Canada – Pacific
(Grant Wyeth – Lowy The Interpreter) Canada’s national motto is A Mari usque ad Mare (from sea to sea). Recently, in reciting the motto, politicians have added a third sea, the Arctic. Yet, for most of Canada’s existence as a modern state, the Atlantic – with its central actors of Washington, London and Paris – has dominated Ottawa’s foreign policy thinking. Now the prevailing winds have seen Prime Minister Mark Carney plot a course towards the Pacific. When Carney arrived in Australia this week he did so on a flight from India, where he sought a complete reset of the relationship. He next goes to Japan, having earlier this year made a much-heralded trip to China. During his Lowy Institute address on Wednesday, Carney stated his Australian visit aimed to forge a “critical mineral alliance” as a sovereign asset – a priority he will carry onwards in the region. Carney argued that “true sovereignty” required diversification and partnerships that limited dependence on hegemons to “ensure that integration is never the source of our subordination.” – Mark Carney’s Pacific pivot | Lowy Institute
China – Europe
(Steven Honig – Council on Foreign Relations) In January 2026, several European leaders visited China to deepen ties with the world’s second-largest economy, China and the European Union began to resolve long-standing electric vehicle disputes, the European Commission proposed a new Cybersecurity Act to crack down on Chinese technology firms, and the European Parliament commissioned a report on Chinese transnational repression – China in Europe: January 2026 | Council on Foreign Relations
France – Europe
(Jonathan Rosenstein and Emily Cheesman – Atlantic Council) President Emmanuel Macron has announced France’s most significant nuclear policy change in decades, moving beyond its traditional doctrine of sufficiency and strictly national defense toward a broader European role. Macron’s plan expands France’s nuclear arsenal, ends public disclosure of total stockpile numbers, permits temporary forward-basing of nuclear forces in allied European states, and deepens deterrence cooperation with partners. The plan is also notable for what it doesn’t do—it doesn’t change France’s position on tactical nuclear weapons—and for how long it might last, given the French presidential election next year. – What Macron’s changes to French nuclear policy mean for European security – Atlantic Council
Gaza
(Jaser AbuMousa – Middle East Institute) Disarmament is necessary in Gaza. It is the only way to realize the goals articulated in the internationally endorsed 20-point plan laid out by President Donald Trump: a Gaza “redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza” and that “does not pose a threat to its neighbors.” But a policy approach that makes disarmament a prerequisite for action on governance, recovery, freedom of movement for Gazans, and any credible political horizon is structurally and strategically counterproductive. A more effective approach would treat disarmament as one track of an essential governing transition process, rather than as a stand-alone and ultimate achievement. The end goal should be a legitimate Palestinian governing order that delivers security based on the rule of law, restores viable life and livelihood conditions for Gazans, and sustains a political horizon that reconnects Gaza to a wider Palestinian future. Disarmament should be considered the security expression of that end — not a precondition demanded in a vacuum. This distinction is not semantic. Reframing the approach changes the incentives for armed actors, civilians, regional states, and international implementers. It also avoids a trap that has repeatedly undermined post-conflict stabilization efforts: When people experience the future as conditional, humiliating, indeterminate, and indefinite, coercive power reemerges — whether as insurgency, criminal predation, or “local protection” economies. A classic maxim becomes relevant in a new way: While power corrupts, what corrupts even more is abject powerlessness — the corrosion produced by humiliation, blocked horizons, and the daily logic of survival. In Gaza, powerlessness does not yield passivity; it brings about shadow authority, weaponized patronage, and recruitment economies. A disarmament strategy that deepens powerlessness — by making daily life contingent on political compliance with no credible destination — will not de-weaponize Gaza. It will merely change who holds the weapons. – Disarmament as a means, not an end: A practical strategy for Gaza’s governing transition – Middle East Institute
Iran and beyond
(Kazimier Lim – Lowy The Interpreter) The Iranian drones and missiles that struck airports in Dubai, Doha, and across the Gulf in the opening days of Iran’s retaliation against American and Israeli strikes were notable for hitting the passenger terminals, not the runways. Conventional air-denial doctrine would suggest Iran do the opposite. Crater the tarmac and you prevent the military conversion of civilian airstrips into ad hoc airbases, a real concern given that American forces stationed across the region were also subject to attacks. Yet when Iran launched its response to Operation Epic Fury and the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it targeted the passenger concourses. Terminal 3 at Dubai International was hit by a drone and evacuated. Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International was struck too, killing one person and injuring several others. Kuwait International was also hit, while thick smoke rose over the southern skyline of Doha. – Iran’s threat to airline travel: The Gulf’s skies are now a chokepoint too | Lowy Institute
(Mariel Ferragamo, Jonathan Masters, Will Merrow – Council on Foreign Relations) Many foreign policy experts warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Middle East and nearby regions. A first-order concern is that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would pose a major, perhaps existential, threat to Israel—a worry that drove Israel to launch a full-scale attack on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities in June 2025 and another larger, joint attack with the United States in February 2026. Other experts say Iran would be assuring its own demise if it were to launch a nuclear strike on Israel, a close U.S. defense partner and possessor of its own nuclear weapons arsenal, which is undeclared. Either way, there would be a dangerous potential for miscalculation that could result in a nuclear exchange, analysts say. An added concern is that Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon could spur other regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, to pursue their own program. International scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs intensified in 2018 after the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal—known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—and again in late 2024, following direct military strikes between Iran and Israel, as well as the reelection of Donald Trump. In Trump’s second term, Washington resumed talks with Tehran for the first time since pulling out of the JCPOA. However, in June 2025, after the UN nuclear watchdog declared Iran in violation of its nuclear nonproliferation agreements, the United States bombed Iran’s major nuclear facilities. Despite ongoing negotiations in early 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale offensive against Iran in February with a stated aim of destroying its nuclear and missile capabilities. Although there has reportedly been some damage to one Iranian nuclear site, there is no confirmed evidence of major damage to the country’s overall nuclear facilities. Joint U.S.-Israeli strikes also killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran has retaliated by targeting Israel and U.S. military sites across the region, as well as several other Gulf countries, adding to concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. – What Are Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities? | Council on Foreign Relations
Kazakhstan – Pakistan
(Syed Fazl-e-Haider – The Jamestown Foundation) Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s February 3 state visit to Pakistan—the first by a Kazakh head of state in 23 years—elevated bilateral relations to a strategic partnership and produced 37 cooperation agreements. For Kazakhstan, access to Pakistan’s Arabian Sea ports offers a southern alternative to supply chains disrupted by Russia’s war against Ukraine, reducing dependence on northern transit routes. The partnership reflects Kazakhstan’s broader economic and trade recalibration and diversification over the last few years, integrating southern corridors alongside existing northern and eastern routes to expand access to South and Southeast Asian markets. – Tokayev’s Visit to Islamabad Elevates Kazakhstan–Pakistan Relations – Jamestown
North Korea
(Khang Vu – Lowy The Interpreter) Chairman Kim Jong-un is determined to strengthen North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Years of sanctions, international pressure and on-and-off negotiations have not dented North Korea’s confidence in its ability to set the terms and conditions of engagement with the United States and South Korea. At a Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang last month, Kim laid bare his conditions of dialogue with the United States. Unless Washington recognises Pyongyang as a nuclear state, he said, and drops the hostile policies towards North Korea, he would be prepared for “eternal confrontation”. Kim has also continued to shun South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. He dismissed past South Korean engagement bids as efforts to subvert the North Korean regime through the spread of South Korean culture. So the prospect of resuming dialogue seems distant. – Kim Jong-un is in no rush to talk | Lowy Institute
Poland
(Jakub Bornio – The Jamestown Foundation) Polish President Karol Nawrocki has become the first senior Polish official to openly support initiating work on the development of Polish nuclear capabilities. His statement on this issue reflects an ongoing debate within Polish analytical and expert circles. Some representatives of Polish political circles have shifted their ambitions from merely joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear sharing program to initiating work on Poland’s own nuclear capabilities. This shift is related to the perceived erosion of the international order and to the ambiguities, from Warsaw’s perspective, surrounding U.S. policy on allied security guarantees vis-à-vis Russia. – Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program – Jamestown
Southeast Asia
(Brendan Taylor – Lowy The Interpreter) Nuclear weapons are dominating headlines. US strikes against Iran. Allegations of Chinese nuclear testing. The expiry of New START, which until February was the last strategic arms control treaty between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. As nuclear danger rises, it is important not to miss the quieter restraints that still hold. One sits in Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), created by the 1995 Bangkok Treaty and in force since March 1997, has endured for almost three decades. In Australia, it draws little serious attention. Australia is not a party to the treaty but has benefitted from it and has a clear interest in Southeast Asia remaining free of nuclear weapons. The treaty will not determine what China and North Korea do with their arsenals, or whether America continues to run the risks required to shelter allies under its nuclear umbrella. – Southeast Asia’s nuclear weapons-free zone needs reinforcement | Lowy Institute
Taiwan
(William Leben – Lowy The Interpreter) There are no people for whom the impulses of both Washington and Beijing are more consequential than the Taiwanese. All the same, Taiwan and Taiwanese politics are more than a one-dimensional outgrowth of US–China competition. International media coverage of President Lai Ching-te’s travails in passing a big hike in Taiwan’s military spending has been extensive. Lai, of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has been frustrated by the Kuomintang-dominated (and more China-friendly) legislature. There have been major signs of progress in recent weeks, however, with the bill now moving through the relevant committee processes. Issues with defence spending are not Lai’s only headache. He has proven unable to secure appointments to Taiwan’s constitutional court. He is also subject to impeachment proceedings relating to his refusal to enact local government spending changes passed by the legislature last year, though these proceedings are unlikely to succeed. And he is unpopular. – Taiwan is still working itself out | Lowy Institute
