the KMT legislators up for recall. – Taiwan’s recall vote: Implications for Taiwan, China, and the United States | Brookings
Ukraine
(Olena Halushka – Atlantic Council) The Ukrainian Parliament voted last week to reverse controversial legislative changes that threatened to deprive the country’s anti-corruption institutions of their independence. This apparent U-turn by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came after thousands took to the streets in Ukraine’s first major public protests since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago. The scandal surrounding efforts to subordinate Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General was part of a broader trend that has sparked concerns over potential backsliding in the country’s reform agenda. Additional factors include the failure to appoint a new head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, investigations targeting prominent anti-corruption activists, and alleged attempts to undermine the work of other key institutions like the High Qualification Commission of Judges. – Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms are more vital than ever during wartime – Atlantic Council
US
(Alexis Harmon, Reed Blakemore – Atlantic Council) The United States wants to secure its supply chains and revitalize domestic manufacturing, but when it comes to minerals, it’s still playing catch up—and not always with the right playbook. On August 1, the Trump administration launched sweeping new copper policies, including steep tariffs on semi-finished copper products and a domestic sales requirement. The announcement came just weeks after the US Department of Defense finalized a multibillion-dollar deal supporting the US-based rare earth company MP Materials—a targeted move to strengthen an important link in US mineral supply chains. Together, the two decisions reveal divergent approaches to mineral policy—but only one tackles the United States’ most acute supply chain vulnerabilities. The United States remains heavily dependent on imports for both raw materials and the capacity to process them. Not all supply chains are equally vulnerable, however, and not all interventions are equally helpful. A policy that works for rare earths may be counterproductive when applied to copper, and vice versa. – A tale of two supply chains: Comparing Trump’s new copper tariffs and rare earth investments – Atlantic Council
(Allison J. Smith and Matthew P. Goodman – Council on Foreign Relations) Many observers have been surprised that the Trump administration’s tariff hikes and threats since the start of the year have had a relatively mild impact on the U.S. economy to date. The weak jobs report issued on August 1 is a sign that the data may be turning. Moreover, a recent conversation with a food importer near the Mexican border made clear that American businesses are already feeling a range of adverse impacts from the tariffs—and that pain for consumers is likely to follow. Despite a rebound in gross domestic product (GDP) in the second quarter, U.S. growth in the first half of the year has clearly slowed. Meanwhile, the consumer price index (CPI) report in June registered a four-month high of 2.7 percent over the previous year. – Consumers Should Brace Themselves for Higher Food Prices | Council on Foreign Relations
(William H. Frey – Brookings) The terms “diversity” and “immigration” are constantly in the news in light of the current administration’s focus on eliminating diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs, increasing deportations, and reducing refugee admissions. Some scholars estimate that these and other programs could lead to zero or negative net international migration in this calendar year. This stands in contrast with Census Bureau population estimates released late last year, which revealed that the nation’s population growth rate of nearly 1% for the year July 2023 to July 2024 was driven mostly by immigration. This growth represented a much-needed uptick from the historically low population growth of the COVID-19 period, along with the diminishing growth of recent decades. – Growing diverse and immigrant populations drove the nation’s post-pandemic demographic rebound, new census data show | Brookings
