Sources: Al Arabiya; Just Security; Lawfare; Lowy The Interpreter; RFE/RL; The Jamestown Foundation
Around and beyond the war in Iran
(Alex Raufoglu – RFE/RL) US Vice President JD Vance has again signaled that the White House is prepared to use force against Iran if diplomacy fails, raising the stakes around a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MOU) that has halted open hostilities but left the core disputes unresolved. In an interview on The Michael Knowles Show released on June 30, Vance cast the US approach toward Iran as a stark choice: a longer-term agreement anchored in permanent, verifiable nuclear inspections, or renewed military action to preserve what Washington sees as gains already secured. He said President Donald Trump wants diplomacy to continue but only if Tehran accepts enforceable limits on its nuclear program. Vance described Iran’s public messaging as contradictory, pointing to what he said was a gap between Tehran’s public denial of peace talks and its acknowledgment of ongoing technical discussions. “They’ll say, ‘No, no, there aren’t peace talks ongoing, but there are technical talks between the United States and Iran about the peace deal,'” Vance said. “It’s a Persian negotiating tactic and a Persian rhetorical device that I don’t understand”. Responding to critics who have urged a harder military line, Vance defended Trump’s approach as one of calibrated coercion rather than open-ended escalation. “The president is saying, ‘I’m willing to drop bombs,’ and he’s clearly shown that he’s willing to drop bombs, but only if it serves an objective,” he said. In a separate interview with Fox News, Vance said Washington was focused less on rhetoric than on whether Tehran was prepared to make “real concessions”, “We care a lot less about what the Iranians say. We care a lot more about what they do,” he said. The remarks come as uncertainty hangs over the next phase of negotiations. Iranian negotiators did not meet US envoys in Doha on June 30 as expected, clouding hopes that the current cease-fire framework could quickly evolve into a broader settlement. Back in Washington, analysts warn the current arrangement amounts less to a peace agreement than a temporary pause in fighting. – US Keeps Military Option Alive As Iran Talks Near A Critical Test
(Alex Raufoglu – RFE/RL) Despite a US-Iran memorandum that opened a 60-day diplomatic window, missile exchanges and maritime threats suggest the negotiations are faltering under growing military pressure. RFE/RL spoke with Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Mary Kissel about whether diplomacy can still deliver lasting security, and why she believes Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains the central issue. – Mary Kissel: Iran’s Nuclear Program Must Remain The Focus
Artificial Intelligence
(Nicholas Felstead – Lawfare) The Anthropic Institute recently published an essay on “recursive self-improvement” (RSI)— the prospect of a state-of-the-art artificial intelligence (AI) system that is “capable of fully autonomously designing and developing its own successor.” Anthropic stresses that we are not yet at that point of RSI, but that AI is accelerating AI development at an alarming pace. Anthropic’s essay closes with a call for a slowdown in AI development to deal with the implications of RSI. It suggests that it “would be good for the world to have the option to slow or temporarily pause frontier AI development” and that if systems existed that could verify peer company compliance, “we expect that we would slow down or temporarily pause, if other developers at or near the frontier also did so in a verifiable manner.” This is a market-leading company publicly stating that it is prepared to halt development of its most important and financially lucrative products, provided that its competitors verifiably do the same. A coordinated pause may be the most valuable safety intervention available to the industry, and it is also the form of collaboration most likely to raise antitrust concerns. – Can Frontier AI Labs Lawfully Agree to Pause? | Lawfare
(Ignacio Cofone – Just Security) The public bodies that are supposed to set the standards for AI regulation have, for the most part, not done it yet. AI regulations on both sides of the Atlantic require providers to certify or document that their systems meet general requirements (such as accuracy, fairness, robustness, human oversight). But they leave much of the specification over what those requirements mean to bodies that have not yet produced requirements that match the systems being regulated. The European Union’s AI Act delay is a visible example. Under the Act, providers of high-risk AI systems are supposed to certify their systems against harmonized technical standards written by independent bodies in Brussels, but those bodies missed their August 2025 deadline to issue the standards, and the European Commission proposed postponing parts of the Act’s application to 2027 and 2028 because of that delay. In the meantime, providers are working out their own definitions of what compliance requires with, at most, sectoral guidance from non-AI regulators and their own interpretations of general legal requirements. The standard-setting work that the AI Act assumed public bodies and regulators would do, in other words, is being done by the companies whose systems are being regulated. This pattern, as detailed below, is not specific to the AI Act. – The Handover of AI Standard-Setting
Central Asia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Many of the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia are now taking the next and more difficult step of agreeing to swap small border areas to overcome problems created by Soviet map-making following commitments to resolve border disputes. s this approach is applied, it will become easier for them to cooperate on other issues and help with the ethnic exclaves in the region. These places have regularly sparked violent conflicts since the Central Asian republics gained independence in 1991. These moves are thus important in their own right, but they may prove important as a precedent elsewhere in the post-Soviet space where many borders that divide ethnic groups and ethnic exclaves still exist and remain sources of tension. – More Central Asian Countries Swapping Territories to End Border Disputes – Jamestown
Crimes against Humanity and Disability Rights
(Janet Lord, Kate McInnes, Gerard Quinn, Jillian Rafferty, Matthew “Hezzy” Smith, Michael Ashley Stein and Sigurjón Sveinsson – Just Security) Progress on a Draft Convention on Crimes against Humanity is finally underway — but whether it will deliver justice for persons with disabilities remains deeply uncertain. In April 2023, the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly adopted a resolution to begin drafting an international convention on crimes against humanity, opening a two-year process of debate and discussion on draft articles that had been prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC), the U.N. body charged with the development of international law. Based on that debate and discussion, State comments in response to the draft articles have now been released, and they are not encouraging. Of the 64 submissions proposing amendments, just two — from Poland and Uruguay — recommend revising the crime of persecution in the ILC draft articles to enumerate disability as a protected category. Sustained advocacy from persons with disabilities, related organizations, broader civil society, and academics, such as those of us working on disability rights in international criminal law, has aimed to generate wider support for recognizing disability-based persecution. Failure to do so would cast a shadow over the 20th anniversary later this year of the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which was drafted with the intent to close gaps in international legal protections for persons with disabilities. Dialogue between now and December with States and civil society alike can build on discussions that occurred at the 19th Conference of States Parties convened in early June at the U.N. in New York, where the issue was a focus of an important side event on the topic. Measured against the benchmarks set by Security Council Resolution 2475 in 2019 on the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict, as well as the U.N. Disability Inclusion Strategy for 2026 to 2030, and the nearly universally ratified CRPD, early state responsiveness to disability inclusion in the Convention on Crimes against Humanity has been poor. The window for course correction, however, remains open. It must be used. – Will the Crimes Against Humanity Treaty Address Disability?
Japan – China – Southeast Asia
(Susannah Patton, Euan Graham – Lowy The Interpreter) Since November 2025, relations between Japan and China have undergone a rupture. China’s over-reaction to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement in parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a “life-threatening situation” for Japan has included restricting economic and cultural ties between the two countries. Beijing appears intent on isolating and stigmatising Japan as far as possible through a wide-ranging pressure campaign. Takaichi has been undeterred by China’s pressure tactics, which actually benefited her in political terms by contributing to her government’s resounding election victory in February. But Beijing’s sustained diplomatic offensive has an important audience beyond Japan. As China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson put it in May, “all Asia-Pacific countries need to stay clear-eyed and jointly reject Japanese neo-militarism to safeguard the order of peace on which all countries rely to live and thrive”. There may be a parallel here with China’s attempts to coerce Australia between 2020 and 2022, which although largely unsuccessful in changing Canberra’s behaviour, had a diplomatic chilling effect on third countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Whereas Beijing previously sought to present Australia to the region as “anti-China” and a US proxy, it seeks to delegitimise Japan’s regional role on historical and moral grounds. It is tempting to dismiss China’s efforts as futile. After all, surveys have consistently shown Japan to be the most trusted partner for Southeast Asia. According to 2024 Pew Research Centre public opinion polling, 81% of respondents in Thailand and the Philippines, 72% of Malaysians and 58% of Singaporeans see Japan as contributing positively to peace and stability. The 2026 ISEAS State of Southeast Asia Survey shows Japan is by far the most trusted external partner to the region’s elites. The latest Lowy Poll also illustrates the high regard that Australians hold for Japan to act responsibly in the world. – Beijing is trying to turn Tokyo toxic in Southeast Asia | Lowy Institute
Russia – Belarus
(Alexander Taranov – The Jamestown Foundation) From May 19–21, the Russian and Belarusian militaries conducted a major strategic and non-strategic nuclear drill that included joint presidential participation. The exercise focused on the preparation and employment of nuclear forces under simulated aggression conditions across the Western/European Theater of Military Operations (TVD). Moscow and Minsk presented it as a defensive response to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) militarization and the Western-backed war in Ukraine, while some Russian experts openly advocated for the consideration of nuclear strikes against Ukraine and NATO. Belarus’s 8–12 Iskander launchers and about 36 nuclear-capable aircraft provide 13–33 percent of the missile and up to 17–75 percent of the aviation component required by Russian strategists in 1999 for a regional nuclear operation, making Belarus a significant forward-deployed nuclear platform rather than a symbolic participant. The Kremlin is sharing political responsibility for nuclear drills with Minsk by publicly displaying joint presidential-level nuclear decision-making, reinforcing Belarus’s status as a potential nuclear co-belligerent and retaliatory target in a potential nuclear conflict scenario involving NATO and Ukraine. – Russia and Belarus Held Major Nuclear Drill – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Ryan O’Neale – Just Security) Even long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin employed various “hybrid” methods to extend its influence within Ukrainian territory, including by cultivating allies in Ukrainian government circles in the years after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union and by supporting oligarchs in their drive for control over sectors of Ukraine’s economy. With its 2014 capture of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine and subsequent full-scale invasion eight years later, it has manipulated citizenship and the granting of Russian passports in various ways to justify its invasion and consolidate control over occupied Ukrainian territory. These tactics of hybrid warfare have significantly supplemented the power of Russia’s conventional military operations to exert political and administrative control over occupied populations. This Russian policy of “passportization” — meaning the mass, expedited conferral of citizenship through the distribution of passports — is a critical tool in Russia’s effort to lure or subjugate populations. The Russian interior minister asserted in March 2025 that 3.5 million residents of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east and other occupied Ukrainian territory that the Kremlin calls by the imperial-era term “Novorossiya” (New Russia) have received Russian passports. The practice and the strategic objectives underlying this practice have severe implications for international law, future peace negotiations, and European security. – Russia’s Abuse of Passports as Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine
Software Supply Chains
(Hans Nelson – Just Security) When Anthropic announced in April 2026 a limited preview of its Claude Mythos model capable of finding and exploiting vulnerabilities at scale, government and industry immediately focused on what it could mean for cybersecurity. Mythos Preview can reportedly find and author vulnerability exploits in hours that would have previously taken weeks. The White House even viewed the capability as significant enough to re-examine aspects of its current approach to artificial intelligence oversight. But the growing focus on AI-driven vulnerability detection risks obscuring another category of threat hidden deeper within modern software ecosystems and their supply chains. Risks facing national security systems arise not only from software code vulnerabilities, but from governance structures and strategic dependencies embedded within the larger software ecosystems. This gap creates a strategic blind spot: modern defense technologies may rely on software ecosystems whose control, influence, or development pathways lie outside the visibility of traditional supply chain risk frameworks. As the next generation of defense and weapons programs come online infused with AI capabilities, defense officials should scrutinize software supply chains supporting mission-critical defense systems with the same mindset as they do physical supply chains. Software ecosystems built upon open-source dependencies should be evaluated for geopolitical risk and subjected to risk-tiered governance reviews within the defense acquisition process. This more expansive strategic software assurance review would evaluate strategic risk stemming from things like maintainer authority, dependency governance, repository control, and indicators of foreign ownership, control, or influence. Critical defense technology software supply chains should be treated as strategic infrastructure. Fortunately, adopting a more strategic view to shielding software supply chains from risk does not require new legislation or regulation. There are already regulatory regimes in place; the necessary step towards realizing the full spirit of those regimes is improving due diligence in reviewing critical defense software supply chains. These reviews should be scoped and only performed on the most critical systems, taking advantage of existing expert personnel in the acquisition program offices, supported by the contractors’ security, compliance, and product teams. – Hiding in Plain Sight: The Geopolitics of Software Supply Chains
Sudan
(AFP/Al Arabiya) The Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing during their attack on al-Fashir city between 2024 and 2025, Amnesty International alleged Wednesday. Sudan has been mired since April 2023 in a brutal war between the army and the RSF, which has killed tens of thousands and forced millions to flee, according to the United Nations. Both sides have been accused of atrocities, with a UN independent fact-finding mission in February concluding that the 2025 assault on al-Fashir bore the “hallmarks of genocide.” – Amnesty says RSF committed ethnic cleansing in Sudan
US
(Alex Zerden, Rachel Lyngaas – Lawfare) More than 21 years have passed since Congress created the Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). In that time, TFI has pioneered the targeted use of financial sanctions, financial intelligence information, financial regulation, and international standard setting to support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives “while also protecting the integrity of the U.S. and global financial systems.” Financial sanctions in particular have become a “tool of first resort,” as noted by the Treasury Department’s 2021 Sanctions Review and other analyses. However, as put bluntly by former Treasury Department Deputy Secretary Justin Muzinich, TFI “is not a team built to analyze the complex economic and financial links that would be implicated in a great-power clash”. TFI’s analytical demands have expanded well beyond its 9/11-era design. Over the past 20 years, sanctions programs have grown more than 1,000 percent; anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policy has shifted toward risk-based frameworks that presuppose quantitative evidence that TFI has no permanent capacity to produce; and when high-stakes operational decisions have required serious macroeconomic analysis—the 2022 Russia oil price cap being the clearest example—that work has fallen to other Treasury offices whose mandates do not include national security. – Rethinking Treasury’s Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Office | Lawfare
(Michael Dreeben – Just Security) For nearly a century, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the effects of technology on the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches or seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects. Yet it is undeniable that technological advances enable the police to pry into formerly private areas in ways unimaginable to the drafters of the Bill of Rights. Views of private property from airplanes and helicopters, electronic surveillance of telephone calls, use of infrared imaging to probe the interiors of buildings, and GPS tracking of motor vehicles, allow the government to acquire private information without the type of physical search that would have been familiar to the framers in the late eighteenth century. In a line of decisions, the Supreme Court has updated the Fourth Amendment to limit unrestrained police searches that draw on new technologies. The Court has a particular romance with cell phones, consistently finding privacy interests in the vast amount of information accessible through smart phones. This week’s decision in Chatrie v. United States continues that trend. Once again, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a reasonable search, and generally requires a warrant, when the government seeks to compel the production of information from a service provider about an individual’s location generated by his phone. The decision in Chatrie is narrow and incremental, but the stakes were high. If the Court had declined to find a Fourth Amendment search, it would have opened the door to potential government surveillance of individuals’ locations as tracked by their phones without any judicial oversight. Given the near-ubiquitous use of smart phones and location-tracking apps, the government’s proposed rule — that short-term acquisition of location history did not implicate the Fourth Amendment protections — had enormous and ominous consequences. The Court rejected that concept of a Fourth-Amendment-free zone by finding that, consistent with earlier cases, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy about their location when tracked by their cell phone. But the Court stopped well short of saying whether any judicial warrant could issue for “geofence” information and, if so, what the warrant had to provide. Chatrie thus stands as an important but narrow reaffirmation of the Court’s determination not to let technology overwhelm all privacy expectations in the digital age. The next shoes to drop will come as the lower courts work out the details. Those courts will have to strike the balance between law enforcement needs and privacy interests in the first instance, before the issues inevitably return to the Supreme Court. – Unpacking the Supreme Court’s Chatrie Decision
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