Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; Center for Strategic & International Studies; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; German Marshall Fund of the United States; Royal United Services Institute; The Jamestown Foundation; The Soufan Center
Artificial Intelligence
(Gordon M. Goldstein – Council on Foreign Relations) In the rapidly evolving age of artificial intelligence (AI), new milestones occur at a dizzying pace as the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran vividly illustrates. The war in the Persian Gulf reflects the technology’s deepest integration yet into multifaceted domains of warfighting, including intelligence analysis, target identification, battle simulations, covert reconnaissance, and exotic forms of war disinformation—all executed with astounding speed. Admiral Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, recently touted AI’s influence on the war in a video update. “These systems help us sift through vast amounts of data,” he said. “Advanced AI tools can turn processes that used to take hours and sometimes even days into seconds.”. These developments are indeed impressive, but they are simply data points in a larger transformative narrative that has been accelerating since at least 2023. The world’s leading AI companies are increasingly becoming both architects and instruments of global security in the twenty-first century, rivaling the influence of nation-states. The security environment they are shaping is characterized by a fundamental dynamic: AI companies are developing and unleashing new technologies that can evade human control, a mutating crisis that industry leaders and AI experts have been remarkably transparent in disclosing. The crisis of control has two dimensions. The first relates to what might be called AI proliferation, the growing capacity for malevolent individuals and groups to potentially use emerging technology to design and deploy a terrifying new generation of chemical weapons, synthetic pathogens, and autonomous cyber weapons that can breach and sabotage the world’s critical infrastructure. The second is equally ominous. AI companies have honestly reported multiple instances when their models engage in elaborate acts of deception and manipulation, and attempt to go rogue. The world is watching the development of a compounding, consistent, and treacherous problem. Urgent warnings over several years have failed to generate viable solutions to address a metastasizing threat. In the absence of government or societal action, AI companies—the messengers of risk—may have to also be the gamekeepers of this new technology. – AI Is Facing a Crisis of Control—and the Industry Knows It | Council on Foreign Relations
China
On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most. How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? – What the Iran War Means for China’s Energy Security | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Democratic Republic of the Congo/US
(Chatham House) As a key mediator in the ongoing conflict in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States has brokered peace agreements backed by security guarantees and by the investment potential of the country’s vast mineral wealth. However, critics warn this ‘minerals for peace’ approach risks overlooking unresolved issues – from the protection of minority rights to the limited role of the African Union, and fragile state-society relations in the DRC. In this episode, Christian-Géraud Neema and Joshua Walker join the Africa Programme’s Romane Dideberg and Lisa Musumba to discuss how the short and long-term implications of the DRC’s pivot to the US are affecting its strategic autonomy, mining sovereignty, and what it means for President Tshisekedi’s political options. – Africa Aware: Can minerals buy peace in the DRC? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Hungary
(Marton Gellert – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Hungary’s parliamentary election on April 12 could mark a turning point in the country’s relationship with Brussels and Kyiv. A victory for opposition leader Péter Magyar and his Tisza party would likely signal a departure from the confrontational foreign policy pursued by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, even if some challenges and political limitations are clear. Magyar has carefully calibrated his campaign rhetoric to avoid alienating voters wary of foreign influence, but his leadership could gradually move Budapest toward a more cooperative stance with Western partners on most issues. – A New Tone in Hungary? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Iran
(The Soufan Center) Intelligence assessments predict that the current regime in Iran will remain intact, even if in a significantly weaker state, while the most hardline elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will rule as a rump government in Tehran. There are a number of factors that could increase the chances of an insurgency developing in Iran once the conflict comes to a halt. A variable that would increase the likelihood of a lingering insurgency in Iran after the current conflict ebbs would be the introduction of U.S. ground troops in an offensive directed at the regime. The fallout from a failed state in Iran, especially one still controlled by a hardline and battle-tested IRGC core, would reverberate for decades. – After the Guns Fall Silent, a Failed State in Iran Could Breed an Insurgency – The Soufan Center
Lapis Lazuli Corridor
(Nargiza Umarova – The Jamestown Foundation) Given the military escalation in the Middle East and the intensifying conflict with Islamabad, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor remains a viable alternative for Afghanistan to access global markets via Central Asia and the Caucasus. Extending the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan will enable Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian countries to participate in transit traffic between Southeast Asia and Europe, thereby strengthening their geopolitical significance. A land transport corridor from India to Europe via Afghanistan, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus could potentially diminish the transit role of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on north–south routes. – Turkic States Work to Develop Lapis Lazuli Corridor – Jamestown
Syria
(Chatham House) Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Chatham House on 31 March for a conversation with Director and Chief Executive Bronwen Maddox – his first public event in the United Kingdom. The two discussed Syria’s reconstruction, its foreign policy, and its position on the Iran war, before the president took questions from the audience. Asked by Maddox about his government’s position on Iran and the war with the US and Israel, President al-Sharaa said that: ‘There is no doubt that Iran… was at the forefront of the conflict led by the [former] regime against the Syrian people. However, after we reached Damascus, we did not have an issue with Iran in Tehran; rather, our problem was with Iran in Damascus, because it was occupying Syrian villages and towns, displacing people, and so on.’ – Syrian President al-Sharaa on Iran war: ‘Syria will remain outside this conflict’ | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Technologies
(Lindsay Gorman, Alexandra Pugh – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Technology took center stage this month in geopolitics within and beyond the transatlantic context. Who owns, controls, exports, and derives strategic and economic value from artificial intelligence (AI) chips and counter-drone technology is increasingly defining corporate and nation state power. Will Europe move quickly enough to seize a piece of this pie? – TransatlanTech Insider—March 2026 Edition | German Marshall Fund of the United States
UK
(Chatham House) Chatham House Director Bronwen Maddox discusses energy with Sir Dieter Helm, Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Oxford, who has been advising governments and writing on energy, water and the environment for decades. They examine how energy policies of different governments over decades led to the UK’s energy costs being so high. And what the government should do if it wants to guarantee security of supply – and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Are those concerned about climate change right to push for net zero? Are current policies driving industry from the UK? Should there be more nuclear power stations, or more drilling in the North Sea? – Why are UK energy costs so high? And how to bring them down. Independent Thinking Podcast | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Ukraine/Saudi Arabia
(Yuri Lapaiev – The Jamestown Foundation) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a March 27 defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, highlighting Ukraine’s growing role as a provider of military expertise, technology, and joint production capabilities shaped by real-world combat experience. Conflict in the Middle East is generating increased interest in Ukraine’s military experience from Gulf countries. In March, Kyiv sent more than 200 of its air defense experts as advisors to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Ukraine is evolving from simply a military aid recipient to an exporter of military technology and strategy expertise, which Kyiv leverages to strengthen political and defense–diplomatic partnerships. – Ukraine–Saudi Arabia Defense Agreement Highlights Demand for Battle-Tested Expertise – Jamestown
UN/Cyberspace
(James A. Lewis – Royal United Services Institute) The conclusion of the UN’s Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) – the process responsible for devising ‘rules of the road’ for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace – finished its work in July 2025, marking the end of a cycle of negotiations on cybersecurity begun 21 years ago. What will take its place remains uncertain and raises issues regarding the future of norms and rules for states in cyberspace. The Final Report of the OEWG broke little new ground because states did not wish to go beyond the ideas discussed in six earlier Groups of Government Experts (GGE) and two OEWGs. This means the substantive agreements in the 2015 GGE – when states agreed on 11 norms – are the high-water mark of UN cyber negotiations. But it has been over a decade since that agreement and further progress requires states must now transition from the OEWG to a new ‘Permanent Mechanism.’ – UN Norms: Tackling the Rise of Cyber Capabilities | Royal United Services Institute
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Hayder Al-Shakeri – Chatham House) Iraq has been increasingly dragged into the US and Israel’s war with Iran, with both sides attacking each other on its territory. Civilians have suffered as rockets and drones fall near residential buildings in cities including Baghdad and Erbil. The war has also exposed the fragility of Iraq’s economy and society. Most Iraqis are facing this latest conflict with limited financial resources and minimal savings, and with low confidence in the state to protect them from the war’s impact. For many households, the war has caused anxiety over whether they will keep receiving their salaries or be able to access food and medicine. There are also concerns over whether electricity supplies will continue as temperatures rise ahead of summer. Suspected Iranian attacks on two tankers in Iraqi waters near the port town of Al Fao in early March have also highlighted Iraq’s heavy dependence on maritime trade. The disruption to Gulf shipping is already constraining imports and leaving Iraq-bound cargo stranded or delayed. For a country that moves more than 90 per cent of its trade by sea, prolonged disruption in the Gulf risks hitting Iraq’s economy and depriving it of crucial oil exports that finance the majority of the state’s budget. – Iraqi civilians are paying the price of the Iran war | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Caitlin Welsh – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The energy and fertilizer market disruptions resulting from the Iran war are threatening agriculture markets and food prices around the world. How could these market shocks affect food systems? What evidence are we seeing to date, and what are the policy solutions for farmers and consumers—in the United States and worldwide? – Iran, Fertilizer, and Food Security: Risks, Impacts, and Policy Responses
(Will Merrow, Mariel Ferragamo, Diana Roy – Council on Foreign Relations) Kharg Island, a small coral island in the northern Persian Gulf responsible for handling approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports, has become a flash point in the United States and Israel’s widening conflict in Iran. The United States carried out a large bombing raid of the island on March 13, hitting more than ninety Iranian military targets, including missile and naval mine storage facilities. U.S. President Donald Trump said on social media that the attack “obliterated” every military target on the island but he chose not to “wipe out” oil infrastructure there. However, he warned he would “immediately reconsider” that decision if Iran continues to disrupt global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—the choke point for nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supply. Trump has indicated that his administration is considering seizing the island, telling the Financial Times on March 29 that “Maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don’t. We have a lot of options.” While the United States has been ramping up its military presence in the Middle East, experts say an attack or invasion of Kharg Island could further drive up global oil prices by curbing Iran’s oil exports, provoke retaliation, and endanger the lives of U.S. military personnel who could be deployed to the island. – Kharg Island: Iran’s Oil Lifeline and a Tempting U.S. Target | Council on Foreign Relations
(Daniel B. Shapiro and Cleary Waldo – Atlantic Council) US and Israeli forces have inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military and leadership through coordinated strikes, but some US and Israeli strategic priorities now diverge. Israel favors more maximalist outcomes, such as Iranian regime collapse, while the US is more constrained by global economic risks and domestic politics. Trump faces three main options for what to do next: pursue a negotiated off-ramp, adopt an ongoing attrition strategy, or “escalate to de-escalate” militarily. – Trump’s path forward on Iran will determine US-Israeli war alignment – Atlantic Council
