Brazil – India
(The Soufan Center) Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva’s recent visit to India marks a significant step in the deepening of strategic and economic ties between the two middle powers. The trip centered on a newly signed critical minerals and mining cooperation pact, which will focus on attracting investment for exploration, mining, and steel-sector infrastructure. Lula’s visit also coincided with the India AI Impact Summit, India’s leading forum on artificial intelligence, where Lula participated and spoke on the need to regulate AI to mitigate harmful effects like disinformation and to ensure its benefits extend to the Global South. The partnership between Brazil and India is particularly strong as both countries have been navigating the consequences of the steep tariffs imposed by the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump. – Brazil and India Deepen Strategic Ties – The Soufan Center
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Brian G. Karamuka – The Jamestown Foundation) In December 2025, the March 23 Movement (M23) seized the city of Uvira in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) after a year of steady advances across the country, underscoring the ineffectiveness of regional military interventions against the group. Formed in late 2022 to counter M23’s 2021 resurgence, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) has proved ineffective because contributing nations have avoided direct combat, pursued divergent security interests, and lacked a unified operational framework. Public confidence in regional forces has been severely eroded as M23 has continued to exercise de facto authority and collect local taxes in eastern DRC. Following civilian deaths, widespread protests demanded the withdrawal of both the EACRF and UN peacekeepers. – Regional Interventions Fail to Contain M23 in Eastern Congo – Jamestown
Honduras
(María Fernanda Bozmoski and Isabella Palacios – Atlantic Council) President Nasry Asfura’s early reforms signal a focus on fiscal austerity and economic competitiveness, sending positive signals to the private sector and to President Donald Trump, who backed Asfura during the campaign. The expansion of the Temporary Import Regime and steps to rejoin the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes aim to strengthen the investment climate and support trade. Lasting gains will require structural reforms in trade, investment, and energy, and securing promised deals with Washington and Taiwan, alongside reducing crime. – One month in, can Honduras’ new president put the country on the path to lasting economic gains? – Atlantic Council
Iran – US
(Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park – CSIS) The United States appears poised to attack Iran just eight months after Operation Midnight Hammer. While U.S. military presence in the Middle East is at its highest level since five carrier battle groups assembled at the outset of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it lacks the size and capabilities needed for major combat operations or regime change. – With Trump’s Middle East Buildup, Think Desert Fox—Not Desert Storm
(Jennifer Gavito and Bianca Rosen – Atlantic Council) Since US President Donald Trump assured the Iranian people on January 13 that “help is on its way” amid nationwide protests—a little over a week after a US operation removed Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro from power—the United States has been on a seemingly steady march to renewed conflict with Iran. Trump’s State of the Union address this week did little to counter that perception, even as Washington continues to pursue diplomatic negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Both sides are holding firm on their respective redlines regarding Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and the window for a deal seems to be closing quickly. Meanwhile, with the most significant buildup of military assets in the Middle East since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, every day adds to the sense that US strikes on Iran are inevitable, even as the objectives of that potential military action remain frustratingly murky. But Trump should think twice before ordering a large-scale conflict aimed at regime change. Such an approach would likely create more problems than it would solve. – Regime change in Iran? Here’s why the US should avoid the temptation. – Atlantic Council
Sahel – Low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet
(Aminah Mustapha – The Jamestown Foundation) Commercial low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet is rapidly expanding across the central Sahel, giving civilians and states connectivity beyond fragile terrestrial networks, while also enabling violent extremist groups to coordinate in remote areas with fewer interception constraints. Niger, Mali, and Chad are shifting from bans or informal tolerance to licensing-and-control regimes built around approved distribution channels that can improve traceability but also increase state leverage over connectivity. Centralizing satellite connectivity creates chokepoints that increase the payoff of disruption and coercion, ranging from illicit diversion and “ring-fencing” to cyberattack and jamming/spoofing risks. At the same time, bloc-level AES cooperation with Russia may trade one dependency for another. – Security Risks of Centralized Satellite Internet in Junta-Led Sahel States – Jamestown
Nigeria – ISWAP
(Jacob Zenn – The Jamestown Foundatiion) Recent visual data from an Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) photoset suggests the presence of Caucasian fighters in the group, further evidenced by the recent arrest of another Caucasian militant by Cameroonian forces. The expanding tactical exchanges between ISWAP and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) enable the cross-border flow of foreign combatants, including Westerners and Nigerians. While ISWAP’s insurgency was never “local” and always featured international allegiances, the recent exchanges of foreign fighters and the growing U.S. military interest in Nigeria add a new dimension to the trajectory of the conflict. – Caucasian Foreign Fighters Confirmed in ISWAP’s Ranks in Nigeria – Jamestown
Sudan – Chad
(Michelle Gavin – Council on Foreign Relations) On February 23, the government of Chad announced that it would close its border with war-torn Sudan after Chadians were killed as the Rapid Support Forces clashed with Sudanese Armed Forces-allied groups at the border. Chad’s fragile government has long pursued a policy of ambiguity when it comes to Sudan’s conflict. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been extremely generous backers of the Chadian government, committing billions of dollars worth of investment to a country that consistently ranks among the poorest on earth. It’s hard to imagine that there is no relationship between that generosity and the evidence showing that weapons from the UAE, the RSF’s primary patron, have been funneled to the militia through Chad. Yet the RSF is hardly a natural ally of the Chadians. It is a genocidal force that has expressly targeted Sudanese from the Zaghawa ethnic group—the same group that dominates Chad’s political and military class. Money talks, but it can’t completely drown out political reality. Whether or not the border closure will significantly challenge RSF supply lines remains to be seen, but it will almost certainly mean more hardship for desperate Sudanese civilians fleeing to Chad for refuge. – Sudan’s War, Africa’s Complicity | Council on Foreign Relations
Turkish/PKK Peace Process – Iraqi Yezidis
(Wladimir van Wilgenburg – The Jamestown Foundation) The Sinjar Resistance Unit (YBŞ)—based in Sinjar, Iraq—has so far refused to disarm despite the ongoing peace process between Türkiye and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), asserting that the initiative excludes Yezidis. The rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) hopes the peace process will help implement the 2020 Sinjar agreement to remove PKK-linked groups. This remains difficult, however, due to strong local sympathy for the YBŞ. If the peace process succeeds, the YBŞ’s future will depend more on its relationship with Baghdad and resolving chronic local issues than on developments in Türkiye. – Impact of Turkish-PKK Peace Process on Iraqi Yezidis – Jamestown
US
Immigration – (Kaleah Haddock, Diana Roy – Council on Foreign Relations) Since returning to office in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has taken major steps to reshape immigration policy and enforcement in pursuit of his campaign promise to execute “the largest domestic deportation operation” in U.S. history. As part of this effort, his administration has carried out deportation flights, sometimes to third countries where migrants have no existing ties; ramped up nationwide immigration raids; and granted expanded or new powers to various federal, state, and local officials to enforce domestic immigration laws. However, the administration’s whole-of-government approach has raised concerns. In January 2026, the administration’s enforcement push reached a controversial new phase after federal agents fatally shot two U.S. citizens, Renee Good and Alex Pretti, in separate incidents in Minneapolis. The shootings triggered widespread protests and criticism from members of both political parties, leading some Republican lawmakers to call for an investigation into federal immigration enforcement tactics. In implementing his immigration agenda, some legal experts say Trump is pushing the limits of presidential power, including by invoking centuries-old statutes and expediting deportations, while immigrant rights activists warn that the administration’s aggressive tactics have eroded migrants’ due process protections. Growing criticism of the administration’s immigration policy comes after the July 2025 passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which allocates nearly $170 billion to enforcement over the next four years. – How Trump Is Reshaping Immigration Enforcement | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Lithuania – LNG – Russia
(Karlis Kuskevics and Justina Budginaite-Froehly – Atlantic Council) The United States has become the world’s top LNG exporter, reshaping global energy markets and enabling allies to diversify away from Russian gas. More than a decade ago, Lithuania began investing in its Klaipėda LNG terminal and making EU-backed reforms; today it serves as a regional gateway supplying gas to countries including Ukraine. Lithuania’s success challenges claims by Hungary and Slovakia that phasing out Russian gas is unfeasible, demonstrating that diversification is largely a matter of political will. – The US-Lithuania LNG partnership exposes the myth that there are ‘no alternatives’ to Russian gas – Atlantic Council
