Sources: Chatham House; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation; The Soufan Center
Europe – Azerbaijan
(Vasif Huseynov – The Jamestown Foundation) On July 1, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen arrived in Baku for the first leg of a two-day South Caucasus tour, meeting Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss energy cooperation, regional connectivity, and the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. Von der Leyen announced a 200 million euro ($229 million) Global Gateway grant package for South Caucasus connectivity, projected to mobilize up to 2 billion euros ($2.29 billion) in combined public and private investment, alongside a proposed EU–Azerbaijan Connectivity Partnership. The visit reflected a broader recalibration of EU–Azerbaijan relations, with Baku becoming a strategic partner in energy security and Middle Corridor connectivity while advancing negotiations on a new bilateral framework agreement to replace the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. – European Commission President Visits Azerbaijan – Jamestown
Europe – US – Russia
(Sidharth Kaushal and Matthew Savill – RUSI) In spite of reassuring words in the most recent NATO summit communique, there is still considerable debate over how Europe should prepare for reduced American involvement in European defence, given the focus on ‘rebalancing’ the Alliance. This often begins by asking how European allies might replace the capabilities the US would contribute to NATO’s existing plans. But it should also ask how the wider strategic context that reduces US involvement changes the problem Europe is trying to solve. For example, a crisis or major war between the US and a near-peer China would not simply reduce the American military resources available to Europe; it would fundamentally reshape the conditions under which Europe would have to deter Russia. Discussion of European defence remains largely regional in character. Rather than treating deterrence in Europe as one component of a wider global strategic competition, it continues to revolve around a relatively narrow set of contingencies. This has encouraged a conception of European defence that may be difficult to resource without sustained American support and whose suitability for shaping the wider strategic balance is open to question. – Thinking Beyond the Baltics for Deterring Russia | Royal United Services Institute
NATO – Asia
(Philip Shetler-Jones – RUSI) NATO developed partnership programs after 1991, when the threat from the Soviet Union evaporated and the alliance was led into activities beyond the foundational mission of collective defence. The first generation of partnerships served NATO enlargement and the stabilisation of post-Soviet Central Asia. A second generation following 9/11 supported missions on counter-piracy and Afghanistan. The current third phase of partnerships reflects a shift of attention toward the rise of China from 2019, producing the ‘Indo-Pacific 4’ (IP4) made up of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. For the 2026 Ankara summit the NATO Secretary General invited the IP4 defense ministers. South Korea was represented at Presidential level, reinforcing the country’s prominence in events centered on defence industry partnership and procurement. Other IP4 members sent ministers of defence, and Japan sent both defence and foreign ministers (PM Takaichi having committed to domestic legislative duties). Compared to the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid with ‘the first-ever participation of the Heads of State and Government of the IP-4 partners in a NATO summit’, and the stronger statement in 2025, this level of representation may be read as an indication of decline. Alternatively, the attendance by defence ministers may be interpreted as a sign that the partnership has matured into a more pragmatic functionality. Looking back, the IP4 has been challenged from the start due to caution that allies’ bilateral diplomacy with China could be overshadowed by a collective NATO (and therefore US-dominated) stance on China. This ambivalence caused an early proposal to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo to whither on the vine. A lack of uniformity in the policies of IP4 members toward China has meant their agenda tended more to other shared interests like countering North Korean nuclear proliferation or mounting a cooperative defence industry response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. – What’s Left of NATO’s Asia Engagement? | Royal United Services Institute
Russia
(Kassie Corelli – The Jamestown Foundation) .Ukraine’s expanding drone strikes deep inside Russia, including the June 18 attack on Moscow, are prompting Kremlin-aligned media and military bloggers to demand treason charges against civilians who photograph or share footage of attacks online. Russia’s new “confirming the delivery date of goods” (SPOT) import system is likely intended to prevent drone-component smuggling but is also disrupting parallel import networks that have helped Moscow circumvent sanctions and acquire critical military technologies. Expanded domestic repression, tighter import controls, and ongoing anti-corruption purges in the defense sector are straining Russia’s military supply chains and are likely to undermine its long-term defense capabilities. – Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin’s Defense Capabilities – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Gas shortages across the Russian Federation that Ukrainian drone attacks have brought on are rapidly acquiring a political dimension despite the Kremlin’s assumption that Russians will weather this latest challenge with their usual forbearance. Russians are angry not only because the Kremlin has not protected them but also because it is protecting those closest to Moscow first. Elites are using the situation to press their own agendas, and the crisis now has an international dimension as Russia’s neighbors react. That does not mean the Duma vote will not go as the Kremlin wants—Russian President Vladimir Putin can and will get the results he wants—or that there will be any repeat of the 2011 protests. It does mean support for Putin will continue to fall, even among Russian elites. – Gas Crisis Increasingly Serious Political Problem for Putin – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Bethany Elliott – The Jamestown Foundation) Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, who held the position from 2021–2023, believes that Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2004 after the Orange Revolution. Russia’s war against Ukraine today is markedly different from the one that Reznikov oversaw. He says the war has evolved into a drone- and electronic warfare-dominated conflict, with inexpensive, scalable technologies replacing traditional armored warfare and making battlefield innovation more important than manpower or costly conventional weapons. Ukraine’s rapid military-technological advances have not yet translated into major territorial gains. Although Ukraine’s overall goal remains a return to its 1991 borders, Reznikov asserts that this is unlikely in the short term. Reznikov says that both Russia and Ukraine remain unable to achieve a decisive military breakthrough. Reznikov believes that Russia may require a pause to recover from mounting economic and military strain as well as the loss of its professional corps. Lasting peace, he argues, will require credible security guarantees because Moscow remains a long-term threat to European security. – Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Reznikov Describes New Type of War – Jamestown
Ukraine
(The Soufan Center) Since the start of the war, innovative solutions by Ukrainian volunteer groups and soldiers have spurred on a defense industrial base that has rapidly innovated, produced, and scaled drones and counter-drone technology to address constraints on the battlefield and shifting tactics used by Russia to besiege the country. Various agreements signed on the sidelines of last week’s NATO summit in Ankara attest to the global demand for Ukraine’s combat-proven technology and expertise, prompted by the Iran War and European rearmament. Gulf and European states now aim to learn from Ukraine’s overarching operational and doctrinal innovation on the battlefield to respond to current security threats. While Ukraine is clearly at the cutting edge of cost-effective offensive and defensive drone technology, Kyiv remains dependent on its partners — especially the United States — for air and missile defense. – Global Demand for Ukraine’s Drone and Counterdrone Expertise and Technology – The Soufan Center
US – Iran – Middle East – Gulf
(Marc Weller – Chatham House) On 13 July President Donald Trump appointed the United States the ‘Guardian’ of the Strait of Hormuz. The US would ensure passage through the Strait, he announced, but would ‘as a matter of FAIRNESS’ demand a payment of 20 per cent of the value of the cargo carried by each passing vessel. This could be up to $30 million per passage for a large oil tanker – an exorbitant amount and 15 times the sum Iran has reportedly demanded in tolls. It would be a reimbursement ‘for any and all costs necessary to do the job of providing safety and security to this very volatile section of the world,’ Trump added. The president matched this announcement in the same post by re-imposing the US blockade of Iranian vessels and maritime traffic destined for Iran. In response, Iran confirmed that it would close the Strait again. In essence, this means that shipping has returned to the status it had before the ceasefire agreed by the US and Iran in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 17 June. Of course, international law does not allow any country, however powerful it may be, to appoint itself ‘guardian’ of the rights of all other states, and demand payment for such unsolicited protection. And the president’s move contradicted the statements of his senior officials, undermining US credibility in the region. On 14 July, a new post by the president appeared to reverse his position, saying that he had decided to replace the reimbursement fee ‘with Trade and Investment Deals that the various Gulf States will be making into the United States’. This U-turn will not undo the damage his fees threat has done to trust in the US, and to its supposedly principled position in defence of free maritime transit through international straits. Meanwhile the only viable solution to restoring shipping in the Strait of Hormuz remains a negotiated settlement – a prospect made even more difficult by the risk of further escalation of the renewed military conflict. – Trump’s threats – and U-turn – on Hormuz fees further undermine US credibility in the Gulf | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Mexico – Canada Agreement
(Vanessa Rubio-Márquez – Chatham House) On 1 July, the US announced it would not renew the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) free trade deal in its current form. Mexico and Canada had each confirmed that they wished to extend the agreement for a further 16-year term, but the US declined. Its trade representative, Ambassador Jamieson Greer, said Washington would keep working with Mexico and Canada to address the agreement’s shortcomings and the trade imbalances with both. Crucially, the USMCA stays in effect while those matters are worked through. The USMCA will now be reviewed annually until 2036. But the Trump administration’s volatile policies intertwining trade and security matters will add to the complexity of these negotiations – especially for Mexico. – US refusal to renew USMCA trade deal brings uncertainty for Mexico. But the treaty is far from dead | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
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