From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Greenland; Iran; Russia-US-Venezuela; Syria; Tunisia; Ukraine; US
Greenland
(Reed Blakemore and Alexis Harmon – Atlantic Council) Greenland has substantial reserves of rare earth elements, uranium, and other strategically important minerals. Yet there are substantial obstacles to mining and processing these minerals, including Greenland’s limited infrastructure, its harsh climate, and local opposition to mining. A unilateral approach by the United States risks limiting its ability to engage productively with Greenland’s mineral sector; a better option is for Washington to collaborate with partners to help de-risk projects for investors. – Greenland’s critical minerals require patient statecraft – Atlantic Council
Iran
(Michael Singh – The Washington Institute) For all the military weapons remaining in the Iranian regime’s arsenal, it has finally been deprived of the one that authoritarians rely upon most: fear. For almost five decades, the Iranian regime has brutally repressed its own people while sowing mayhem in the Middle East and beyond. But the regime may have finally entered a strategic crisis from which it will not be able to escape. To ensure its survival to this point, the regime in Tehran has sought to fend off what it perceived as its two greatest threats: Iran’s own relatively young, well-educated and politically engaged populace; and countries in the region and beyond, including especially the United States, that took umbrage with the Iranian regime’s nonstop threats to their interests and to regional stability. Fear has been the regime’s chief instrument: whether stoking Washington and others’ self-deterring fear that taking conflict with Iran too far would spark a regional war, or inspiring fear among the Iranian populace that protests would attract only regime reprisals rather than international support. – Iran’s Regime Has Already Lost Its Most Potent Weapon | The Washington Institute
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) Last week, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei effectively greenlit mass killings to save his regime. His message was blunt: Blood would be spilled to preserve the system. His security forces followed through, unleashing a level of violence against protesters that, even by the Islamic Republic’s grim standards, marks a dangerous escalation. This may suppress demonstrations in the short term. It will not solve the regime’s deeper problem though. Even if the system survives this round, the next wave of protests is already forming. Killing thousands of citizens is not a strategy for stability; it is an admission of political bankruptcy and a step that may ultimately hasten the regime’s demise. – Khamenei did this to himself. The US can help — without another Middle East quagmire – Middle East Institute
Russia – US – Venezuela
(Stephen Sestanovich – Council on Foreign Relations) How do Russian policymakers view President Donald Trump’s military action against Venezuela? Since U.S. forces seized Nicolás Maduro and his wife, much analysis—in both Russia and the West—has weighed the balance between obvious short-term costs and possible long-term benefits. For Russian President Vladimir Putin two bigger—but less mentioned—questions, to which he does not yet have answers, are these: whether Trump aims to lower global oil prices and whether U.S. pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” which handles Russian oil exports, will trigger a bigger change in policy toward Ukraine. – Putin’s Real Worry About Trump’s Venezuela Intervention | Council on Foreign Relations
Syria
(The Soufan Center) Damascus’ effort to force remaining Kurdish militia fighters out of the northern city of Aleppo will set back efforts to construct an inclusive, national political structure in post-Assad Syria. The Syrian offensive undermined U.S. negotiations to integrate its anti-ISIS partner, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), into the central government security architecture. The expulsion of SDF members from Aleppo answers demands by Damascus’ ally, Türkiye, for a sphere of influence and buffer zone in northern Syria free of armed Kurdish groups. The fighting in Aleppo dampened regional optimism that followed a U.S.-brokered agreement between Syria and Israel to engage in limited security cooperation and intelligence sharing. – Syrian Offensive Against Kurds in Aleppo Clouds Prospects for Stability – The Soufan Center
Tunisia
(Sharan Grewal – Brookings) On this day in 2011, Tunisians overthrew their long-time dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, igniting the Arab Spring. Fifteen years later, after a failed experience with democracy, Tunisians again face the same conditions that fueled their revolution: a poor economy, a repressive regime, and a lack of hope. But while the grievances for revolution have returned, the factors that had facilitated Tunisia’s revolution and transition to democracy—a supportive military, a strong civil society, and a cooperative political class—have largely disappeared. An uprising today would therefore look very different than it did in 2011. – 15 years later, is a new Tunisian revolution possible? | Brookings
Ukraine
(Jade McGlynn – CSIS) The 2024 CSIS report Crossing Thresholds traced the emergence of diverse forms of resistance in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories between 2022 and 2023. Since then, the occupation environment has hardened dramatically: Pervasive surveillance, coercion, and new forms of digital control have almost eliminated the space for open activism, forcing adaptation underground. This update examines developments in 2024–2025, analyzing how resistance has evolved to survive, relying on compartmentation and trust, and prioritizing survivability over visibility. Understanding this evolution is critical for assessing impact, setting realistic expectations, and aligning Western assistance with the lived realities of resistance under Russian occupation. The analysis draws on field research conducted across free Ukraine throughout 2024–25, including interviews and observation within units and networks engaged in resistance-related activity. Insights from Ukrainian officials, coordinators, and civil society actors have been incorporated with consent where appropriate; others are anonymized for security reasons. The report integrates these perspectives with verified open-source material and secondary data to ensure analytical accuracy while protecting participants. – Thresholds of Survival: The Resistance in Occupied Ukraine
US
(Michael Jacobson, Matthew Levitt – The Washington Institute) Last week, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from sixty-six international organizations, including three with vital counterterrorism missions. Soon after, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the administration would continue reviewing such organizations and severing ties with those it deems “wasteful, ineffective, or harmful,” in line with Trump’s February 2025 executive order to that effect. The new withdrawals and the implication that more will follow raise questions about whether the administration intends to continue America’s post-9/11 counterterrorism leadership role. The U.S. government and the United Nations will be issuing new CT strategy documents and revisions in the near future, and both represent important opportunities for the administration to clarify that it remains committed to setting the international counterterrorism agenda, including via multilateral organizations. Besides facilitating historic U.S. victories and progress over the past twenty-five years, this multilateral approach will be essential going forward if President Trump hopes to achieve his goals against the Islamic State (IS), Iran-linked terrorism, and other threats—not just in the Middle East, but also in South America and beyond. – Why the United States Must Maintain Its International Counterterrorism Leadership Role | The Washington Institute
