COMPLEX RESEARCH LABORATORY
Daily from global think tanks
(the analyzes here recalled do not necessarily correspond to the geostrategic thinking of The Global Eye)
Afghanistan
(Puspa Kumari – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Climate change is one of the most important challenges in the 21st century and has unfavourable consequences, including droughts, floods, storms, decrease in rainfall, landslides, rise in temperature, premature melting of natural glaciers, etc. Despite contributing the least to climate change, Afghanistan remains the sixth most vulnerable country to be affected by climate change. The country has been witnessing erratic rainfall, prolonged droughts, flash floods and earthquakes, wreaking havoc on agricultural productivity and thereby severely affecting local livelihoods.
Biodiversity
(Laetitia Pettinotti, Yue Cao, Tony Mwenda Kamninga, Sarah Colenbrander – ODI) In 2022, signatories to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) committed to provide at least $20 billion a year to restore biodiversity in developing nations by 2025. Just one year out, we are far from achieving this goal. With 55% of global GDP depending on high-functioning biodiversity and a quarter of known species globally facing extinction, the stakes for both people and planet are astronomically high.
China
(Jeremy Mark – Atlantic Council) As China grapples with a property crisis, high youth unemployment, tumbling business and consumer confidence, and an ocean of local government debt, one might expect the government to put everything it has into plans to pull the country out of the economic doldrums. But a meeting of senior Chinese leaders this month is shaping up to offer a very different set of reforms. Instead of focusing on China’s current problems, the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee—so-called because it is the third session of the committee’s five-year term—will prepare China for a confrontation with the United States by building industries powered by massive investments in cutting-edge technologies. This program is aimed at reinforcing the party’s hold on Chinese society and paying obeisance to paramount leader Xi Jinping, whose policy mistakes—ranging from zero-COVID-19 lockdowns to a crackdown on major online companies—have produced economic malaise. It will also underline China’s shift away from its longtime economic strategy of growth for growth’s sake.
(Robin Brooks – Brookings) There is currently a lot of focus on capital flight out of China. This post—the seventh in our new Global Economy and Markets blog—examines capital flight in 2015 and 2016, which came after a surprise devaluation of China’s yuan against the dollar in August 2015. That devaluation came after a decade during which the yuan either strengthened or was stable against the dollar and sparked fear among Chinese households that further depreciation was inevitable. What followed was large-scale capital flight, causing official foreign exchange reserves to fall around $1 trillion as China defended the yuan. There is once again lots of focus on capital flight out of China now, but—while outflows are certainly happening—they are nowhere near the panic in 2015 and 2016. That is not to say that capital flight could not resume. If onshore expectations of yuan depreciation build once again, that could reignite genuine capital flight. Additional large U.S. tariffs could be a catalyst for this, given that such tariffs led to meaningful yuan depreciation in 2017 and 2018.
China’s Achilles’ heel—capital flight | Brookings
China – Russia
(Ondrej Ditrych, Alice Ekman – European Union Institute for Security Studies) China and Russia have a shared interest in revising the global political order, which they perceive as overly dominated by the United States and its allies. Their current rapprochement is primarily driven by this concern, and facilitated by the absence of a perceived mutual threat between the two countries
European Union
(Carl Bildt – European Council on Foreign Relations) As Brussels gears up for the next institutional cycle, it should first take stock of the last five years of EU foreign policy
Rough seas: A scorecard of the EU’s last institutional cycle | ECFR
European Union – USA – China
(Mathilde Velliet – French Institute of International Relations) Outbound investments into rival powers are receiving increasing political attention on both sides of the Atlantic, as competition between the United States and China intensifies. The concern lies with American and European investments in certain Chinese technologies – such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, semiconductors, or quantum computing – which could enable China to enhance its military capabilities and thus may pose risks to national and international security.
France
(Célia Belin, Camille Grand, Camille Lons – European Council on Foreign Relations) France is on the cusp of a seismic political shift as voters head to the polls for the second round of the snap election for the National Assembly on 7 July. The far-right National Rally (RN) is leading the polls, and could emerge with a near or absolute majority in the assembly, making its leader Jordan Bardella prime minister in a cohabitation with President Emmanuel Macron. Alternatively, it could find itself as the largest parliamentary group, though without a majority, resulting in Macron leading a minority government. Either of these outcomes would have serious consequences for France’s domestic and foreign policies.
France’s fallout: The foreign policy consequences of the far right’s ascent | ECFR
Hungary
(Tibor Dessewffy – European Council on Foreign Relations) There is a new kid on the block in Budapest, but it remains to be seen whether Peter Magyar can break 14 years of Orban rule
A star in the storm: The rise of Peter Magyar | ECFR
India
(Lydia Powell, Akhilesh Sati, Vinod Kumar – Observer Research Foundation) Since the end of the pandemic, many international statistical publications on energy and the mainstream media have highlighted India’s emergence as the only large economy with the fastest energy demand growth till 2050. For some, this signalled India’s rise as an economic superpower, but the reality is more nuanced. In 2023, India’s primary energy consumption, listed as the third largest in the World, was 39.02 exajoules (EJ) behind China (170.74 EJ) and the USA (94.28 EJ). Per person, energy consumption in India is 27.3 gigajoules (GJ) compared to 120 GJ in China and 277.3 GJ in US in 2023. India’s per person energy consumption is close to the average in Southern African countries (excluding South Africa) of 25.5 GJ and well below the world average of 77 GJ. If energy consumption growth were a race, India would count as a determined competitor slowly approaching the finishing line (achieve per person energy consumption of about 100 GJ required for high development index [HDI]) while most other large economies have crossed the finishing line.
India’s energy profile: View from the South (orfonline.org)
India – Uzbekistan
(Ayjaz Wani, Kanwar Simar Singh – Observer Research Foundation) India-Uzbekistan relations have flourished on the bedrock of mutual respect and shared values deeply rooted in centuries-old cultural connections. New Delhi has pursued a consistent strategy to elevate the relationship and underscore the region’s strategic and economic importance. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s visit to Uzbekistan in 2015 advanced the strategic partnership and enhanced economic relations. In the last 10 years, the trade between the two countries has seen an upward trend from US$ 316.7 in 2014 to US$ 689.7 in 2023. According to the Statistics Agency of Uzbekistan, India exported goods worth US$ 254.5 million to Uzbekistan in the first four months of 2024. The increased trade is an outcome of high-level political engagements between the two countries that significantly strengthened economic and strategic relations. Still, New Delhi’s strategic and economic interests in the region remained curtailed due to Pakistan’s unwillingness to allow India access through its territory. India must work towards expediting connectivity projects to facilitate continued trade growth and investments.
India and Uzbekistan Trade on the Trajectory of Growth (orfonline.org)
Japan
(Yuta Kimura – ASPI The Strategist) Japan in the past believed it was relatively safe from malign information operations, thanks to the linguistic barrier and a generally high level of public trust in traditional media. But in the wake of some high-profile Chinese disinformation and misinformation operations targeting Japan, the government in Tokyo has rightfully moved beyond these assumptions and is now increasingly aware of the power of information operations to undermine social cohesion and trust in political institutions.
Kenya
(Crisis Group) Kenyan police have killed dozens of protesters since demonstrations against proposed new taxes began on 18 June. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Meron Elias explains the roots of the discontent and calls for meaningful dialogue with young people demanding accountability from the country’s leaders.
What is Behind Kenya’s Protest Movement? | Crisis Group
Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Gulf
(Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter – Institute for the Study of War) Iran: Iran held the second round of its presidential election between ultraconservative hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on July 5 – Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a delegation led by Mossad Director David Barnea to Doha, Qatar on July 5 to continue ceasefire talks – Gaza Strip: Hamas tactics and Shujaiya’s dense, urban terrain are presenting challenges for the IDF, in some cases requiring that Israeli infantry clear buildings multiple times – Lebanon: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and security developments in the Gaza Strip with a senior Hamas delegation in Beirut on July 5.
Iran Update, July 5, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) As the Israel Defense Forces appear to have almost completed their mission to defeat Hamas terrorists in Rafah, a Gazan city along the Egyptian border, the Islamic Republic of Iran is utilizing Hezbollah, its proxy in Lebanon, to attack – even more aggressively – Israel’s northern territories. Behind Hezbollah, behind Hamas, behind Islamic Jihad, behind the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and multiple Shia militias in Syria and Iraq is an expanding jihadist empire whose metropole is in Tehran.
So Many Wars, So Little Time (fdd.org)
(Jacob Nagel – Foundation for Defense of Democracies) After nine months of fighting in Gaza and the north, direct attacks from Iran, and terror attacks inside Israel, the country faces several difficult decisions. The main challenges are the wise transition from a high-intensity war to an ongoing low-intensity war in Gaza, promoting a hostage deal, and shifting the center of gravity to the north (by agreement or war) and to Iran (preventing a nuclear breakout and weakening the regime).
Impending Gaza deal: Is Israel ready to make painful concessions? (fdd.org)
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Hezbollah launched 200 rockets and 20 drones at Israel on July 4, killing an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officer and sparking fires in northern Israel. “Sirens had sounded across communities in Israel’s north throughout Thursday morning as Hezbollah launched its massive attack, one of the largest in the nine months of skirmishes,” the Times of Israel reported. Hezbollah carried out the attack a day after the IDF eliminated Hezbollah senior commander Muhammad Nimeh Nasser in an airstrike in the coastal Lebanese city of Tyre. The IDF identified the Israeli casualty killed in Hezbollah’s attack as Maj. Itay Galea, 38, who was stationed at a military base in the Golan Heights, the Israeli website Ynet added.
Hezbollah Launches 200 Rockets, 20 Drones at Israel in Lethal Attack (fdd.org)
(Rohit Kumar Sharma – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Threat actors linked to Hamas and its allies have been incessantly targeting Israel since the onset of the Israel–Hamas conflict in October 2023. According to the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD), which is responsible for securing Israel’s national cyberspace, the intensity of cyberattacks has increased threefold since the beginning of the conflict. The head of the agency also shared concern over coordinated attacks by Iran and Hezbollah across various sectors in Israel. In response to growing attacks against its infrastructure by formidable adversaries like Iran and its proxies, Israel recently announced that they are building a ‘cyber-dome’ or a digital ‘Iron Dome’ system to protect Israel’s cyberspace to defend against online attacks.
(Shay Shabtai – BESA Center) This paper raises essential issues for discussion regarding the design of Israel’s national cyber strategy. It deals with aspects related to the promotion of national cyber security and the improvement of national resilience and the private sector’s ability to cope with major attacks that have security, economic and social impact. The paper concentrates on what the author considers to be the key issues. It neither pretends nor aims to encompass all the elements involved in formulating a national cyber security strategy. It is intended to point out the complexity of the issues concerned and create a basis for deepening discussions about them. In the service of the discourse, it does not contain decisive or unequivocal recommendations. Nor does it deal with the offensive component, which is a fundamental component of an overall national cyber strategy.
National Cyber Strategy: Issues for Discussion (besacenter.org)
(Reem Cohen – INSS) Since the events of October 7 and especially following the Palestinian Authority’s involvement in legal cases against Israel at international courts in The Hague and the wave of nations recognizing a Palestinian state, the Israeli government has significantly intensified its punitive measures against the PA, where the economy, which was in a difficult situation even before the war, has deteriorated even further. These measures are designed to punish the Palestinian Authority to the point of its collapse since the package of measures will gradually undermine the PA government’s ability to rule. Punitive measures by the Israeli government could spark a violent Palestinian uprising in Judea and Samaria.
(Pnina Sharvit Baruch – INSS) Israel’s strength is deeply tied to its integration within the international system, but this connection is currently under significant threat. The country is confronting an unprecedented international campaign that surpasses previous challenges in its scale and intensity across political, media, and public spheres. This sustained effort has resulted in a marked demonization of Israel and a notable decline in its global standing. Failing to effectively address this campaign poses risks to Israel’s economy, national security, and ability to meet its military objectives, potentially setting back its progress on all fronts. Addressing these challenges requires fundamental changes in Israel’s approach. This document analyzes the ongoing campaign against Israel, its implications for the country’s growing international isolation, and underscores the critical consequences of this trend. Additionally, it proposes a set of policy recommendations aimed at reversing these developments.
Israel on the Dangerous Path to International Isolation | INSS
NATO – Russia
(Mathieu Boulègue – Chatham House) In mid-July, NATO leaders will gather in Washington for the annual summit of the alliance, the 10th such summit since the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. The Washington summit also marks a decade of renewed deterrence policy against the Kremlin and international targeted sanctions against Russia. Moscow has been waging its unrelenting war against Ukraine and the wider Western world for over a decade too, with two invasions, as well as upscaling low-intensity warfare activities against Western interests and NATO.
Nuclear
(Alicia Sanders-Zakre, Susi Snyder – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) Passing an extended and expanded Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) would be an enormous victory for those affected by US nuclear weapons testing and development who will receive compensation from the legislation. A proposed revised bill would include many communities formerly left out from the compensation program, including additional residents of Arizona, Nevada and Utah, for the first time, residents of Colorado, Idaho, Guam, Montana and New Mexico, uranium miners after 1971, veterans of nuclear waste clean-up in the Marshall Islands, and St. Louis area residents exposed to nuclear waste. The bill, originally estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to cost $147 billion over 10 years, was cut down to cost $50 billion over 10 years, due to concerns by members of Congress about the expense. A RECA bill has gained overwhelming support in the Senate, but it has yet to be passed by the House, in part due to ongoing concerns about the price tag.
(Austyn Gaffney – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) The world’s first permanent depository for nuclear fuel waste opens later this year on Olkiluoto, a sparsely populated and lushly forested island in the Baltic Sea three hours north of Helsinki.
(Curtis T. Asplund, Zia Mian, Stewart Prager, Frank von Hippel – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) Physicists have been central to imagining, developing, constructing and advancing nuclear weapons ever since the idea of a nuclear chain reaction came to Leo Szilard in 1933. Over the subsequent 90 years, physicists have also been an important force in global efforts aimed at confronting the nuclear threat they created, through the promotion of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the physics community has been relatively absent as analysts, activists, and advocates contesting nuclear weapons policies. Meanwhile, the Cold War-era nuclear arms control regime has mostly collapsed, a nuclear arms race led by the United States, Russia, and China is underway, and all nine nuclear-armed states are recommitting to nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future.
Poland
(Daniel Fried – Atlantic Council) Poland’s strategic consensus—in support of Ukraine, opposed to Russia’s aggression, pro-NATO, and committed to its alliance with the United States—is solid, notwithstanding second-order (and avoidable) sniping between the governing coalition and the rightist opposition that controls the presidency. That’s more than can be said for France or, for that matter, the United States.
Russia’s War in Ukraine
(Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan – Institute for the Study of War) Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a “final” end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine’s territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war.
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin’s confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine. Putin’s rejection of any ceasefire agreement contradicts the Kremlin’s previous effort to place the onus for negotiations on the West and Ukraine. Putin attempted to portray Orban as an EU representative who can speak on the EU’s behalf – a claim that EU officials explicitly denied. Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Kremlin information operations are influencing domestic Russian support of the war in Ukraine. These Russian polls indicate that Russians who criticize the conduct of the war in Ukraine still support the war due to patriotism and disenfranchisement. Many of Russia’s “non-opponents” to the war have criticisms that parallel those of Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, yet they lack the ultranationalists’ close attention to the war and desire for political change in support of Russian war aims. Ukrainian forces conducted successful drone and missile strikes against targets in Tambov and Rostov oblasts and Krasnodar Krai on July 4 and 5. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Donetsk City. Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care and other support for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine amid ongoing criticisms that the Russian military command sends injured soldiers to fight on the frontline.
South China Sea
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) Tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) have now become a regular affair. While the area had become a key maritime flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific in recent years, over the last year in particular, Beijing has stepped up the conflict with Manila. There have been clashes between Chinese and Filipino coast guard and fishermen almost daily. To reinforce public opinion and influence perception in favour of what China believes are the country’s “correct” maritime limits, Beijing has been using its academics to defend, bolster, and legitimise its SCS claims. The process is a sophisticated and coordinated effort that integrates historical research, legal arguments, academic publications, and international engagement. This strategy not only aims to solidify domestic support but also seeks to influence global opinion and shape the international legal and academic discourse in favour of China’s maritime ambitions while countering distorted international narratives.
China uses academia to assert South China Sea claims (orfonline.org)
UK
(Atlantic Council) After fourteen years, a changing of the guard. The United Kingdom’s Labour Party romped to victory in Thursday’s general elections, winning power for the first time since 2010. Incoming Prime Minister Keir Starmer will have to address Britain’s economic woes, but what other priorities will he have? What about the United Kingdom’s role on the world stage, and its transatlantic and cross-Channel relationships?
Experts react: Labour is back. Here’s what to expect from the new UK government. – Atlantic Council
(Nicolai von Ondarza – SWP) Labour has won a landslide in the United Kingdom (UK) snap elections and will now lead the government. Following the mutual estrangement caused by Brexit, among other changes, this provides an opportunity to revitalise relations with the European Union (EU). Particularly in foreign, security and defence policy, cooperation has already increased in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression, but mainly on an ad hoc basis. In the medium term, it is not a question of reversing Brexit, but rather of establishing an EU-UK Common Strategic Initiative – in other words, a new model for structured relations with a partner that is very important for the EU and Germany. Here, the EU should also show more flexibility than in the past.
(Malcolm Chalmers – RUSI) The UK’s new Labour government takes power at a time of multiplying foreign and defence policy challenges. Can it steer a course through these choppy waters?
(Chatham House) In this recording of a Chatham House event, Bronwen Maddox is joined by an expert panel on the morning of Labour’s landslide win in the UK general election. Will Hutton, Anne McElvoy, James Heappey and Olivia O’Sullivan discuss the Conservatives’ collapse, the new prime minister and his likely cabinet, and what the result means for the UK and its place in the world.
(Bronwen Maddox, Olivia O’Sullivan – Chatham House) It is a mark of the significance of this general election that a result predicted for months still brings with it a sense of uncertainty about what will follow. On paper, there is little difference between most elements of Labour and Conservative foreign policy. The greatest differences are on Europe and migration; on China, Ukraine, the rest, it is astonishingly similar. But there will be early decisions that will set the tone of the Labour government’s approach to Britain’s place in the world and begin to fill in the questions carefully left blank in the campaign.
Can Labour improve Britain’s place in the world? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
USA
(William A. Galston – Brookings) Since the creation of televised presidential debates, they’ve always mattered, sometimes dramatically but it takes some time for the debate effects to surface in the public. Since 1976, the first debate of a presidential year has shifted voters’ preferences by an average of 2.4 percentage points during the two weeks following the debate, almost always against the incumbent president (or the incumbent’s party when the president is not running for reelection). Today, although it has only been one week since the Biden-Trump debate, we can already see the effect of the debate on voter preferences and the news for Biden is not good.
Biden’s debate performance threatens his ability to win | Brookings
