From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Global Risks; Iran; Russia; Russia-Azerbaijan; Russia-Venezuela-US; Syria; US-China; US-Middle East
Global Risks
(World Economic Forum) The Global Risks Report 2026, the 21st edition of this annual report, marks the second half of a turbulent decade. The report analyses global risks through three timeframes to support decision-makers in balancing current crises and longer-term priorities. Chapter 1 presents the findings of this year’s Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS), which captures insights from over 1,300 experts worldwide. It explores risks in the current or immediate term (in 2026), the short-to-medium term (to 2028) and in the long term (to 2036). Chapter 2 explores the range of implications of these risks and their interconnections, through six in-depth analyses of selected themes. Below are the key findings of the report, in which we compare the risk outlooks across the three-time horizons. – World Economic Forum
Iran
(Ray Takeyh – Council on Foreign Relations) Iran is once more experiencing a popular uprising. Scenes of protesters chanting “death to the dictator” and confronting their oppressors have led to comparisons to the 1979 revolution that toppled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. A comparison of the two movements could offer useful guideposts as Iran undergoes an unpredictable transition. As Mark Twain said, history does not always repeat itself but sometimes it does rhyme. In both instances, economic grievances provided the essential spark. In the late 1970s, Iran experienced a severe recession that dashed expectations for continued growth. Corruption, class cleavages, and sudden austerity measures called into question the shah’s ability to lead the nation. The monarch had hoped to trade economic rewards for political passivity. Once his treasury was depleted, he had little to offer his aggrieved citizenry. – Iran’s Uprising Is Similar to 1979—But It’s Not a Revolution Yet | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia has increased trade with former Soviet republics since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine—nearly doubling between 2020 and 2024—even as its political influence in the post-Soviet space is declining. This trade increase stems primarily from former Soviet republics re-exporting Western-sanctioned goods to Russia. When Russia’s war against Ukraine ends and sanctions ease, Moscow will likely end re-export arrangements, causing bilateral trade to decrease, potentially causing these countries to further distance themselves from Russia. The Kremlin is likely to consider soft and hard power solutions to maintain its influence in response. – Russian Trade with Former Soviet Republics Rising as Kremlin Influence Declines – Jamestown
Russia – Azerbaijan
(Vasif Huseynov – The Jamestown Foundation) Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s decision to skip Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Council meetings in December 2025 signaled renewed strain with Moscow, surprising observers who believed the October 2025 Dushanbe summit had stabilized relations after the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) crash. Tensions resurfaced after Azerbaijan learned Russia had closed the crash’s criminal investigation, which contradicted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Dushanbe assurances of missile-related responsibility, legal accountability, and compensation, instead attributing the crash to weather and pilot error. Conflicting Russian narratives and public criticism in Azerbaijan highlight a widening gap between Moscow’s political statements and legal actions, leaving normalization stalled and Russia–Azerbaijan relations suspended in distrust rather than reconciliation. – Russia–Azerbaijan Relations Remain in State of Limbo – Jamestown
Russia – Venezuela – US
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington. The Kremlin’s relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela’s oil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda. Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela’s crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia. Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia’s military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback. – Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere – Jamestown
Syria
(Wladimir van Wilgenburg – The Washington Institute) Since its signing on March 10, no tangible progress has been made on the eight-point agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Interim Government to facilitate SDF integration into the Interim Government’s armed forces. Instead, the talks have run past the agreement’s provision for implementation to be reached by the end of 2025, and violence between the two sides quickly unfolded in Aleppo once the talks stalled after the deadline. On the one hand, the talks did initially continue past the deadline set in March; the respective parties met again on January 4, signaling both continued mediation efforts and a continued lack of progress. Yet clashes in Aleppo between the two sides—preceded by smaller clashes there in the days leading up to the deadline—have caused civilian casualties and emphasize how the ongoing lack of a resolution can flare into a broader conflict if an agreement is not soon reached. – The SDF’s Approach to Integration Talks in Syria and the Risk of Expanded Conflict | The Washington Institute
(Daniele Garofalo – The Jamestown Foundation) In early October 2025, Syrian authorities arrested Muhojir Tactical leader Abu Dujanah al-Turkistani and his deputy, sparking outrage among Central Asian jihadists regarding unfulfilled promises of citizenship and military integration. Founded in 2022, the Uzbek-led Muhojir Tactical group provided military training and produced anti-Russian propaganda to support Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) operations while maintaining long-term ambitions to fight Central Asian regimes. These detentions have suspended the group’s operations, raising the possibility of the group’s dissolution or that disillusioned fighters may defect to the Islamic State or relocate to Central Asia. – Muhojir Tactical Leadership duo Arrested in Syria – Jamestown
US – China
(The Soufan Center) Weaknesses in Russia’s military and defense industrial base exposed during the Russia-Ukraine War have effectively entrenched the Sino-American dyad as the main arena of great power competition today. The PRC is rapidly modernizing its military and scaling its defense industrial base but suffers from corruption and combat inexperience. Both the U.S. and the PRC seek to strategically decouple and have leveraged supply chains and export controls as geopolitical tools. Competition has reshaped alliances as the PRC expands influence via BRICS+ and its Belt and Road Initiative, while the U.S. increasingly prioritizes purpose-built, minilateral partnerships (e.g., Pax Silica) over legacy alliances like NATO. – State of Play: Great Power Competition in 2026 – The Soufan Center
US – Middle East
(The Washington Institute) On January 8, The Washington Institute held a virtual Policy Forum to mark the launch of Ambassador James Jeffrey’s new book Middle East Crises: Expeditionary Diplomacy with the Bush, Obama and Trump Teams. Speakers included Lloyd J. Austin III, who served as U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2021 to 2025 after a forty-one-year Army career that culminated with leading U.S. Central Command; Ambassador Jeffrey, the Institute’s Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, who formerly served as U.S. Special Representative for Syria and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq; and Dana Stroul, the Institute’s Director of Research and Kassen Senior Fellow, who served as Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for the Middle East in 2021-23. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks. – Crisis Diplomacy in the Middle East: Insights from the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Teams | The Washington Institute
