From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Afghanistan, Africa, ASEAN, ASEAN-India, Black Sea-US-Russia-China, Central African Republic, Chile, China, China-Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, European Union-India, European Union-US, Georgia, India-Western Indian Ocean, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan-South Korea-US, Japan-US, Middle East, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), South Africa, South China Sea, Southeast Asia-US, Sub-Saharan Africa, Syria, Thailand, Türkiye-Syria, Türkiye-Ukraine, US, US-China, US-Iran
Afghanistan
(Angana Kotokey – Vivekananda International Foundation) Since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the country has found itself at the centre of complex geopolitical dynamics. The Taliban’s resurgence as Afghanistan’s ruling regime is marked by a mix of isolationism and selective engagement, leading to ‘diplomatic quandaries’ regarding internal policies and their style of governance. As Afghanistan enters 2025, the Taliban’s strategy continues to evolve in an environment that is filled with internal challenges, complicated regional diplomacy, and an escalating humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. This article will explore the key socio-political, economic, and humanitarian developments inside Afghanistan in 2024, the Taliban’s diplomatic engagements with regional countries, and its implications for regional stability. – Afghanistan in 2024: A Year of Diplomacy, Economic Challenges, and Humanitarian Crises under Taliban 2.0 | Vivekananda International Foundation
Africa
(Institute for the Study of War)
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits. M23 will likely continue to advance in the eastern DRC due to FARDC’s ineffectiveness as the Congolese government seeks more effective external support. The West is increasing pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC and cut its support for M23, which would decrease M23’s military effectiveness, however. Various international and domestic peace talks have stalled, and CTP continues to assess that the Congolese government will be unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist demands. M23’s offensive has significantly restricted humanitarian operations and caused widespread population displacement.
Sudan—International. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) agreed to several deals, including a Russian naval base, during separate diplomatic meetings with Iran and Russia in mid-February. A Russian naval base in Sudan would support Russia’s strategic objective of threatening NATO’s southern flank from Africa and the Mediterranean Sea while decreasing Russian reliance on bases in Syria after the collapse of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024. Iran also seeks to grow bilateral ties with the SAF to secure an Iranian Red Sea naval base. An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Russia could allow Iran to operate from Russia’s naval base in Port Sudan if Russia and Sudan follow through on the naval port deal.
Sudan—Domestic. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other RSF-aligned political and military factions will create a new government in Sudan on February 21 as the RSF seeks to portray itself as the legitimate governing power in Sudan. The RSF proposal to form a parallel government comes after the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new SAF-led government on February 8. The RSF has committed more mass atrocities against civilians and refugees in several areas in Sudan as it faces military setbacks in Khartoum. The RSF’s abuses across Sudan continue a pattern of indiscriminate violence against civilians and genocide. – Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan | Institute for the Study of War
ASEAN
(Abdul Rahman Yaacob – East Asia Forum) ASEAN confronts three major challenges in 2025 — Myanmar’s deteriorating political situation, escalating South China Sea disputes, and intensifying US-China competition. While Malaysia’s leadership offers opportunities for mediation and new economic partnerships, the combination of regional tensions and great power rivalry will test ASEAN’s cohesion and effectiveness. Success depends on member states’ unity in pursuing shared interests despite mounting external pressures. – Storm clouds gather over ASEAN as it enters 2025 | East Asia Forum
ASEAN – India
(Sauradeep Bag – Observer Research Foundation) India and ASEAN have embarked on an ambitious journey to enhance digital cooperation, particularly through cross-border payment linkages, a move that could transform regional financial landscapes. At the 21st India-ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi showcased India’s success with digital public infrastructure, such as Aadhaar and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), as models to address complex challenges in sectors like education, healthcare, agriculture, and climate change. It’s crucial to carefully evaluate how this initiative can be strategically advanced to realise its full potential, underscoring the importance of such collaborations in shaping the future. – Reimagining regional financial systems: India and ASEAN’s digital leap
Black Sea – US – Russia – China
(Natia Gamkrelidze – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) The real challenge for the U.S. and its allies is not just countering Russian influence militarily in the Black Sea but also strategically investing in regional infrastructure and economic resilience to ensure long-term stability. China is not pursuing military expansion but is instead trying to invest in infrastructure and trade routes. The U.S. can either help shape the Black Sea’s future—or risk watching its influence fade from the region. – Russia’s Black Sea Grip Endures—China Slips In. Is the U.S. Watching? | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Central African Republic
(UN News) The recent attack on a UN patrol in the Central African Republic (CAR) which resulted in the death of a Tunisian peacekeeper, underlines the constant dangers facing peacekeepers from armed groups there, the head of the UN mission (MINUSCA) told the Security Council on Thursday. – Central African Republic faces ongoing challenges ahead of elections | UN News
Chile
(Richard Kouyoumdjian Inglis – RUSI) In South America, keeping costs and labour in local shipyards might be an option to compete with a heavily stressed global market. – Should Medium Naval Powers Like Chile Have Their Own Shipbuilding Capacity? | Royal United Services Institute
China
(Mallaika Thapar, Shivam Shekhawat – Observer Research Foundation) In an era marked by escalating threats from extremist groups, China’s counterterrorism strategy has undergone a significant transformation. A stark reminder of this urgency was the suicide bombing in October 2024 that resulted in the deaths of two Chinese workers in Pakistan. This incident highlighted the vulnerability of Chinese nationals involved in critical infrastructure projects abroad. To counter such incidents, China and Pakistan conducted the joint military exercise Warrior-VIII from late November to mid-December 2024, enhancing their counterterrorism collaboration. This exercise was not only a show of military strength but also a strategic maneuver to address the growing influence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has increasingly targeted Chinese nationals working under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As tensions rise between Pakistan and Afghanistan, these dynamics significantly affect China’s counterterrorism methods, compelling Beijing to adapt its strategies through a combination of domestic security measures, regional diplomacy, and multilateral partnerships. – From Xinjiang to the frontier: China’s evolving counterterrorism strategy
(Gerard DiPippo – RAND Corporation) Today, one hears two narratives about China’s economy. One is about economic decline, and the other is about China’s growing economic and technological power. China’s economy has slowed substantially. Local governments are straining under debt burdens. The property sector has nearly collapsed. Consumer confidence is poor. External demand is a brittle support beam, as Western governments consider protectionist measures. China’s GDP is no longer catching up to the United States. China is also the top global manufacturer, leading exports of many goods, investing heavily in high-tech sectors, and innovating rapidly, with DeepSeek being just the latest example. Although these narratives appear contradictory, both are true. – Focus on the New Economy, Not the Old: Why China’s Economic Slowdown Understates Gains | RAND
China – Africa
(Samir Bhattacharya – Observer Research Foundation) To expand its influence in Africa, China has stepped up its elite capture programs from hosting delegations and training to exporting its authoritarian model of governance. Graduates are now emerging from a school for politicians and officials in Tanzania, the first of its kind that China has set up in Africa. More may follow. – China is exporting its model of political authoritarianism to Africa
Democratic Republic of Congo
(UN News) UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, reported on Thursday that 35,000 Congolese nationals have now reached Burundi since the beginning of February, as Rwanda-backed M23 fighters continue to advance across both South and North Kivu. – DR Congo violence has pushed 35,000 to Burundi, says UN refugee agency | UN News
(Shambhavi Anand – Vivekananda International Foundation) February 12, 2025, marked an important shift in the activities of the M23 rebels. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) turned grim after the M23 rebels resumed their offensive against Congolese government forces just two days after declaring a unilateral ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. Earlier this year, they had taken over Goma, the largest city in the North Kivu province in eastern Congo. Now they have threatened to move towards Bakavu, the capital of South Kivu province after the ruling party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) refused to directly engage in talks with the rebels. UN aid groups reported that more than two million of Goma’s civilians including one million already displaced by violence were at risk of ‘catastrophic’ humanitarian consequences with hundreds of wounded coming every day as it is the civilians who get caught in the crossfire. – The Resurgence of M23 Rebel Group in Democratic Republic of Congo | Vivekananda International Foundation
European Union – India
(Shairee Malhotra – Observer Research Foundation) There is a strong case to be made for a deeper EU-India partnership against the backdrop of global uncertainties and ongoing wars, an assertive China, and the likelihood of a more transactional United States (US) under Trump 2.0. Meanwhile, the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 has run its course, and the EU-India summit of 2025 could be an opportune moment to release a fresh blueprint for cooperation. As the new European Commission’s agenda springs into action and Ursula von der Leyen and her College of Commissioners prepare for their visit to India in late February, this brief provides recommendations on what a new strategic EU-India agenda should prioritise. – A New EU-India Strategic Agenda in 2025
European Union – US
(Robin S. Quinville – Wilson Center) My shorthand description of the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC) has long been: “It’s Davos for security wonks.” MSC’s focus is on global security challenges, bringing voices from across the planet to snowy Bavaria in mid-February. Yet these discussions build on a legacy foundation: the relationship between the United States and Europe. – Making Sense of the Munich Security Conference | Wilson Center
(Giselle Donnelly – American Enterprise Institute) After the “rookie mistakes” of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels, the insults and intrusions into Germany’s election hurled by Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference, and the kowtowing of Secretary of State Marco Rubio to his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov during “peace negotiations” in Riyadh and, finally and most egregiously, President Donald Trump’s scolding of Ukraine for defending itself in a war they “should have never started,” European leaders have come to understand that, after eight decades of Atlantic alliance, the United States has become a feckless and unreliable strategic partner. For Europe, the message from Washington “is one of the last calls [for Europe] to wake up,” said Gabrielius Landsbergis, former Lithuanian foreign minister at the conclusion of the Munich pow-wow. “If this doesn’t wake [us] up, well, somebody might declare that the patient is actually dead. One has to be worthy for [one’s] own freedom.”. Landsbergis’s frustrations are common across Eastern Europe; frontline states from the Baltic to the Black Sea have been warning of Russian revanche almost from the day Putin came to power in the Kremlin. Yet Western Europe’s traditional great powers—especially Germany—have been lethargic in response, all talk and little action. In Munich on Sunday, European Union foreign ministers gathered to try to digest what they had just heard. On Monday, the day Rubio and Lavrov were winging their way to Saudi Arabia to discuss the carving up of Ukraine—with neither Kyiv nor any European representative present—European heads of state scrambled to convene in Paris to try to cobble together some response to the Trump administration’s assaults. Yet beyond promises to increase defense spending in the future and hints that European troops might be made available as peacekeepers in the event of a Ukraine deal—a mission that Hegseth announced the United States wanted no part of—no concrete policy came from the session. – European Defense Without America | American Enterprise Institute – AEI
Georgia
(Emirates Policy Center) In the past decade, Georgia has pursued a more pragmatic and multidimensional foreign policy aimed at balancing its relationships with Russia, Western countries and China. However, the growing polarization between Russia and the West since 2022 has increasingly constrained Georgia’s ability to maintain this balance. The country’s foreign policy orientation – whether to sustain its pragmatic approach, pivot toward Russia or deepen its alignment with the West – has become a deeply divisive issue. This debate shaped the October 2024 parliamentary elections, exacerbating political uncertainty. Georgia’s capacity to sustain a pragmatic foreign policy now hinges on President Trump’s approach to Russia and the war in Ukraine. If Trump eases pressure on Russia and seeks a mediated settlement in Ukraine, Georgia may gain greater strategic flexibility. – Emirates Policy Center | Georgia At a Crossroad: Limits of Pragmatic Policy in an Era of International Polarization
India – Western Indian Ocean
(Raghvendra Kumar – Vivekananda International Foundation) The magnitude of overlapping and interlinked conflicts in West Asia, Northern, and Eastern Africa makes 2024 one of the most volatile years in the global political landscape, affecting the lives and livelihoods of millions and jeopardising peace and stability in the region and beyond. In West Asia, the escalation of the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestine (involving Hamas and Palestinian Jihadi groups) stands as a flashpoint of regional instability, exacerbating tensions across the Arab world and drawing external (state and non-state) actors into the conflict. A case in point is the Iran-Israel strike and counterstrike, Israel-Lebanon’s periodic targeted attacks and counterattacks, the Syrian civil war, Yemen’s conflict, Libya’s unstable political landscape, Egypt’s insurgency, Sudan’s civil strife, Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions, Somalia’s Al-Shabaab insurgency, and Mozambique’s insurgency in Cabo Delgado—all of which highlight the proxy nature of regional rivalries with both localised and transregional ramifications. These complex and interconnected conflicts in the wider Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region undermine governance and security structures, intensify humanitarian crises, and manifest threats such as transnational terrorism, organised crime, and illicit trade in narcotics and trafficking. The ongoing land-based conflict has a spillover effect on the WIO maritime domain, affecting maritime trade, energy supplies, and regional security. They undermine the security of vital global maritime trade routes passing through the region. – India’s Strategic Balancing in Navigating the Arc of Instability and Conflict in the Western Indian Ocean | Vivekananda International Foundation
Indonesia
(Data Avicenna, Intan Permata Sari – East Asia Forum) Indonesia’s move to cleaner cooking fuels, achieved largely through the 2007 ‘Zero Kero Program’, has significantly reduced domestic kerosene use but has resulted in a reliance on imported liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and increased the government’s LPG subsidy. Now there is an effort to transition to induction stoves, but this has met challenges such as low adoption rates, the need for an expanded renewable energy grid to mitigate fossil fuel dependency, financial and infrastructure implications and cultural norms around cooking methods. – Burning questions over Indonesia’s cooking transition | East Asia Forum
Iran
(Danny Citrinowicz – INSS) As the renewal of nuclear talks approaches, the Iranian leadership faces an increasingly sharp dilemma over the strategy it should adopt regarding its nuclear program. On one side, figures from the “moderate” camp are urging Tehran’s leadership to take a conciliatory approach that would lead to a nuclear agreement with the United States in exchange for concessions on its uranium enrichment program. On the other side, voices within the “conservative” camp are growing louder, advocating for Iran to reconsider its nuclear strategy and move toward developing a bomb. The decision ultimately rests with Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, and whatever path he chooses will have far-reaching consequences for the future of the regime in general and Tehran’s nuclear program in particular. – Iran—Between Accepting a Diplomatic Settlement or Acquiring a Nuclear Bomb | INSS
Israel
(Dolev Cfir, Yochai Elani – INSS) This article discusses influence operations aimed at harming Israeli economic and security interests in the international arena, with a focus on two case studies in the United Kingdom and Japan. In both cases, Elbit Systems was targeted for economic and strategic influence and damage. The article describes the operational methods used in the influence operations on social networks, which include coordinating between activist organizations and coordinated inauthentic behavior networks on social media. In addition, it proposes initial directions for addressing these threats, including strengthening the ability to identify coordinated influence operations in social networks, developing international and civilian-security collaborations, strengthening digital resilience, and formulating legal and security action mechanisms for addressing influence operations in the digital arena. – Influence Operations Against Israeli Economic and Security Interests Abroad | INSS
Japan – South Korea – US
(Kanishkh Kanodia – Chatham House) US Vice President JD Vance gave a speech that shocked European allies at the Munich Security Conference this month, putting US commitment to European security into question. But on the sidelines of the event, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was meeting with the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers. It was the first high-level meeting of the Japan–South Korea–US trilateral since Donald Trump became president. Although the three sides reaffirmed their ‘unshakable’ partnership in their joint statement, the new Trump administration’s approach throws doubt on this other important US partnership. – The unpromising future of Japan–South Korea–US trilateral cooperation | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Japan – US
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) On 7 February 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met with United States (US) President Donald Trump during his three-day visit to the US—his first trip to Washington as Japan’s Prime Minister and Trump’s second meeting with a foreign leader. The meeting underscored the commitment of both Washington and Tokyo to strengthen their alliance amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics. – Ishiba’s Washington mission: Safeguarding Japan’s strategic interests
Middle East
(Institute for the Study of War)
Iranian Rhetoric: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Hajji Zadeh also highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”
Syrian Constitution: The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants. This is notable given the KNC’s long-standing opposition to the SDF.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria: Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible PKK vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20. It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.
Iraqi Elections: Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
Iraqi Politics: Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government. – Iran Update, February 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) The spotlight on the second Donald Trump administration’s foreign policy in its fourth week in office was on Europe, where talks around “ending” Russia’s war against Ukraine had a curious connection to the Middle East. Top Trump diplomat Marco Rubio concluded his first visit to the Middle East as secretary of state, traveling to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In this trip, Rubio tried hard to put the best face on Trump’s Gaza “plan” and sounded a hawkish tone on Iran; the latter stance has not yet been backed up by a strategic policy direction or synchronized with key partners of the United States in any clear way. – Trump’s diplomatic gambit in the Middle East at one month | Middle East Institute
(UN News) The UN Secretary-General on Thursday condemned the “parading” of coffins earlier in the day containing the bodies of dead Israeli hostages by their Hamas captors, describing the manner of the handover in Gaza as abhorrent. – UN chief condemns ‘abhorrent and appalling’ treatment of hostages’ remains by Hamas | UN News
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Institute for the Study of War)
The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW’s long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
FT’s investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
(The Soufan Center) On Tuesday, U.S. and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia to initiate peace talks regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine, drawing the ire of Ukrainian officials who were notably excluded from discussions. The exclusion of European leaders from the Riyadh talks has sparked alarm in many European capitals regarding the bloc’s role, or lack thereof, in the peace process and an apparent weakening of the transatlantic partnership. Outsourcing defense to the U.S. was a successful strategy for decades, however, it has left Europe with an atrophied defense sector and hollowed out militaries structured for stability operations and combatting irregular threats––like terrorism––rather than conventional state threats. This shift in U.S. strategy suggests the Trump administration may follow through on a long-expected policy to force Ukraine into accepting an unfavorable peace deal by leveraging American aid––thereby increasing the EU’s responsibility to help uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty. – Breaking the Western Front: U.S.-Russia Talks Deepen European Uncertainty – The Soufan Center
(Benjamin Jensen – Center for Strategic & International Relations) Beyond the headlines and the heartache, the Trump team is charting a course that is as bold as it is risky in relation to Russia and Ukraine. The private calls to Putin and dialogue in Saudi Arabia are likely not just about ending the war in Ukraine. These talks pivot around striking a new grand bargain linked to a mix of geopolitical spheres of influence and cross-cutting issues from access to natural resources to twenty-first-century arms control, which involves not just nuclear concerns but competition in space and cyberspace. In other words, the president’s foreign policy team appears to be leveraging negotiations around Ukraine as a forum to negotiate remaking the international system. The theory of victory is simple and seductive: use a grand rapprochement with Russia to undermine the authoritarian axis linking Moscow to China, Iran, and North Korea while advancing U.S. economic interests. – Grand Bargains in History: Trump’s Ukraine Gambit
(Center for Strategic & International Studies) Moderated by Colonel Scott Pence, U.S. Army Fellow, this week’s Conflict in Focus: Land Domain panel explored the latest battlefield tactics in the Russia-Ukraine war. Ukrainian Parliamentarian Colonel Roman Kostenko discussed key developments, including the role of tanks, the success of the Kursk Incursion, and the impact of North Korean forces. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (Ret.), former U.S. Army Europe Commander, provided insights on the will to fight, drawing from his latest research, while Dr. Benjamin Jensen, Director of CSIS’s Futures Lab, examined the complexities of command and control in modern warfare. The Russia-Ukraine conflict shocked the world—unfolding a story of strategy, resilience, innovation, and global implications. With battles fought on the ground, in the skies, on the seas, and in cyberspace—this conflict has reshaped modern warfare. – Land Domain Lessons from Russia-Ukraine | Conflict in Focus | CSIS Events
South Africa
(Greg Mills, Ray Hartley – RUSI) South Africa’s defiance of US pressure over land expropriation and foreign policy has triggered economic consequences, raising fears of a Zimbabwe-style decline. – South Africa’s Collision Course with Trump: Predictable and Avoidable | Royal United Services Institute
South China Sea
(Carlyle Thayer – East Asia Forum) In 2024, China escalated its intimidation against the Philippines in the South China Sea, leading to numerous violent confrontations. The Philippines has engaged in responses that have sought to bolster operations in the region, while also participating in multilateral military efforts in the South China Sea. Vietnam continues to intensify construction efforts in the Spratly Islands, while attempts to establish a South China Sea Code of Conduct continued to be undermined by divisions within ASEAN. – Choppy waters continue in the South China Sea | East Asia Forum
Southeast Asia – US
(Stephen Olson – FULCRUM) Southeast Asia was spared in the initial flurry of Trumpian trade actions, but Trump’s introduction of expansive and unprecedented non-trade issues into trade relations will inevitably entangle the region. – Southeast Asia must Prepare for Trump’s ‘Everything’s on the Table’ Approach to Trade | FULCRUM
Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Resources Institute) This report analyzed nearly 300 nature-based solutions (NBS) projects across sub-Saharan Africa from 2012 to 2023. It offers a comprehensive overview of NBS in the region: what climate resilience objectives projects are addressing, where projects are occurring and at what scale, how they are funded, and intended co-benefits. It also provides recommendations to scale NBS projects for climate resilience. This report was co-developed by the WRI and the World Bank, with key contributions from the African Development Bank. – Growing Resilience: Unlocking the Potential of Nature-Based Solutions for Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa | World Resources Institute
Syria
(UN News) Accelerating economic recovery is critical to reverse Syria’s decline and restore stability, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) said in a report published on Thursday. –UNDP calls for long-term investment to support recovery in Syria | UN News
(Soufan Center) Continued military intervention by outside actors in post-Assad Syria is complicating the country’s effort to stabilize politically and economically. Türkiye is taking advantage of the fall of the Assad regime to secure its borders from Syrian Kurds, whom Ankara perceives as aligned with militant Turkish Kurds. Conflicts inside Syria, coupled with a potential withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country, might jeopardize efforts to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State organization (IS). Syrian forces have confronted Lebanese Hezbollah’s encroachment on border areas, but have not tried to militarily oppose Israel’s advances on the Golan Heights. – Like Vultures Circling: External Actors Eager to Intervene in Post-Assad Syria – The Soufan Center
Thailand
(Panarat Anamwathana – FULCRUM) Many Thai undergraduates are engaged politically. While ‘all politics is local’, there is regional variation in undergraduate voting behaviour that suggests nuance and nous notwithstanding their youth. – Thai Undergraduates’ Voting Behaviour in Provincial and National Elections | FULCRUM
Türkiye – Syria
(Aaron Y. Zelin, Soner Cagaptay – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) When Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched the military campaign that collapsed Bashar al-Assad’s regime in under two weeks, it did so with Turkey’s approval. This cataclysmic development has placed the Ankara-Damascus relationship at the core of Syria’s stabilization prospects post-Assad. Although the United States and Turkey still formally regard HTS as a designated terrorist entity, Turkey seems to be embracing the daunting prospect of nation building next door in Syria, and doing so via the HTS-led transitional government. The Trump administration has a strong interest in shaping post-Assad Syria as well, given the stated U.S. aims of degrading Iranian influence in the region, countering terrorism, and eventually withdrawing U.S. forces from the country. To achieve these goals, however, Washington will need to fully understand—and leverage—the new Syrian government’s relationship with NATO ally Turkey. – A New Age for Turkish Relations with Syria | The Washington Institute
Türkiye – Ukraine
(Zineb Riboua – Hudson Institute) On February 17, French President Emmanuel Macron gathered the leaders of Denmark, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, the European Commission, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reaffirm support for Ukraine. But NATO’s second-largest military power, Turkey, was conspicuously absent. While Europe deliberated and the United States engaged Russia in Saudi Arabia, Turkey maneuvered to reshape the strategic theater. By hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a clear signal that Turkey remains a key player in shaping Ukraine’s future. Zelenskyy reinforced this, stating that “the European Union, Turkey, and the UK . . . should be involved in conversations and the development of the necessary security guarantees with America regarding the fate of our part of the world.” – Turkey’s Role in Checking Russia | Hudson Institute
US
(Bryan Clark – Hudson Institute) The US military will require more, not less, access to the electromagnetic spectrum in the coming decade. Facing numerical and geographic disadvantages against an opponent like China, US forces will need electronic warfare systems that can jam, decoy, and deceive enemy sensors by operating outside traditional US frequencies and inside those used by adversaries. At home, the US military will need to continuously operate high-power sensors and defenses from S through K band to defend US territory from air and missile attack as part of the Trump Administration’s Iron Dome for America initiative. – The US Military Will Need More, Not Less, Access to Electromagnetic Spectrum | Hudson Institute
(Muddassar Ahmed – German Marshall Fund of the United States) As President Donald Trump embarks on his second term, the United States has in recent decades rarely been as divided as it is now. Republicans and Democrats report ever-shrinking common ground between their parties. This is not just a mild disagreement among compatriots. Members of both parties are increasingly likely to describe their counterparts as close-minded, dishonest, immoral and unintelligent. But there is still hope of restoring unity. – A Reunited United States | German Marshall Fund of the United States
(Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Donald Trump’s presidency is accelerating the pace of change that has been reshaping the US role in the world and reconfiguring alliances for more than two decades. Trump is intensifying the pivot to Asia by transferring (rather than sharing) the burden of European security to the Europeans themselves while he refocuses on three priorities: economic security, China, and immigration. – JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference should be seen as a clarification of Donald Trump’s vision | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – China
(Isaac B. Kardon, Milo McBride – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) As the United States and China careen toward intensified economic decoupling and geopolitical rivalry, trends in the semiconductor and minerals sectors will define their strategic competition. Both great powers aim to consolidate competitive advantages by hampering the other’s technological development and hammering their trading partners. Both are doing so using increasingly damaging measures—but from opposite ends of tech supply chains. The American position remains strongest in advanced technologies, an edge that the Joe Biden administration sought to preserve and extend through an unprecedented series of export controls. China, meanwhile, is just beginning to implement a parallel export control regime that leverages its dominant market share in critical minerals as well as niche but strategic industries. The efficacy of both strategies will depend not only on each party’s execution, but also on their ability to sway middle countries toward cooperation. – Rocks vs. Chips | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
US – Iran
(Colby Connelly – Middle East Institute) With the signing of a presidential memorandum on Feb. 4, the administration of Donald Trump has returned to a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but circumstances have changed drastically since the policy of intensified sanctions was originally crafted during his first term. Regional geopolitics will present the White House with a new set of variables, while changes in the petroleum markets will affect how the administration approaches sanctions on oil exports. As Washington’s ability to return to tighter enforcement of new and existing sanctions on Iran becomes clearer, Tehran’s chronic struggle to produce enough natural gas to satisfy domestic demand — despite possessing some of the largest gas reserves on the planet — continues to worsen. Given US attempts to “driv[e] Iran’s oil exports to zero” in an effort to deter Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Iran’s domestic energy crisis may present a significant source of leverage in any talks on an updated nuclear agreement and could ultimately open the way to a new accord. – Return to “maximum pressure”: Opportunities and challenges | Middle East Institute
(Ariel (Eli) Levite – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) President Donald Trump is eager for a diplomatic breakthrough. He ought to prioritize seeking one with Iran to deliver on his (and his predecessors’) firm commitment to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Success just might be possible. The trick is to identify principles that will make a deal both viable and desirable: acceptable to all parties and beneficial for U.S. and international interests over the long term. – Prioritizing Nuclear Negotiations With Iran | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
