From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: China; China-Indo Pacific; China-Japan; COP30; G20; Global Development; India-Sri Lanka; North Korea; Pakistan; Russia-Ukraine
China
(Owen Au – The Jamestown Foundation) Enhancing “maritime judiciary” is now a priority for building a “strong sea power,” according to the recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan. Beijing is actively countering unfavorable international maritime rulings by international organizations by advancing its own dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions. The lack of a “Maritime Basic Law,” however, continues to hamper the ability of the government to coordinate domestic institutions in support of its growing maritime ambitions. – The PRC’s Drive for Judicial Power at Sea – Jamestown
China – Indo Pacific
(Sayantan Haldar – Observer Research Foundation) One of the key aspects of China’s strategy to project power on a global stage is its growing expansion in the Indo-Pacific. While Beijing neither has a formal nor comprehensive outlook towards the conventional definition of the Indo-Pacific, its presence in the region is significantly shaping its evolving strategic equations. The Indo-Pacific, a joint theatre comprising the Indian and the Pacific oceans, lies at the heart of Beijing’s strategy to project its dominant role in shaping regional geopolitics. In the Pacific, China remains embroiled in a contest with various countries, including the Philippines and Japan, among others, over disputes of sovereignty and territoriality. Notably, Chinese overtures in the South China Sea (SCS) region have prompted physical confrontations between the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia and the coast guard of the Philippines. Interestingly, Beijing’s strategy in the Indian Ocean, the other half of the Indo-Pacific construct, has remained varied from the Pacific. – Beijing’s Long Game in the Indian Ocean
China – Japan
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) China’s 335-day run of coast guard and other government vessels operating in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands, till they withdrew in October, represents a structural shift in maritime coercion. Japan’s coast guard noted the departure and suggested that the weather was a factor in Chinese vessels pulling back; however, the scale and duration of their presence beforehand had already altered routines and risk calculations in Tokyo and among its partners. This prolonged streak far surpasses the earlier record of 215 consecutive days from December 2023 to July 2024, signalling a notable escalation in Chinese maritime activity. The record for the total number of days of confirmed navigation by China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels stands at 336 days in the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands in 2022. In fact, the situation escalated in December 2022, when an intrusion into Japan’s territorial sea lasted over 72 hours, the most extended duration ever recorded. Tokyo views these actions as unilateral attempts by China to alter the status quo by force, constituting clear violations of international law. – Lessons from 335 Days of Chinese Vessels near the Senkaku Islands
COP30
(Alice C. Hill, Daniel B. Poneman, David M. Hart, and Lindsay Iversen – Council on Foreign Relations) The 2025 UN Climate Summit, known as COP30, is wrapping up its final week, with little evident progress on critical issues. Underscoring the rising costs of climate impacts and the lack of results to the assembled delegations on Thursday morning, UN Secretary-General António Guterres pleaded, “How much more must we suffer?”. Brazil, the host country for this year’s talks, attempted to goose the process forward on Tuesday night by issuing a draft negotiating text [PDF] of almost herculean scope. Covering finance, trade, national transparency requirements on climate progress, and ways to close the gap between countries’ emissions-reductions plans and their agreed goal of limiting overall warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels, the draft text incorporated issues that had been deemed too sensitive to include in the official agenda, let alone the negotiating document itself. – COP30: Climate Experts Assess Progress in Brazil And Beyond | Council on Foreign Relations
G20
(Harsh V. Pant, Samir Bhattacharya – Observer Research Foundation) South Africa’s G20 Presidency represents a landmark moment for Africa and the broader Global South, building on the momentum generated by preceding Global South chairs, Indonesia, India, and Brazil. With South Africa taking charge in 2025, the G20 will complete an uninterrupted four-year run of Global South presidencies. This creates a clear line of continuity and helps keep the development priorities of the Global South firmly on the G20 agenda. Scheduled to take place in Johannesburg on 22 and 23 November 2025, the summit will be the first G20 Leaders’ gathering on African soil. The occasion is symbolically powerful as it situates Africa from the fringes of global governance to its centre. Interestingly, it was during India’s G20 presidency that the African Union, the continental body, became a permanent member of the G20. – South Africa’s G20 Presidency and the Global South Continuum
Global Development
(Arezo Kohistany – Observer Research Foundation) The global development system no longer reflects current economic realities. Institutions built in the 20th century assumed that development was a form of Western benevolence, even as emerging economies now drive global growth, infrastructure demand, and technological change. The structural mismatch of such countries being treated as recipients rather than partners in the development architecture has become unsustainable. BRICS+ economies alone face more than US$12 trillion in infrastructure needs, spanning logistics, renewable power, digital systems, water and food security, and critical mineral supply chains. Multilateral development banks that should be mobilising capital at this scale remain hampered by slow processes, sovereign-heavy mandates, and limited private-sector engagement. Even the New Development Bank (NDB) illustrates the problem. Since its creation, NDB has deployed only US$22.4 billion, and less than 15% of the financing has gone to private-sector projects. The result is a widening gap between what these economies require and what existing institutions can deliver. – The Business of Development: A New Development Finance Corporation
India – Sri Lanka
(Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy – Observer Research Foundation) India and Sri Lanka are perhaps at the best phase yet of their bilateral relations. Since the onset of the political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka in 2022, both countries have seen a new vigour in their outreach and connectivity efforts, fuelled by their respective geopolitical and economic aspirations. This paper outlines key connectivity initiatives between the two countries and records their progress. It finds that, for India, the primary motivations for connectivity with Sri Lanka are national security, economic, and geopolitical concerns; meanwhile, economic interests lead Sri Lanka. The paper also underlines the challenges, including facets of Sri Lanka’s domestic politics and its protectionist tendencies, and the gaps that impede the efficient implementation of India’s development cooperation activities. – Politics and Protectionism: Decoding the Challenges to India-Sri Lanka Connectivity
North Korea
(Abhishek Sharma – Observer Research Foundation) On October 28, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui participated in the 3rd Minsk International Conference in Belarus. Besides Moscow and Beijing, this visit marked the beginning of a high-level visit by the North Korean minister to a Eurasian capital, signalling Pyongyang’s interest in widening its diplomatic engagement beyond Northeast Asia. This visit falls within a larger trend of North Korea’s increasing diplomatic partnerships with its socialist and ideological friends, highlighting its diplomatic comeback to the international fora. In this context, this article examines the rationale behind Pyongyang’s diplomatic outreach and the implications this will have on regional dynamics. – Reopening Old Doors: North Korea’s Diplomatic Comeback
Pakistan
(Rajiv Sinha, Sarral Sharma – Observer Research Foundation) Pakistan’s recently passed 27th Constitutional Amendment is set to reinforce the military’s primacy over the country’s fragile democracy. The latest amendment gives unprecedented power and legal immunity to Field Marshal and Chief of Army Staff Syed Asim Munir. In effect, its passage would underline that the army has once again outmanoeuvred the nation, the civilian leadership, and undermined key democratic institutions, including the judiciary. It is another attempt to undo the 1973 Constitution and shift the balance of power in favour of the Army, with the civilian leadership playing second fiddle. The amendment encapsulates this power shift, making Munir virtually untouchable under the law and placing him above the heads of all other military branches. – Pakistan: The Winner Takes It All
Russia – Ukraine
(Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan – CSIS) U.S. President Donald Trump is right. The war in Ukraine must end. The challenge is determining how to set conditions for a lasting peace deal in a way that doesn’t further destabilize Europe or create openings for additional Russian aggression. This installment of Critical Questions reviews findings published in the CSIS Futures Lab Strategic Headwinds series over the last year on the opportunities and challenges to negotiating—and implementing—a peace deal in Ukraine. This series integrates expert surveys and analysis with an AI model trained on historic peace negotiations to provide perspectives on the prospects for peace and ending the war in Ukraine. Drawing on CSIS Futures Lab survey data across Ukraine war experts, this analysis maps where the plan’s provisions intersect with issues previously identified as plausible negotiation articles. The only way Trump’s Ukraine peace plan can make any meaningful progress is if it serves as an opening gambit to start a larger peace negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The plan’s limited security guarantees should change to include third-party guarantees that extend beyond economic sanctions. Ukraine can survive not being in NATO. But it cannot survive as a sovereign state with a hollowed-out military and limits on the ability of European states to deter future Russian aggression. – Will Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine Succeed?
(Liana Fix – Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump has thrown his support behind a new twenty-eight-point peace plan, the White House’s latest attempt to move ceasefire discussions forward between Russia and Ukraine. Initial attempts, such as the talks in Alaska, have stalled in the face of Russian intransigence. With the Russian military grinding slowly forward in eastern Ukraine and U.S. military support for Ukraine foundering, Russian President Vladimir Putin is simply not interested in genuine negotiation. – Is Trump’s Ukraine Peace Deal a Faustian Bargain? | Council on Foreign Relations
(Atlantic Council) “Thursday is it.” Today US President Donald Trump gave Ukraine a Thanksgiving deadline to approve a twenty-eight-point peace plan. The proposal reportedly gives Russia large chunks of Ukrainian territory and restricts Ukraine’s armed forces, while providing Ukraine a new security guarantee—though without Western troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the choice could come down to “loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” – The good, the bad, and the ugly in the US peace plan for Ukraine – Atlantic Council
