From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Azerbaijan-Türkiye; Central Asia; Ecuador; Europe; Gaza; Japan; Russia; Shadow Fleets; Sudan; US-Iran
Azerbaijan – Türkiye
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed a 15-year gas agreement on January 4 for the Absheron field starting in 2029, reinforcing Türkiye’s energy diversification strategy and accelerating its ambition to become a regional energy hub. The deal reflects deeper Azerbaijan–Türkiye alignment, linking energy cooperation with broader geopolitical goals, including the creation of a Turkic trade corridor positioning Türkiye as the primary gateway between Central Asia and Europe. The agreement advances Absheron’s full-scale development while strengthening Azerbaijan’s export diversification and Türkiye’s position in Eurasia’s shifting energy and security architecture. –Azerbaijan and Türkiye Sign Energy Contract – Jamestown
Central Asia
(Yunis Gurbanov – The Jamestown Foundation) C5+1, the U.S. government’s platform to jointly engage all five Central Asian governments, has transformed from a consultative-level forum to a more operationally oriented framework focusing on economic diversification, connectivity, and critical minerals. The C5+1 shift toward “pragmatic and more deliverable goals” brings new channels for economic and logistical growth via external investment in Central Asia, challenging Russia’s long-standing economic hegemony in the region. Azerbaijan has deepened its involvement in Central Asian meetings, extending the framework’s operational geography beyond Central Asia, in which Azerbaijan works to facilitate the platform’s economic and connectivity projects. – C5+1 Reframing Russia’s Position in Central Asia – Jamestown
Ecuador
(Crisis Group) Crisis Group’s Expert for the Southern Andes, Glaeldys González Calanche, explains why criminal groups in Ecuador have grown so precipitously since 2021 and analyses the impact of the government’s strategy to deploy the military to combat insecurity. – Living in Fear: How Gang Violence Is Reshaping Ecuador | International Crisis Group
Europe
(The Soufan Center) As Europe grapples with the gradual erosion of the institutional and normative foundations of the liberal international order, its most glaring vulnerability remains its fragmented defense posture. Significant issues persist in mounting a credible, non-U.S.-dependent European deterrence and defense framework, with some structural and others solvable through policy innovation and major investment. Although Europe collectively fields a sizable number of military personnel (roughly 1.4 million active-duty personnel), interoperability remains limited. The timelines European officials have set themselves to substitute most U.S. capabilities short of the nuclear deterrent are colliding with a very rapidly shifting international order, leaving European states to hedge against an increasingly unreliable and mercurial transatlantic relationship – Towards a Credible European Deterrence? Rearmament and the State of NATO – The Soufan Center
Gaza
(UN News) The start of a second phase of a stabilisation plan for Gaza offers a potential turning point for the war-ravaged enclave, a senior UN official told the Security Council on Wednesday. Ramiz Alakbarov warned that risks of violence escalating again remain high, while the situation in the occupied West Bank continues to deteriorate. The Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process said he was addressing ambassadors “at a moment of both profound opportunity and considerable risk,” pointing to cautious diplomatic progress on Gaza alongside deepening instability elsewhere. “In front of us we see a potential turning point for Gaza, a genuine chance for a better future,” Mr. Alakbarov said. “But many uncertainties remain.”. He heralded the second phase of President Donald Trump’s 20-point Comprehensive Plan as “a critical step in consolidating the ceasefire in Gaza,” alongside the establishment of new transitional bodies, including the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. – Potential turning point for Gaza as peace plan enters second phase: UN envoy | UN News
Japan
(Chris Baylor – Council on Foreign Relations) On January 23, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae dissolved the Diet and called for a Lower House election on February 8. She hopes to take advantage of her continued high approval ratings which hovered around 70 percent for months to better position the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to legislate a slate of policy initiatives in the coming year. The last two elections proved the LDP had fallen out of favor with Japan’s voters, and Takaichi is betting that she can repair that erosion of confidence in her party. The 2024 Lower House election resulted in a loss of fifty-six seats and left Japan’s conservatives in a minority position. The LDP similarly suffered in the Upper House election last summer, losing its majority and only winning 39 out of the 125 contested seats. As the campaign for the Lower House opens, Takaichi’s approval ratings have dipped to the 60 percent range. Yet, there are broader political currents afoot. – Political Realignment and the 2026 Japanese Election | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia
(Richard Connolly – RUSI) One of the enduring beliefs of liberal internationalism is that economic pressure can substitute for military force. Sanctions, trade restrictions and financial isolation are supposed to raise the costs of aggression to such an extent that governments eventually revise their aims. This faith has been widely applied to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As Russia’s economy shows signs of strain – slowing growth, persistent inflation, high interest rates and deteriorating investment prospects – hopes periodically re-emerge that economic pain will compel Moscow to change course. History, however, offers limited comfort for this view. Wars are rarely abandoned because they become expensive. They are more often terminated when states are defeated militarily, when ruling coalitions fracture, or when regimes themselves collapse. Economic pressure, where it matters, tends to operate through these channels rather than through persuasion alone. The experience of Russia today fits this broader pattern. Its economy is under strain, but that strain is unlikely to prove decisive. – Why Economic Pain Won’t Stop Russia’s War | Royal United Services Institute
Shadow Fleets
(Anna Matilde Bassoli and Emma Isabella Sage – RUSI) The global crackdown on shadow ships continues with the American seizure of a seventh tanker on January 21. This follows the capture of the Bella 1, which was renamed the Marinera before being captured by US and UK forces after a weeks-long pursuit despite a Russian naval escort. Separately, Europe’s battle against shadow ship cable-cutting continued, with France and Finland each separately interdicting a shadow ship in the span of 3 weeks. The surging attention paid to these ships has taken an unpredictable path, with their profile rising as they transitioned from implements of sanctions evasion to irregular warfare, as well as becoming, in one case, a potential flashpoint for conventional war. Shadow fleets are not just an adversarial tool, but a threat in their own right. Both American actions against shadow ships leaving Venezuela and European actions against Russian shadow ships are too limited and specific in scope to have a meaningful global impact. Treating shadow fleets as an auxiliary problem has produced auxiliary results; effective policy will require a strategy designed around the specific challenges of this threat. – Old Ships, Modern Menace: How to Tackle the World’s Shadow Fleets | Royal United Services Institute
Sudan
(Areig Elhag – The Washington Institute) Ending the conflict in Sudan will be exceedingly difficult, and for reasons beyond the country’s fractured political and military landscape. A new regional reality has emerged that cannot be ignored: the deep rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two members of the diplomatic “Quad” established to help resolve the crisis alongside Egypt and the United States. Their disputes and competing interests in Yemen, northeastern Africa, and elsewhere are undermining Washington’s ability to secure a ceasefire in Sudan and initiate the next phase of diplomacy needed to achieve a sustainable resolution. – Breaking the Deadlock in Sudan | The Washington Institute
US – Iran
(Jason M. Brodsky and Danny Citrinowicz – Atlantic Council) On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump posted on social media that a “massive” US armada led by the USS Abraham Lincoln was nearing Iran. “Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary,” he wrote. Jason Brodsky and Danny Citrinowicz have years of experience working on Iran and thoughtful but significantly different viewpoints. After they engaged in a fascinating back-and-forth on X, we asked if they would expand the conversation about the opportunities, uncertainties, and risks associated with a US military strike on Iran. – The expert conversation: Should Trump strike Iran? What happens next if he does? – Atlantic Council
