From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Belarus-US-EU; China; European Union; Iraq; Lebanon-Israel; Sudan; Syria; UK; US; US-China; US-Japan; US-Venezuela-Latin America
Belarus – US – EU
(Natalya Kovaleva – Chatham House) On 4 November, the US Treasury lifted some of the sanctions imposed on the Belarusian regime, signalling a limited but notable shift in Washington’s policy. The curtailing of measures targeting the country’s national airline, Belavia, and the presidential aircraft of Belarusian ruler Aliaksandr Lukashenka was conditioned, at least in part, on the regime’s selective release of political prisoners. The easing of sanctions reveals the transactional logic driving the recent thaw in US–Belarus relations – one in which calibrated diplomatic concessions are earned through symbolic gestures of goodwill. – As the US eases sanctions on Belarus, is it time for the EU to rethink its approach? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
China
(Masashi Umehara – RUSI) The year 2025 marks the completion of Beijing’s decade long ‘Made in China 2025’ strategic blueprint to transform the country into a global manufacturing powerhouse. The plan explicitly promotes military–civil fusion, and at the core of this fusion lie semiconductors – indispensable components for AI, drone and missile systems. Led by Huawei Technologies, China is seeking to internalize semiconductor production. If these efforts succeed, China will gain an important military advantage in East Asia, potentially triggering a global rebalancing of military power. While it may be unrealistic to obstruct China’s national strategy, it may nevertheless be possible to delay its progression by expanding mini-lateral export control frameworks among key technology-supplying nations. – Huawei’s ‘Spare Tyre 2.0’ and the Limits of US Sanctions | Royal United Services Institute
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) Beijing’s education policies support science and technology self-reliance while courting foreign humanities scholars to endorse its global ambitions. Several plans released in 2025 double down on achieving breakthroughs in science and technology, in spite of widespread negative social impacts from similar existing policies. Global China studies and sinology conferences this year have called on international academics to act as “ambassadors,” promoting Beijing’s global initiatives and praising China’s path to modernization. – Talent Policies Drive Tech Race While Party Courts Sinologists – Jamestown
(Daniel Fu – The Jamestown Foundation) Alongside continued investment in artificial intelligence (AI) technology and applications, a growing body of skeptics has emerged within media, policy, academic, and scientific circles in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). AI skeptics voice concerns over a lack of coordinated deployment, overhyped technology that may not produce the economic development many expect, effects on labor, and general social and safety issues. Analyses of the U.S.-China AI race often overlook national-level debates and local implementation, where some skeptics see wasted resources and inefficiencies. – PRC Elites Voice AI-Skepticism – Jamestown
(Gerui Zhang, Brandon Tran – The Jamestown Foundation) Personnel changes at the top of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may shift its near-term strategy for Taiwan away from planning for a blockade or amphibious invasion and toward a joint firepower strike campaign or decapitation strike. The purging of nine People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals, most of whom were linked to the Nanjing Military Region and the 31st Group Army, likely signals both an extension of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and an internal power struggle within the upper ranks of the PLA. Officers connected to He Weidong and Miao Hua were removed, while the Central Military Commission now consists exclusively of members of the “Shaanxi Gang”—officials with family and career ties to Shaanxi Province. – Political Purification and Strategic Realignment in the PLA – Jamestown
(Michael Cunningham – The Jamestown Foundation) The detention of Liu Jianchao, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Liaison Department (ILD), has caused instability in the PRC’s foreign affairs hierarchy and signals uncertainty in its succession planning. Liu Haixing was appointed to lead the ILD, but his appointment shows that the CCP is struggling to field senior diplomats who have the requisite experience, party rank, and political loyalty to Xi. With Wang Yi already having long surpassed the informal retirement age, the CCP must decide by 2027 whether to promote Liu Haixing, retain Wang, or downgrade the chief diplomat’s role altogether. – China’s Foreign Affairs Apparatus Grapples with Succession Challenges – Jamestown
European Union
(Joseph Jarnecki – RUSI) Cloud computing has become a fundamental capability for European national security and defence. Governments increasingly depend on cloud services to strengthen national resilience, modernise legacy systems and provide advanced technological capabilities such as AI. – European Cloud Adoption for National Security | Royal United Services Institute
Iraq
(Atlantic Council) The voting is over, but the maneuvering could go on for a while. In Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Tuesday, the bloc led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani won the most seats, but it will need the backing of other parties to form a government. Tuesday’s vote came amid pressure from the Trump administration to crack down on Iran-backed militias operating in the country and questions over whether Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s call to boycott the elections would depress turnout. – Experts react: How will Iraq’s parliamentary election shape the country’s politics? – Atlantic Council
Lebanon – Israel
(Lina Khatib – Chatham House) Lebanese president Joseph Aoun stated last week that Lebanon has ‘no choice’ but to negotiate, in a clear reference to Israel. He told journalists that ‘the language of negotiation is more important than the language of war’, adding ‘we have seen what [war] did to us.’. Aoun’s statement sparked intense debate among Lebanon’s political parties over the prospect of direct negotiations with Israel. This scenario has been long been considered a taboo in Lebanon. The two countries have no diplomatic relations and have been technically in a state of war since 1948, although recent conflicts have been between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, with the Lebanese Armed Forces generally staying on the sidelines. – Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm makes direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel more likely | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Sudan
(Jeffrey Feltman – Brookings) Bloodstains and bodies visible from space. Video selfies of giddy fighters butchering civilians. Executions, sexual violence, torture. The October 26 fall of el-Fasher in North Darfur to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) challenges Washington’s attempts to create consensus with Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi on ending Sudan’s agony. Will Sudan feature prominently and seriously—enough to make a difference—when President Donald Trump hosts Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on November 18? By that meeting, thousands in el-Fasher who survived the RSF’s 500-day siege will have been massacred. The savagery, reportedly ethnically based, fits a pattern. It highlights the RSF’s roots in the notorious Janjaweed militias accused of genocide in Darfur two decades ago. Issued just weeks before el-Fasher’s fall, the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”) for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2003 and 2004—the ICC’s first indictment from that Darfur conflict—was too weak a symbol and issued too late to moderate the current RSF quest for carnage. – Sudan’s deadly divide: The RSF and SAF’s reign of terror | Brookings
Syria
(Chatham House) Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Chatham House on 13 November in his first public event in the United Kingdom, for a discussion with Institute Chair, Sir Simon Fraser, followed by questions from the audience. The visit followed the historic raising of the Syrian flag outside the country’s re-opened London embassy on 12 November (the embassy had been closed for 12 years). The event also took place shortly after the visit of Syrian President Al-Sharaa to the White House in Washington on 10 November. – Syrian foreign minister says Assad regime made Syria an ‘exporter of threats’ – new government wants to restore trust | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
UK
(Jerome Puri, Olivia O’Sullivan – Chatham House) The crisis in the global system of foreign aid is a problem for the effectiveness of the UK’s own aid strategy. By 2026, global aid is expected to have declined by almost a third compared to its 2023 level, as spending cuts by many donors – including the UK and, most consequentially, the US – reduce funding for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and provision of global public goods such as vaccination or climate action. – Rethinking UK aid policy in an era of global funding cuts | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Olivia O’Sullivan – Chatham House) November’s G20 summit in Johannesburg is a time for the UK to make some important decisions. Britain will co-host an event in the margins of the summit, discussing replenishing finances for the Global Fund for Aids, TB and malaria. It will do so amid speculation that it may cut its own promised contribution to the fund. This is one of several areas where the UK’s decision to cut aid spending to 0.3 per cent of GNI is working its way through to choices about specific funds – in a year when aid spending across the Western world has also been dramatically cut. – The UK should go ahead with its plans to host a global conference on the future of development | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Carla Anne Robbins – Council on Foreign Relations) When President Donald Trump addressed the country’s top military officers in late September, he offered no insight into his plans for China, Iran, or Russia. North Korea and its fifty nuclear weapons didn’t come up. The president’s only apparent security concerns were alleged Venezuelan drug traffickers—whose boats, he promised to blow “out of existence”—and the need to fight the “enemy from within.” – ‘America First’ Meets the National Security and Defense Strategies | Council on Foreign Relations
US – China
(Nero Huang – RUSI) On 10 October, a remark made by China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping was recalled around the world, becoming a focal point of commentary across Europe. Deng had stated in 1992, during his southern tour that ‘China’s rare-earth resources account for 80 per cent of the world’s known reserves. Their importance can be compared to Middle Eastern oil, possessing extremely vital strategic significance. We must handle rare earths well and make full use of China’s advantages in this field.’ – Xi-Trump Pause on Rare-Earths Tariff Shields AI Bubble Temporarily | Royal United Services Institute
US – Japan
(Daisuke Kawai – RUSI) In late October 2025, US President Donald Trump returned to Tokyo for a highly choreographed state visit, during which he and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi declared a ‘New Golden Age’ for the US-Japan alliance. The defining image was unmistakable: both leaders standing on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, addressing American and Japanese service members side-by-side. – The Trump–Takaichi Summit and Japan’s Emerging Economic Statecraft | Royal United Services Institute
US – Venezuela – Latin America
(The Soufan Center) Tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela have risen markedly this week as U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, announced “Operation Southern Spear” Thursday night, just days after Washington deployed its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, to Latin American waters, sounding the alarm for Venezuela to mobilize its military and militia forces. The addition of troops from the USS Gerald R. Ford brings the total U.S. personnel in Latin America to approximately 15,000, including those in Puerto Rico and aboard the eight warships already in the region, marking the largest military buildup in the region in decades. Washington’s recent strikes on alleged drug boats have strained its relationship with key allies such as the UK and Colombia. Caracas has leaned closer to its ally Russia, ratifying a strategic agreement in October, while unverified reports suggest Moscow may have delivered new air defense systems to Venezuela. – U.S. Launches Operation Southern Spear – The Soufan Center
