Biodefense
Prominent in recent assassinations, terrorist plots, nation-state research programs, and lethal accidents, toxins are not a danger relegated to the past but persist as a current threat. And the risk is expanding, as toxins remain accessible, difficult to detect and attribute, and potentially easier to weaponize due to advances in artificial intelligence. Governments must prioritize toxin biodefense, investing in biological attribution, rapid diagnostics, and biosurveillance to detect and respond to intentional, accidental, and natural toxin exposures. Asha M. George and John “J.T.” O’Brien, Atlantic Council – Toxins are an escalating global threat. Here’s how governments should respond. – Atlantic Council
Gaza and the Middle East
The Board of Peace met for the first time in Washington on February 18 for much-anticipated deliberations about Gaza’s future. Twenty-seven countries that have signed onto the board were present at the meeting. Envoys from nearly fifty countries in total attended, some only as observers. The United States’ NATO allies have broadly declined invitations to join the board, citing concerns about the scope of its charter and invitations to countries whose leaders have outstanding arrest warrants with the International Criminal Court, such as Russia. U.S. President Donald Trump, who chairs the board, announced at its first meeting that the United States would commit $10 billion to the body, but didn’t provide details on where the funds would come from. Other countries collectively pledged $7 billion toward Gaza’s reconstruction, with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates expected to contribute up to $1.2 billion to the board’s coffers. The World Bank estimated last year it would cost more than $70 billion to rebuild Gaza. The coming weeks will see the board attempt to chart a course through the ceasefire’s second phase, which includes plans to navigate governing a postwar Gaza, bring aid into the enclave, and work to negotiate Hamas’s disarmament and Israeli troop withdrawal. Those are all critical components of the ceasefire agreement—and areas in which the board, the warring parties, and other mediating nations have historically held differing positions. The peace plan, which the Trump administration proposed in October 2025, entered a first phase when Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire that month, and was supported by a UN resolution that November. The plan shifted to its second phase only recently, after Israel confirmed in January 2026 that Hamas had returned the remains of the last hostage from its October 7, 2023, attacks, thus fulfilling the agreed-upon terms of the first phase. Mariel Ferragamo, Council on Foreign Relations – A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal | Council on Foreign Relations
Gaza’s recovery and Middle East integration must advance together, beginning with phase two of Trump’s Gaza plan. To remove obstacles to regional integration, Israel should withdraw from parts of Gaza as conditions permit, advance a credible and long-term pathway toward Palestinian statehood, and exercise restraint in the West Bank. The United States should help ease the path for a breakthrough by advancing regional infrastructure, such as IMEC, and broadening forums for partnership, such as the I2U2. Daniel B. Shapiro, Atlantic Council – What I told Israeli lawmakers about reviving regional integration – Atlantic Council
Russia
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has triggered a sweeping redistribution, with the Kremlin nationalizing assets worth over 3 trillion rubles (around $39.2 million) in 2025, including the June 2025 seizure and January resale of billionaire Dmitry Kamenshchik’s Domodedovo Airport. The Kremlin has fractured its “social contract” with regional elites, increasing arrests of governors and officials while cutting regional funding. Russian veterans and new military recruits face shrinking economic benefits and difficulty reintegrating into domestic life. With oil prices falling, EU gas markets lost, and uncertainty over demand, Russia’s shrinking profits make further redistribution likely. This fuels elite insecurity, public frustration, and social instability as wartime economic gains prove temporary and unevenly distributed. Kassie Corelli, The Jamestown Foundation – Onetime Russian ‘War Beneficiaries’ Face Rising Uncertainty – Jamestown
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his war against Ukraine, Western countries have closed almost two dozen Russian consulates in protest against Moscow’s actions. The Russian government has responded by closing an equal number of Western consulates in Russia. That has complicated consular work on both sides, but it has had more serious consequences for the West because it means the West “knows ever less about Russia” and is again increasingly Moscow-centric in its evaluation. At the same time, it has freed up a group of experienced cadres Moscow is using to dramatically expand its diplomatic presence in Africa and Asia, where it has opened nine new embassies and seven consulates in recent months—a new challenge for the West. Paul Globe, The Jamestown Foundation – West Losing Its ‘Eyes and Ears’ in Russia with Consulate Closures – Jamestown
Russia’s illegal war of aggression on Ukraine
As peace negotiations continue between Russia and Ukraine, Europe should prepare for Russia to step out of the “gray zone” of hybrid warfare activities toward more overt attacks as part of a pressure strategy on Europeans. With transatlantic trust at a historic low, Russia could use the window of opportunity and decide to conduct low-level conventional provocations against European states, for example by using military drones against civilian targets, to further undermine the alliance. Europe needs to prepare to manage such a crisis on its own, without (or with less of) its traditional U.S. backing. Benjamin Harris, Council on Foreign Relations – Defending Europe if Russia Steps Out of the Gray Zone | Council on Foreign Relations
Even as peace in Ukraine remains uncertain, U.S. and European policymakers should begin preparing for the postwar challenges a settlement will likely bring. Most analysts agree that any agreement will not diminish Russia’s threat to the continent—Moscow will continue testing European and transatlantic cohesion through hybrid attacks and possible military incursions, deepening preexisting divisions. To promote greater alliance cohesion and reduce the risk of renewed conflict, NATO, the European Union, and the Group of Seven should launch comprehensive reviews of their long-term strategies toward Russia to bolster deterrence and restore stability to Europe. It is better to plan for most likely postwar challenges now than to hope for the best when the moment arrives. Paul B. Stares, Council on Foreign Relations – Preparing for the Day After in Europe | Council on Foreign Relations
The United States and Europe are confronting vast and complex challenges in how to respond to threats posed by Russia four years after its invasion of Ukraine. Six experts offer their recommendations across the critical dimensions of these challenges—spanning security, economics, diplomacy, and the humanitarian response—to chart a path toward a stable and secure Europe. Council on Foreign Relations experts – Securing Ukraine’s Future: Adapting to New Realities After Four Years of War | Council on Foreign Relations
Ukraine
Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) has evolved into a pillar of Europe’s future security and Ukraine’s postwar economy. However, the country’s innovative defense sector—especially in drones, autonomy, electronic warfare, and battlefield software—will require capital, certification, and integration into European and NATO procurement ecosystems if it hopes to scale beyond Ukraine. Some European countries have developed a promising path forward: coproduction models, where Ukrainian firms develop and manufacture arms at facilities elsewhere in Europe. Expanding support for Ukraine’s DIB is an essential investment in the continent’s long-term security. Heidi E. Crebo-Rediker, Council on Foreign Relations – Securing Ukraine’s Future in Europe: Ukraine’s Defense Industrial Base—An Anchor for Economic Renewal and European Security | Council on Foreign Relations
With growing needs and dwindling funding, Ukraine’s humanitarian response is under extreme strain. The United States slashed aid by 74 percent in 2025, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)—an agile program that worked with Ukrainian partners to address the country’s dynamic humanitarian requirements—was eliminated entirely. The early response revealed a fundamental gap: the United Nations mobilizes resources effectively yet struggles to deploy them with speed and dexterity. Ukraine needs a public-private partnership that institutionalizes OTI’s fast-and-flexible model while integrating private-sector capabilities and Ukrainian partners, coordinating with UN operations without replacing their constraints. This initiative would adapt to shifting frontlines as the war continues and pivot to recovery and reconstruction if a ceasefire materializes. Sam Vigersky, Council on Foreign Relations – Beyond Conventional Aid: Institutionalizing Public-Private Partnership in Ukraine’s Humanitarian Response | Council on Foreign Relations
US, Armenia, Azerbaijan
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s February 9–11 visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan marked Washington’s most consequential engagement in the South Caucasus since the August 2025 peace summit. In Yerevan, Vance advanced a landmark U.S.–Armenia nuclear cooperation deal, backed AI technology and defense sales, and promoted TRIPP connectivity. In Baku, he signed a Strategic Partnership Charter expanding energy, transit, and security cooperation. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the visit underscored Washington’s commitment to sustained regional engagement, reinforcing the United States as a key external partner in post-conflict normalization and economic integration. Vasif Huseynov, The Jamestown Foundation – Baku and Yerevan View Vance’s Visit as Expansion of U.S. Engagement – Jamestown
US and Iran
President Donald Trump likely feels that the U.S. military is invincible after the success of various operations he has ordered during his time in office, including the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020, the bombing of the Iranian nuclear program in June 2025, and the abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in January. But those were all “one and done” strikes. The military operation that Trump has threatened against Iran is potentially much larger and lengthier—and thus much riskier. Various news outlets have published articles in recent days reporting that General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is concerned about the risks of strikes on Iran. This looks very much like a concerted messaging campaign by the U.S. military to surface their concerns before Trump orders them into action. In response, Trump took to Truth Social to denounce “the Fake News Media” for stating that Caine “is against us going to War with Iran,” calling that “100% incorrect.” But, in fact, all of these news stories state that Caine has not expressed either support or opposition to the strikes; he is merely raising concerns about how a military campaign would unfold, as he is legally obligated to do in his role as the president’s senior military adviser. Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations – Trump Should Take the U.S. Military’s Warning on Iran Seriously | Council on Foreign Relations
US Digital Empire
Over the past few decades, three U.S. companies—Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud—have quietly amassed control over nearly two-thirds of global cloud infrastructure services. It is an ad hoc American empire, built through commercial logic rather than grand strategy and answering to shareholders rather than voters or bureaucrats. The internet was built for decentralization, designed to route around damage and resist single points of failure or control. Nonetheless, a combination of convenience, cybersecurity and cost have driven most of the world onto a handful of platforms, positioning them as “hyperscalers”—great powers of digital infrastructure that operate across more countries than most international organizations. As the footprint of these hyperscalers has increased, policymakers in Washington have found ways to serve U.S. foreign policy goals by weaponizing this digital infrastructure. In response, other nations have increasingly sought to reduce their dependence on the U.S. for their critical digital infrastructure. Technologically, their task is herculean. But one year into President Donald Trump’s second term, the sense of urgency driving their efforts has grown palpable. – Kat Duffy, Council on Foreign Relations – America’s Digital Empire Has a Trust Problem | Council on Foreign Relations
US. Supreme Courts and tariffs
On February 20, 2026, in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to impose sweeping, open-ended tariffs—striking down the legal foundation for a central pillar of the administration’s trade strategy. The decision removes the fastest tool for imposing broad country-level duties, but it does not end the tariff debate. Other statutory authorities remain in play, and businesses and trading partners are left to assess what comes next. Brookings experts – Brookings experts on the Supreme Court’s tariff decision | Brookings
