From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Australia-US; Caspian Sea; Central African Republic; China; China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan; European Union; European Union-India; Indo-Pacific; Myanmar; Russia-Belarus; Russia-Ukraine; Singapore; Türkiye-Syria; UK-Mauritius-Chagos Archipelago; US; US-China; US-Cuba; US-Russia
Australia – US
(James Curran – East Asia Forum) Australia appeared to weather US President Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 relatively well, securing relatively favourable trade and defence outcomes. But this apparent reprieve conceals deeper strategic vulnerabilities stemming from the United States’ unpredictable and often unilateral foreign policy. As Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese seeks to maintain a careful balance between Washington and Beijing, Trump’s renewed emphasis on spheres of influence, coupled with his disregard for allied concerns, increasingly challenges the sustainability and effectiveness of Australia’s diplomatic straddle. – Trump stretches Australia’s strategic straddle | East Asia Forum
Caspian Sea
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) The increased military use of the Caspian by Russia and Iran, ranging from the illicit delivery of arms to attacks on Ukraine, is sparking concerns that the sea is no longer safe for shipping in Azerbaijan and other littoral states. Ukraine has responded to this trend with drone attacks in the Caspian. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have increased the size and activity of their navies, and Azerbaijan and Türkiye have expanded their cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Three alliances are emerging on the Caspian littoral, and the risks of clashes between them are growing, heightening tensions and threatening the interests of trading partners, such as the People’s Republic of China, which depends on Caspian sea lanes. – Caspian Less Safe for Shipping as Russia and Iran Increase Military Use of Sea – Jamestown
Central African Republic
(Crisis Group) En République centrafricaine, malgré des inquiétudes entourant l’intégrité du scrutin, largement remporté par le pouvoir, les élections générales du 28 décembre se sont déroulées dans le calme. Dans ce Q&A, l’expert de Crisis Group Charles Bouëssel analyse les progrès sécuritaires accomplis par le pays au cours des dernières années et souligne la nécessité de poursuivre ces efforts. – Centrafrique : après les élections, consolider les gains sécuritaires | International Crisis Group
China
(Ange Vaucher – RUSI) On 24 January, China’s Ministry of Defence announced it was investigating two members of the powerful Central Military Commission, the country’s supreme military leadership body. The removal of Zhang Youxia, China’s highest-ranking general, along with Liu Zhenli, leaves the Commission with merely two members (President Xi Jinping and one uniformed official) to head and manage China’s People’s Liberation Army. This internal fracture in China’s military apparatus contrasts with the recent external assertiveness of its foreign policy community. Its culmination came last November, with the return of China’s infamous ‘wolf warriors’, confrontational diplomats who had made themselves first known through fiery rhetoric during the Covid pandemic. Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian posted the following tweet in response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s position on military support for Taiwan: ‘The only thing to do is cut off a dirty neck without a moment’s hesitation. Are you ready for that?’. Such language, combined with support from China’s Foreign Ministry, whose spokesperson asked, ‘Where does Japan intend to take China-Japan relations?’, successfully framed the debate in terms foreign to China’s domestic politics, shifting attention to the regional balance of power. Yet this risks obscuring the deeper internal causes for Chinese diplomats’ ;initial reactions to Takaichi’s stance. Turning our attention to China’s politics in analysing this episode instead provides key insights: aggressive rhetoric provided relief for a foreign policy-making system under intense political pressure and thus serves as useful indication of the varying levels of constraint felt inside China. – What are China’s New Wolf Warriors Really Fighting For? | Royal United Services Institute
China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan
(Syed Fazl-e-Haider – The Jamestown Foundation) The CKU Railway Company LLC signed a $4.7 billion loan agreement in December 2025 that advances the long-delayed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is providing over half the funding through a 35-year loan to the joint venture. The CKU railway is a technically complex project with extensive tunnels and bridges, and will significantly reduce transit times between the PRC and Europe, boosting Central Asia’s role as a critical Eurasian transit hub. This railway creates a bypass route that avoids transit routes in Russia, diminishing Moscow’s regional transit influence and elevating Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as key partners in diversified Eurasian trade routes. – China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway Financing Loan Signed – Jamestown
European Union
(Chatham House) The EU’s well-known commitment to the low-carbon transition implies rapid take-up of technologies – including electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines – that are often principally associated with tackling climate change. However, beyond the benefits in terms of emissions reduction, the energy transition is critical to the EU purely on the grounds of energy security. This fact is often lost on those who argue, not always in good faith, that the EU cannot transition more rapidly from fossil fuels to renewables without putting its energy security at risk. This paper advocates an accelerated transition as a means not only to meet climate goals but also to improve the EU’s energy security. Our analysis highlights how the bloc’s reliance on imported fossil fuels is a major source of energy insecurity, explains why nuclear power cannot take up the slack (for reasons of cost, long development timeframes, and legacy reliance on Russian fuel and parts), and illustrates the ability of renewables to alleviate price volatility, insulate against supply shocks and mitigate the geopolitical risks associated with the EU’s fossil fuel demand. Also critical to the success of this transition are the electrification of transport and increased use of flexible, digitized grids to manage supply and demand more efficiently. The paper presents detailed proposals for policy changes that could be undertaken by the European Commission and its partners. – Why renewables and electrification hold the keys to EU energy security | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
European Union – India
(Atlantic Council) The superlative description—“the mother of all deals”—is unmistakably Trumpian, but it didn’t involve the United States. On Tuesday, Indian and the European Union (EU) leaders announced the completion of a major trade deal. “We have created a free trade zone of two billion people, with both sides set to benefit,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a statement that also included the description above. “It represents 25 percent of the global [gross domestic product] and one-third of global trade,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi added. – The EU and India are creating a free trade area of two billion people. What’s next? – Atlantic Council
Indo – Pacific
(Eric Ang, Tita Sanglee – East Asia Forum) Despite regional governments’ significant investment in advanced maritime technology, real-world outcomes in the Indo-Pacific continue to depend on trust-based coordination among people. Institutions such as Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre enable cross-border information-sharing and collaboration, complementing technological systems. As strategic competition and climate-driven disasters intensify, strengthening liaison networks, improving interoperability and expanding shared training provide Southeast Asian states with a cost-effective approach to managing maritime risks that no single country can address alone. – Human networks anchor maritime security in the Indo-Pacific | East Asia Forum
Myanmar
(Bill Hayton – Chatham House) Five years after its military coup, Myanmar has a nominally civilian government. But the outcome of the general elections held on 25 January was never in doubt. Opposition parties were banned, voting did not take place in areas of the country affected by the ongoing civil war and there were widespread reports of coerced voting. As a result, we can be sure the military’s chosen front organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, won a landslide victory. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has called on the international community to ’unequivocally reject’ the outcome. But is that the best way forward? Or is now the time to reassess relations with the military (‘Tatmadaw’ in Burmese)? – Myanmar ‘election’ shows the military regime is here to stay. How should the world respond? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Russia – Belarus
(Alexander Taranov – The Jamestown Foundation) The Kremlin’s December 2025 placement of the Oreshnik missile battalion on combat duty in Belarus is the highest readiness level for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe. The deployment of up to ten launchers is temporary, while permanent infrastructure remains in Russia. Russia’s use of mobile launchers has not been confirmed—Moscow’s January strike on Ukraine’s Lviv Oblast used a stationary launcher in Kapustin Yar, Russia, indicating that the Oreshnik has not been successfully integrated with the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT, Минский Завод Колёсных Тягачей, Minskii Zavod Kolësnykh Tiagashei) mobile chassis. The missile battalion in Belarus is fully subordinate to Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN, Ракетные Войска Стратегического Назначения, Raketniye Voiska Strategisheskovo Naznacheniia) Main Command, leaving Minsk without real influence over launch orders or target selection but with political and military culpability for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe. – Belarus Liable for Oreshnik but Lacks Control – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe – CSIS) Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity. – Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine
Singapore
(Chang Yee Kwan – East Asia Forum) Singapore’s strong 2025 economic performance, buoyed by AI-driven manufacturing demand, masked growing structural strains in its labour market, including skills mismatches, modest retraining uptake and uneven unemployment across age groups. While targeted transfers and location-based investment strategies have reduced inequality and attracted global capital, persistent re-entry into public assistance and rising household risk exposure point to limits in social mobility under current policy orthodoxies. – Singapore must balance growth and social mobility | East Asia Forum
Türkiye-Syria
(Gönül Tol – Middle East Institute) After a year of talks mediated by the United States failed to persuade the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — a Kurdish-led militia that controls autonomous civilian and military institutions in Syria’s northeast — to dismantle those structures and integrate into the Syrian state, long-simmering tensions with Damascus boiled over, leading to a rapid shift in dynamics on the ground. Over the past two weeks, government forces have seized large swathes of northern and eastern Syria from the SDF, retaking two key Arab-majority provinces, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. The offensive brought major oil fields, hydroelectric dams, and detention facilities holding Islamic State (ISIS) fighters and affiliated civilians back under state control, significantly consolidating President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s authority. A four-day cease-fire between the Syrian government and the SDF agreed on January 20 has been extended by 15 days, giving the group time to disarm and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army — or to resume fighting. Whether the truce holds or collapses will have major implications for neighboring Turkey, which has long-standing interests in Syria, but recent developments already point to a win for Ankara. From Turkey’s perspective, post-Bashar al-Assad Syria presented two immediate challenges: Kurdish autonomy along its southern border and Israeli actions that Ankara believed undermined its goals. The latest shifts suggest that Tom Barrack, President Donald Trump’s ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria, helped tilt the balance in Turkey’s favor on both fronts. – Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria – Middle East Institute
UK – Mauritius – Chagos Archipelago
(Marc Weller – Chatham House) The UK government has delayed further debate in the House of Lords on ratification of the Chagos Archipelago treaty, an agreement signed by the UK and Mauritius in May 2025. The pause follows an amendment tabled by the UK Conservative Party asserting that completion of the ratification process would breach a 1966 agreement between the US and UK regarding the joint military bases in the archipelago. The 2025 Chagos Archipelago treaty between Mauritius and the UK would transfer sovereignty of the islands, including the large military base on Diego Garcia that is shared with the US, to Mauritius. However, at the same time, the UK would obtain a 99-year lease over Diego Garcia, which would assure that the base there would continue to operate as before. That lease can be extended for further periods. – UK ratification of the Chagos Archipelago treaty will not violate international law | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park – CSIS) The Trump administration presents its new National Defense Strategy (NDS) as a break from previous strategies, including that of the first Trump administration. Out are Russia, Europe, and climate change. In are hemispheric security, “warrior ethos,” and burden shifting. Many changes are indeed substantial, even radical, and reportedly received pushback from military leaders during the drafting process. Others, however, may not be as significant as they first appear, and there is some continuity with previous strategy documents. The document also constitutes a different reading experience, departing from the analytic tone of previous strategy documents and often adopting the tone of a political rally. – The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers: Radical Changes, Moderate Changes, and Some Continuities
(Rebecca Patterson – Council on Foreign Relations) The so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord is becoming a reality. The original paper, titled “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System” and written by Stephen Miran—who served as chair of President Donald Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors until his appointment as a voting governor at the Federal Reserve—proposed several strong-arm economic tactics to upend the world order in the United States’ favor. A surprising number of those policy proposals now align with events on the ground: tariffs are being used to help reshape the global economic order, foreign states are investing more in their defense, policies aimed at lowering energy prices through greater supply have been enacted, and efforts are underway to weaken the dollar while keeping it globally dominant and limit any rise in Treasury bond yields. Given this level of implementation, the Accord could provide clues as to what could come next. Three of Miran’s policy proposals stand out as increasingly likely near-term: currency intervention to weaken the dollar, a closer partnership between the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to limit Treasury bond yields, and potential taxes on foreign investments. An optimistic scenario for the White House would see a weaker dollar supporting American exports as lower Treasury yields help household and business borrowing, not to mention interest payments on government debt. The risk, however, is that a weaker dollar contributes to sticky inflation and limits Fed rate cuts. Meanwhile, questions around Fed independence and the attractiveness of U.S. debt, especially to foreign investors, could raise market volatility, push longer-term Treasury yields higher, and weigh down economic growth. Miran has three proposals in the Accord that could be considered Trump administration goals in the year ahead—perhaps bringing new economic risks. Uncertainty is the common thread tying their disparate potential outcomes together. – The Mar-a-Lago Accord’s Economic Ripple Effect Widens | Council on Foreign Relations
(Rashawn Ray, Gabriel R. Sanchez – Brookings) Many cities have seen ICE surges, including Washington, DC, and Minneapolis. A push to double the ICE workforce, concurrent with much reduced training for recruits, raises concerns about the qualifications of quickly deployed new agents. As ICE continues to face allegations over its methods, there are practical measures that can be implemented immediately to safeguard both national security and human rights. – ICE expansion has outpaced accountability. What are the remedies? | Brookings
US – China
(Kenton Thibaut – Atlantic Council) A new entity controlling the social media app TikTok in the United States is being sold as a step toward addressing foreign influence and data security concerns. But China’s influence campaigns and access to data on Americans do not rely on TikTok. Plus, the Chinese parent company ByteDance will retain control over the TikTok algorithm, leaving the door open to possible manipulation by the Chinese government of what shows up in Americans’ feeds. – TikTok’s new ownership structure doesn’t solve security concerns for Americans – Atlantic Council
US – Cuba
(The Soufan Center) Following the successful U.S. military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, U.S. President Donald Trump and his inner circle appear emboldened to continue their foreign policy campaign throughout the Western Hemisphere, now setting their sights on Cuba. Trump posted on his Truth Social account on January 11 that, “Cuba lived, for many years, on large amounts of OIL and MONEY from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided ‘Security Services’ for the last two Venezuelan dictators, BUT NOT ANYMORE!” And “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA – ZERO! I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.” The rivalry between Washington and Havana dates back to the Cold War and American attempts to meddle with the government of Cuba, where intelligence operations sought to depose Fidel Castro’s Communist regime and replace it with a government more pliable to U.S. demands. – After Venezuela, the United States Could Turn its Attention to the Cuban Regime – The Soufan Center
US – Russia
(Georgia Cole – Chatham House) On 4 February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is due to expire. If it does, it will mark the first time since the early 1970s that there will be no legally binding limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces without another agreement being under negotiation. This would mark a significant break in more than five decades of bilateral nuclear arms control. It would also signal a move away from nuclear restraint, making the world a more dangerous place. – The US and Russia’s nuclear weapons treaty is set to expire. Here’s what’s at stake | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
