A key question to arise from a new Chinese military presence in Laos is how Vietnam will see the development. The Lowy Institute’s Hunter Marston noted last week that “Vietnam already fears encirclement as China fortifies artificial islands and bases in the South China Sea.”
So when Vietnamese Prime Minister Le Minh Hung met his newly appointed Lao counterpart Saleumxay Kommasith on 8 October, it was a notable meeting. The language was familiar, reaffirming a special relationship. But its significance was the timing, just over a week after China’s Ministry of National Defence announced the opening of a joint military support and training centre at Ban Keun airport and only days after the Lao National Assembly elected Saleumxay prime minister(Opens in new window), replacing Sonexay Siphandone, who became the new assembly president.
Sonexay’s family background gives the reshuffle particular significance for Hanoi. His father, former Lao president Khamtay Siphandone, had especially close ties to Vietnam, whose leaders described him warmly as a friend. When Khamtay passed away in April 2025, Laos declared five days of national mourning, while Vietnam observed two days.
For Vietnam, Laos occupies a central place in Hanoi’s strategic thinking, shaped by wartime cooperation, shared borders and longstanding ties between the ruling parties. A Chinese military facility there introduces uncertainty into a relationship Vietnam has traditionally regarded as a source of security along its western flank.
by The Interpreter – Money, not China’s new base, is Vietnam’s real worry in Laos
