From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: ASEAN; Australia; Beijing Xiangshan Forum-China; France-US-Israel-Lebanon; Gaza (Phase 2); Gaza-US-UNSC-Middle East; Global Governance (Africa); Himalayas; India; India-Pakistan (Operation Sindoor); India-Russia; India-Thailand; Indonesia; International Security Order; Iran; Iraq; Israel-Egypt; Latin America; Malaysia; Mekong Basin-ASEAN; New Caledonia-France; North Korea; Pacific Islands; Russia; Russia-Afghanistan-Iran; Russia (Africa Corps)-Mali; Southeast Asia; Syria-Israel-Golan Heights; Tonga; US (NSS)-Japan-Indo Pacific; US-Middle East; US-Syria; US-Venezuela
ASEAN
(Sharon Seah, Melinda Martinus, Qiu Jiahui – FULCRUM) ASEAN’s climate governance architecture has evolved to match the urgency to align regional ambition with Paris Agreement goals, with growing recognition that regional coordination is vital in accelerating the green transition and attracting international climate finance. – ASEAN’S Evolving Climate Governance Framework | FULCRUM
Australia
(Jocelinn Kang – Lowy The Interpreter) Google is laying new submarine cables along Australia’s northern and western approaches. The routes will link to a planned Google AI data centre on Christmas Island, likely building on an existing cloud deal with the Australian Department of Defence. The cables also connect to naval base HMAS Stirling, 35 kilometres south-west of Perth, which will host AUKUS partners and nuclear-powered submarines. Together, these moves reflect a shift in Defence planning as senior officials warn that the regional security environment is worsening. Australia’s Chief of Navy Mark Hammond described seabed cables at an address last month as “our lifelines”, noting that their loss would pose “an existential threat to our island and to our people”. His assessment reflects a growing recognition that the integrity of these cables underpins Australia’s economy, military networks and connections to the world. – Australia all at sea on submarine cable risks | Lowy Institute
(Bill Sweetman – ASPI The Strategist) Launching an air-to-air missile from the Australian-developed Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat would be just the start of a new phase for the Royal Australian Air Force, according to a senior officer at the Defence IQ International Fighter Conference in Rome in November. Speaking before Boeing and the Australian government announced that a Ghost Bat had made the missile shot, the officer said the RAAF’s future could include new cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and a new combat aircraft type with heavy payload and long range. That prospective fighter requirement, which would come after the service’s 24 Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornets and 12 EA-18G Growlers reached the ends of their lives, meshes interestingly with the tri-national Global Combat Aircraft Program. – RAAF ambitions: Ghost Bat successor, big missiles and more | The Strategist
Beijing Xiangshan Forum-China
(Sophie Wushuang Yi – East Asia Forum) China’s efforts to build an alternative security platform around the Beijing Xiangshan Forum have gained momentum as its military modernisation accelerates. Demonstrated advances have made regional governments more attentive to Xiangshan within the wider network of security forums. But unless Beijing can manage the divergent security interests and needs of the forum’s diverse participants, Xiangshan risks becoming diplomatic theatre while China’s military capabilities race ahead. – Xiangshan Forum shows the muscle behind China’s diplomacy | East Asia Forum
France-US-Israel-Lebanon
(Souhire Medini – The Washington Institute) For the first time since its inception in November 2024, the U.S.-French mechanism tasked with monitoring the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement has undergone a significant transformation. Its latest meeting included civilian representatives from both sides: Simon Karam, the former Lebanese ambassador to the United States who publicly opposed Syrian control of his country in the 1990s, and Uri Resnick, the senior foreign policy director on Israel’s National Security Council. Although their inclusion was a welcome response to Washington’s longstanding goal of expanding dialogue between Lebanon and Israel, the pace of Hezbollah’s disarmament remains the most crucial question, so broader discussions alone may not prevent a collapse. The U.S.-French mechanism helped stop the war last year and could save the ceasefire in year two, but only if Washington, Paris, and their partners are robustly involved in facilitating the disarmament process and establishing a framework for ongoing dialogue between Israel and Lebanon. Without third-party intervention, escalation and even a potential return to war are the most likely scenarios in the coming months. – The U.S.-French Mechanism 2.0: Preventing Escalation Between Lebanon and Israel | The Washington Institute
Gaza (Phase 2)
(The Washington Institute) Washington Institute experts and former officials lay out the urgent need for clarity on vital questions related to U.S. oversight, the stalled International Stabilization Force, Israel’s red lines, Hamas opposition to multilateral proposals, the contours of the PA’s role, and more. – Getting to Phase 2 in Gaza: Red Lines and Recommendations | The Washington Institute
Gaza-US-UNSC-Middle East
(Emirates Policy Center) The UN Security Council has adopted Resolution No. 2803 based on US President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip. Intensive preparations for implementation include the formation of an international force mandated by the UNSC to operate in the Strip, with responsibilities such as disarmament. Israel welcomed the resolution but emphasized provisions aligned with its objectives – particularly the disarmament of Hamas and ending the group’s rule in Gaza. Most Palestinian factions, including Hamas, opposed the resolution, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) viewed it as a historic opportunity to return to the Strip, noting that it recognizes the establishment of a Palestinian state with US approval. By granting Trump’s plan international and legal legitimacy, the UNSC resolution enhances prospects for implementation on the ground. However, significant challenges face full implementation by the end of December 2027. These include Hamas’ rejection of the resolution – denouncing it as international guardianship over Palestinians – and Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Gaza before disarming Hamas and ending its rule. – Emirates Policy Center | UNSC Resolution on Peace in the Gaza Strip: Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Implementation of Trump’s Plan
Global Governance (Africa)
(Anil Sooklal, Samir Bhattacharya – Observer Research Foundation) As we approach the end of 2025, the world is more fractured than it has been in decades. The global governance architecture, rooted in post-World War structures, is increasingly out of sync with contemporary political, economic, and demographic realities. The very institutions created to preserve peace, facilitate cooperation, and promote development are now viewed as outdated, unrepresentative, and often ineffective. While Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” continues to echo, today’s global divisions are far more layered. Instead of a simple East vs. West binary, the world today faces a complex multipolar environment, divided by divergent political systems, economic interests, technological development, and environmental vulnerabilities. As a result, global governance is not only contested in values but also in its structure, authority and legitimacy. – Rethinking Global Governance Fragmentation, Reform, and Africa’s Rising Role
Himalayas
(Soma Sarkar – Observer Research Foundation) The International Mountain Day once again reminds us that mountains are not remote peripheries. They are central to water security, ecology, and the political economy of development through hydropower, timber, minerals, and critical nodes of urbanisation and tourism. Sadly, however, mountain ranges worldwide, such as the Andes and the Himalayas, bear a contemporary form of ‘resource curse.’ They are embedded in extractive growth models that externalise environmental costs while exploiting their indispensable ecosystem services and strategic commodities. This paradox of abundance, in which environmentally sensitive, resource-rich regions are infrastructurally and socio-economically underserved, provides a framework for understanding the current challenges and dependencies in the Himalayas. – Paradox of Plenty: Understanding Himalayan Water Insecurity
India
(Dhaval Desai – Observer Research Foundation) A recent study by the Complexity Science Hub (CSH) and the World Bank has warned that uncontrolled urban sprawl, or unchecked outward expansion of cities, could deny access to clean water to 220 million people in the Global South by 2050. Combining 183 million building footprints, over 125,000 household surveys, and various infrastructure indicators in 100-plus cities across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the study cautions that low-density urban sprawl increases costs and reduces the feasibility of providing piped water. Evaluating three alternative scenarios, including compact, persistent, and horizontal spread, it concludes that sparser cities have 40 percent lower proximity to critical infrastructure and 50 percent lower access to piped water, and face 75 percent higher water tariffs than denser urban habitats with compact growth. These findings are significant for India, where rapidly expanding cities are already experiencing acute water stress and widening demand-supply gaps despite large-scale investments. For example, Praja Foundation’s annual assessment of Mumbai’s water supply highlighted a 15 percent daily shortfall, as it received ~3,975 million litres daily (MLD) against its total demand of 4,664 MLD. Only one of the city’s 24 municipal wards had a 24/7 water supply, while the remaining 23 received an average of 5.37 hours of daily supply. – Rethinking India’s Urban Expansion for Equitable Water Access
(Nimisha Chadha – Observer Research Foundation) The catastrophic air quality crisis in New Delhi has become a recurring feature of the national capital, posing serious concerns. With countless people in the National Capital Region (NCR) breathing harmful Particulate Matter ≤ 2.5 (µm) (PM2.5) pollutants daily, the impact of the skyrocketing Air Quality Index (AQI) levels amounts to a public health emergency. Invisible pollutants have resulted in hazardous air quality across the northern regions of the Indian subcontinent, with no catch-all solution. To confront Delhi’s air crisis effectively, policy intervention must be an urgent priority, grounded in the latest empirical data, and prioritise immediate actions against local pollution sources. – New Delhi’s Toxic Air Quality: A Public Health Emergency
India-Pakistan (Operation Sindoor)
(Samarveer Singh – Observer Research Foundation) Military engagements, even sharp and swift ones, have economic ramifications. Operation Sindoor entailed high economic costs for both nations. Precision strikes involving missiles, drones, and high‑value weapons incurred expenses ranging from system replacements to repairing damaged airbases and aircraft. While the operation was not costless for India, Pakistan suffered serious losses with massive infrastructure damage, radar and aircraft losses. The operation achieved both its objectives: destroying terror infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan signalling India’s resolve against cross‑border terrorism. This article focuses on estimating these costs- precision missile strikes, aircraft losses, military infrastructure damage, and artillery exchanges, offering a new perspective into the economics that underpinned this operation. – Operation Sindoor: Raising the Cost of Terrorism for Pakistan
India-Russia
(Harsh V. Pant, Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash – Observer Research Foundation) After a hiatus of four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s landmark visit to New Delhi was viewed as a significant development in the India-Russia relationship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to receive Putin personally on the tarmac of Palam Airport underscored Moscow’s continued relevance in India’s strategic calculus. Its significance was further amplified in light of strong geopolitical headwinds, particularly against the backdrop of Washington’s punitive actions aimed at constraining the development of India-Russia relations. The theme of the 23rd annual India-Russia summit further signalled an evolution of the longstanding partnership, with the economic pillar of the bilateral partnership being increasingly prioritised. Ultimately, the significance of the 27-hour-long visit lies less in the agreements concluded and more in the strategic message it conveyed, that the bilateral partnership retains its own momentum, largely insulated from external constraints. – Putin In India: Looking Beyond Deals
India-Thailand
(Sreeparna Banerjee – Observer Research Foundation) The late-November visit of Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow to New Delhi marked an inflexion point in India–Thailand relations. Coming barely seven months after the elevation of bilateral ties to a Strategic Partnership on 3 April, the visit signals a clear intention on both sides to inject substance into a relationship long burdened by promise but constrained by inertia. At a time of regional flux—border tensions involving Thailand- Cambodia, instability in Myanmar, and the proliferation of cyber-scam networks in the Mekong region—the visit was far more than routine diplomacy. It was a test of whether India and Thailand can move beyond rhetoric and shape a more purposeful partnership rooted in shared vulnerabilities and converging strategic ambitions. – Cybercrime and Regional Flux Frame Thai FM’s India Visit
Indonesia
(Irna Nurlina – FULCRUM) While all eyes have been on the fallout from the case of the Al Khoziny Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in East Java, the ongoing construction of a ‘green’ mosque in West Java province offers some lessons for reimagining the pesantren ecosystem in Indonesia. On 14 September 2025, a private pesantren, named Peacesantren Welas Asih, in Garut, West Java, reportedly began constructing the first mosque in Indonesia whose walls will be primarily made from pallets of recycled plastics, taken from the surrounding community. Just two weeks later, on 29 September 2025, a pesantren building of the Al Khoziny School in Sidoarjo, East Java collapsed mid-construction during afternoon prayers, killing 67 people and injuring more than 170 others. – Reconstructing Indonesia’s Pesantren: Moving Beyond Concrete Matters | FULCRUM
International Security Order
(Marion Messmer, Katja Bego – Chatham House) 2025 has not been a banner year for the international security order. A ceasefire in Gaza’s brutal war was achieved – though Israel and Hamas each accuse the other of violating the truce. Elsewhere, from Ukraine to Sudan, ongoing conflicts seem only more intractable. And the threat of further violence looms from Venezuela to the India–Pakistan border. In response to this growing instability, governments are spending on defence at levels not seen since the Cold War. Meanwhile international aid spending has been slashed by many Western countries – worsening conditions in conflict affected countries and degrading early warning systems. 2025 accelerated numerous developments in insecurity but four particular trends stand out. – Global security continued to unravel in 2025. Crucial tests are coming in 2026 | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Iran
(Emirates Policy Center) Repeated calls by Iranian officials to move the capital from Tehran to another city stem from escalating crises plaguing the country’s largest city, pushing it to the brink of health and social collapse – crises that appear largely intractable. However, making an official decision to relocate the capital, or even to establish a new one, seems unrealistic under current conditions. The effort faces major challenges, most notably the high financial cost, the lack of available resources and enduring structural issues such as environmental pressures and water scarcity in potential alternative locations. In the coming years, Iran’s leadership will face a stark choice: either allow Tehran’s mounting social and economic crises to persist and worsen, or pursue practical measures to mitigate them. The latter path would demand substantial funding and likely depend on foreign investment. – Emirates Policy Center | The Debate Over Relocating the Iranian Capital, Tehran: An ‘Urgent Need’ But Unavailable Resources
Iraq
(Emirates Policy Center) The Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC), led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, came first in the Iraqi parliamentary elections held on November 11, 2025. However, the Coordination Framework (CF) succeeded in forming the largest Shia parliamentary bloc by uniting its components. Meanwhile, leaders of the major Sunni factions established the National Political Council (NPC) to “unite visions and decisions” after running in the elections on separate lists. The next phase is expected to involve complex and lengthy negotiations to form a new government. Sudani’s coalition will need to establish alliances with competing Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political forces. At this stage, most CF forces appear inclined to reach an understanding with Sudani’s coalition rather than fracturing his bloc early. This approach sends a positive signal to Washington and other countries concerned about the rise of parties with armed factions dominating Iraq’s parliamentary and governmental landscape. Iraqi political forces are currently focused on two priorities: First, securing a new and comprehensive political deal with leaders who do not raise American or Iranian concerns; and second, rapidly fulfilling current obligations to deny external parties, especially Washington, the opportunity or justifications for direct intervention. – Emirates Policy Center | The Search for a Comprehensive Political Deal: Iraqi Legislative Election Outcomes and Government Formation Scenarios
Israel-Egypt
(Haisam Hassanein – The Washington Institute) U.S. officials are working quietly to broker the first public meeting in years between Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. The summit, if it takes place, will be more than a symbolic reset: it will test whether Cairo, Jerusalem, and Washington can move from wartime crisis management to a more structured approach on Gaza stabilization and broader regional diplomacy. The push comes as the Trump administration tries to reconstitute regional partnerships frayed by the Gaza war, restore visible Arab-Israel engagement, and give form to still-vague ideas for postwar governance and security arrangements in Gaza. A Netanyahu-Sisi meeting would be an early indicator of whether key actors are prepared to reengage at the leadership level on these issues. – Egypt-Israel Summit: A Springboard to Progress on Gaza? | The Washington Institute
Latin America
(José Joel Peña Llanes – Observer Research Foundation) Latin America can turn South–South cooperation into an engine of results—well-designed finance, joint procurement, and Indo-Pacific linkages—provided governance safeguards, local capacity, and transparent metrics guide every decision. The global context offers no relief. Climate shocks, excessive debt, digital divides, food insecurity, and an uneven post-pandemic recovery intersect. Progress on the 2030 Agenda is slow while financing needs continue to grow. In Latin America, the pressure is greater, with limited fiscal space, high informality, and insufficient regional integration. Concurrently, the regional political landscape is marked by intense ideological polarisation. Successive waves of left- and right-leaning governments, reinforced by recent electoral shifts in several South American countries, have produced divergent foreign-policy priorities and, in some cases, mutually exclusive integration projects. This volatility makes it difficult to consolidate long-term regional arrangements: initiatives such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur, and others often advance unevenly, stall when governments change, or end up overshadowed by the bilateral agendas that individual States pursue with extra-regional partners. – From Promise to Practice: Making South-South Cooperation Work for Latin America
Malaysia
(Tricia Yeoh – FULCRUM) Like some other countries, Malaysia intends to ban social media for children and youth under sixteen. However, this sledgehammer of a policy will likely fall short; there are other nuanced options to consider first. – Malaysia’s Social Media Ban for Under-16s: Protection or Overreach? | FULCRUM
Mekong Basin-ASEAN
(Anoulak Kittikhoun – FULCRUM) Imagine the Mighty Mekong Basin not as a source of friction among riparian countries but as a platform of joint management and development across ASEAN. To make this happen, a new deal is needed that involves multiple countries across different sectors. Rising on the Tibetan Plateau and running some 4,800 kilometres through six countries, Southeast Asia’s largest river makes Thailand and Vietnam two of the world’s top rice exporters, powers Laos as the “battery of ASEAN” and sustains Cambodia as the largest inland fishery producer on earth. As a cultural artery, the Mekong ties together fabled cities from China’s Xishuangbanna and Thailand’s Chiang Rai to Luang Prabang in Laos, and onward to the industrialising hubs of Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Can Tho in Vietnam. For most non-riparian ASEAN states, Mekong rice is likely on many dinner tables and for Malaysia and Singapore, Mekong-generated electricity has started to flow into their grids. Every year, millions of Southeast Asians travel to experience the river’s landscapes. In short, the Mekong is a strategic asset for all ASEAN countries, not only for those along its banks. – A New Deal for the Mekong | FULCRUM
New Caledonia-France
(Denise Fisher – Lowy The Interpreter) Despite concerted efforts by France’s fragile government to encourage local support for a March 2026 referendum on its Bougival Accord granting New Caledonia more autonomy within France, a vote in New Caledonia’s Congress exposed deepening divisions. The vote delivered minimum endorsement, showing crumbling support for the Accord’s text as signed in June. On 8 December 2025, the local Congress voted on holding a referendum to implement France’s Bougival Accord, before France’s National Assembly considers enabling legislation. – Support for Bougival Accord waning in New Caledonia | Lowy Institute
North Korea
(Khang Vu – Lowy The Interpreter) For North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, 2025 has been a relatively quiet year. It neither tested a nuclear weapon nor fired an intercontinental ballistic missile. The story is different with regard to its conventional arsenal. North Korea kick-started an ambitious modernisation program by unveiling its biggest warships yet, upgrading its tanks, producing a new type of artillery shell, introducing AI-enhanced suicide attack drones, and launching new air defence systems. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un also promised to equip the air force with “new strategic military assets.” – Why North Korea is modernising its conventional arsenal | Lowy Institute
Pacific Islands
(Hansley Gumbaketi – Lowy The Interpreter) The “friends to all” approach taken by the Pacific’s small island states is no longer fit for purpose in a world that is less accommodating, and where the referees and rules are no longer benign. Unlike larger states, who are able to navigate and rapidly adapt, Pacific Island countries have always been reliant on a multilateral system that gave them voice and an ability to exert influence. Their achievements were made possible through rules and regulations guaranteed by an architect who now seems to have turned assassin. – Pacific Islands: “Friends to all” is no longer pragmatic | Lowy Institute
Russia
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) In late October, the United States and the European Union introduced tougher sanctions targeting Russia’s hydrocarbon sector, aiming to curb energy revenues that fund Moscow’s war against Ukraine. The new U.S. measures feature secondary sanctions—which penalize companies for dealings with sanctioned Russian entities—and added Russian energy giants LUKOIL and Rosneft to the list. The European Union’s 19th sanctions package targets Russian LNG, shadow-fleet operations, and third-country facilitators of sanction circumvention, though Moscow intends to continue rerouting its supply chain to mitigate the impact of the updated EU measures. Most Russian experts assert that the new sanctions will cause damage but not eliminate Russia’s oil and LNG exports, which will rely on middlemen, alternative currencies, and an expanded shadow fleet to avoid debilitation. The United States and European Union must persuade buyers of Russian goods to comply with sanctions to avoid repeating the pattern observed between 2014 and 2024, when international sanctions initially appeared highly threatening but ultimately had limited effects on the Russian economy. – Russia Grapples with Western Hydrocarbon Sanctions – Jamestown
(Jack Watling , Nikolay Staykov, Maya Kalcheva, Olena Yurchenko, Bohdan Kovalenko, Olena Zhul, Oleksii Borovikov, Anastasiia Opria, Roman Rabieiev, Nadiia Reminets and Alex Whitworth – RUSI) This research paper examines the vulnerabilities in Russia’s air defence production ecosystem, highlighting critical dependencies on foreign technologies, materials and supply chains. It underscores the strategic importance of disrupting Russian air defence capabilities to bolster Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign and strengthen European security against Russian aggression. – Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky | Royal United Services Institute
Russia-Afghanistan-Iran
(Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi – RUSI) Russia reportedly exported 5,000 tonnes of diesel fuel by rail for the first time to Afghanistan via the semi-built Khaf-Herat railway in the first weeks of November 2025. A few days prior, construction had begun on an oil depot at the Roznak railway station in Herat province to facilitate the storage and distribution of petroleum products. Around the same time, a private consignment of 1,120 tonnes of Iranian diesel was also sent to Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat railroad. These developments give off a well-planned tactical PR stunt by the Kremlin, Taliban and Tehran. Indeed, the oil on rail to Afghanistan looked pre-baked. It illustrated an image of shared determination between Iran, Russia and Afghanistan, forging their own path outside of Western markets. It would give them much to talk about and champion ahead of two key transport conferences: the first International Conference of Governors of the Caspian Littoral States, which will be held on 18-19 November 2025, in the northern Iranian city of Rasht; and the 3rd Astrakhan International Forum in Russia, which will be held from 26-28 November 2025. In both, the Russia-backed International North-South corridor, otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200 km corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran, is the central theme. It is tempting to see these developments as an achievement in Moscow and Tehran’s quest to craft a new supply chain architecture away from the West. Yet the deeper structure of logistics, the current state of Afghan politics, and the timing of these oil trade runs ahead of two key transport corridor conferences organised by Moscow and Tehran, indicate that the fundamentals challenging the viability of this railway route endure. Still, the larger picture tells us two things: one of growing Iranian and Russian influence among certain factions of the Taliban leadership. And a rising but bounded Taliban agency, in which the leadership can sometimes resist, broker or concede key projects. – Russia’s First Oil Export to Afghanistan Via the Iranian Railways: a Closer Look | Royal United Services Institute
Russia (Africa Corps)-Mali
(The Stimson Center) Africa Corps soldiers are committing egregious atrocities in Mali, including accusations of rape, beheadings, and other human rights abuses and war crimes, according to recent reporting from the Associated Press. Journalists and aid workers have been prevented from entering various parts of Mali, but the reporting so far has demonstrated that, between the transition from Wagner to Africa Corps, the group has maintained its brand, practicing extreme levels of violence, including burning villages to the ground. Military juntas have employed Africa Corps to safeguard their respective regimes, but from a counterinsurgency standpoint, much of what the Russians have done is highly counterproductive, exacerbating instability and pushing locals into the arms of jihadist groups. According to the Armed Conflict and Event Location Database (ACLED), an independent global conflict monitor, more than 5,000 civilians have been killed in Mali since 2023, with nearly half of these attacks involving Russian mercenaries. – New Name, Same Brutality: Russian Mercenaries Committing Atrocities in Mali – The Soufan Center
Southeast Asia
(Marco Kamiya – FULCRUM) Urbanisation in Southeast Asia is now one of the region’s most powerful yet under-recognised industrial policy tools. Urban planners and economists need to work together to unlock the potential of the region’s cities. – Economic Gravity: The Rise of Asian Cities’ Powerhouses | FULCRUM
Syria-Israel-Golan Heights
(Kabir Taneja, Samidha Jain – Observer Research Foundation) The dramatic collapse of the Ba’athist Syria under the Bashar al-Assad government in December 2024 triggered a dramatic recalibration of the Golan Heights’ status in West Asia. Israel rapidly asserted military control over the remaining Syrian portions of the territory, leaving little space for ambiguity in its strategic calculus. Benjamin Netanyahu asserts the stance that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) presence in the region acts as a deterrent, echoing historic domestic anxieties of renewed Syrian aggression. However, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s newly consolidated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime has pivoted sharply from the historic hostility. Favouring Israel, Syria has refused to engage with Hamas, expelled factions of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas, arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures, and attempted to thwart smuggling attempts between Iran and Hezbollah. With Netanyahu’s demand for the complete demilitarisation of Southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Deraa, and Suweida, is it a possibility that Sharaa could cede control of the region? The answer would be no unless he wants to face catastrophic domestic outrage, which could impact his nascent government and fracture his image. Thus, Sharaa’s “quest for inner grace” sparks curiosity about whether the new Syrian regime is merely seeking legitimacy and co-operation from key players such as the United States (US), or if it has any possible past links with Israel. – The Golan Heights: From Demilitarisation To a Pursuit of Peace
Tonga
(Ema Ivarature, ‘Akanesi Katoa, Henry Ivarature – East Asia Forum) Following Tonga’s elections on 20 November, four main contenders have emerged in the prime ministerial race — nobles’ representatives Lord Fakafanua and Lord Tu‘ivakano, as well as people’s representatives Hu‘akavameiliku Siaosi Sovaleni and ‘Aisake Eke. With no clear party or majority, the outcome hinges on how nobles’ and people’s blocs strategically mobilise support. Whether the prime minister title falls to a nobles’ or people’s representative will shape the trajectory of Tonga’s democratic governance and political participation, particularly in the context of declining voter turnout. – Tonga’s elections at a democratic crossroads | East Asia Forum
US (NSS)-Japan-Indo Pacific
(Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation) The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an explicit “America First” strategic posture, accentuating core national interests over broad liberal internationalism. In contrast with recent NSS documents prepared under prior administrations, the 2025 strategy frames global engagement principally through a lens of strategic self-interest rather than collective security or normative order-building. This is evident in three interlinked takeaways: a realist prioritisation of US interests through selective engagement; an economic-nationalist focus on reshoring and resilient supply chains to counter predatory practices; and a model of conditional hegemony in which American leadership is sustained only when allies demonstrably share burdens and align their policies with Washington’s strategic objectives. The strategy also elevates economic security instruments, from export controls to industrial policy and critical minerals security, as central to national defence, effectively treating economic interdependence as a terrain of competition rather than cooperation. This ideological repositioning is consequential as it reframes how US security commitments are conceptualised, articulated, and operationalised, with significant implications for allies. – A Narrower US Compass: Japan and the Indo-Pacific in the 2025 NSS
US-Middle East
(Middle East Institute) In this episode, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Ambassador David Hale joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). Released on December 4, the document outlines the administration’s foreign policy vision, priorities, and approach to global challenges. Ambassador Hale analyzes the new NSS and how it compares to previous US strategy documents. The conversation focuses on what the NSS means for the future of US policy in the Middle East, and how it is likely to be received by regional actors. – What does Trump’s new National Security Strategy mean for the Middle East? | Middle East Institute
US-Syria
(Middle East Institute) Admiral Brad Cooper, USN, Commander of US Central Command, gave opening remarks at MEI’s conference titled “Assessing US Policy on Post-Assad Syria & Its International Integration.” – Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of US Central Command, Addresses MEI | Middle East Institute
US-Venezuela
(Clayton Seigle – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On December 10, President Trump announced that U.S. forces seized Skipper, a sanctioned oil tanker transporting Venezuelan oil. The following questions examine the implications of this seizure for geopolitics and global energy security. – Why Did the United States Seize a Venezuelan Oil Shipment?
