Geostrategic magazine (11 December 2025)

From global think tanks

The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.

Today’s about: Chile; China-India; Syria; UK; US (Navy); US-China; US-Japan-North Korea; US (NSS)-Middle East; West Africa-Sahel

Chile

(Richard Kouyoumdjian Inglis – RUSI) On Sunday 16 November, Chile held presidential and congressional elections renewing half of the Senate and the entirety of the Deputies chamber. Since none of the eight presidential candidates obtained more than 50%, the country will proceed to a runoff on Sunday 14 December between the top seeded, the communist candidate Jannette Jara, who heads a left-wing coalition, and the right-winger José Antonio Kast, who is seeking the presidency for the third time. Although the right had hoped to secure a majority in both chambers and ideally the 4/7 quorum needed to modify certain laws, the results fell short due to major parties deciding to run on separate lists. As a consequence, the composition of Congress will not change significantly and the next government (2026-2030) will have to negotiate with the opposition, likely pursuing more moderate security and economic policies, by far the biggest worries among Chileans. – National Security Marks Chile’s Presidential Runoff | Royal United Services Institute

China-India

(Michael Kugelman, Srujan Palkar – Atlantic Council) Following a 2020 border clash, Beijing and New Delhi have taken steps to stabilize bilateral relations. But China’s recent detention of an Indian citizen born in a disputed territory—and the diplomatic tensions that followed—are a reminder that the two countries remain rivals. New Delhi’s views on its relations with Moscow and Washington should be understood in the context of India-China competition. –  Dispatch from New Delhi: Another India-China flare-up is coming – Atlantic Council

Syria

(Aaron Y. Zelin – The Washington Institute) Syria is home to one of the oldest Christian communities in the world. In Maaloula, locals still speak the ancient language of Aramaic to this day. After the dawn of Islam in the Levant, generally speaking, Christians were allowed to practice their faith without much harassment, but were second-class “citizens” politically. In modern history, there was the infamous massacre of Christians in Damascus in 1860. However, since then, they have been relatively free and safe. Since the fall of the Assad regime a year ago, many have been worried about the fate and future of Christians in the new Syria. Overall, they are allowed to live and worship, but there have been a number of incidents where they have been targeted. These greater risks must be confronted by the new authorities but should be seen in concert with broader risks to all communities in Syria, including the majority population. No one is safe from vigilante attacks in Syria nowadays. Therefore, it is a complex picture worth unfolding to better understand the current situation. – Christians in the New Syria: Accepted, But At-Risk | The Washington Institute

UK

(Neil Barnett – RUSI) In the coming months the UK is expected to pass a new elections bill that will rebuild the country’s ‘firewall against foreign interference’. One of the threats it will supposedly address stems from the use of cryptocurrency. That is a worthwhile aim, but Government suggestions that this threat will be confronted simply by treating crypto donations in the same manner as fiat currency indicate that the bill may both misunderstand and underestimate the nature and scale of the cryptocurrency threat. Unless the version that reaches Parliament is reinforced, the firewall may end up resembling a sieve. Failing to take the opportunity to address these shortcomings now would represent a serious missed opportunity. – UK Election Security is Threatened by Political Money Laundering via Cryptocurrency | Royal United Services Institute

US (Navy)

(IISS) The United States Navy faces an inflection point in the design and sustainment of its surface fleet, as delays, cancellations and industrial shortfalls collide with rising operational demands. Forthcoming budget choices, industrial timelines and early tests of new uncrewed vessels will shape whether the fleet can regain momentum by the late 2020s. – The future of the US surface fleet

US-China

(Atlantic Council) Even with China’s unfair trade practices, the United States and China still “should trade,” said US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. “Just . . . it needs to be managed.”. Greer spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Wednesday, hosted by the GeoEconomics Center, where he unpacked a year in which US President Donald Trump implemented an aggressive trade strategy that resulted in clashes with China over tariffs, export controls, and other trade measures. “The president’s interest is not in blowing up everything,” Greer argued, “and that includes our relationship with China.”. Greer said that the administration’s actions are intended not to solidify geopolitical camps but to address the “giant deficit” in trade. “The landing zone with China is really we just have more balanced trade,” he argued. Below are highlights from the event, moderated by The Wall Street Journal’s Greg Ip, where Greer talked about the Trump administration’s broader strategy, what it has and has not yet achieved, and what to expect next on tariffs and trade. – China’s overcapacity problem ‘doesn’t mean we can’t trade together,’ says US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer – Atlantic Council

US-Japan-North Korea

(Kanishkh Kanodia – Chatham House) In August 2023, US president Joe Biden, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol agreed a bold strategic vision for the development of trilateral cooperation between their countries. However, the structural and personal factors that led to that bold vision are now in doubt. Changes of leadership in all three countries since 2023 may mean a lack of personal and political will at the top level. This paper argues that while trilateral cooperation is likely to persist, officials and policymakers in all three countries will need to keep the momentum going without much in the way of support from the very top, as the Trump administration’s new national security strategy perhaps shows. If they are to succeed, policymakers in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington must rethink the role of ‘values’ such as democracy promotion as coalescing factors in their partnership. Instead, their focus must shift to demonstrating tangible benefits from cooperation by securing mutual interests such as freedom of navigation, increasing burden-sharing in regional defence and security, and deepening collaboration on economic security and technology. – Securing the future of US–Japan–South Korea cooperation | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

US (NSS)-Middle East 

(The Soufan Center) The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy 2025 released last week, states Trump’s intent to de-emphasize U.S. involvement in the Middle East in order to focus on great power competition, narcotics trafficking-related threats, and other threats in the Western Hemisphere. The wide range of threats and conflicts still active in the Middle East will complicate Trump’s plan to pivot from the region. Experts question the strategy’s assumptions that the threat from Iran’s nuclear program has permanently ended, and that ceasefires in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen can be translated into lasting peace agreements. The strategy calculates that key U.S. partners, particularly Israel, will play a leading role in combating Iran and Iran-backed non-state actors, and that Arab Gulf states will bear most of the burden for reconstructing Gaza and Syria. – Trump National Security Strategy Pivots from the Middle East – The Soufan Center

West Africa-Sahel

(Romane Dideberg, Paul Melly – Chatham House) On 7 December, troops led by a special forces commander attempted to take power in Benin. The thwarted coup came less than two weeks after soldiers had seized power in the fellow West African country of Guinea-Bissau following its presidential election. Loyalist forces quickly recovered full control in Benin, with air support and troops from fellow member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed to consolidate government authority. Meanwhile in Guinea-Bissau, which has historically suffered from chronic instability, ECOWAS is engaged in delicate negotiations to navigate a way out of the latest upheaval while the country has been suspended from the bloc’s decision-making bodies. – West Africa needs regional solutions to combat the escalating Sahel security crisis | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

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