From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Azerbaijan-Vietnam; Belarus; Europe; G7-Canada; Hong Kong; Israel-Iran; Kazakhstan-Afghanistan; Lebanon; Russia; Syria; Syria-Islamic State; US-China; US-Middle East; US-North Africa; YouTube-Russia-Belarus
Azerbaijan – Vietnam
(Vusal Guliyev – The Jamestown Foundation) Azerbaijan and Vietnam established an official strategic partnership during General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm’s May 7–8 visit to Baku, signing major agreements in energy, defense, science, trade, and culture to expand bilateral cooperation. Key economic deals include energy collaboration between the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and Petrovietnam, logistics partnerships, and a business council. Both countries aim to boost trade, diversify exports, and connect markets across Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Azerbaijan is leveraging its roles in the People’s Republic of China’s One Belt One Road initiative and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to more deeply integrate into Asia-Europe trade networks, while Vietnam is orienting its exports within these routes. – Azerbaijan and Vietnam Forge Strategic Ties – Jamestown
Belarus
(Yauheni Preiherman – The Jamestown Foundation) Belarus has announced a significant downsizing and relocation of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises with Russia in an apparent effort to reduce tensions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reduced scale of the exercises brings them below international thresholds that require prior notification and international observation, yet Minsk has pledged to do both. Minsk’s measures may create limited space for meaningful future dialogue and engagement with the West, while broader security breakthroughs remain unlikely so long as the war between Russia and Ukraine continues – Belarus Downsizes Zapad-2025 to Reduce Escalation Risks – Jamestown
Europe
(Dimitar Bechev – Carnegie Europe) The Georgian and Serbian leaders’ pivots away from the path to EU accession show the bloc’s waning appeal. To keep EU enlargement on track, Brussels should focus on candidate countries that are making genuine progress toward membership. – The EU’s Waning Attractiveness | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(Rym Momtaz – Carnegie Europe) After forty years, the Schengen area, a pillar of EU integration and free movement, is increasingly undermined by member states reintroducing border controls. Amid global turmoil and populist pressure, can Schengen still stand as a model of European unity? – Taking the Pulse: Is Schengen Still Fit for Purpose? | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
G7 Canada
(Atlantic Council) It’s a high-stakes summit among the high summits. Leaders from the Group of Seven (G7) nations are set to convene in the Rocky Mountain resort of Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, from June 15 to 17. This year also marks the group’s fiftieth meeting. In 1975, the newly created Group of Six (G6) held its first meeting in France amid oil price shocks and financial fallout from then US President Richard Nixon’s decision to remove the dollar from the gold standard. In recent years, the G7 has coalesced around coordinating sanctions on Russia, supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction, and responding to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity. But 2025 comes with new challenges, including an ongoing trade war between G7 members, which will test the resolve and the raison d’etre of the grouping. Here’s a look inside the numbers that will frame the summit. – Seven charts that will define Canada’s G7 Summit – Atlantic Council
Hong Kong
(Matthew Brazil – The Jamestown Foundation) Two new pieces of national security legislation in Hong Kong introduce six offenses and six “prohibited places,” signaling closer alignment with the laws of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) mainland and raising concerns about the safety and freedom of foreigners and locals. The Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS), Beijing’s counter-subversion arm, is central to these efforts. Established in 2020, its leadership is selected from the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing. The apparent requisition of around 1,700 rooms across four hotels suggest that Beijing’s security presence on the ground in Hong Kong is set to ramp up and could lead to increased efforts to build cases against targets abroad and their relatives at home. – New Legislation Could Increase Security Presence in Hong Kong – Jamestown
Israel – Iran
(Atlantic Council) It’s just the beginning. Early on Friday morning in the Middle East, Israeli jets carried out dozens of strikes against nuclear and military sites in Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it “a targeted military operation to roll back the Iranian threat to Israel’s very survival,” adding that the operation would continue “for as many days at it takes to remove this threat.” Israel’s closest ally was quick to distance itself from the strike, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that the United States was “not involved.” As reports of the damage rolled in, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, was listed among those killed in the strikes, according to Iranian state media. Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? – Experts react: Israel just attacked Iran’s military and nuclear sites. What’s next? – Atlantic Council
Kazakhstan – Afghanistan
(Syed Fazl-e-Haider – The Jamestown Foundation) Kazakhstan and Afghanistan signed a protocol of intent on April 24 to jointly develop the Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railway, including a logistics hub in Herat and fiber optic infrastructure to support digital connectivity. The railway is one aspect of regional transport development that could transform Afghanistan into a vital transit corridor linking Central Asia to South Asia, offering Kazakhstan maritime trade access and potentially tripling cargo transport by 2030.
The project reflects Kazakhstan’s growing engagement with Afghanistan, bolstered by the removal of the Taliban from its terrorist list and a projected $500 million investment. – Kazakhstan and Afghanistan Sign Protocol of Intention on Railway Construction – Jamestown
Lebanon
(Middle East Institute) MEI Senior Fellow Paul Salem joins the program to assess Lebanon’s rapidly shifting political landscape. With a new president and government promising to enact reforms and reassert sovereignty, Lebanon faces a daunting agenda: disarming Hizballah, rebuilding institutions, navigating regional diplomacy, and restoring the economy. Salem offers on-the-ground insight from Beirut, unpacks the fragility of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, and outlines how international actors–from the US to Iran–are shaping the country’s future. – Lebanon at a Crossroads: Sovereignty, Hizballah’s Disarmament, and the Road to Reform | Middle East Institute
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin has made knowledge and use of the Russian language central to his understanding of Russian identity, the basis of links between the Russian population and his regime, and a key part of his foreign policy. Putin has also declared that the Russian language is currently subject to attack by other powers with other languages and that these attacks require the constant intervention of the state to defend it from corruption and defeat. The Russian leader has denigrated the non-Russian languages spoken by many in the Russian Federation and suggested that they are first and foremost a means of connecting to Russian and thus to the broader world. – Putin Turns to Linguistics Like Dictators Before Him – Jamestown
Syria
(Mohammed Hassan – Middle East Institute) After leading the lighting campaign that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, 2024, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, quickly began working to form a unified national army, dismantle the existing factions, and centralize all weapons under the authority of the state in an effort to address one of the most pressing challenges facing his administration. While several initial moves have been completed, important steps in this complicated process are still pending. This article highlights the current developments surrounding the formation of the new army, including progress achieved to date and key challenges going forward. – Building Syria’s new army: Future plans and the challenges ahead | Middle East Institute
(Emirates Policy Center) The sectarian tension between the Druze and the Syrian interim authorities led by Ahmed al-Sharaa escalated into armed confrontations that lasted for days and took on regional dimensions, leading to mixed outcomes. Among the key developments: Sharaa has strengthened his hold over Damascus, secured the Damascus-Daraa road, enhanced security along the Damascus Airport Road and effectively confined the Druze issue to Suwayda governorate. Conversely, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has consolidated his position as the leading Druze figure in Syria and deepened his rapprochement and openness toward Israel. The Druze question in Syria will remain a key issue on both the local and international stages. Domestically, it represents a major test for Sharaa’s ability to incorporate rebellious areas under his authority. Internationally, Suwayda is likely to remain central to the evolving dynamics of Syrian-Israeli relations. – Emirates Policy Center | From Jaramana to Suwayda: Domestic and Regional Ramifications of Escalation Between the New Syrian Authority and the Druze
Syria – Islamic State
(Soufan Center) Islamic State (IS) in Syria aims to ignite sectarian violence, fragment national cohesion, and undermine the legitimacy of the transitional government. Lagging integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian military and U.S. troop withdrawals have created a strategic environment ripe for further exploitation. Through IS’s vast propaganda ecosystem, the transitional government has been routinely targeted, and foreign fighters aligned with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham have been coaxed to join IS. Foreign powers in Syria, including Russia, Iran, and Israel, working at cross-purposes could provide more seams for IS to exploit. – Mind the Gap: Islamic State Poised to Destabilize Syria Amid Challenging Transition Period – The Soufan Center
US – China
(Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz – CSIS) On April 4, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export controls on seven rare earth elements in response to President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods. On May 11, U.S. and Chinese officials met in Switzerland and reached a 90-day tariff truce, which included removing U.S. companies from China’s trade blacklist—allowing them renewed access to rare earth supplies. Despite the agreement, the situation remained unstable, as U.S. manufacturers began shutting down operations due to rare earth shortages. Following the Geneva talks, President Trump accused China of reneging on the deal. While China did not officially withdraw from the agreement, it delayed issuing export licenses, effectively using the bureaucratic slowdown as leverage to bring the United States back to the negotiating table. On June 11, U.S. and Chinese officials finalized a new trade framework following two days of negotiations in London, which included U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. According to President Trump, the agreement includes a commitment from Beijing to resume exports of rare earth elements and magnets to the United States, following two months of severe export restrictions that disrupted key inputs for the automotive, robotics, and defense sectors. The centrality of rare earth export restrictions to the trade deal underscores the criticality of minerals to the U.S. economy as well as the severity of the chokehold Beijing holds on global supply chains. – Trump Strikes a Deal to Restore Rare Earths Access
US – Middle East
(Grant Rumley, Claudia Groeling – Washington Institute for Near East Policy) For many American presidencies, the second term is a chance to cement their legacy. The president, unburdened by the constraints of having to face elections again, is thus able to pursue foreign and domestic policies of choice. Historically, the president’s staff largely stayed the same between the first and second terms in office, providing continuity of thought and process. And world events are generally consistent with the themes of the president’s first time in office. Yet in the case of the Second Trump Administration, this is not exactly the case. President Trump has an entirely new cabinet and inherits a world decidedly changed since he was last in office. Not for over a hundred years has an American president served two non-consecutive terms in office, and the similarities and differences between the first and second Trump terms are crystallizing. On the one hand, many of the focal points of the first Trump administration remain in the second. The prioritization of immigration, border security, and the competition with China span both terms. On the other, the aspirations of territorial expansion (see: Greenland), friction with traditional U.S. partners and allies (see: NATO), and chafing at America’s vast overseas military commitments (see: the Houthi campaign) are heightened variations on a similar theme. The world the second Trump administration inherited is dramatically different as well: the U.S. no longer has a military presence in Afghanistan, the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan continue, and the competition with China has only intensified. Yet the Middle East has remained a priority for Trump. In May, he visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the first official overseas travel of his second term in office. What emerged during this trip is the formation of a new foreign policy doctrine, one that starts with the Middle East but has repercussions for America’s relationships around the world. – The Emerging Trump Doctrine in the Middle East | The Washington Institute
US – North Africa
(Mohammed Mahmoud – Middle East Institute) When Executive Order (EO) 14169, “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” was issued and implemented by the administration of President Donald Trump in early 2025, it effectively halted nearly all US foreign aid. The order primarily suspended the disbursement of non-military aid programs, leading to the termination of US-funded assistance projects, contracts, and employment across the world. The impact of this abrupt elimination of foreign aid was especially acute for humanitarian and development programs, crippling those targeting food assistance, clean water access, public health, and agricultural support. Countries in North Africa have traditionally been direct recipients and beneficiaries of US foreign aid programs, generally administered through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) or the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). In addition to bilateral assistance, foreign aid also reaches North Africa indirectly through international organizations and development agencies that receive significant funding from the United States, such as the various agencies and committees of the United Nations. A number of these foreign-funded programs are specifically aimed at improving access to adequate food and clean water, particularly in areas that are highly vulnerable to chronic food insecurity and water scarcity. Collectively, these programs play a vital role in addressing hunger, supporting sustainable agriculture, and improving public health conditions in resource-stressed regions. The sudden withdrawal of this critical support threatens to strain and undermine the capacity of North African nations to manage a number of food and water-related challenges. The withdrawal of US foreign aid from North Africa not only jeopardizes critical food and water security initiatives in the region but also poses significant risks to US strategic interests. Prolonged resource insecurity can contribute to political instability, heighten the risk of conflict, and drive displacement and migration, developments that often may necessitate more costly US security interventions. Moreover, foreign aid serves as a key tool of US soft power, strengthening diplomatic relationships, fostering regional stability, and countering the growing influence of rival powers. In this context, sustained investment in development programs is not only a humanitarian priority but also a pragmatic component of US foreign policy. – The ripple effects of US foreign aid cuts to food and water access across North Africa | Middle East Institute
YouTube – Russia – Belarus
(Dmitry Bolkunets – The Jamestown Foundation) Sanctions, blocks on international payment systems, and the suspension of monetization on YouTube have significantly undermined the financial sustainability of independent media channels in Belarus and Russia. Belarusian state media rapidly filled the vacuum left by Russian outlets that YouTube banned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, using aggressive advertising and Kremlin-style narratives to grow their audience. Independent Russian-language media saw initial growth after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but now face tightening censorship, throttled access, and financial isolation. With state media dominating alternative platforms, independent outlets rely increasingly on diaspora and international audiences to survive. – YouTube Restrictions on Belarus and Russia Strengthen Minsk’s Propaganda – Jamestown
