From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Baltic States, China-Australia, Europe-Russia, Europe-Ukraine, Indonesia, Malaysia, Middle East, Middle East-Syria, Philippines, Russia-Central Asia, Russia-North Korea, Southeast Asia
Baltic States
(Anshu Kumar – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Baltic states have been at the forefront of efforts in supporting Ukraine’s war efforts. Trump vowing to end the conflict swiftly and the US becoming less promising as regards its security assurances to Europe complicates the security situation of these small states. – Trump’s Outreach to Putin has Implications for the Baltics – MP-IDSA
China – Australia
(Marina Yue Zhang – Australian Institute of International Affairs) The clash between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House over the weekend was more than a personal spat or a bilateral dispute—it was a moment of geopolitical reckoning. The post-Cold War order—once defined by a rules-based international political economy and security alliances—is rapidly unraveling. Since returning to office, President Trump has revived a transactional and coercive brand of diplomacy—better described as “bully diplomacy.” Characterised by unilateral economic sanctions against major trading partners and coercive threats against allies, his approach undermines multilateralism and raises existential questions about the future of American leadership. For Australia, the implications of this shift are profound. Security has long been underpinned by its alliance with the United States, while prosperity has rested on trade with China. For decades, Canberra mostly walked this tightrope adeptly, but both pillars are now under strain. The restructuring of global supply chains, the increasing use of economic statecraft as a tool of foreign policy, and the erosion of institutionalised security alliances—amid intensifying great power competition—are converging to reshape the world order, and, with it, Australia’s diplomatic calculus. – Australia’s China Diplomacy: Is It Ready for a World Without US Certainty? – Australian Institute of International Affairs
(Joe Keary – The Strategist) China’s deployment of a potent surface action group around Australia over the past two weeks is unprecedented but not unique. Over the past few years, China’s navy has deployed a range of vessels in Australia’s vicinity, including state-of-the-art warships, replenishment ships, intelligence-gathering ships, survey ships, satellite support ships and hospital ships. Together, these deployments paint a picture of a country that is undertaking sweeping efforts to transform its navy into a formidable blue water force, capable of regularly projecting hard and soft power to our region. – China’s navy sends a steady drumbeat of ships around Australia | The Strategist
Europe – Russia
(Charlie Eadwards – IISS) In the coming weeks and months, Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid warfare to sow discord in European capitals and populations via cyberspace, including through digital vandalism, sabotage and influence operations. The situation is increasingly uncertain, not least due to news that the United States Cyber Command has paused offensive cyber operations against Russia. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s orders may have been part of a wider negotiation package to draw Russian President Vladimir Putin into talks on the future of Ukraine. However, the reality is that a halt in cyber operations risks emboldening Russian cyber actors who over the past year have expanded their targeting to include aviation, education, government, law enforcement and military organisations. – Europe needs both sword and shield to deter Russia
Europe- Ukraine
(Ben Barry – IISS) France and the United Kingdom have proposed military options to maintain the peace and uphold stability for post-conflict Ukraine. However, the significant challenges in building a force capable of deterring Russia means that major doubts persist over Europe’s ability to undertake such a mission without direct US support. – Potential European mission in Ukraine: key military factors
Indonesia
(Muhammad Fajar – FULCRUM) Following his ruling coalition’s dominance in Indonesia’s 2024 regional and local elections (pilkada), President Prabowo Subianto has an opportunity to set up a political order in the form of a stable political coalition. Does Prabowo have what he needs to solidify his coalition for the long haul? Will he build a resilient political order in Indonesia, like those initiated by the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia (UMNO) and the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, or will Prabowo’s Indonesia follow the Philippines’ pathway, plagued by fragmentation? – Indonesia: Towards a Durable Political Order? | FULCRUM
Malaysia
(Lee Hwok-Aun – FULCRUM) Malaysia’s minimum wage would be raised from RM1,500 (US$340) per month to RM1,700 on 1 February 2025, announced Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim while presenting the 2025 federal government budget in October 2024. While the insertion of this minimum wage revision into the budget speech, the pinnacle of parliamentary proceedings, reflects the political importance of addressing low wages and slow wage growth, most workers still lack the power to negotiate salaries. – Malaysia Raises Minimum Wage but Most Workers Still Lack Bargaining Power | FULCRUM
Middle East
(Raphael S. Cohen – RAND Corporation) Over the last few weeks, a lot of ink has been spilled on the Trump administration’s “day after” plans for Gaza. Less attention, though, has been focused on evaluating what might happen to Gaza if Israel and Hamas were to agree to a deal to end the current war after a final hostages-for-prisoners exchange. The short answer is that it’s not good. On its present course, Hamas would likely rebuild, Gaza would remain in ruins, and a durable peace settlement would be all but impossible. – Gaza Is the Land of No Good Options | RAND
Middle East – Syria
(Emile Hokayem, Laith Alajlouni, John Raine, Hasan Alhasan – IISS) In December 2024, Syria’s Assad regime, in power since 1970, collapsed following a major rebel campaign led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohamed al-Golani and then-emir of HTS, later named himself as transnational president at the end of January 2025 and is now overseeing the country’s transition. Syria’s regional neighbours have accepted these new political realities in Damascus, and are now manoeuvring to influence the new leadership and pursue their interests. Whether they can cooperate, both with Syria and each other, will determine to a large extent Syria’s future stability and economic prospects. – Regional reactions to the transition in Syria
Philippines
(Aries A. Arugay – Fulcrum) The Philippines entered an impeachment cycle when the House of Representatives successfully impeached Vice-President (VP) Sara Duterte. This sets the stage for the Senate to preside over a polarising trial possibly by this July. According to the 1987 Constitution (Article IX, Section 3), the removal of any VP from office needs at least a two-thirds (majority) vote from Senate members. This is the first time a sitting vice president has been impeached in the country’s tumultuous political history. It is the latest episode in the bitter rivalry of the erstwhile allied Marcos and Duterte dynasties, the culmination of previous skirmishes, where their differences included irreconcilable policy clashes, a protracted Congressional hearing exposing Sara Duterte’s office’s alleged questionable use of public funds, and a war of words between President “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and former president Rodrigo Duterte — Sara’s father — in an exchange of drug addiction allegations. – A Return to Political Chaos? The Philippines’ Impeachment Saga | FULCRUM
Russia – Central Asia
(Dalvi Sethi – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Russia advanced the concept of a Trilateral Gas Union in December 2022, to consolidate regional energy cooperation. This was in the context of its reduced gas exports to Europe, precipitated by sanctions and the broader geopolitical ramifications of the Ukraine war. By October 2023, Uzbekistan, aiming to mitigate energy insecurity and stabilise domestic supply, committed to importing approximately 2.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas annually, while Kazakhstan agreed to facilitate gas transit and explore domestic utilisation of Russian gas. From Russia’s perspective, Central Asia is a crucial market for gas exports. The region’s geographical proximity, coupled with its existing energy infrastructure, offers Moscow a pragmatic avenue to mitigate the economic repercussions of the European Union’s (EU) phased reduction of Russian gas imports.[i] However, the scale of the Central Asian energy market remains insufficient to compensate for the demand previously generated by European consumers. Prior to 2022, Russia supplied over 40 per cent of the EU’s natural gas imports. In March 2022, Russian pipeline gas exports to the EU peaked at 8.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) monthly. By 2023, Russia’s share in EU pipeline gas imports plummeted to just 8 per cent, and less than 15 per cent for both pipeline and LNG imports. The evolving trajectory of Russia–Central Asia energy partnership not only highlights pragmatic energy cooperation but also reflects the complex interplay of economic imperatives and geopolitical realignments. – Russia’s Central Asian Gas Gambit – MP-IDSA
Russia – North Korea
(Gabriela Bernal – The Interpreter) With US President Donald Trump’s administration pushing to quickly end the war in Ukraine, negotiations will remain a top priority for Washington. After talks between Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy ended disastrously, and the US paused military aid to the country and suspended intelligence sharing, there is no end of speculation about where the next moves will follow. This is, of course, a live and fast-moving situation, but given North Korea’s direct participation in the Ukraine war in support of Moscow, any developments will have consequences for Pyongyang. While global media has mainly focused on the deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea over the past two years, the two countries have done much more than talk weapons and troop deployments. – Pyongyang–Moscow ties will outlive the Ukraine conflict | Lowy Institute
Southeast Asia
(Josiah Patrick P. Bagayas – FULCRUM) Mary Jane Veloso, a Filipino national convicted of drug trafficking in Indonesia in 2010, was repatriated to the Philippines in December 2024. After fourteen years of incarceration and narrowly escaping death by firing squad, Veloso’s future hangs in the balance. As calls for clemency are being mounted on Philippine President Bongbong Marcos, Veloso is being detained at a correctional facility for women in the Manila capital region as she awaits the president’s decision. The episode underscores the need for regional-level initiatives to tackle the issue of transnational drug trafficking. Governments across Southeast Asia have taken a tough stance against illegal drugs. Indonesia and the Philippines, particularly during the terms of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Rodrigo Duterte, employed severe measures against illicit drug trafficking. Indonesia metes out the death penalty as a deterrent for such crimes. Eighteen convicted offenders, most of whom were foreign nationals, were executed during Jokowi’s first two years in office. Duterte’s violent war on drugs, on the other hand, was responsible for more than 6,000 casualties in anti-drug police operations by the end of his term. – Challenges of Combating Transnational Drug Trafficking in Southeast Asia | FULCRUM
