(Stephen Pomper – Just Security) When the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor obtained arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, in March 2023, he must have known that the Court was in for a bumpy ride. Going straight to the top of the State that holds the world’s largest nuclear arsenal was an audacious move, and in one sense doomed to fail. Even the Court’s most ardent supporters acknowledged that neither the Court nor its backers had the muscle to bring Putin to The Hague for a war crimes trial. But some argued the warrants should be viewed instead as serving broader ends, many only obliquely related to the goal of putting him in the dock. Perhaps at the top was the symbolism of indicting one of the world’s most powerful people and memorializing his unlawful acts for the ages. At a more practical level, proponents hoped that the charges might deter mid- and low-level Russian forces from further atrocities, isolate Putin internationally, encourage a more critical narrative about him domestically, and perhaps even encourage Russians to begin thinking about a post-Putin political horizon. The sum total of these costs to Putin might even, it was hoped, help end the war by softening him up for a settlement more favorable to Ukraine. But there were potential downsides too, including the possibility the Court would emerge weaker for having swung at Mr. Putin and missed, or the risk that issuing warrants could backfire by provoking Putin to escalate the conflict, impeding peacemaking efforts, or undermining relations between Western champions of the Court and certain countries of the Global South that have sought to avoid friction with Moscow. It’s probably too early to calculate benefits and costs decisively, but three years in we can at least hazard an interim assessment.
Assessing the ICC’s Impact in Ukraine
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