From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : European Union, European Union-ASEAN, G20, India, QUAD, Russia-Africa, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine, Serbia-Kosovo-European Union, US, US-European Union, US-Japan, US-Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
European Union
(Olivier Blanchard, Jean Pisani-Ferry – Bruegel) President Donald Trump has launched an all-out attack on the rules-based international order, which most governments regard as the bedrock of peace and prosperity. Many governments are appalled by his initiatives(. They still believe in respecting trade rules, in limiting tax competition and in fighting global warming. The European Union, which is governed by such rules, has the potential to organise an effective collective response. To do so, however, it must overcome two obstacles – its size and its internal divisions. – Europe’s challenge and opportunity: building coalitions of the willing
(Silvia Merler – Bruegel) The European Union has sought to steer corporate behaviour to support its climate goals by adopting a large body of rules on sustainable investment, sustainability disclosures and sustainability labelling of financial products, underpinned by a taxonomy of activities considered sustainable. It is unclear, however, if this effort has had significant results. Examination of financial market data and metrics of investment flows towards green and sustainable investment shows up several weaknesses – both contingent and structural – in the EU sustainable finance framework, which could limit its effectiveness in aligning capital flows with climate objectives. – How to improve the European Union’s sustainable finance framework
(Ugnė Keliauskaitė, Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Georg Zachmann – Bruegel) This regularly updated dataset aggregates daily data on European natural gas import flows and storage levels. It provides readily available insights into European natural gas supply. The flow of Russian gas has drawn attention, as have soaring energy prices, largely caused by a tight natural gas market. – European natural gas imports
European Union – ASEAN
(Louise Shania Sabela – East Asia Forum) The Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA) aims to replace over 140 bilateral aviation arrangements between the EU and ASEAN with a unified framework, but balancing national sovereignty remains a challenge. Many ASEAN states focus on protecting domestic markets and face infrastructure or capacity constraints, hindering the vision of an integrated regional aviation market. Singapore’s open skies model highlights the benefits of liberalisation, while Indonesia and the Philippines’ large domestic demand and Laos’ infrastructure limitations illustrate persistent barriers. The EU supports ASEAN’s efforts to harmonise regulations and infrastructure through initiatives like ARISE Plus, working towards a more seamless ‘ASEAN sky’. – The EU and ASEAN aim for a smooth landing in aviation cooperation | East Asia Forum
G20
(Rossella Marangio – European Union Institute for Security Studies) ‘We will not be bullied!’ declared Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, in his address to the nation on 6 February 2025. This was in response to recent remarks by US officials and to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s decision to snub the upcoming G20 Ministerial meeting in Johannesburg. While tension seemed inevitable between the US and South Africa following Trump’s election – particularly over the referral of Israel to the International Court of Justice and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – the current level of pressure now leaves little doubt that Washington’s intentions extend beyond undermining multilateralism. It now seems focused on undermining diplomacy itself, unless the US is at the helm. – The G20 at a crossroads: South Africa backs multilateralism and eyes the EU following US snub | European Union Institute for Security Studies
India
(Crisis Group) Manipur, a state in north-eastern India, has been beset with intercommunal strife since May 2023. The central government has now taken a bold step to quell the violence. It should keep acting urgently to avert a protracted crisis. – Finding a Way Out of Festering Conflict in India’s Manipur | Crisis Group
(Kanchan Lakshman – Observer Research Foundation) Sustained and effective anti-Maoist operations by the Security Forces (SFs) leading to heavy Maoist casualties are continuing during the new year in Chhattisgarh. In a major achievement for the SFs, 14 cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-M), including top leader Ramachandra Reddy, were neutralised on 19 January in an encounter at Bhaludiggi, Chhattisgarh, along the Chhattisgarh-Odisha border. This was the second major setback for the Maoists in a week and the latest in a series of SF operations against them. Earlier, on 16 January, during another encounter in the Bijapur district, 18 Maoists, including Telangana State Committee leader Damodar, were neutralised. – Chhattisgarh’s anti-Maoist operations: Key successes and implications
(Kamal Kumar Murari – Observer Research Foundation) Cities, being focal points for human activities, contribute to climate change while also suffering its dire consequences. Current estimates indicate that cities account for 75 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, with a large share coming from the transportation and building sectors. An imperative, therefore, is to position cities as integral components in climate action. – Heat resilience as a key element of city-level climate action policy
QUAD
(Archishman Ray Goswami – Observer Research Foundation) “Short and sweet” is how analysts described the joint statement released by the Quad foreign ministers on the sidelines of President Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President of the United States in January 2025. The convivial atmosphere of the summit—the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first in his new cabinet role—underscores the Quad’s enduring unity and strategic weight within the altered, increasingly competitive security order that President Trump now faces in his second non-consecutive term in office. It is in this context that attention must be paid to the scale and quality of security cooperation among its member-states. The question of intelligence sharing lies at the heart of such issues, especially in a more competitive geopolitical landscape both within the Indo-Pacific and beyond. – Quad intelligence cooperation: Prospects in a competitive age
Russia – Africa
(Ludovic Terren, Peter Van Aelst, Thomas Van Damme – European Union Institute for Security Studies) Russia is expanding its footprint in Africa. The First Ministerial Conference of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum, held in November 2024, brought together foreign ministers from African countries and representatives of the African Union and regional organisations. Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged ‘total support’ for Africa, particularly in combating terrorism and extremism. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, quoted by RIA Novosti, said the conference dashed Western ‘dirty hopes’ for Russia’s isolation, underscoring Moscow’s strategic intent to deepen ties and bolster its influence in the region. These high-level engagements contrast sharply with the Western perception of Russia as a pariah, and reflect the growing support for Russia’s leadership across parts of Africa, particularly in West African countries like Mali and Burkina Faso. Gallup World Poll data shows that approval of Russia’s leadership increased by 22% between 2020 and 2023 across West Africa, despite Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. But how widespread is this support, and how can it be explained? – Shifting alliances in West Africa: Measuring Russian engagement to support counter-FIMI strategies | European Union Institute for Security Studies
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds – RUSI) Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are in a process of adaptation in the pursuit of advantage. Over time, this leads to new capabilities being fielded, tactics applied and lessons relevant to Ukraine and its international partners. The purpose of this report is to survey tactical developments during 2024 that characterise the fighting at time of publication and to highlight areas where military–technical assistance to Ukraine can be improved and where NATO militaries should adapt to keep pace with the threat. This report is based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in November 2024 and January 2025, with the authors having visited two air assault brigades, a marine brigade, a mechanised brigade, a jaeger brigade and assault units along the Donetsk and Sumy fronts. – Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War | Royal United Services Institute
Serbia – Kosovo – European Union
(Bojana Zorić – European Union Institute for Security Studies) The Western Balkans, overshadowed by larger geopolitical crises, may not feature prominently on the agenda of the Munich Security Conference, it remains a vital region for European security. Tensions in the region are often dismissed as business as usual – but this time, the stakes are different. Serbia has been gripped by mass protests since 1 November, triggered by the tragic collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad that claimed the lives of 15 people. The prime minister has resigned, yet demonstrators remain defiant. Meanwhile, Kosovo has just emerged from parliamentary elections in which Albin Kurti’s ruling Vetëvendosje party fell short of securing a majority – winning just 40.8% of the vote. For the first time since coming to power, President Vučić’s political future is uncertain, while an ascendant opposition could turn the tide against Albin Kurti in Kosovo. Amid such critical uncertainties, one thing is clear: the status quo is no longer an option. This leaves the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in limbo, with little prospect of progress in the near future and meaningful negotiations unlikely to advance. – Power struggle in Belgrade and Pristina: What does domestic turmoil mean for EU integration? | European Union Institute for Security Studies
US
(Stimson Center) Trump administration — in 2025. Efforts to resolve conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, relations with China, and global economic challenges will all test the United States and its policymakers. Members of the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy team examined assumptions that they believe are central to U.S. foreign policy and will likely be tested in 2025. Each author identifies and unpacks a key piece of conventional wisdom, and then assesses whether that prevailing view holds up, or whether a fresh approach is needed in light of new realities. – Testing Assumptions About US Foreign Policy in 2025 • Stimson Center
(Thomas Fingar – Bulletin of the Atmoci Scientists) As a long-time China scholar, and as I watch the early days of the Trump presidency, I cannot help but be reminded of the Chinese Communist Party’s assertion in the 1970s that everything Mao said or did was correct and beyond challenge. Donald Trump’s wrecking-ball approach to government reform is indeed reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s misguided attempt to achieve “better, faster, cheaper” results through ex cathedra pronouncements, disparagement of experts and bureaucratic procedures, and the dismantling the institutions of government. Mao’s denunciation of professionals and political opponents for the vague sins of “rightism” and “bureaucratism” seemingly provide the template for Trump’s crusade against the so-called radical left and “wokeism.” The Chinese Communist Party’s slavish endorsement of Mao’s assertions—that government institutions, public servants, and policies were corrupt because they did not conform to his vision for the country—resulted in prolonged and deep deterioration of government services, quality of life, and national security in China. China’s experience should be a cautionary tale for Americans. Mao’s approach proved disastrous for the Party, the nation, and the Chinese people. But then again, there are many distinctly American reasons for concern about the approach and actions of Trump, Elon Musk, and Musk’s young men at the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE (which isn’t actually a department of government). Those reasons apply across the federal government, but I want to focus on the intelligence community because of its importance to the security of our nation and the safety of Americans and American activities at home and abroad. –How Trump, Musk, and DOGE are undermining US intelligence and national security – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
US – European Union
(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) ‘A New Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar’ is a landmark report—co-authored by former senior government officials, national security experts, and policy leaders—presenting a bold strategy for rebalancing the transatlantic security relationship, strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities, and redefining the U.S.-European strategic partnership in an era of shifting global threats. The report argues that Europe must take on a significantly greater role in its own defense, both to safeguard the continent from Russian aggression and to ensure that NATO remains a viable and valuable alliance for the United States. – A New Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
US – Japan
(Yuki Tatsumi – Stimson Center) Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s high-stakes meeting with U.S. President Donald J. Trump set the bilateral relationship on a positive trajectory. In addition to confirming bilateral initiatives ranging from defense to economy, the two leaders also reassured allies and partners in the region as the two countries explicitly recommitted themselves to work tougher for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. However, looking ahead, Ishiba’s own political weakness at home may be the Achilles’ heel of progress, undermining the tone set by the meeting. – Trump and Ishiba Meet for the First Time—Success, Maybe? • Stimson Center
US – Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Nigel Gould-Davies – IISS) On 12 February, United States President Donald Trump’s drive to end the Russia–Ukraine war began in earnest with three initiatives. They reveal much about the administration’s diplomatic strategy and method. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth spoke to Europe. He outlined the administration’s view of future Ukrainian and transatlantic security to his European counterparts in Brussels. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent spoke to Ukraine. He discussed US access to Ukraine’s mineral resources with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv. President Trump spoke to Russia. He set out a diplomatic process to end the war following a 90-minute phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. – Ukraine: America’s diplomatic blitz
(Armida van Rij – Chatham House) President Donald Trump’s comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos last month provided brief respite from fears he might sell out Ukraine to Russia. The president had seemed to place responsibility for opening negotiations to end the war in Ukraine on Russian President Vladimir Putin, rather than Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy. That suggested that perhaps he was on Ukraine’s side after all. The past week has stripped away any such illusions. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined US policy towards Ukraine (changed 24 hours later) at a NATO defence ministerial. Hegseth proposed to concede territory to Russia, keep Ukraine out of NATO, and exclude US troops from guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. Then, President Trump revealed he has opened direct communications with Putin. – Europe needs to make its own plan for peace in Ukraine – and rouse its people to the threat from Russia | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Jack Watling – RUSI) The US’s refusal to offer Ukraine security guarantees and its pivot to the Indo-Pacific present Europe with stark choices. US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, speaking at NATO on 12 February, provided the opening pitch for US efforts to bring an end to the Russo-Ukrainian War. He stated that Ukraine would not be getting back its territories, joining NATO or receiving any security guarantees from the US, but that it would get arms to defend itself and that leverage would be brought against Russia to achieve a ceasefire. Ultimately, Hegseth argued, Ukraine’s future was Europe’s problem. The US’s priority was deterring China. – US Clarity Underscores Ukraine’s Peril | Royal United Services Institute
