From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia; China-Taiwan; Europe-Indo Pacific; Gaza; Houthis-Israel; Israel; Lithuania-Georgia; Russia; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond); South Korea; UK; Ukraine; US-China; US-Islamic State
Australia
(Victor Abramowicz – The Strategist) After watching videos of flaming Russian bombers on Sunday, Canberra decision makers have no excuse for foot-dragging in fielding counters to small, cheap drones. A similar attack could happen in Australia at any moment and cripple the nation’s defences, yet work to counter such threats isn’t due to produce much until 2028. The effort must be accelerated urgently. As Ukraine showed so spectacularly on 1 June, soft targets even thousands of kilometres from front lines are now more vulnerable than ever. Kyiv’s attack involved 117 small one-way drones concealed in modified prefabricated houses. These were driven by unsuspecting truck drivers more than 4,000 km until they were close to Russian airbases, at which point the roofs opened by remote control and the attack began. – Get on with it, Defence. Counter-drone capability is urgent | The Strategist
China – Taiwan
(Nathan Attrill – The Strategist) Beijing’s campaign to erase Taiwan from the international system is built on a lie. Beijing routinely claims that United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, passed in 1971, settled the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty and confirmed that the island is part of the People’s Republic of China. This is false. But that hasn’t stopped Beijing from building an entire strategy of legal distortion and diplomatic bullying around this misinterpretation, nor from using it to block Taiwan from meaningful participation in everything from global health to aviation safety. What’s changed recently is that more governments are starting to call Beijing out. Let’s begin with the facts. Resolution 2758 recognised the government of the People’s Republic of China as ‘the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations’. It removed the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek—then still claiming to represent ‘China’ from Taipei—from the UN seat. But it said absolutely nothing about Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, the resolution never even mentions the word ‘Taiwan’. – UN Resolution 2758 was never about Taiwan. Beijing just pretends it was | The Strategist
Europe – Indo Pacific
(Ben Schreer – IISS) This report assesses the evolving role of select European powers and institutions in Indo-Pacific defence and security in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and concerns over the strategic trajectory of the United States under President Donald Trump’s second term in office. Will European powers live up to their stated ambitions to increase their defence engagement in the region? Or will they refocus their strategic attention on Europe given that the Trump administration seems less inclined to defend its European allies? The report looks at several continental European countries as well as NATO and the European Union, identifying the level of ambitions, actual policies and engagement, and shortfalls. – More or Less? European Defence Engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the Second Trump Administration
Gaza
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) Some of the worst humanitarian situations the world has faced are the product of natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes; others are the result of poor leadership and bad policy. What has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for millions of Palestinians is the direct consequence of the failures of political leaders who are ignoring best practices for the delivery of aid to innocent people caught in the crosshairs of a complicated war. Without a major shift in the current approach, the already dire conditions are only likely to deteriorate further going forward. – A devastating crisis for Palestinians in Gaza worsens | Middle East Institute
Houthis – Israel
(Soufan Center) Israel and the Houthi movement in Yemen continue to exchange missile and air strikes in the aftermath of a U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, which did not include Israel. Israeli retaliatory strikes on Houthi-controlled airports in Yemen have prompted Houthi threats to attack Israeli passenger jets. The Houthis might potentially use their deepening ties to the al-Shabaab terrorist organization based in Somalia to attack Israel-linked assets. The clashes have the potential to expand throughout the region, potentially including U.S. or Israeli action against Iran, the main backer of the Houthis. – Houthi-Israel Clashes Threaten to Escalate and Expand – The Soufan Center
Israel
(Amichai Cohen, Yuval Shany – Lawfare) In an earlier post, we discussed the serious constitutional crisis unfolding in Israel around the attempt by Prime Minister Netanyahu to fire Ronen Bar, the head of the Israel Security Agency (ISA; also referred to as Shin Bet) and the legal proceedings aimed at blocking the dismissal (Movement for the Quality of Government in Israel v. Government of Israel). In this follow-up post, we consider three major developments in the head of Shin Bet saga: The decision by Bar to voluntarily resign on April 28; the May 21 judgment of the High Court of Justice (HCJ) that the government’s decision to dismiss Bar was unlawful; and Netanyahu’s May 22 announcement of Bar’s successor—General David Zini—the legal validity of which has already been challenged by Israel’s attorney general, Gali Baharav-Miara. These three developments suggest that the Israeli government and the country’s legal establishment are still on a collision course, which looks increasingly destined to result in a full-blown constitutional crisis involving competing claims of legal authority. – Israel’s Shin Bet Saga, Continued | Lawfare
Lithuania – Georgia
(Giorgi Menabde – The Jamestown Foundation) Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys warned against diplomatic engagement with Georgia’s ruling party without a renewed commitment to democratic norms on May 20, criticizing recent crackdowns on protests, unfair elections, and restrictive laws against non-governmental organizations. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have become vocal opponents of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, accusing the Georgian government of violating human rights and turning the country onto an anti-European trajectory. The government and the Georgian Dream parliamentary majority accuse their Baltic partners of interfering in internal affairs, provoking a revolutionary scenario, and wanting to use Georgia as a “tool” against Russia. – Lithuania Warns Against Engagement With Georgia Over Democratic Backsliding – Jamestown
Russia
(Yuri Lapaiev – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia is increasing the production and use of Shahed-type kamikaze drones against Ukraine, constantly improving their effectiveness and ability to break through air defenses. In addition to simpler drones, Moscow is developing and testing more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) featuring artificial intelligence (AI) for auto-targeting and computer vision. The Kremlin may transfer weapon technologies and tactics to allies such as the People’s Republic of China or Iran in exchange for resources and weapons. – Russian Drones Pose Growing Danger – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Vladimir Socor – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia has released an embryonic Treaty of final settlement with Ukraine following their June 2 bilateral meeting in Istanbul. The territorial clauses require Ukraine to recognize Russia’s de jure annexations of Crimea and four Ukrainian mainland provinces to the full extent of their pre-2014 administrative boundaries. Security clauses demand Ukraine give up all its previously existing forms of cooperation with Western powers in any framework. Under its expansive interpretation of neutrality, Russia could also claim the right to vet or even veto cooperation agreements between Ukraine and the European Union. Ukraine’s renunciation of war reparations could shift the post-war reconstruction costs on the EU. Cultural and political clauses would introduce official Russian-Ukrainian language parallelism and language contest in Ukraine; could ban legitimate expressions of Ukrainian nationalism through conflation with “Nazism;” and initiate a process of re-russification in Ukraine. – Russia Details Preconditions to Ukraine For Ceasefire and Political Settlement: Political Terms – Jamestown
South Korea
(Edward Howell – Chatham House) South Korea elected the left-leaning Democratic Party candidate, Lee Jae-myung, as its new president on 3 June. The snap election followed the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol in April, after the conservative leader declared martial law on 3 December last year. Lee won the election with 49.42 per cent of the vote, ahead of the People Power Party candidate, Kim Moon-soo, at 41.15 per cent. His victory is not a surprise. In the weeks prior to the election, Lee had commanded a sizeable, albeit tightening, lead over his rivals. At 79.4 per cent, turnout was the highest since 1997, perhaps reflecting the heightened stakes and sharp political divisions within South Korean society. The new South Korean president now faces a myriad of domestic, regional, and global challenges, including domestic political polarization, escalating threats from North Korea and China, and evolving dynamics in Seoul’s alliance with Washington. – South Korea’s new president Lee Jae-myung brings uncertainty to Seoul’s foreign policy | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
UK
(AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.) – Atlantic Council) By publishing its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, the United Kingdom has taken a positive step toward the reinvigoration and reform of its defense posture. Recognizing the perilous nature of the geostrategic scene, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, and seeking to enhance its leading role in NATO, the review is rigorous, thoughtful, and compelling; it offers one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory. Its success, however, will hinge on funding and follow-through. The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly. – The UK Strategic Defence Review lays out an ambitious roadmap for reform. Will the government deliver? – Atlantic Council
(Olivia O’Sullivan, Marion Messmer – Chatham House) The UK government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published this week, clearly prioritizes the UK’s contribution to NATO and European security, setting out plans to orient the armed forces around deterring a full-scale war in Europe and protecting civilian infrastructure at home. – The UK Strategic Defence Review draws the right lessons from Ukraine – but still relies on continued US commitment | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Nick Childs, James Hackett, Huw Williams – IISS) The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) not only recognises the armed forces’ limited capacity for warfare with a peer or near-peer adversary, but sets out a defence reform plan for new capabilities, a ‘high-low’ equipment mix, reshaped forces and a reinvigorated defence industrial base that will act as an engine for economic growth and prosperity. Given the threat environment, it notes that ‘business as usual’ is not an option. However, as in all defence reviews, funding will be key to implementation. The review was conducted ‘within the budgetary context of a transition to 2.5% of GDP’ from 2027. An ambition is also noted to spend ‘3% of GDP on defence in the 2030s if economic and fiscal conditions allow’. Timelines are important. Recent IISS analysis assessed that – were a ceasefire to take place in Ukraine in 2025 – Russia could be in a position to pose a significant military challenge to NATO allies, particularly the Baltic states, as early as 2027.1 For its part, the SDR heralds ambitious delivery timelines, but since it sets out a range of ‘recommendations’ rather than firm commitments – even if the defence secretary has accepted the recommendations – the armed forces will be keenly anticipating the outcome of the Spending Review to understand whether, and at what pace, this improved budgetary context for defence can be realised, as well as the formulation of the new Defence Capability Plan that will set out future equipment programmes and force structures. – Strategic Defence Review 2025: UK outlines ambitious vision for defence amid fiscal challenges
(Shashank Joshi – The Strategist) It’s ‘a truly transformational and genuinely strategic review,’ according to the three external reviewers who headed its production. Prime Minister Keir Starmer says the document, Britain’s Strategic Defence Review 2025, is a ‘landmark shift in our deterrence and defence.’. In essence, the review says Britain’s armed forces, as well as industry, civil society and others, must prepare again for the possibility of a high-intensity, peer-on-peer conflict. – Five important ideas from Britain’s defence review | The Strategist
Ukraine
(Antonina Broyaka, Vitalii Dankevych, Emma Dodd, and Caitlin Welsh – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Given the critical role agriculture plays in Ukraine’s national economy, a number of strategic reconstruction plans have put forth various policy frameworks to rebuild the country’s agriculture sector. However, no formal, comprehensive plan for Ukraine’s agricultural recovery exists today after more than three years of protracted conflict. From Black Sea port infrastructure to farmland soils, Russia’s war has negatively impacted all aspects of Ukraine’s agricultural system. Russia has gained significant economic and geopolitical benefits by doing so, including the diminishment of Ukraine’s wartime economy, disruption to EU agricultural markets, and opening of opportunity for Russia to expand its agricultural market share—and influence—in strategic regions. The Kyiv School of Economics and the World Bank’s latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates total direct damages to Ukraine’s agriculture sector at $11.2 billion, leading to $72.7 billion in losses since 2022. Reconstruction and recovery will be costly, estimated at $55.5 billion over the next 10 years, but the benefits are numerous: bolstering Ukraine’s economy, strengthening global food security, and countering Russia’s expanding influence in global agriculture markets. CSIS’s white paper, “Blueprint for an Agricultural Recovery Plan for Ukraine,” presents the essential elements of an agricultural recovery plan that would position Ukraine’s agriculture sector for a sustainable and economically competitive future in line with EU integration. When a ceasefire is reached, this blueprint could serve as the basis for a formal plan for Ukraine’s agricultural recovery, endorsed by the Ukrainian government and its partners. Absent a ceasefire plan, the blueprint could still help guide investments from Ukraine’s partners in Ukraine’s agriculture sector. The agricultural recovery priorities are organized temporally into urgent (0–1 years), short-term (1–3 years), medium-term (3–5 years), and long-term (5+ years) actions, with the integration of long-term strategic planning into short-term efforts. – Blueprint for an Agricultural Recovery Plan for Ukraine
US – China
(Graeme Dobell – The Strategist) The struggle between China and the US defines this century. Even close US allies are torn by a choice—not between the two great powers but in choosing whether to back the US against China or to try to stand aside. The US-China bilateral relationship ‘is more strained than it has ever been at any other point in the 21st century’, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) says in its 2025 Asia-Pacific security assessment. Trade, technology and Taiwan set the tone for ‘deep mutual distrust’. The worst-of-times diagnosis applies even without Donald Trump’s trade tensions. Under Joe Biden last year, the IISS’s 2024 security assessment said US–China relations had gone through their worst period since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. – As US resists China, some leaders resist making a choice | The Strategist
US – Islamic State
(Devorah Margolin – Lawfare) Since the Islamic State crashed onto the scene in 2014, the U.S. has led efforts to combat the group’s influence, acting as one of the largest donors to the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State and leading its forces through Operation Inherent Resolve. These efforts resulted in the successful territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2017 and in Syria in 2019. With the fall of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate, however, the threat changed—demanding a new approach. Accordingly, in 2022, U.S. Central Command Commanding General Michael Kurilla divided the Islamic State threat into three parts: “[Islamic State] at large” (the leaders and operatives fighting the U.S. and its partners Irweaq and Syria); “[Islamic State] in detention” (the thousands of Islamic State-affiliated men and boys, as well as some women and girls, held in detention facilities and youth “rehabilitation” centers in Iraq and Syria); and the “potential next generation of [Islamic State]” (the tens of thousands of primarily women and minors held in northeast Syrian Al-Hol and Roj detention camps). This approach led to new funding structures. With a small footprint of mostly Special Forces troops, for the last several years U.S.-led coalition forces have worked with local partners on the ground to counter “Islamic State at large.” The U.S. Department of Defense, through the Counter-Islamic State Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) has spent hundreds of millions of dollars a year funding detention facilities holding almost 10,000 Islamic State-affiliated men and teenage boys, who make up “Islamic State in detention.” In closed detention camps like Al-Hol and Roj—which at their peak held more than 70,000 “potential next generation of the Islamic State,” and today hold around 40,000 primarily women and children—CTEF funding has secured guards outside the camp, while USAID and State Department have primarily funded the camps’ operating budget. USAID and State Department funds have been aimed at Syrian stabilization to ensure the lasting defeat of the Islamic State, as well as funds for Al-Hol in particular. Together, the Defense Department’s CTEF funding, coupled with aid from USAID and State Department, has been vital to countering the three-pronged threat emanating from the Islamic State in Syria today. However, as the U.S. re-evaluates its relationship with Syria, the future of the counter-Islamic State mission is increasingly uncertain. While the Trump administration says it is still prioritizing counter-Islamic State operations, changes to program funding suggests otherwise, presenting both short and long term challenges. – U.S. Funding Cuts Risk Jeopardizing Counter-Islamic State Operations | Lawfare
