Complex research (by Marco Emanuele):
La (vera) politica è umano-planetaria / (True) politics is human-planetary | The Global Eye
I futuri che ci aspettano / The futures that await us | The Global Eye
Tempi duri per il pensiero / Hard times for thinking | The Global Eye
Distinzioni fondamentali / Fundamental distinctions | The Global Eye
L’assoluto della sicurezza lineare / Absolute linear security | The Global Eye
Disumanità / Inhumanity | The Global Eye
From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Afghanistan; Armenia-Azerbaijan-US; Australia; Australia-Japan; China; Gaza-Israel; India; Indonesia; Israel-Iran; Middle East (Iran,Yemen); Philippines-China; Russia; Russia-Afghanistan; Thailand-Cambodia-China; UK-India; US-Africa; US-China; US-India; US-Russia-Ukraine; US-Vaccine Research
Afghanistan
(UN News) In 2021, an Afghan woman could have run for president – although none did. Spool forward to 2025, they can’t even speak in public. There is an edict from the Taliban which labels public speaking by women a moral violation. Four years after Taliban fighters retook the capital Kabul on 15 August 2021, gender equality agency UN Women is warning that the situation for women and girls in Afghanistan is increasingly untenable. And without urgent action, this untenable reality will become normalised and women and girls will be fully excluded. “The Taliban is closer than ever to achieving its vision of a society that completely erases women from public life,” UN women said in a press release on Monday. UN Women’s warning came just as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its latest report on the human rights situation between May and June, detailing harshening enforcement of regulations against women and death threats against female humanitarians. – Four years on, here’s what total exclusion of women in Afghanistan looks like | UN News
Armenia – Azerbaijan – US
(Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı – German Marshall Fund of the United States) The joint declaration signed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the peace agreement initialed by their foreign ministers—both mediated by US President Donald Trump—mark the most significant step in decades toward lasting peace between the two Southern Caucasus countries. Once the peace agreement is ratified, Türkiye is likely to move swiftly to open its border and establish diplomatic relations with neighboring Armenia. The moment presents a rare strategic opportunity to reduce the Kremlin’s influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan, draw the former closer to Europe, catalyze regional cooperation, and make the Middle Corridor trade route between Europe and Central Asia, which bypasses Russia, a reality. – A Window of Opportunity in the South Caucasus | German Marshall Fund of the United States
(Callum Fraser and Natia Seskuria – RUSI) The recent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan marks a potential end to decades of hostility and signals a significant geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus. For Armenians, the deal represents a painful reckoning, with the loss of Karabakh, a deepening refugee crisis, and growing domestic unrest ahead of elections. For Azerbaijan, it is a moment of restored territorial sovereignty and cautious optimism, though tempered by the ongoing threat posed by Russia. Located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the South Caucasus is a region of increasing geostrategic importance. The Middle Corridor, the shortest trade route between China and Europe, has year-on-year increased its trade flow since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s proximity to Russia and Iran make them invaluable potential partners to limit anti-Western interests. – Seizing the Moment: Western Opportunities Amid Change in the South Caucasus | Royal United Services Institute
(The Soufan Center) On Friday, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House, where they signed a landmark agreement to advance the resolution of the long-disputed Zangezur corridor issue. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) will place Iran’s sole land border with Armenia under a U.S.-controlled transit route — effectively constraining Tehran’s only friendly access point to the South Caucasus. The TRIPP is not only a strategic success for Turkish regional interests, but it also cements Ankara’s growing role as a regional hegemon, replacing Russia, which had long held that title. While the TRIPP is a landmark achievement for the U.S and its interests —cementing American dominance in this key energy hub for the next 99 years — questions remain over how its security will be guaranteed after Trump’s tenure. – Armenia–Azerbaijan Agreement Delivers Strategic Win for Washington – The Soufan Center
Australia
(Krishna Vohra – Observer Research Foundation) One of the most promising pathways towards a clean energy future, green hydrogen (H₂) emerged as a pillar of decarbonisation, particularly for hard-to-abate industries like steelmaking and heavy transport. Green H₂ is produced by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen using renewable electricity. Grey H₂, which is produced from fossil fuels such as natural gas, emits substantial amounts of greenhouse gases. Blue H₂ combines this method with carbon capture mechanisms to reduce emissions. Green H₂, on the other hand, results in zero emissions and has been projected to become a major global export in the future. Australia was on track to become one of the leading producers and exporters of green H₂, with Australian green energy giant Fortescue having already put pen to paper on a deal to supply German energy company E.ON with the renewable energy source. Why then, has the industry suddenly stuttered? – Why is the Green Hydrogen Industry Faltering in Australia?
(Jennifer Parker – Lowy The Interpreter) Maritime trade is Australia’s lifeline – in times of peace, crisis or conflict. Without ships bringing in the fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, and other critical supplies that keep our economy running and our defence viable, Australia would quickly run out. Yet Sam Roggeveen, arguing in The Interpreter, “Why Japan’s Mogami frigates can’t protect Australia’s trade”, joins a long line of advocates for a continental defence approach, underplaying the importance of protecting maritime trade. This view seeks to wish away Australia’s vulnerabilities rather than confront them. To adopt such a view would be a costly strategic error. – Sea control, not stockpiles, will secure Australia’s future | Lowy Institute
(James Corera – ASPI The Strategist) Australia’s jewels are being stolen—and yet we’re still leaving the front door open. Foreign espionage has cost the nation more than A$12.5 billion in a single year, according to new estimates from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Institute of Criminology released in late July. But that’s just part of the picture. With espionage, other countries are stealing information for strategic advantage. With foreign interference, they’re stealing trust in the community, aiming at influencing decisions, institutions and society. These two actions are distinct but linked. They’re components of covert, persistent efforts which erode Australia’s advantage and which influence its decisions. – Foiling espionage and foreign interference is a national, not just government, task | The Strategist
(John Coyne and James Corera – ASPI The Strategist) Successive Australian governments have worked hard to limit Chinese involvement in our critical minerals sector, reflecting a bipartisan understanding that such resources are central to economic security and future self-reliance. Against that backdrop, Friday’s revelation that a Chinese company had been allowed to invest in an Australian lithium producer was both surprising and politically fraught. It undermined the strategic coherence in critical minerals policy that has served us well. The government’s decision touches a deeper question: how can Australia reconcile the desire to work with China on shared priorities, such as clean-energy transition, while guarding against the strategic risks that come with Chinese involvement in critical industries? – Australia’s lithium gamble: balancing climate cooperation and strategic sovereignty | The Strategist
Australia – Japan
(Nick Childs, Ben Schreer – IISS) Australia’s choice of a Japanese design for its newest class of frigates represents a milestone for both countries, offering to boost Australian naval capabilities and Japan’s defence-export aspirations, and helping further build strategic and defence-industrial ties between the two nations. Delivering on that promise, however, will come with challenges. – Strategic choice: Australia opts for Japanese frigates
China
(Akankshya Ray – Vivekananda International Foundation) China is slowly transforming into a nuclear energy powerhouse. Its domestic nuclear capacity expanded from under 20 GW in 2014 to approximately 53 GW across 55 reactors by mid-2025. There are 26 more units under construction, which will increase the output to about 30 GW. It has also emerged as a formidable global supplier of civilian nuclear technology, with strong focus on exporting reactors, fuel, and ancillary services. Consequently, China became a growing alternative to traditional suppliers like USA, Russia, France, and South Korea. The expansion of Chinese capability, underscores its ambitious export objectives, especially those linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy. By the year 2030, Beijing aims to supply approximately 30 nuclear reactors to roughly 40 BRI countries and target a global market share of 20-30%. The influence is most visible in South Asia, where China’s nuclear collaborations, especially with Pakistan, have raised both opportunities and concerns for regional power dynamics, non-proliferation regimes, and global technology markets. This article explores the scope and impact of China’s nuclear exports, the state-owned companies spearheading these projects, the types of technologies and services offered and its South Asian footprint with Pakistan as the most significant case study of China’s nuclear outreach. In doing so, it raises a critical question: to what extent does China’s turnkey civil-nuclear export model create long term geo-political implications and energy dependencies that function as strategic leverage, especially for the BRI countries? – How Civilian Nuclear Energy Is Powering China’s Global Strategy | Vivekananda International Foundation
(Michael Pettis – Carnegie China) By the end of June 2025, China’s total social financing—the most widely-used measure of total credit in the Chinese economy—stood at RMB 430.2 trillion, up 8.9% year‑on‑year. In comparison, nominal GDP grew just 4.1% over the same period. As a result, China’s total social financing climbed from 303% of GDP at the end of 2024 to 309% six months later. According to the IMF, debt has grown so rapidly in China that the nation accounts for more than half of the increase in the global economy’s debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008. Among major economies, only Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is higher, and given that debt-to-GDP ratios tend to rise with income levels, this makes China, as a middle-income economy, even more of an outlier than Japan. As high as those figures are, however, the debt in itself is not the problem. Financial crises occur mainly when a contraction on the liability side of a mismatched balance sheet forces a disruptive contraction on the asset side. Because Beijing largely controls the country’s financial system, and because Chinese regulators can restructure liabilities at will, the likelihood of China’s suffering a financial crisis is very low. But while Beijing’s ability to prevent banking crises is fairly well-known, the implications are often poorly understood. Many analysts and policymakers believe that the main danger posed by having excessive debt is the risk of financial crisis, and so they believe that the extent to which Beijing’s financial regulators can control this risk means that China’s heavy debt burden is unlikely to become a problem for the economy. – Using China’s Central Government Balance Sheet to “Clean up” Local Government Debt Is a Bad Idea | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Gaza – Israel
(UN News) UN Secretary-General António Guterres has condemned the killing of six Palestinian journalists in Gaza this past weekend, his Spokesman said on Monday. The reporters – five of whom worked for the Al Jazeera media network – were killed in a targeted Israeli strike in Gaza City the previous day. “These latest killings highlight the extreme risks journalists continue to face when covering the ongoing war,” UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said during his regular media briefing from New York. “The Secretary-General calls for an independent and impartial investigation into these latest killings.” – Gaza: Guterres urges probe into killing of journalists, as child malnutrition deaths rise | UN News
(UN News) The humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate, UN officials warned on Monday, describing overflowing hospitals, critically malnourished children, and desperate civilians risking their lives to secure food for their families. Olga Cherevko from aid coordination office, OCHA, said conditions at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis were “shocking” when she visited there on Sunday, with hallways crammed with patients. Many were transferred from militarised aid distribution points or along convoy routes. – Hospitals overflowing in Gaza, as malnutrition surges | UN News
India
(Amoha Basrur – Observer Research Foundation) Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are a group of 17 metals essential for a wide range of modern technology, including high-performance magnets, electronics, clean energy technologies, and advanced defence systems. In April 2025, China placed export restrictions on seven rare earth elements and their magnets in response to escalating American tariffs. Since China controls over 90 percent of global REE refining and magnet manufacturing, this jolted global supply chains. India, being heavily reliant on imports for these products, faced immediate repercussions in its clean energy and electronics sectors. In a significant setback, Indian automakers were forced to cut production targets due to supply shortages. – India’s REE Strategy: Turning Resources into Capacity
(Amiya Chandra – Vivekananda International Foundation) This article argues that recent U.S. tariff threats against India, including explicit penalties for continued trade with Russia, signal a broader structural use of economic tools to enforce geopolitical alignment. These actions, part of a wider U.S. and Western strategy, leverage supply chains, digital standards, and financial rules to pressure rising powers and constrain their autonomy. India is not confronting isolated trade disputes, but strategic scrutiny within a global system governed by opaque hierarchies of control. By examining Western responses to Ukraine, Gaza, and other contested regions, the article reveals the contradictions of value-based diplomacy. It concludes by proposing a new Indian trade doctrine grounded in economic sovereignty, sovereign treaty infrastructure, diversified global partnerships, and adaptive tools such as SMART FTAs. – Tariffs, Trade and Trump: The Empire’s Mirage That Punishes Sovereignty | Vivekananda International Foundation
Indonesia
(Jascha Ramba Santoso – ASPI The Strategist) As President Prabowo Subianto’s administration prioritises national self-reliance, maintaining autonomy on technology that matters for Indonesia’s future—including AI—is essential. AI embedded in critical infrastructure affects how data is collected, processed and secured, shaping decision-making processes. Indonesia needs robust guardrails to ensure AI adoption in critical infrastructure does not constrain strategic autonomy, in line with its ‘free and active’ foreign policy, amid competition between China and the United States. Huawei has already established itself as the dominant player in Indonesia’s telecommunication infrastructure. Now, it is expanding its presence into Indonesia’s artificial-intelligence ecosystem, offering extensive capabilities. This includes hardware, 5G-advanced infrastructure, AI-driven network solutions that enhance consumer experience through Huawei-made AI agents, and AI operations centres focused on AI-cloud infrastructure development. – Without AI guardrails, Indonesia risks dependence on Huawei’s AI | The Strategist
Israel – Iran
(Rohit Kumar Sharma – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Cyber offensive operations have become an integral part of contemporary military conflicts. States also increasingly rely on these operations to project power, shape narratives and undermine the adversaries’ infrastructure. States’ tendency to leverage the cyber realm for tactical and strategic objectives further underscores its significance in modern conflicts. The synchronisation of cyber campaigns with kinetic operations also indicates cyberwarfare’s evolving nature, which is not merely perceived as a set of ‘grey-zone’ tactics operating between peace and war but as an integral part of armed conflict. The trend of conducting cyber offensive operations simultaneously with military hostilities was very evident in the ‘12-day war’ between Israel and Iran. Following Israel’s ‘pre-emptive’ strikes against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme, an Iranian retaliation through cyberattacks was widely anticipated. Cyber operations were a more viable alternative for Iran, given the vast schism between Israeli and Iranian military capabilities, with Tel-Aviv leading in advanced conventional military strength. For Israel, cyber operations essentially served its intelligence gathering and reconnaissance missions over the Iranian nuclear and ballistic programme. – The 12-Day War: Cyber Frontlines between Israel and Iran – MP-IDSA
Middle East (Iran, Yemen)
Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.
Iran: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly indicate that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor.
Iran: Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.
Yemen: The Houthis and Iran are using an extensive smuggling network involving personnel in Iran, Somalia, and Yemen to bypass the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti, according to smugglers detained by a pro-Yemeni government faction. – Iran Update, August 11, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Philippines – China
(Crisis Group) As they watch Beijing become more assertive in the South China Sea, Philippine leaders are adapting the country’s external defences while tending to partnerships with the U.S. and others. To manage the attendant risks, Manila should walk a line between diplomacy and deterrence. – Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort | International Crisis Group
(Enrico Gloria – East Asia Forum) The first 50 years of Philippines–China diplomatic relations have been marked by persistent US influence, power asymmetry and the influence of domestic politics. Manila’s alliance with Washington has offered security and stability while complicating diplomacy with Beijing. Moving forward, the Philippines should pursue a consistent yet flexible China policy informed by a proactive understanding of China’s worldview. – 50 years of Philippines–China relations offer lessons for engaging an indispensable power | East Asia Forum
Russia
(John Kennedy, Edward Bryan, Illimar Ploom, Viljar Veebel – RAND Corporation) To maintain access to international markets in the face of Western economic pressure, Russia is increasingly turning to noncurrency payment schemes. The state has strong incentives to obscure its transactions and reduce reliance on fiat currencies (such as the dollar or euro) to evade sanctions and avoid scrutiny. This month, the head of Rosfinmonitoring, Russia’s anti-money-laundering agency, publicly informed President Vladimir Putin that the government is reorienting international trade towards the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, and developing alternatives to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) international banking network with the former Soviet republics that are members of Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia also is “actively employing” alternative means of payment including gold, cryptocurrency, and netting, where multiple payments are consolidated to reduce the number of transactions and limit exposure. While these initiatives may be new, Russia’s use of cryptocurrency builds on a long history of nonfiat and illicit trade practices that have shaped its engagement with global markets. – Russia’s Use of Crypto Schemes | RAND
(Sergey Vakulenko – Carnegie Russia Eurasia) Russia’s oil industry enjoyed a renaissance between 2008 and 2018 when about 30 new oil fields came online, significantly boosting production. Almost all the fields were discovered in the Soviet period, but they could not be profitably developed because drilling technology was not sufficiently advanced, and it was too complicated to ship the oil out of such isolated areas. Now, there is only one project left in Russia that could theoretically offer a significant increase in production: state-owned Rosneft’s Vostok Oil. What does this project involve, how much oil could it produce, and over what timeframe? Between 2019 and 2021, Rosneft shouted from the rooftops about Vostok Oil, including at international conferences, in publications for shareholders, and in press releases about meetings between company head Igor Sechin and Russian President Vladimir Putin. In company documents, Vostok Oil was said to contain 6 million tonnes (45 billion barrels) of oil, and production was envisaged to be 115 million tonnes a year by 2033 (in other words, 2.3 million barrels a day). As early as 2024, it was supposed to produce 30 million tonnes a year. – What Is Rosneft’s Flagship Vostok Oil Project Really Seeking to Achieve? | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Russia – Afghanistan
(Rahul Roy-Chaudhury – IISS) Russia’s recent formal recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is a landmark moment and raises questions over who will be next to do so amidst increasing global engagement with the state. – Will Russia’s diplomatic recognition of the Afghan Taliban government have a domino effect?
Thailand – Cambodia – China
(Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat – Carnegie China) Fierce exchanges of artillery fire since July 24 shattered the fragile ceasefire along the Thai-Cambodian border, leading to a significant death toll, numerous injuries, and the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians. While a ceasefire agreement has now been reached through efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, it is notable both that China and the United States joined the talks as observers and that China had previously positioned itself as the potential peacemaker. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 11 in Kuala Lumpur that Beijing was prepared to “uphold an objective and fair position and play a constructive role for the harmonious coexistence between Thailand and Cambodia.”. The ongoing border crisis was, therefore, instructive about the possibilities and limits for China to translate the ambition of peacemaker that it has sometimes shown in the Middle East and Asia into meaningful action, and what such a role might signify for Southeast Asia’s balance of power especially. – China’s Mediation Offer in the Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute Sheds Light on Beijing’s Security Role in Southeast Asia | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
UK – India
(Durgesh K. Rai – East Asia Forum) UK opposition parties are criticising the India–UK trade deal, particularly its Double Contribution Convention, which they argue will cost the UK treasury £200 million annually and undercut local jobs by favouring Indian workers. Despite these concerns, the convention also benefits UK firms in India and is part of a broader agreement expected to boost UK exports overall. The overall economic impact is likely to be beneficial for both nations. – UK opposition parties up in arms about trade deal with India | East Asia Forum
US – Africa
(Shambhavi Anand – Vivekananda International Foundation) On July 9, 2025, a three-day summit was hosted at the White House by the US President with the leaders of five African nations: Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal. The summit witnessed the gathering of country leaders for various bilateral, multilateral, and closed-door meetings. This was an important event aimed at resetting the US policy towards Africa from ‘aid to trade’. The summit focussed on establishing close and mutually beneficial relationships with certain African countries in areas of economic cooperation, security challenges, and migration issues. However, this event raised a lot of scepticism about the US government’s long-term motives, given the transactional nature and emphasis on America First policies by the current President. This then brings us to a very pertinent question: why did President Trump invite only these five, out of 54 African countries, to the White House, and what are his objectives? – Understanding Trump’s Selective Engagement with Africa | Vivekananda International Foundation
US – China
(Katja Bego – Chatham House) The news that the Trump administration has struck a deal with US chipmakers Nvidia and AMD, allowing exports of some of the companies’ chips to China in return for a 15 per cent cut of revenue (to be paid to the US federal government), has been met with disbelief from national security, economics and legal experts alike. US President Donald Trump said he brokered what he called a ‘little deal’ last week during a meeting with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang in the White House. The significance of this decision is not primarily in China’s ability to access the chips themselves. The chips in question (Nvidia’s H20 and AMD’s MI308) are not cutting-edge and are unlikely to be gamechangers for China’s AI fortunes. More significant is the precedent this sets for the Trump administration to potentially weaponize national security arguments and export control licenses as leverage in deals with private companies. This is in many ways an unprecedented move. It not only risks significantly undermining Washington’s global credibility and leverage when it comes to its economic statecraft agenda, but also reflects a more structural weakness in the US approach to its technological competition with China. – Trump’s AI chip deal with Nvidia and AMD sets a dangerous precedent | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – India
(Rajesh Singh – Vivekananda International Foundation) The Trump Administration’s decision to impose a fifty per cent tariff on Indian products into the US (25 per cent of which is a ‘punishment’ for India continuing to purchase oil from Russia), is not the wisest of moves that the US President has made. There has been general condemnation of the US’s arm-twisting, even within the United States. In the swirl of these opinions, what stands out is the Modi government’s resolve to not give in to the US’s tactics, and to reiterate this message in a non-belligerent yet firm manner. – New India Cannot be Arm-twisted | Vivekananda International Foundation
(Nilanjan Ghosh – Observer Research Foundation) With US President Donald Trump’s announcement of an extra 25% tariff on India on August 6 as a ‘penalty’ for continuing with the import of Russian crude oil, concerns are being raised about its potential impact on the Indian economy. While such a concern is natural and inevitable, a closer scrutiny of the impact of this tariff reveals something more than what meets the eye. Such scrutiny needs a better understanding of the backdrop in which the Indian economy and its long-run trade policy and dynamics have been operating. Let’s face this: while most have been talking about the impact on India, very few have referred to the impact of this tariff on the US economy. – Trumpian Tariffs on India: Who pays? Who gains?
US – Russia – Ukraine
(Ian Hill – Lowy The Interpreter) Uncertainty, and no little trepidation, surrounds the upcoming Trump-Putin meeting on Friday 15 August in Alaska. While Trump has (for now) ruled out attendance at the meeting by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it’s still not clear what is on the negotiating table. There is a lot at stake – most immediately for Ukraine but also for broader European security – and the auguries aren’t encouraging. – Trump-Putin summit: The dangers of dealmaking without Ukraine at the table | Lowy Institute
(Seth G. Jones, Eliot A. Cohen, Maria Snegovaya, Mark F. Cancian, and Benjamin Jensen – Center for Strategic & International Studies) As U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepare to meet this Friday at a summit in Alaska, questions arise over the potential agenda and implications for the war in Ukraine. With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky currently expected to be absent from the talks, concerns have emerged about the scope of any possible agreements, the role of Ukraine’s allies, and the durability of any negotiated settlement. – Experts React: What’s at Stake in the Trump–Putin Alaska Meeting
US – Vaccine Research
(Syra Madad – Belfer Center) Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s decision to terminate nearly $500 million in federal funding for mRNA vaccine research is a dangerous reversal of scientific progress that puts millions of lives at risk, writes Syra Madad. – Why Defunding mRNA Vaccine Research Is a Catastrophic Mistake | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
