Arctic
(Julia Nesheiwat – Atlantic Council) The Arctic is emerging as a central arena of great-power competition, driven by melting sea ice, expanding access to energy and minerals, and intensifying activity by Russia and China. Vast reserves of energy and critical minerals—especially in Greenland—are fueling strategic competition, with Moscow prioritizing Arctic development and Beijing investing heavily through joint ventures. Increasingly navigable shipping corridors could disrupt global trade by shortening routes, but they raise disputes over sovereignty, militarization, and freedom of navigation. – Why the Arctic matters to the United States – Atlantic Council
Australia
(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) On 19 February 1942, Japanese aircraft attacked the harbour and town in what remains the largest single assault ever mounted on Australian soil. For much of Australia, it’s a historical reference point. In Darwin, it’s a lived inheritance, recalled in families, marked in ceremony and embedded in local identity. That difference shapes how the Northern Territory understands defence. Darwin sits closer to Jakarta than to Canberra. It’s proximate to Southeast Asia’s maritime chokepoints and to the Indo-Pacific’s most dynamic economic and security corridors. For Territorians, distance isn’t measured in political narratives but in nautical miles. – Darwin is central to defence. It should be treated as such | The Strategist
Australia – China
(Mark Beeson – ASPI The Strategist) A nightmare that has haunted generations of strategic thinkers and policymakers in Australia has come true: we live in a region increasingly dominated by an Asian great power. China has rapidly become East Asia’s principal trade partner and strategic actor. If Australians want to be secure in the Indo-Pacific, we have no choice other than to recognise, if not embrace, this reality and the unforgiving logic of geography. Even though China is famously Australia’s major trading partner, the rise of the People’s Republic is overwhelmingly seen as more of a strategic threat than an economic opportunity. True, Australia’s enviable living standards are potentially hostage to China’s increasingly assertive policy calculus, but its use of geoeconomic leverage is hardly unique. – China is our region’s great power. We need to make the best of that | The Strategist
Critical Minerals Policy
(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) In critical minerals policy, one of the costliest things we can say is ‘we signed a memorandum of understanding’. Public announcements can signal intent, but they don’t build processing plants, turn ore into usable materials or keep factories running when supply is tight. What must change is how projects in the middle of the supply chain are funded and backed. Without steady, coordinated finance that links miners to the manufacturers that depend on their materials, good intentions won’t translate into real capacity or secure supply. The hard truth is that there are no quick fixes, and not only because of China’s scale or technical capability. The constraint is structural. Resilient supply chains require a synchronised response across early-stage development, midstream processing and downstream manufacturing. If policy pushes only one segment at a time, the system defaults to established offshore processing networks backed by patient capital and integrated offtake. – Critical minerals need reliable financing frameworks | The Strategist
Europe
(Enrico Letta – Politico) In a world reshaped by Trump and by the accelerating logic of geopolitical competition, Europe needs an answer that is both realistic and ambitious. The strongest response the EU can offer is to complete the single market. For decades, it has been Europe’s strongest asset, the backbone of our prosperity, and increasingly the cornerstone of our sovereignty. And yet, in the areas that matter most, we still do not have one market. We have the sum of 27 national markets. This fragmentation is not a technical flaw. It is a political and strategic weakness. We pay for it in higher costs, weaker investment, slower innovation, and reduced capacity to act in the world. Europe’s problem is not diagnosis. The problem is speed, ownership and political commitment. – One Europe. One market. Time to complete the EU single market – POLITICO
Europe – US
(The Soufan Center) Efforts by European governments to accelerate a move away from relying on U.S. technology providers are gaining momentum. Calls for strategic autonomy in Europe have increased amid spreading fear of a possible “kill switch” that would put cloud, communication, and data infrastructure at the mercy of service providers. A number of European governments and institutions have started the process of decoupling from U.S.-dominated platforms. The transatlantic relationship remains foundational, but without question, it is entering a phase of major uncertainty in which digital interdependence is no longer guaranteed to be risk-free and without strings attached. – Europe Technological Decoupling: Lasting Fissure or Temporary Fracture? – The Soufan Center
Mexico
(Henry Ziemer and Ryan C. Berg – CSIS) On Sunday, February 22, Mexico’s Ministry of Defense reported that it had killed drug kingpin Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes in an operation originally aimed at capturing him. During the operation, six other cartel members were killed, and weapons, including “rocket launchers capable of downing aircraft and destroying armored vehicles” (authors’ translation) were reportedly seized. Mexico will need to keep up pressure against organized crime, however, to further dismantle the powerful criminal enterprise El Mencho oversaw, which remains intact following his death. – Criminal Kingpin “El Mencho” Is Dead, What Comes Next?
Myanmar
(Sean Turnell – Lowy The Interpreter) The longevity of Iran’s theocracy is a topic of much current debate. Beyond immediate events, it has also prompted musings on some general principles on authoritarian rule. What are the conditions that keep such regimes in place, especially in circumstances where the popular will seems so obviously thwarted? In a contribution to The Atlantic in January, Karim Sadjadpour and Jack Goldstone advance five conditions for a revolution, anywhere, to succeed: 1) A fiscal crisis; 2) Divided elites; 3) A diverse oppositional coalition; 4) A convincing narrative of resistance, and; 5) A favourable international environment. In my view Sadjadpour and Goldstone are on to something, and they got me thinking about their schema and the case of Myanmar. Suffering under a military junta as incompetent as it is despotic, how does its situation measure up? Do these five criteria offer hope for revolutionary change? – Myanmar’s junta – next to fall? | Lowy Institute
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russians talked about violence in schools as “Columbines,” the 1991 attack in a U.S. school, until recently, as something foreign to their own experience. The Kremlin has exploited this attitude to avoid taking serious action other than against the internet. Attacks in Russian schools, ranging from bullying to armed violence, have become so common in recent months that many Russians are demanding the government act, with some even pulling children out of school. None of the steps that the Russian government has taken have stemmed the increase in the number and violence of such attacks. This disturbing trend seems certain to continue, resulting in more tragedies. – School Violence in Russia Spreads and Becomes More Lethal – Jamestown
Russia – Arctic
(Megi Benia – The Jamestown Foundation) On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing “competition” from Russia in the Arctic and the region’s strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increased the securitization of the High North by reframing its approach to the Arctic from development-focused to a region essential for military deterrence. Russia’s military posture in the Arctic relies on a blended toolkit of government tools, dual-use infrastructure, and diplomatic posturing to strengthen Russian control over access routes and to impose uncertainty on NATO planning. – Russia Continues to Reshape Arctic Security – Jamestown
UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy
(Jordan Street, CJ (Caleb) Pine – Just Security) The U.N. General Assembly is due to adopt its ninth update of its Global Counter-terrorism Strategy (GCTS) by the end of June, marking the 20th anniversary of its first passage. So the coming months will be a test of whether U.N. member states can withstand the choppy waters of multilateral negotiations and reach consensus on a new strategy that will guide the future of U.N. counterterrorism activity. As one of the fastest-growing areas of the United Nations, counterterrorism is not going to fall off the agenda anytime soon, but failure to agree on a consensus resolution could severely undermine multilateral action. The problems the U.N. faced in 2025 — from unprecedented budget turmoil to deepening tension at the U.N. Security Council — invites skepticism that the 192 members of the U.N. General Assembly can agree on anything this substantial and potentially controversial. Yet, other agreements at the end of 2025 suggest there are paths for a successful outcome that protects consensus while ensuring a balanced strategy grounded in the respect for human rights and the rule of law. It will not be easy. Every negotiation for a new GCTS has been harder than the last. This time around, everything could blow up, without careful diplomacy to guide the process. – How to Keep U.N. Counterterrorism Negotiations from Blowing Up
US – Iran
(Benjamin Jensen – CSIS) With the prospect of war in the Middle East again on the horizon, it is important to assess how Iran might respond to a U.S. attack. This installment of Critical Questions looks back to look ahead, using the history of how Iran has attacked the United States and its allies since 1980 as a baseline for predicting how Iran might retaliate and what it says about the potential for an escalation spiral that pulls the region, if not the world, into a broader war. Both the history of Iran’s attacks and core insights from international relations theory suggest near-term limits on a larger conflict. The underlying assumption is that any military response is part of a larger bargaining strategy. States talk and fight at the same time, using coercion alongside diplomacy to achieve their interests. This implies that both the United States and Iran will seek to initially keep violence to a minimum to preserve space for ongoing talks and avoid a larger spiral that leads to a protracted regional conflict. Iran is likely to prefer a proportional response that limits regional escalation. The more the regime can do to limit sustained U.S. strikes, especially while it is confronting a second round of protests, and ensure that aircraft from other Gulf states don’t join, the better. Yet, there is a tipping point. The gravity of escalation pulls harder the more missiles each side fires and the higher the number of lives lost, creating a real possibility, despite the preference for limited strikes and reciprocity, of a larger war. Fear and honor could devour interests to undermine even the most rational of plans. – How Would Iran Respond to a U.S. Attack?
US – Pacific
(Rowan Allport – ASPI The Strategist) In World War II, the United States built a western Pacific airfield here, another there, and more elsewhere, each intended to bring more Japanese targets into range. Now the abundance of old bases is becoming a resource for resilience: several are being brought back into service as places to disperse aircraft and to maintain operations even as other airfields are knocked out. While major exercises using these facilities are not explicit rehearsals for such a war, they closely align with the US’s projected operational requirements. They reflect an effort to ensure that, in the event of a Taiwan crisis or another regional emergency bringing Washington and Beijing into conflict, the US and its allies can move forces into the theatre, fight as a coalition and sustain operations even under conditions of contested access and degraded infrastructure. This underlying idea is intended not to guarantee a short war, but to shape an adversary’s calculations by reducing its confidence that it can decisively accomplish its goals. – Resilience under fire: how US’s WWII airfield upgrades back Taiwan | The Strategist
US – UK
(Neil Barnett and Eliza Lockhart – RUSI) The Trump administration has openly stated its intention to intervene in the UK and Europe’s domestic politics, supposedly for the purposes of preserving free speech and preventing political oppression. These ideological aims are closely linked to the commercial interests of powerful US technology firms, who have framed UK and European online regulation as censorship. What has emerged from this change in US foreign policy, combined with rising digital platform power, is a serious threat of foreign interference by a traditional ally, one which has the potential to eclipse the Russian threat in scale and effectiveness. With a Bill intended to futureproof democracy currently before Parliament, the UK should act now to strengthen its defences. – The Emerging US Influence Threat to British Democracy | Royal United Services Institute
