Taiwan’s undersea communications cables keep getting cut. In January, Xingshun 39 — a Tanzanian-flagged vessel controlled by a Hong Kong company and crewed by Chinese nationals — disabled its tracking system before dragging its anchor over a cable, severing a key link between Taiwan, Asia, and the United States. Days later, the Taiwan Coast Guard thwarted a cable-cutting attempt by a Mongolian-flagged ship with a Chinese name. In February, Hongtai 58, a Togolese-flagged vessel with a Chinese crew, severed a cable connecting Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. Its voyage history revealed ties to Chinese interests, frequent name and flag changes, and deliberate efforts to obscure ownership. Beijing claims these are routine accidents, but the pattern, precision, and persistence of such incidents point to deliberate sabotage — a calculated prelude to a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To escape accountability, China is employing a form of lawfare best described as civil-exploitation lawfare: the manipulation of international law governing civilian maritime activity to mask state-backed malign behavior. Undersea cables are a focal point of Chinese strategy because they form the backbone of global communications, supporting everything from routine internet use to global financial transactions and secure military communications. Taiwan serves as a critical node in undersea communications, connected by 14 international cables to the United States and countries across East Asia. A major attack on Taiwan’s undersea infrastructure could destabilize the global economy and force high-stakes decisions on defending the island under conditions of digital isolation. To mitigate this risk, U.S. policymakers should adopt a strategy to enhance cable security by countering China’s “shadow fleet” — a network of vessels whose ties to China are deliberately concealed, enabling them to threaten undersea infrastructure while preserving deniability for Beijing. Such a strategy should involve building a maritime security coalition, closing gaps in international law, leveraging information transparency, applying targeted diplomatic pressure, strengthening Taiwan’s maritime defenses, and using legal tools as instruments of deterrence.
A New Strategy to Counter Chinese Sabotage of Taiwan’s Undersea Cables (Timothy Boyle – Just Security)
Related articles
