From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Canada-US-China; Greenland-US; Iran-Middle East; Iran-US; Mercosur-European Union; Russia; Russia-India-Arctic; Russia-Ukraine; US-Colombia
Canada – US – China
(Roland Paris – Chatham House) Canada has not considered the United States a military threat since the mid-19th century. Such tensions appeared to be settled, if not ancient, history – until now. The US capture of President Nicolás Maduro, coupled with President Donald Trump’s broad assertions of US dominance across the Western Hemisphere – including ominous hints about seizing Greenland ‘the hard way’ – have unsettled long-held assumptions about Canada’s security in North America. Trump frequently called for Canada to become the ‘51st state’ in the early months of his second term, provoking disbelief and anger among Canadians, and helping to propel Mark Carney to victory in Canada’s federal election last April. In the second half of 2025, however, Trump dialed back his comments, tempering Canadian unease about his territorial ambitions. The US National Security Strategy issued in November elevated control of the Western Hemisphere as a top priority. But that document made no mention of Canada in that context, suggesting to some observers ‘that Ottawa is no longer squarely in Trump’s firing line’. Instead, the US was assembling a naval force in the Caribbean and destroying speedboats – allegedly belonging to ‘narco-terrorists’ – in international waters, actions criticized by legal experts as violating international law. Ottawa remained silent, seemingly unwilling to provoke Trump – a caution shared by most US allies. Then came the attack on Venezuela and capture of Maduro on 3 January. Canada’s response was again muted, with Carney vaguely urging ‘all parties to respect international law’. The prime minister’s caution is perhaps more understandable than that of other NATO allies: his economy remains heavily integrated with the US. Even with tariffs, 67 per cent of Canadian exports went to the US in October 2025. – As Carney visits China to diversify Canada’s trade, the ‘Donroe Doctrine’ further strains US relations | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Greenland – US
(Charlie Edwards – IISS) Following the operation that captured Venezuela’s then-president, Nicolás Maduro, on 3 January 2026, United States President Donald Trump has intensified pressure on Denmark over Greenland. Against this backdrop, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Greenland’s Minister for Statehood and Foreign Affairs, Vivian Motzfeldt, travel to Washington this week to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for trilateral talks on the island’s future. The meeting comes as the Trump administration elevates hemispheric defence, the organising principle underpinning the US 2025 National Security Strategy, to focus on the Western Hemisphere, even as the Arctic case is more being built through political messaging than underpinned by strategy. – The ‘Donroe Doctrine’ reaches the Arctic
(Reed Blakemore and Alexis Harmon – Atlantic Council) Greenland has substantial reserves of rare earth elements, uranium, and other strategically important minerals. Yet there are substantial obstacles to mining and processing these minerals, including Greenland’s limited infrastructure, its harsh climate, and local opposition to mining. A unilateral approach by the United States risks limiting its ability to engage productively with Greenland’s mineral sector; a better option is for Washington to collaborate with partners to help de-risk projects for investors. – Greenland’s critical minerals require patient statecraft – Atlantic Council
Iran – Middle East
(Elliott Abrams, Steven A. Cook, Elisa Ewers, and Henri J. Barkey – Council on Foreign Relations) The protests in the Islamic Republic could shape up to be more than a domestic crisis. Demonstrations that began on December 28 with economic grievances have developed into an open call for regime change. The outcome of the protests could prove pivotal for the region and reshape dynamics in the Middle East. The Iranian authorities have responded with a violent crackdown that includes an internet blackout and severed communications. The death and arrest figures vary due to the challenging information space, but the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency now estimates that at least two thousand people have been killed since the protests began. – What Iran’s Protests Mean for Countries in the Middle East | Council on Foreign Relations
Iran – US
(Clayton Swope – CSIS) As of January 13, 2025, President Trump is reportedly considering air strikes, among other retaliatory measures, in response to growing evidence that Iranian efforts to suppress widespread anti-government protests had led to hundreds of civilian deaths. To date, there is no sign that the president would consider deploying ground forces in Iran, meaning that U.S. kinetic action would involve military airpower alone. The United States has a long history of leaning on airpower to accomplish policy objectives—and history shows that the results of such efforts are mixed. The strength of airpower is that it can strike suddenly and accurately from afar; its weakness is that it has a hard time controlling subsequent events on the ground. This means airpower alone has proven to be an imperfect tool for compelling behavior, like ending attacks on civilians. But in the case of Iran, airpower could help bring about a different goal that would bring about an end to the violence against demonstrators: regime collapse. But what would come next is an open question. – Would Air Strikes Against Iran Work?
Mercosur – European Union
(Irene Mia – IISS) On 9 January 2026, a qualified majority of European Union member-state ambassadors cleared the way for the EU to sign a long-awaited free-trade agreement with Mercosur, a South American customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Officially launched in 1999, the negotiations have spanned more than two decades and been repeatedly stalled by opposition from European farmers concerned about competition from agricultural powerhouses Brazil and Argentina, South American industrialists wary of exposure to European manufactured goods and the risk of de-industrialisation, and environmental groups alarmed by the agreement’s implications for deforestation and climate policy. Shifting global trade and geopolitical dynamics, not least the United States’ increasingly erratic trade and foreign policy under President Donald Trump, likely injected new urgency into concluding the deal. – The Mercosur–EU deal: a test for climate diplomacy in the twenty-first century
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Most of Russia is located in the Far North, where cold winters put a strain on infrastructure, causing transportation delays and breakdowns in the delivery of heat, electricity, and even water to homes, schools, and hospitals. This year, those problems have been intensified by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine because of Kyiv’s drone attacks and Moscow’s diversion of infrastructure funds to the war. Russians, including some Duma deputies, are protesting Moscow’s cutbacks and the infrastructure collapse across the country. – War Spending Accelerating Russian Infrastructure Collapse – Jamestown
Russia – India – Arctic
(John C. K. Daly – The Jamestown Foundation) During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 2025 visit to New Delhi, Russia formalized Indian military access to Arctic naval ports, training in polar operations, and logistics support under a five-year agreement, deepening Russia–India military cooperation in the Arctic. The two countries also committed to developing key transport routes, including the Northern Sea Route, the International North–South Transport Corridor, and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, aiming to shorten shipping distances between Europe and Asia. India and Russia’s Arctic cooperation balances Russia’s reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), strengthens bilateral ties, and allows India access to Arctic trade routes. – Russia and India Formalize Arctic Partnership – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Yuri Lapaiev – The Jamestown Foundation) The use of ballistic missiles against Ukraine on January 8–9 had a demonstrative effect, aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners, as well as at the Russian domestic audience. Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter indicate the continuation of terror against Ukraine’s civilian population. Russia will most likely continue to combine kinetic strikes—or the use of various military systems—to support psyops against its adversaries. – Moscow Uses Oreshnik for Psychological Pressure – Jamestown
US – Colombia
(The Soufan Center) Tensions have spiked once again between the United States and Colombia, particularly following the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. While Trump’s comments regarding the Western Hemisphere should, and have been, taken seriously, it remains unlikely that he would pursue regime change in Colombia in the same manner as Venezuela. Colombia and other regional actors must balance maintaining cooperation with Washington and addressing U.S. security demands, while still asserting national sovereignty and protecting domestic political priorities without triggering punitive responses from Washington. Armed non-state actors — such as Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents and criminal organizations — have utilized Venezuela as a safe haven under Maduro’s regime, and his capture may create a complicated security landscape for Bogotá. – The Future of U.S.-Colombia Relations After Maduro – The Soufan Center
