From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Arctic; Australia-Japan; Bosnia-Balkans; China; China-Solomon Islands; China-Taiwan; European Union; Hong Kong; Iraq; Russia-Middle East; South Korea; UK; US (NSS)-Latin America; War in Ukraine-Europe
Arctic
(Anurag Bisen – The Arctic Institute) We often hear the phrase: “What happens in the Arctic doesn’t stay in the Arctic, it affects the entire planet”. This underscores the region’s critical role in regulating the Earth’s climate. Yet, despite this global importance, only 10 of the 48 signatories to the Svalbard Treaty, currently maintain permanent research stations on the archipelago. Even if the eight Arctic Council states are included, which operate stations either within their own territories or on Svalbard, the overall participation still represents less than 40 percent of the Treaty’s signatories. Moreover, there is a striking underrepresentation of the Global South in Arctic research. Only two developing countries, India and China, have established permanent research stations in the region. This disparity likely stems from the absence of a fair, transparent, affordable and inclusive framework for regulating scientific research on Svalbard. Although the Svalbard Treaty itself provides for such a mechanism, it remains unimplemented more than a century after it entered into force. In the following article, the rationale behind the recommendations to address these gaps is outlined. – Towards a Svalbard Convention on Scientific Research: Building on the ATCM Model | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies
Australia-Japan
(Alex Bristow – ASPI The Strategist) Australia and Japan should split the burden of protecting critical sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the Pacific. In an ASPI special report published today, Japan-Australia defence cooperation in the Pacific: The case for a partial division of labour, I argue that this will be necessary to reinforce deterrence now and prepare for the growing possibility of a regional war instigated by China. In such a conflict, the United States would likely be focused on fighting China and would expect allies to shoulder much of the burden of protecting their own supply chains. – Australia and Japan should secure the sea lanes that could decide the next war | The Strategist
Bosnia-Balkans
(Thom Shanker – Atlantic Council) Before Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine spawned the largest war in Europe since World War II, that grim distinction belonged to a conflict that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s—the fighting to carve up or hold onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by Eastern Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Bosniaks. In Bosnia, less than fifty years after the horror of the Nazi “final solution,” genocide returned to Europe. The Bosnian war was fought with medieval tactics and twentieth-century weapons. Its signatures were siege, mass expulsion, the burning of villages and leveling of houses of worship, and mass rape and mass murder. The carnage ended thirty years ago this week, on December 14, 1995, with the signing of the US-brokered Dayton Accords. The Balkans produce more history than can be consumed, goes the aphorism usually attributed to Winston Churchill, and that is true of the Bosnian war. Yet too many in the United States and around the world—though certainly not in the Balkans—have consigned the conflict to history or forgotten about it entirely. – Bosnia’s forgotten war is still with us – Atlantic Council
China
(Sabine Mokry – The Jamestown Foundation) The State Council has published a new arms control white paper that expands its arms-control agenda to include outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and technology governance, signaling Beijing’s intentions to shape emerging security norms. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) now presents itself as a rule-shaper in global arms control, projecting leadership, offering “Chinese solutions,” and more forcefully contesting U.S. behavior while selectively embracing transparency and risk-reduction on its own terms. The PRC’s long-standing arms control principles, defensive nuclear posture, no-first-use, minimal deterrence, and UN-centered multilateralism, have persisted over the past 30 years, indicating durable strategic principles despite major shifts in its capabilities and environment. – The PRC’s Expanding Arms Control Agenda – Jamestown
China-Solomon Islands
(Erik Green, Olivia Parker, Meia Nouwens – IISS) Solomon Islands has become an important location of geopolitical competition as China seeks to establish itself as a prominent economic and security partner in the Pacific region. For China, Solomon Islands offers a key strategic location from which to expand its maritime influence in the Pacific, challenge the American island-chain encirclement strategy (as perceived by China), and gain further diplomatic support from Pacific Islands countries for its global initiatives and norms and values. – China’s evolving approach to police training in Solomon Islands
China-Taiwan
(Paul B. Stares and David Sacks – Council on Foreign Relations) Current thinking about a conflict over Taiwan relies on outdated assumptions. A future conflict, far from being contained and easily definable, would almost certainly ensnare multiple regional actors, spill into other theaters, and could even be triggered by external events. To adjust to this new reality, U.S. policymakers should accelerate joint military planning and establish a pre-crisis consultative mechanism with allies, conduct simulations that take into account political dynamics in allied capitals, and evaluate how crises elsewhere could expand to encompass Taiwan. – The Next Taiwan Crisis Won’t Be Like the Last | Council on Foreign Relations
European Union
(Tim Lawrenson – IISS) NATO remains Europe’s primary security provider, and its regional plans and capability targets have set strenuous objectives for its European members. However, its role in the continent’s defence market is limited. The European Union, by contrast, has become an increasingly significant actor, particularly since it set up instruments offering financial support to EU industry and member states for capability development and procurement programmes. Having had no dedicated defence budget before 2014, the EU allocated EUR591 million in the 2014–20 Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) rising to EUR11.37 billion for 2021–27. In 2025 the European Commission proposed a EUR131bn budget for defence and space for the 2028–34 MFF. Having initially focused on supporting defence research and development, the Commission recently expanded its purview to encompass procurement and industrial capacity with a series of instruments, the most significant of which is the EUR150bn Security Action for Europe (SAFE), adopted by EU member states in May 2025. The growing budget, broader mandate and proliferation of instruments will give the EU greater influence over the evolution of the defence market in Europe. – The EU’s Burgeoning Defence Role and its Impact on Third-country Market Access
Hong Kong
(Eric Y.H. Lai – The Jamestown Foundation) Hong Kong authorities have deployed national security measures to manage the aftermath of a fire in Tai Po that killed over 150. They have turned to censorship and intimidation, and used state-aligned civic organizations to suppress grassroots responses and facilitate centralized relief efforts. Official efforts to seek justice and accountability appear largely symbolic. Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee has created an “independent committee,” but it is unable to open a commission of inquiry, limiting its ability to produce credible and substantive findings. Information control and the national security framing emerged after Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, met with mainland officials, underscoring the increasing synergies between governance in Hong Kong and that of the mainland. – Authorities Securitize Response to Tai Po Fire – Jamestown
Iraq
(Victoria J. Taylor – Atlantic Council) Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary elections have given way to jockeying among political parties over issues such as who will be the next prime minister. Many Iraqi politicians are reluctant to grant Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani a second term. As this political competition plays out, many Iraqis are disaffected with a political process that they view as unresponsive to their concerns. – Dispatch from Iraq: The biggest challenge awaiting the country’s next prime minister – Atlantic Council
Russia-Middle East
(Nikolay Kozhanov – Chatham House) Russia’s military and economic resources are stretched thin by the war in Ukraine. Its former stronghold in Syria has fallen. Yet, even under these circumstances, the Kremlin has adapted to new realities rather than decided to withdraw from the Middle East. Russia continues to exploit opportunities provided by the region to ease the pressure of sanctions, compensate economic and political losses from its global confrontation with the West, and occasionally create challenges for the US and European players. Consequently, analysts who dismiss Russia as ‘finished’ in the region risk overlooking a weakened but still capable actor that remains committed to complicating Western objectives. – Russia is weakened, but its influence in the Middle East should not be underestimated | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
South Korea
(Chung Min Lee – IISS) Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, South Korea has emerged as one of the key sources of military equipment for NATO’s European members. South Korea deserves credit for building up its defence industries for the past half-century, and especially since the 2010s, but it faces an expanded threat envelope. How South Korea is going to meet an ever-growing menu of defence threats, and growing pressure from the US to assume a greater role in co-defending the First Island Chains, remains to be seen, but partnering with NATO will offer key dividends. Direct European military assistance to South Korea in the event of a major conflict or even war is not impossible, but it is less likely given South Korea’s alliance with the US and its own increasingly sophisticated military arsenal. Nor is South Korea going to play a central role in helping to revitalise European defence modernisation. But at the margins, South Korean firms can play a key role in boosting European defence capabilities through joint R&D, European-based manufacturing of mid- to high-level weapons systems, and strengthening military supply chains. In turn, Europe’s growing defence expenditures and innovation resources cannot help but address South Korea’s own deepening defence challenges, such as the need to operationalise crewed-uncrewed systems owing to falling military manpower, through joint defence-technology partnerships with key NATO states and companies. In the end, ‘marginal boosts’ are likely to become increasingly valuable in the rapidly approaching AI-driven battlespace, especially between techno-democratic partners like NATO and South Korea. – South Korea as a Rising Defence Exporter: Challenges and Opportunities
UK
(Matt Ince – RUSI) The most immediate threat to UK national security in 2026 is unlikely to take the form of a conventional military attack by Russia against the British homeland or a European NATO ally. Instead, the UK – like a growing number of European states – faces a more insidious challenge: the gradual erosion of its resilience through a sustained campaign of sabotage, malign interference and provocation. Much of this activity appears to be directed or enabled by the Kremlin, though typically carried out through proxies and other deniable channels. These operations, subtle and dispersed across multiple domains, are designed to discredit European governments, probe for weaknesses in their defences, drain resources and reduce capacity for coherent, timely response. – Maintaining the UK’s Intelligence Edge in the Grey Zone | Royal United Services Institute
US (NSS)-Latin America
(Mariano Aguirre Ernst – Chatham House) The new US National Security Strategy (NSS), unveiled on 5 December, has been influenced by various interest groups and personalities, from those in Washington who prioritize containing China and Russia, to those who want to expand Make America Great Again (MAGA) to Europe – and those who wish to dominate the Western Hemisphere. On the latter, ‘sovereigntists’ have gained ground in the NSS – a trend that, according to Jennifer Mittelstadt, ‘asserts liberty from international agreements and institutions that threaten to limit the sovereign jurisdiction and governance of the US’. The strategy states that the Western Hemisphere must be controlled by the US politically, economically, commercially, and militarily. It is the ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine – an 1823 policy which established that European powers should not intervene in Latin America. This paved the way for US pre-eminence in the region until well into the 20th century. However, Washington neglected it in the last three decades. – The ‘Trump Corollary’ in the US security strategy brings a new focus on Latin America – but it is a disordered plan | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
War in Ukraine-Europe
(Kateryna Olkhovyk, Olena Bilousova, Marta Bukhtiiarova – IISS) As the war in Ukraine redefines the requirements of modern industrial warfare, this report analyses how Kyiv has maintained and scaled defence production through sectoral restructuring, battlefield-driven innovation and flexible sourcing. It explores the growing relevance of Indo-Pacific partners and the broader implications for Europe’s resilience, supply chains and defence-industrial planning. – Exploring Opportunities for European Rearmament Through Ukraine’s Experience and Indo-Pacific Partnerships
