From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Balkans; China; Cyber International Crimes; Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia; Greenland-NATO-US; Iraq; Israel-Iran; Japan-Central Asia; UAE-Russia-Ukraine-US; Ukraine; Ukraine-Europe; US; US-China; US-Iran; Venezuela; World Economic Forum
Balkans
(Amanda Thorpe and Stuart Jones – Atlantic Council) The past year was a dynamic one for transatlantic relations, and the Western Balkans were no exception. In 2025, countries in the region continued to look to the United States, the European Union (EU), and each other for increased economic investment, expanded infrastructure connectivity, and greater regional stability. At the same time, Washington delivered several mixed signals about the scope and durability of its future engagement with Europe, while Brussels remained ambiguous about the timeline for EU accession for several Western Balkan countries. If the trends evident in 2025 persist into the year ahead, then Western Balkan countries may increasingly need to assume greater agency in shaping their own trajectories. What follows is an overview of key developments in the past year and the issues to watch in the year ahead in this important region. – 2026 will be a big year in the Western Balkans. Here’s what to watch. – Atlantic Council
China
(Matthew Johnson – The Jamestown Foundation) General Secretary Xi Jinping appears to have prevailed in the latest round of military purges in the Central Military Commission (CMC), but only by further dismantling the institutional safeguards that once stabilized elite politics—deepening, rather than resolving, long-term regime fragility. The removal of generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli marks the elimination of the last residual chain of military authority not fully subsumed under the “CMC chairman responsibility system,” meaning that military command now begins and ends with Xi personally. This consolidation does not alter near-term timelines on Taiwan, but it accelerates political drift in the People’s Republic of China toward a late Stalinist disequilibrium in which Xi’s personal control is maximized at the cost of orderly succession management, professional and expertise-based authority—exemplified by figures like Zhang Youxia—and tolerance for dissenting or corrective views within the leadership. – Late Stalinism in Beijing – Jamestown
Cyber International Crimes
(Chatham House) Many states now have laws that criminalize cyber activity such as online fraud and hacking. But cyber means can also be used to facilitate or commit the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. There is an urgent need to improve the prospects for prosecution of such crimes when committed or facilitated by cyber means, as harmful cyber operations such as the targeting of critical infrastructure are on the increase, while generative AI threatens to expand the opportunities and means for criminals to carry out such acts. Guidance is lacking for actors of all kinds – including states, technology companies, hacker groups and individuals – regarding the constraints imposed on their cyber activities by international criminal law and the possibilities of prosecution. This Chatham House paper follows the 2025 publication by the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of a policy paper on the subject. Our paper takes the discussion forward by examining the challenges and opportunities of investigating and prosecuting cyber-enabled international crimes in practice, and by proposing ways for states, the OTP, private companies and civil society to improve the prospects for successful future prosecutions. – Securing justice for cyber-enabled international crimes | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Georgia – Abkhazia – South Ossetia
(Nino Lezhava – The Jamestown Foundation) Venezuela is among a small group of states—alongside Syria, Russia, Nicaragua, and Nauru—that recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s territories occupied by Russia, as independent countries in 2009. Tbilisi has an opportunity to convince Venezuela to withdraw its recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions’ independence after Nicolas Maduro’s January 3 capture. Tbilisi also has an opportunity to change Syria’s position since Damascus has been free from former President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia, since December 2024. Venezuela and Syria, however, are not decisive international players regarding recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions. The People’s Republic of China’s ambiguous position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia poses a more serious challenge, particularly given that Beijing and Tbilisi maintain a strategic partnership. – Georgia Hopes to Reverse Venezuela’s Recognition of Occupied Territories – Jamestown
Greenland – NATO – US
(Stephen J. Hadley and Franklin D. Kramer – Atlantic Council) NATO is considering a major defense expansion in the Arctic; one proposal is an Arctic Sentry mission with a significantly expanded US presence in Greenland. Given the Trump administration’s concerns, the most viable option for the US, Denmark, and Greenland is a “shared responsibility and shared sovereignty” model for parts of Greenland. Drawing on precedents such as Diego Garcia, this approach could give the US the operational control needed for defense without undermining Danish or Greenlandic sovereignty. – Resolving the Greenland challenge through shared responsibility – Atlantic Council
Iraq
(The Soufan Center) Iraq is facing unprecedented challenges on its main frontiers, including from Damascus’s offensive to extend its writ throughout Syria and efforts by a weakened Iran to secure strategic depth in Iraq. With U.S. backing, Iraq has agreed to take thousands of Islamic State (IS) prisoners and their relatives from Syria to ensure the terrorist organization does not regain strength. The external challenges contributed to a decision announced by Iraq’s Shia leaders on Saturday to nominate Tehran-leaning partisan Nuri al-Maliki to return to the prime minister’s seat. Although Washington might acquiesce to Nouri al-Maliki’s return to power, the Trump team will continue to push Baghdad to exclude leaders of pro-Iranian militias from government and to demobilize their armed groups outright. – Domestic and Regional Challenges Intersect in Iraq – The Soufan Center
Israel – Iran
(Emirates Policy Center) The recent wave of protests in Iran has attracted significant attention in Israel. Many Israeli analysts believe the unrest has weakened the regime and brought it closer to collapse than at any previous point. While Israel supports the idea of potential US military action to aid the protests, it has advised the Trump administration to delay such measures. Israeli officials argue that strikes are unlikely to topple the regime and warn of possible Iranian retaliation, particularly given shortcomings in Israel’s air defense readiness. They believe that allowing the protests more time to expand before any intervention would be more effective. Although the frequency of Iranian protests has declined since mid-January, the potential for renewed unrest remains. As a result, Israel is likely to continue covert intelligence and cyber operations aimed at undermining the regime, while also providing political and media support to the protesters. Regardless of whether a US strike occurs, Israel will coordinate with the United States to maintain political pressure on the Iranian regime. This strategy includes increasing economic sanctions to force compliance with Israeli-US demands, which include restricting ballistic missile development, ending support for militias and regional proxies and dismantling Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. – Emirates Policy Center | Israeli Policy Toward Protests in Iran: Divergent Approaches and Possible Scenarios
Japan – Central Asia
(Vusal Guliyev – The Jamestown Foundation) Japan and the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Tokyo on December 20, 2025, announcing the CA+JAD Tokyo Initiative. The initiative is a new framework aimed at promoting Japanese industrial and logistical integration with Central Asia through official development assistance and technical cooperation for a more assertive geoeconomic partnership. Tokyo is actively seeking to establish its role in reshaping east–west connectivity through Central Asia through investments in infrastructure, resources, and digital systems. – Japan Deepens Cooperation with Central Asian States – Jamestown
UAE – Russia – Ukraine – US
(Ebtesam AlKetbi – Emirates Policy Center) In protracted wars, the choice of a negotiation venue is no longer a procedural detail, but an integral part of the conflict-management equation. Abu Dhabi’s hosting of Russian–Ukrainian–American talks reflects a shift in diplomacy from symbolic neutrality to a practical “negotiating environment.”. Negotiation is no longer a stage that follows a ceasefire, but an instrument that accompanies conflict at its peak, aimed at limiting escalation and miscalculation. Acceptance of the venue by opposing parties reflects the UAE’s role as an intermediary space that does not impose the political costs of alignment or concession. The value of mediation today is measured by procedural capability – keeping channels open – rather than moral rhetoric or producing immediate settlements. The UAE’s role illustrates a broader transformation in the international system, where capable middle powers step in to fill the vacuum left by the inability of major powers to provide stable negotiating frameworks. – Emirates Policy Center | Abu Dhabi as a Space for Negotiation, Not a Theater of Alignment
Ukraine
(Taras Kuzio – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia’s war against Ukraine has transformed Ukraine into the world’s leading innovator in unmanned warfare, expanding from aerial and naval drones to large-scale production and battlefield deployment of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Ukraine’s UGV ecosystem combines real combat experience, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-standard certification, and a growing private defense sector, positioning Ukrainian engineers at the forefront of future global military technology. UGVs now perform surveillance, logistics, fire support, and self-detonating attacks in lethal frontline “kill zones,” reducing Ukrainian casualties and reshaping tactics through coordinated, multi-domain robotic warfare. Ukrainian UGVs are increasingly replacing infantry in high-risk missions, providing sustained firepower, engineering support, and resilience against electronic warfare, terrain challenges, and prolonged deployments where human soldiers would face extreme danger. UGVs are an essential tool for logistics, medevac, and emergency response. They enable the delivery of supplies, the evacuation of wounded, mine clearance, and civilian rescue. – Ukraine Becomes World Leader in Unmanned Ground Vehicles – Jamestown
(Olivier Kraft and Marta Popyk – RUSI) This paper highlights the critical role of public–private partnerships and technology in addressing the growing threat of money mule schemes in Ukraine, which have significant implications for financial crime, tax revenue loss and national security. Drawing on the insights from the third meeting of the Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine, held in December 2025, the paper explores how money mule activity manifests in practice and how it is currently being addressed across the public and private sectors. – Leveraging Partnerships and Technology to Tackle Money Mules | Royal United Services Institute
Ukraine – Europe
(Oleksiy Honcharuk – Atlantic Council) Europe is rearming but at too slow of a pace, as countries encounter several structural challenges that hinder development. Ukraine offers what Europe lacks—speed. Kyiv has rapidly become a leader in unmanned technologies and other cutting-edge, battle-tested innovations. Combining Europe’s long-term capital with Ukraine’s high-speed innovation can help the continent achieve greater strategic autonomy and a military edge. – Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation – Atlantic Council
US
(Kaleah Haddock, Diana Roy – Council on Foreign Relations) Since returning to office in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has taken major steps to reshape immigration policy and enforcement in pursuit of his campaign promise to execute “the largest domestic deportation operation” in U.S. history. As part of this effort, his administration has carried out deportation flights, sometimes to third countries where migrants have no existing ties; ramped up nationwide immigration raids; and granted expanded or new powers to various federal, state, and local officials to enforce domestic immigration laws. However, the administration’s whole-of-government approach has raised concerns. In January 2026, the administration’s enforcement push reached a controversial new phase after federal agents fatally shot two U.S. citizens, Renee Good and Alex Pretti, in separate incidents in Minneapolis. The shootings triggered widespread protests and criticism from members of both political parties, leading some Republican lawmakers to call for an investigation into federal immigration enforcement tactics. In implementing his immigration agenda, some legal experts say Trump is pushing the limits of presidential power, including by invoking centuries-old statutes and expediting deportations, while immigrant rights activists warn that the administration’s aggressive tactics have eroded migrants’ due process protections. Growing criticism of the administration’s immigration policy comes after the July 2025 passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which allocates nearly $170 billion to enforcement over the next four years. – ICE and Deportations: How Trump Is Reshaping Immigration Enforcement | Council on Foreign Relations
US – China
(Bonny Lin and Brian Hart – CSIS) On January 23, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), recently renamed the Department of War, released the unclassified version of its long-awaited National Defense Strategy (NDS). In line with the broader National Security Strategy (NSS), which the Trump administration released in late 2025, the new NDS signals shifts in U.S. defense strategy and priorities compared to past administrations—including notable differences in how the document discusses the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nevertheless, the NDS continues to emphasize the importance of deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. – What Does the Trump Administration’s New National Defense Strategy Say About China?
(Matthew Ferren – Council on Foreign Relations) Against a steady drumbeat of ransomware attacks, data breaches, and sophisticated intrusions, President Donald Trump’s administration is preparing to release a new national cybersecurity strategy this month centered on offensive cyber operations. Senior officials have repeatedly emphasized hitting back at the hackers and nation-states who have compromised U.S. networks with seeming impunity. If early signals are any indication, the strategy will treat offense as the primary solution to the United States’ cybersecurity challenges. Meanwhile, the administration has weakened the foundations of U.S. cyber defenses. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has seen its budget reduced and staffing slashed, and the agency still lacks a Senate-confirmed director. Similar cuts have affected cyber defense offices across federal agencies, and the administration is rolling back cybersecurity requirements for critical infrastructure operators. This combination—more offense, less defense—reflects a seductive logic: why play defense when you can take the fight to the enemy? But against China, now the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. networks, an offense-first strategy is a dangerous miscalculation. Cyber operations cannot stop or even substantially diminish Beijing’s campaigns. Doubling down on offense while neglecting defense will leave the United States more vulnerable, not less. – The Trump Administration’s Cyber Strategy Fundamentally Misunderstands China’s Threat | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Iran
(Nate Swanson – Atlantic Council) “We’re watching Iran,” US President Donald Trump told reporters Thursday as he returned from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “We have a big flotilla going in that direction, and we’ll see what happens.” For the past week, a US carrier strike group led by the USS Abraham Lincoln has proceeded west from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf near Iran. Earlier this month, as anti-regime protests in Iran spread and reports of Iranian security forces killing demonstrators emerged, Trump pledged that the United States would “come to their rescue.” Is the arrival of US naval forces near Iran a prelude to a strike on the regime? For answers, we turned to Nate Swanson, who was the director for Iran at the National Security Council in the Biden White House and a member of the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team: – What Trump could do next in Iran – Atlantic Council
Venezuela
(Federico Varese – RUSI) What are the defining characteristics of Venezuelan drug trafficking and how will they change after the fall of Nicolás Maduro? Venezuela is not a cocaine-producing country, yet it has become one transit hub in global trafficking. Its role in the supply chain stems from geographical factors, institutional decay and the emergence of criminal organisations capable of controlling infrastructure and communities. Among these, the Tren de Aragua (TdA) exercises forms of criminal governance over territory; as a result, its involvement in drug trafficking is indirect, regulatory and opportunistic. The regime led by Maduro until 3 January, 2026, was not a centralised ‘narco-state’. Yet, it allowed fragmented institutional complicity that facilitated large-scale trafficking even in the absence of unified control by a single cartel. The fall of the dictator will affect neither cocaine production nor its transport, and corrupt deals continue unchanged. – Drugs Trafficking in Venezuela is an Ocean Away From the Capture of Maduro | Royal United Services Institute
(Jason Pack – RUSI) Is the Trump Administration’s intervention in Venezuela an exercise in full-scale regime change, partial regime decapitation, or merely a police action? What are the likely pitfalls of each approach? Is the security situation on the ground in Venezuela likely to deteriorate and which social or economic structures might form a locus of resistance? Neither President Trump nor Secretary Rubio appear to have concrete thoughts on an end game. Nonetheless, early signs indicate a mixed approach – partial decapitation of the old leadership, paradoxically leaving Maduro’s interior minister Diosdado Cabello in place – combined with a high degree of continuity of existing regime structures, with the primary economic changes limited to preferential access to oil assets for American firms. In line with this approach, President Trump’s press statements have thrown Venezuela’s internationally-acclaimed opposition figures under the bus, especially the Nobel Prize Laureate and Magnitsky Award winner Maria Corina Machado. Despite this, she is trying everything to court his favour, going even as far as giving her Nobel Laureate medal to Trump. – Libya’s Lessons for Venezuela: Reform the Economy Before It Is Too Late | Royal United Services Institute
World Economic Forum
(Josh Lipsky and Alisha Chhangani – Atlantic Council) Business and geopolitics collided at last week’s World Economic Forum in Davos, as leaders confronted how deeply markets, national security, and policy are now intertwined. US tariff policies forced a sober reassessment of global trade, while AI drew a mix of optimism and concern over risks, ethics, and regulation. Despite a US–Europe focus in Davos, other powers were active, too, with Canada’s prime minister warning that the rules-based order is rupturing. – Inside the biggest Davos debates (other than Greenland) – Atlantic Council
