Sources: ASPI The Strategist; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; Defense News; RUSI; The Soufan Center; UN News
Australia
(Raff Ciccone – ASPI The Strategist) Decades ago, national security was measured in tanks, fighters and border protection. Today, it is far broader, extending across our digital networks, critical infrastructure, social cohesion and online spaces. A stronger national security future means staying ahead of emerging threats while protecting the safety of Australians and the resilience of our communities. This year’s Australian federal budget continues investment in security, cyber capability and prevention to ensure Australia is prepared for the challenges of a rapidly changing world. – Defence and social cohesion at the heart of modern national security | The Strategist
Australia – Europe
(Fitriani and Bart Hogeveen – ASPI The Strategist) Australia and European countries are separated by geography but aligned in strategic interests. This principle is guiding a growing network of security partnerships built around countering hybrid threats. In the week of 8 June, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong engaged in the Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN), meetings with their German counterparts, and separate visits to Paris and Helsinki. This demonstrated Canberra’s determination to maintain European engagement in Indo-Pacific security while also providing avenues to articulate Australia’s security interests related to the war in Ukraine, the Strait of Hormuz and the future of NATO. To some extent this burst of diplomatic activity has offset the disappointing decision of G7 host and French President Emmanuel Macron not to invite Australia to a meeting of that group this week. – Australia and Europe at the centre of coalition against hybrid threats | The Strategist
Australia – South Korea
(Euan Graham – ASPI The Strategist) Australia and South Korea are both acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines, a parallel step-change in their conventional deterrent capability. Though their discrete pathways to realise this common goal reflect different strategic circumstances and problems, they can still usefully learn from each other’s experience and cooperate. Viewed from Australia, where AUKUS still stirs controversy five years after the tripartite initiative was announced, South Korea’s recently announced framework to acquire nuclear powered submarines is a refreshing contrast. Unlike Australia, which is acquiring two different types of nuclear-powered submarine in close partnership with the United States and Britain, President Lee Jae Myung’s administration is seeking a largely made-in-Korea solution, with limited assistance from the US. – Canberra and Seoul can learn from each other’s nuclear submarine plans | The Strategist
Colombia
(Mariano Aguirre Ernst – Chatham House) The second round of Colombia’s presidential election will be held on 21 June, revealing a country deeply divided between two candidates with entirely different political visions. Iván Cepeda, leader of the left-wing coalition Pacto Histórico, is the government-backed candidate endorsed by current president Gustavo Petro. He aims to combat the economic elites and political forces that have dominated Colombia for over a century. To do so, he wants to reform the state and the tax system, reduce inequality through social agreements and increased access to new technologies, protect nature, and strengthen peace and multilateralism. His opponent, Abelardo de la Espriella, is a businessman and lawyer with no political experience who is endorsed by US President Donald Trump – and currently leading the polls. Nicknamed ‘El Tigre’ (The Tiger) for his aggressive approach, he blends the characteristics of Donald Trump, Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. De la Espriella presents himself as a staunch opponent of communism and advocates a tough stance against the authoritarianism of the left, organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking and illicit economies. – Will Colombia elect a far-right president? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Culture and Education
(UN News) UN cultural agency UNESCO has launched a global consultation process to inform its Draft Guidance on Fair Compensation for News, particularly as online platforms and artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly rely on journalistic content. The initiative comes “at a time when securing the sustainability of news media is more urgent than ever to protect the future of journalism and safeguard information integrity,” the agency said. The text under consultation outlines disruptions to the media landscape, including decreased funding for public-interest journalism, the contraction or closure of local and community news organisations, and other challenges that indicate “a fundamental and ongoing change in the structure of the information economy.” – UNESCO launches consultation on fair payment for news in the digital age | UN News
Defence issues
(Tom Kington – Defense News) Italy has confirmed it will not fund the purchase of U.S. weapons due to be delivered to Ukraine, the latest sign that Rome is seeking to place limits on its defense spending. Addressing the Italian parliament this week, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto said Italy had decided against backing the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) scheme, under which nations agree to fund the purchase of U.S. arms which are then transferred to Ukraine. – Italy rejects aid scheme that buys US weapons for Ukraine’s defense
(Leilani Chavez – Defense News) Japan plans to rapidly deploy autonomous interceptor drones to complement emerging standoff-strike capabilities, as reports surfaced that Tomahawk missile orders could face delays after U.S. stockpiles come under strain following the Iran war. State procurement agency Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency has released notices for a demonstration schedule next month with the goal of fast-tracking acquisitions and expediting mass production and deployment. – Japan joins the global craze to field interceptor drones
Europe
(Tom Keatinge and Kinga Redlowskac – RUSI) Crypto is no longer a peripheral feature of sanctions evasion. Nor is it a self-contained world of wallets, tokens and exchanges that can be addressed separately from the wider architecture of illicit finance. For Russia, Iran and other sanctioned actors, crypto-assets are increasingly embedded in broader systems of procurement, payment, settlement and value transfer. They are used alongside the traditional suite of tools favoured by sanctions evaders, including shell companies, trade-based evasion, third-country intermediaries, money service businesses and professional enablers. The EU has already begun to recognise this. Recent Russia sanctions packages have included measures targeting crypto-assets, crypto-service providers and Russia-linked instruments such as A7A5. And recent proposals for a 21st Russia sanctions package suggest that this trajectory is continuing, with the European Commission signalling further action against crypto platforms and, for the first time, the possibility of a full third-country ban for crypto-asset services linked to Russia’s circumvention activity. But the direction of travel, while welcome, does not remove the need for a more operationally focused strategy. But the challenge is moving faster than the policy response. Russia’s networks adapt quickly, exploit gaps between jurisdictions, and combine traditional and digital finance in ways that are difficult to capture through entity-by-entity designation alone. The next phase of the EU response should therefore be built around a simple proposition: crypto-enabled sanctions circumvention is an infrastructure challenge. The task is not merely to identify which sanctioned actor used which wallet. It is to understand, target and disrupt the infrastructure that allows sanctioned actors to turn crypto into usable financial power. Against this background, in early June, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a roundtable discussion of EU and UK policymakers and crypto experts at RUSI Europe in Brussels to consider what steps the EU could take next and what lessons can be learned from recent crypto sanctions actions by the UK. – Enhancing the EU Response to Crypto-Enabled Sanctions Circumvention | Royal United Services Institute
(Tom Keatinge, Kinga Redlowska and Cathy Haenlein – RUSI) The EU is moving towards a new sanctions regime targeting criminal networks, reportedly focusing on migrant smuggling. In the main, restrictive measures have been used by the EU primarily as instruments of foreign policy, national security and economic statecraft. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced the EU and its partners to become far more ambitious in the design, implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Now, the bloc is turning that ambition towards serious organised crime. The sanctions community in the EU is relatively young, forged in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, but ensuring the effectiveness of criminal network sanctions requires different skills and strategy. Put simply, sanctions against criminal networks are not merely Russia sanctions with different names on the list. They require a different logic, an adapted institutional model and a more nuanced assessment of impact. If the EU wants the proposed regime to matter, it must avoid merely creating a symbolic tool that allows policymakers to announce action without changing the operating environment for criminal actors and the threats they pose to member states. This risk is real. Sanctions can be politically attractive. They are visible, flexible and often quicker to deploy than prosecutions or asset recovery proceedings. They allow governments to signal resolve in response to emerging threats. But sanctions are not automatically effective. If poorly designed, they can become performative and dismissed as mere attempts to look tough, without achieving the promised impact. This is the core challenge that emerged from a recent workshop hosted by the Centre for Finance and Security in The Hague, that gathered 50 representatives from law enforcement, sanctions policymaking, and the private sector from across the EU. The short answer, for those involved, is that for the EU’s planned criminal network sanctions to succeed, they must meet a set of clear criteria. – How Can the EU’s Criminal Network Sanctions Succeed? | Royal United Services Institute
Europe – Strait of Hormuz
(Chris Aylett, Zissis Marmarelis – Chatham House) European governments, most of which rely on oil and gas imports to fuel their economies, have been nervously watching prices climb and storage levels fall in the weeks since the US-Israeli attack on Iran triggered the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. They could be forgiven for being relieved by this week’s news of a US-Iran framework agreement that promises to enable ships to transit the Strait, through which approximately one-fifth of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) flowed before the war. This would be premature, however. Even in the event of a lasting deal, it will take months for shipping flows to fully resume. Logistically, it will take time to reschedule routes efficiently as ships struggle to transit the strait and supply chains are disrupted. Crucially, insurance and shipping firms must be convinced of safe passage in the long term, which remains uncertain. More importantly, the war has reconfigured the global LNG market, on which Europe increasingly depends, in ways that are unfavourable to its energy security. This reconfiguration will continue to weigh on Europe, irrespective of any deal. – Even Hormuz reopening will not resolve Europe’s key energy vulnerability | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Gaza
(UN News) After another deadly night of clashes in Lebanon, aid agencies issued a new alert for Gaza, where 265 Palestinian children have been killed since a ceasefire was announced in October 2025. “During a period supposedly defined by restraint and protection, a child has been killed, on average, every single day for more than eight months,” said UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) spokesperson James Elder. “That is an absurd and devastating figure.” – Gaza: Sneeze and you might get shot, warns UNICEF in alert on child killings | UN News
G7
(Creon Butler – Chatham House) French President Emmanuel Macron appears to have had two goals for France’s Evian G7 summit which concluded on 17 June. First, to facilitate a constructive dialogue between President Donald Trump and the G7’s other members (or ‘G6’) on a limited number of issues. And second, to strengthen cooperation between the G7 as a whole and leading emerging economies. In the event, he achieved both these goals. In contrast to last year’s Kananaskis Summit, Trump did not leave early. There were no public spats of the kind that marred the 2018 Canadian G7 summit. And the guest countries attending – Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya and the Republic of Korea – took part in at least half the sessions, explicitly endorsing some of the policy statements. But Evian also shows the limits of what can be achieved at the G7 with President Trump in the US chair. A new format is urgently needed to address pressing global challenges. – Macron’s Evian summit shows the limits Trump places on the G7 | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Israel – Hezbollah – Lebanon
(UN News) The United Nations has welcomed reports of a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah on Friday while warning that civilians on the ground are still fleeing amid ongoing insecurity. UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told journalists at the noon briefing in New York that the UN was “aware of reports indicating that Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to a ceasefire” and welcomed the development while renewing calls on all parties “to cease hostilities, respect existing ceasefire arrangements and pursue dialogue as the only viable path to long-term security and stability”. The continued fighting between Israeli forces operating inside southern Lebanon and Hezbollah has tested the provisional agreement signed by Washington and Tehran this week, which includes the demand for a ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. Israel has indicated it is not bound by the deal, and neither Israel nor Hezbollah have publicly confirmed the renewed ceasefire commitment, according to reports. Diplomats reported that talks to advance the provisional deal between the US and Iran in Switzerland had been postponed due to Israeli strikes on Lebanon Friday. – UN welcomes fresh Lebanon ceasefire reports as rights experts urge Iran accountability | UN News
Migrants and Refugees
(UN News) The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has called on the international community to strengthen support for the nearly 42 million people worldwide who have fled their home countries to escape conflict, violence or persecution. Barham Salih highlighted the contributions refugees make to their host communities as workers, students, neighbours, artists, athletes, entrepreneurs and leaders. “Given the opportunity, they rebuild their lives and help strengthen the societies around them,” he said ahead of World Refugee Day, observed annually on 20 June. – World Refugee Day: UN calls for renewed commitment and solidarity | UN News
Russia
(Juliana Suess – RUSI) In late May, four Russian military satellites adjusted their position to match the orbital plane of the commercial radar reconnaissance satellite ICEYE-X36. The Russian satellites were declared to be for military purposes and launched in April 2026, with their exact capabilities unknown. The seemingly targeted ICEYE satellite is not just any commercial radar satellite – it is the ‘People’s Satellite’, a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite from the Finnish company ICEYE whose data services were purchased through Ukrainian fundraising in 2022. An orbital plane matching manoeuvre is costly and the positioning of four satellites at once seems highly intentional. The question is: why would Russia perform such a manoeuvre and what are the possible motives? – Checkmate? Russian Orbital Manoeuvring Threatens Ukraine’s Space Capability | Royal United Services Institute
Russia – Ukraine
(The Soufan Center) On Thursday, Ukraine launched what may have been its largest drone attack on Russia since the beginning of the full-scale war between the two countries, striking a major oil refinery in Moscow for the second time in a week, causing massive disruptions. The strikes have disrupted the Russia’s years-long attempts to insulate citizens in major cities from the realities of this war, while also straining Russia’s already-vulnerable gasoline market and possibly compounding the country’s broader wartime economic strains. Russia is likely to respond by intensifying its own campaign against Ukrainian cities and air defenses, which will be bolstered by its ability to launch larger and more complex barrages of strikes. If Ukraine can continue imposing costs on Russia while securing the air defenses and diplomatic backing it needs from Western allies, this moment could strengthen Ukraine’s leverage on the battlefield and in future negotiations with Russia. – Ukraine’s Drone Campaign Puts New Pressure on Moscow – The Soufan Center
UK
(Olivia O’Sullivan – Chatham House) After securing a strong victory in the Makerfield by-election, Andy Burnham has returned as a Labour MP and looks set to mount a leadership challenge against UK prime minister Keir Starmer. While there is still a possibility Starmer holds on, it seems likely that the UK will have a new leader before long. Much of the debate around how Burnham, or other potential challengers, may differ from Starmer has focused on their approach to pressing domestic issues, especially the cost of living and growth, public services and immigration. Future relations with the EU have made the occasional appearance. These issues are crucial. But Starmer’s time as prime minister has been largely consumed by foreign affairs. Any potential new prime minister will face a relentless deluge of international issues and challenges. – Any UK prime minister faces deep foreign policy challenges – whether Starmer, Burnham or another | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Europe – Russia
(John R. Deni – Defense News) Although some of the recently announced changes to U.S. troops levels in Europe have been signaled for a year or more, they have nonetheless unnerved America’s allies and potentially emboldened Moscow. American troops have been in Europe for decades not merely to underwrite NATO treaty commitments but more specifically to safeguard the country’s most important trading and investment relationship in the world. Cutting U.S. troops in Europe places transatlantic trade and investment ties in jeopardy, but additionally, the decision represents a potential missed opportunity – Washington risks giving away something for nothing. Russia wants U.S. troop reductions in Europe, and it’s not too late for the United States to get something in return from Moscow. – Troop cuts in Europe: Giving away something for nothing
US – Iran
(Burcu Ozcelik – Chatham House) More than three months after the 28 February opening of the US-Israel war with Iran, the reported US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding does not end the conflict so much as move it into a new phase. It is less a peace agreement than an agreement to negotiate one, with no clarity on the consequences of failure. If reported versions of the text of the deal are to be believed, it resolves almost none of the nuclear, ballistic missile, proxy network or regional security questions that made direct military confrontation possible in the first place. Instead, nearly every contentious issue has been deferred into a sixty-day negotiating window that can, and likely will, be extended. It creates a politically convenient holding pattern – one that could stretch into the US midterm election cycle, when President Trump’s position on Iran may shift yet again. If David Fromkin famously described the First World War settlement as ‘a peace to end all peace’, this agreement risks becoming something different: the peace that was not one. The greatest danger is therefore not renewed total war, although that remains possible. It is something more insidious: a state of permanent diplomatic incompletion. The memorandum rests on four assumptions that will determine whether it becomes a durable settlement or a mechanism for postponing the next major confrontation. – The Peace That Was Not One; The US-Iran Memorandum Risks Permanent Crisis | Royal United Services Institute
(Marc Weller – Chatham House) Making peace is more difficult than starting wars. President Donald Trump has found this to be painfully true over the past months. Now that a ceasefire arrangement, or memorandum of understanding (MoU), has been made public, it is possible to measure what has been agreed against the standards of international law and practice. The 14-point document accommodates virtually the full catalogue of Iranian demands, which would have seemed entirely unrealistic when made during the active conflict. The US is losing its key pressure points, whether economic or military. And Iran’s nuclear obligations are yet to be determined. Other war aims, like stopping Iranian support for proxy forces, do not feature in the instrument. But is this a legally binding agreement at all? An MoU can be a political or a legal undertaking. But a formal treaty would require advice and consent from the US Senate. In its opening sentence, the MoU confirms that the US and Iran ‘have jointly agreed,’ which might suggest an informal legal agreement – one which rests on ‘good faith’. This is probably as far as the sides could go to avoid giving the impression of a formal treaty, while indicating their intention to comply. The sides commit to negotiating a ‘final deal’ – not exactly a technical legal term for a comprehensive peace settlement – within a maximum of 60 days. The ‘final deal’ is to be endorsed by a ‘binding’ resolution of the UN Security Council. This would compensate for the ambiguous legal nature of any final settlement by confirming that its legally binding character will ultimately emanate from the UN Charter. But the Trump administration and Iran have shown contempt for the UN Charter: The US attacked Iran without permissible cause and assassinated much of its leadership; Iran attacked its neighbours – non belligerents – and closed the Strait of Hormuz. It has also massacred thousands of its own citizens. How seriously can an agreement between such parties be taken? And what does the MoU tell us about the state of international law? – The US–Iran memorandum of understanding nods to international law. Can that be taken seriously? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Max Boot – Council on Foreign Relations) With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Wednesday, the Iran war is over, at least for now. The full ramifications are not yet obvious. We do not know, for example, what restrictions on its nuclear program, if any, Iran will ultimately agree on as part of the follow-on negotiations—though the economic windfall President Donald Trump is offering Tehran up front greatly lessens the Islamic Republic’s incentive to compromise. But one thing can already be said with confidence: The war was not worth the high price paid for it. There is, first, the human cost. The U.S. lost thirteen troops in the conflict, while Iran lost over 3,375 people, including 170 killed in what was likely a Tomahawk missile strike on a girls’ school. Twenty-six people who were also killed in Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel, and dozens more in various Gulf states. At least two thousand people have been killed in Lebanon where Israel has mounted a major offensive in response to Hezbollah attacks. Then there is the economic cost. Moody’s Analytics estimates that the war has cost U.S. consumers and taxpayers about $132 billion so far and counting. The largest share of that came through the price at the pump. Gasoline prices peaked at an average of $4.56 a gallon before dropping once it appeared that the two sides might come to an agreement. Fertilizer prices also climbed about 47 percent during the war, indirectly contributing to rising food costs. Persian Gulf countries and the Global South were hit even harder than the United States. As a result of the war, the World Bank downgraded its global forecast for economic growth this year to 2.5 percent—the lowest level since the Covid-19 pandemic. – Was It Worth It? The True Cost of Trump’s Iran War | Council on Foreign Relations
(Lester Munson – ASPI The Strategist) The early reviews from fellow Republicans of President Donald Trump’s leaked, 14-point memorandum of understanding with Iran are very grim. ‘A disastrous mistake,’ says Senator Ted Cruz, from Texas. ‘This is the worst foreign policy blunder in decades,’ says Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana. ‘Much bigger than a mistake … [it will] essentially be a lifeline to the Iranian regime,’ says former vice president Mike Pence. The memorandum of understanding, signed on 17 June, appears to give Iran substantial financial benefits in exchange for vague promises about halting its nuclear weapons program and opening the Strait of Hormuz. A US$300 billion fund for Iran’s reconstruction is particularly notable, as that is twice that amount that Iran received after president Barack Obama’s 2015 Iran deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was widely panned by Republicans as far too generous to Iran. – Trump’s Iran deal: Republican frustration, Democratic criticism | The Strategist
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