From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Africa; Cambodia; China; China-Myanmar; COP30; Food Systems; Indonesia; Iran; Japan; Malaysia; Myanmar; Russia-ASEAN; Russia-North Korea; Russia-North Korea-China; Saudi Arabia-Pakistan; Syria; Timor Leste-ASEAN; US-China; US-Saudi Arabia; Vietnam
Africa
(Jhanvi Tripathi, Swati Prabhu – Observer Research Foundation) With global trade in disarray, Africa, though poised for growth, faces severe economic challenges. The continent must respond decisively to avoid losing the momentum it has already begun to build. This report outlines a suggested roadmap for Africa’s rise to a US$7-trillion economy over the next decade, aligned with the “Africa for Africa” vision of Agenda 2063. The recommendations recognise that each African country comes with its own unique contexts and challenges. The authors offer pragmatic policy measures aimed at enabling the continent to achieve the US$7-trillion target in the next decade. – The 2035 Agenda for a 7-Trillion-Dollar Africa
Cambodia
(Scott Rawlinson – East Asia Forum) In pursuing ambitious plans for economic development while amplifying a border dispute with Thailand to garner nationalist support, Cambodia’s government has been engaged in a balancing act. Hun Manet has sought to simultaneously keep the ‘runways’ of development moving while managing the ‘redlines’ of Khmer nationalism. Yet the outcomes have been mixed. While mobilising nationalism has stoked government popularity in the short run, prolonged conflict risks jeopardising long-term growth prospects that underpin the government’s legitimacy. – Stoking nationalism costs Cambodia economic growth | East Asia Forum
China
(Jennifer Lind – Chatham House) Twenty years ago, few observers expected that China would become a serious competitor to US technological leadership. Authoritarian countries, it was argued, would be unable to foster technological innovation. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adapted, transforming China from the world’s assembly line to an innovation superpower. The result is a geopolitical and military challenge far greater than the world’s leading liberal countries ever envisioned. – China’s ‘smart authoritarianism’ has upended ideas about autocracies’ limitations. The West must cooperate to respond | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Zi Yang – The Jamestown Foundation) The Eastern Theater Command leadership has been hollowed out. Its commander has been purged and its political commissar has disappeared, leaving the People’s Liberation Army’s most strategically important theater command effectively leaderless. The absence of top Eastern Theater Command leaders and uncertainty surrounding potential acting commanders weaken the theater command’s Party committee and undermine its ability to prepare for conflict. Despite rising tensions with Japan, the Eastern Theater Command’s compromised leadership structure likely constrains Beijing’s readiness and willingness to engage in high-risk military actions. – Leadership Turmoil Impacts Eastern Theater Command Readiness – Jamestown
China-Myanmar
(Jared Bissinger – FULCRUM) In the last year, China has increasingly used its economic leverage in Myanmar to tilt the scales towards the military’s State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), helping them to regain territory and re-exert economic control. China has done this by combining its economic heft and proximity to Myanmar with a policy of fostering economic connections with both state and non-state authorities, then leveraging these to its advantage. Western countries, on the other hand, have adopted some sanctions but continue trading with the SSPC-controlled state. This is despite the SSPC’s numerous changes to the trading system, which have given it extraordinary control and benefits. The result is that the West’s economic engagement with Myanmar is indirectly undermining its political objectives and aid dollars. This is the key reason why China has been increasingly influential in Myanmar while Western countries have been sidelined. – How China Outmanoeuvres the West in Myanmar | FULCRUM
COP30
(Leslie Abrahams, Jane Nakano, Noam Unger, J. Stephen Morrison, Katherine E. Bliss, Mathias Zacarias, Ray Cai, and Alexis Burns – CSIS) The 30th United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP30) gathered heads of state, diplomats, climate stakeholders, and business leaders at the “gateway to the Amazon” in the city of Belém, Brazil. Despite the absence of the United States, which eliminated the possibility of a large breakthrough on climate, the summit delivered noteworthy progress in several areas. CSIS experts unpack some of COP30’s most notable outcomes and their implications for the future of climate, energy, health, development, and the COP process at large. – Experts React: Progress and Setbacks at COP30
Food Systems
(Shoba Suri – Observer Research Foundation) Climate change, systemic inefficiencies, financial exclusion, and widening inequalities in access to nutritious food are converging into a multidimensional crisis that threatens both planetary and human health. Today, agriculture contributes nearly 39 percent of food-system emissions, while land-use changes and supply chain activities add 32 and 29 percent, respectively. Left unchanged, these emissions could climb to 30 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2050, a staggering 67 percent rise /from current levels. At the same time, climate change has already reduced global agricultural productivity by 21 percent since 1961, the equivalent of losing an entire decade of development. These impacts are not evenly distributed. Tropical regions, home to some of the world’s most vulnerable communities, face productivity losses exceeding 40 percent, intensifying risks of hunger across Africa, Central America, South Asia, and the Middle East. While these challenges are not new, their intensity and interconnectedness demand new solutions. Among the most promising of these is Fintech, the emerging ecosystem of digital tools reshaping financial access, risk management, and value chain integration. As agriculture sits at the centre of climate vulnerability and food insecurity, fintech’s potential to transform the sector is enormous. However, systemic inefficiencies continue to drain resources across food systems, the most glaring of which is food loss and waste (FLW). Globally, one-third of all food (1.3 billion tons) produced is lost or wasted. The economic cost is close to US$1 trillion annually, and the environmental cost is even higher at 8-10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. The paradox is stark: the world produces enough food for everyone; yet more than 828 million people go to bed hungry each night, while one in three suffers from some form of malnutrition. Patterns differ sharply by income level: developing countries lose nearly 13 percent of food post-harvest, while consumer-driven waste dominates in richer economies. – Fintech’s Promise for Equitable and Sustainable Food Systems
Indonesia
(Mirza Fanzikri – FULCRUM) In this year’s annual State of the Nation address before the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) on 15 August, President Prabowo Subianto warned that he would crack down on those who ran or owned illegal mining operations in the country, regardless of whether they were serving or retired generals from the military or police or politicians from his own Gerindra Party. The president noted that there were approximately 1,063 illegal mining sites across Indonesia, which potentially cost the state at least 300 trillion rupiah (about US$19 billion). However, instead of halting illegal mining activities entirely, Prabowo promised to transform some small-scale illegal mining operations involving ordinary citizens into community-based cooperatives. – Why Community Mining Is No Panacea for Illegal Mining | FULCRUM
(Adi Abidin – East Asia Forum) Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s first year in power was orchestrated not only through policy rollout, but also carefully crafted rhetoric. His governing philosophy of discipline, compassion and continuity has resulted in an Indonesia that is stable, coherent and command-driven, forming a centripetal hierarchy that draws loyalty upwards. Twenty-five years after Suharto’s fall, Indonesian politics is witnessing a second smiling general with a brand of paternal populism that blends affection with authority. – The return of the smiling general to Indonesian politics | East Asia Forum
Iran
(David Michel, Will Todman, and Jennifer Jun – CSIS) Tehran is experiencing an unprecedented water crisis. Satellite imagery analysis shows that key reservoirs that feed the capital are far below their typical seasonal variation. The Iranian president has warned that Iran has “no choice” but to move the location of the capital due to the water crisis. In the short term, water rationing has been imposed on some neighborhoods, and authorities may have to evacuate residents from Tehran. This crisis is driven by mounting demand for water, a historic drought, and persistent mismanagement. The Iranian government faces no easy way out, as necessary reforms would undercut the regime’s political economy and could risk triggering broad social unrest. – Satellite Imagery Shows Tehran’s Accelerating Water Crisis
Japan
(Toshiya Takahashi – East Asia Forum) Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s early popularity rests on speculative public expectations, a fragile LDP–Ishin arrangement and her dependence on party heavyweight Taro Aso, leaving her authority vulnerable despite high initial approval ratings. To avoid the rapid collapses in approval that have plagued past Japanese governments, Takaichi must deliver tangible policy outcomes in a factionalised political environment. – Uncertainties trail behind Takaichi’s strong start | East Asia Forum
(Charles Crabtree, Sona N Golder – East Asia Forum) Sanae Takaichi’s historic rise as Japan’s Prime Minister comes amid one of the most uncertain parliamentary situations in postwar history. Governing without Komeito for the first time in two decades, her Liberal Democratic Party relies on a loose confidence-and-supply deal with the Japan Innovation Party. As a minority government, the Takaichi cabinet’s survival hinges on careful bargaining and constant coalition-building in a divided Diet. – Takaichi’s Japan enters an era of fragile coalitions | East Asia Forum
Malaysia
(Francis E. Hutchinson – FULCRUM) Muhyiddin Yassin, former Prime Minister (PM) and current President of Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), is feeling the many pains of being in the opposition. His party’s funds are frozen, he faces charges of abuse of power, and he has family members under investigation for alleged criminal breach of trust. Yet, Muhyiddin’s personal travails are only part of the picture. He presides over a deeply divided party. There are three factions: one centred around Muhyiddin, another led by Bersatu Deputy President and former UMNO inside man Hamzah Zainuddin, and a third headed by Bersatu Secretary General and former PKR vice-president Azmil Ali. Those affiliated with Hamzah would like Muhyiddin to step aside now, while those allied with Azmin are happy for the transfer to take place later – as long as it is to their benefit. – Bersatu’s Muhyiddin Yassin: Why the Rush to Say ‘Good-bye’? | FULCRUM
(Syaza Shukri – FULCRUM) Malaysia signed a new trade pact with the US on 26 October 2025 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. One of the requirements is for Malaysia to align its export controls and sanctions screening with US standards, a concern that is amplified in domestic politics as potentially undermining Bumiputera privileges. Without missing a beat, opposition leaders claimed the agreement was lopsided and eroded national sovereignty. The government defended it as a pragmatic safeguard to protect Malaysian exporters from ongoing tariff disruptions. In frustration, Prime Minister (PM) Anwar Ibrahim dismissed calls for his resignation over the matter. – PAS’ ‘Civilisational Outrage’ at the US Rings Hollow When China Gets a Pass | FULCRUM
Myanmar
(Crisis Group) The 2021 coup upended the balance of power in Shan State, Myanmar’s largest. As anti-military resistance grew, non-Shan ethnic armed groups moved into areas of the northern trade corridor, to the Shan majority’s frustration. National and international actors, including neighbouring China, should work to ease tensions. – Fractured Heartland: Shan Politics and Conflict in Post-coup Myanmar | International Crisis Group
Russia-ASEAN
(Aleksei Zakharov – Observer Research Foundation) Recognising that the unpredictable US-China dynamics are putting additional pressure on Southeast Asian states, Moscow has attempted to capitalise on ASEAN’s foreign policy approaches. As the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk highlighted at the 20th East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, Russia and ASEAN “must jointly seek economic balances between the new multipolar world centres, primarily, the countries of Northern Eurasia, Southeast Asia, North America, China, and India.” Convinced of ‘building bridges’ in Eurasia, Moscow has offered new integration mechanisms as well as specific commodities and technological solutions that can shore up regional economies during this period of flux. – Russia and ASEAN: Markets, Multilateralism, and a Third Way
Russia-North Korea
(Molly Carlough and James Kennedy – Council on Foreign Relations) In the more than three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea has emerged as a significant ally for Moscow. By first providing ammunition and weapons, then sending thousands of its own troops to fight alongside the Russian military, North Korea has become essential to fueling Russia’s war machine. It has reportedly suffered heavy casualties yet also benefited by modernizing its military and anchoring itself more firmly in an anti-Western coalition led by China and Russia. – How North Korea Has Bolstered Russia’s War in Ukraine | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia-North Korea-China
(Seong-Hyon Lee – The Jamestown Foundation) Multiple Chinese readouts from the president-, premier-, and foreign minister-levels have omitted references to “denuclearization” following summits between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Russia, the DPRK, and the PRC are engaged in a mutually-beneficial triangular relationship, which promotes diversification from Western dependence for Russia, regime survival for the DPRK, and a buffer that drains U.S. focus and resources for the PRC. The dynamic is not a formal alliance, nor is it a “marriage of convenience.” It may be considered an “axis.”. Competition and bilateral frictions are still present, but the bloc continues to promote sanctions-resilience and satisfy the needs of each participant. – PRC–Russia–DPRK Relations Grow Closer – Jamestown
Saudi Arabia-Pakistan
(Kabir Taneja – Observer Research Foundation) In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). The agreement revitalises an old strategic cooperative arrangement between Islamabad and Riyadh and comes amid a churn in the international order that has impacted both the Middle East and South Asia alike. While strategic and fraternal ties between the two states are not new, what requires examination is the recalibration, intent, language, and timing of this renewed understanding between the home of the two Holy Mosques, on one side, and on the other, the Islamic world’s only state with nuclear weapons. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan go back seven decades, and Pakistani military personnel being deployed for Saudi security requirements is also an institutionalised process cemented over the years. In essence, the signing of the SMDA itself is not a tectonic geopolitical event. However, a section of the language used in the statement, although vague, calls for a “collective defence” framework, which piqued the interest of analysts, including in India. – The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Agreement: Perspectives from India and the Middle East
(Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Ambar Khawaja – Observer Research Foundation) In September 2025, Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive defence pact with Pakistan not long after an Israeli missile attack on Qatar. While driven by broader geopolitical shifts, this was not an isolated gesture of goodwill. Since 2024, Saudi Arabia has concluded 34 bilateral agreements with Pakistan, amounting to over US$2.8 billion in commitments across various sectors. This renewed financial engagement marks a steady recovery from the setback in 2015, when Pakistan declined Saudi Arabia’s request for military support during the Yemen war. The two countries have since begun a rapprochement, seeking to strengthen their ties in the past few years, with Saudi Arabia viewing Pakistan as a crucial military, economic, and geostrategic partner in advancing its ‘Vision 2030’. – Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Ties: Explaining the Shifts in Proximity
Syria
(Crisis Group) Two major crises – one in majority-Alawite areas and another in the largely Druze south – have tested Syria’s new government in 2025. Its heavy-handed response has alienated parts of society. To keep the country’s transition on track, it needs to remedy flaws in its security approach. – Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida | International Crisis Group
Timor Leste-ASEAN
(Shafiah Muhibat – East Asia Forum) By acceding to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Timor-Leste has strengthened ASEAN’s identity as a neutral, law-based regional body. Despite scepticism about the treaty’s limited military impact, the move underscores ASEAN’s commitment to regional peace amid growing US–China tensions. Its move completes the treaty’s geographic coverage, revives the bloc’s political coherence and reaffirms non-alignment as ASEAN’s core strategic principle. – Timor-Leste steps up as ASEAN’s new neutrality anchor | East Asia Forum
US-China
(Vivek Mishra, Prakreeti Chaudhary – Observer Research Foundation) The redirection of global focus on the geopolitical compact G2 in the current discourse is both reminiscent of an older conception and points to an impending shift. The reference did not emanate from a coordinated diplomatic announcement between the two largest powers- China and the United States (US). Instead, it resurfaced through a calculated message from US President Donald Trump, who declared on social media that “The G2 will be convening shortly.” Far from being a rhetorical flourish, the statement functioned as a deliberate strategic signal. By framing his meeting with Xi Jinping in Busan as a “G2” engagement, Trump pitched the encounter as a potential pivot at the helm of international politics, stating that the US and China alone could shape the parameters of global order at a moment of deep systemic uncertainty. The Busan Summit, which followed Trump’s declaration, was more packed with theatrics and transactional wins than any tangible, structural change. Beijing agreed to resume large-scale US soybean purchases, which would benefit Trump’s farm base. On the other hand, Washington offered selective tariff relief and signalled flexibility on certain high-end technology export controls. China also pledged cooperation on fentanyl precursors and rare-earth supplies essential to US industries. However, beyond these announcements, the summit produced no new institutional commitments, principles, or conflict-management mechanisms. In a pattern quite akin to Trump’s, Busan was high on performative diplomacy, which appeared staged and devoid of any concrete or long-term fix. – Return of the G2: Trump, China, and the Mirage of a Bipolar World
US-Saudi Arabia
(Darya Dolzikova – RUSI) On 18 November, the US and Saudi Arabia concluded a series of agreements on strategic, defence and economic cooperation. At least two of these agreements are directly relevant to US-Saudi cooperation in the civil nuclear sector, although the precise details of their contents are not yet clear. While any hopes that Saudi Arabia may become a meaningful player in US efforts to diversify its own nuclear supply chain are misplaced, the strategic implications of these agreements should not be underestimated. The details of the deal – critically, whatever non-proliferation provisions are agreed on as part of the deal – will have consequences for the broader region. – The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Supply Chain and Non-Proliferation Implications | Royal United Services Institute
Vietnam
(Nguyen Khac Giang – FULCRUMI) Vietnam’s top leader, To Lam, has spent his first year on an unusually busy diplomatic circuit. Among his 20 foreign stops (by author’s count), one has left analysts scratching their heads. In October, just two months after visiting Seoul, where Vietnam inked US$250 million in South Korean arms deals and deepened ties with its largest foreign investor, To Lam flew to Pyongyang to stand beside Kim Jong Un at a military parade, making him the first General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) since Nong Duc Manh in 2007 to set foot in North Korea. The optics hardly make sense: Vietnam courts South Korea for capital, technology, and supply-chain security while North Korea offers none of these. – The Domestic Calculations of To Lam’s Foreign Policy | FULCRUM
