From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Gaza; Russia; Russia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia-Georgia; Russia-Ukraine; Syria; US; US-China
Gaza
(Julie Norman – Chatham House) As the US administration declares the launch of Phase Two of the Gaza ceasefire, the reality on the ground tells a different story. More than 450 Gazans have been killed since the start of the ceasefire in October. Israel controls over half of the enclave, Hamas is still armed, and humanitarian conditions remain dire. Meanwhile, across the Israeli-occupied West Bank, de facto annexation continues with the expansion of settlements, and extremist settler violence has wreaked havoc on daily life. Across both territories, the urgent need for security is intertwined with the broader priority of determining a political vision for Palestine. Indeed, the key pillars of the ceasefire plan, as well as hopes for broader regional stability, will fail without a political vision and a credible pathway for Palestinian self-determination. – Phase Two of Gaza’s ceasefire will fail without a political vision for Palestine | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Russia
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia’s official absence from the World Economic Forum in Davos reflects its sharp economic, technological, and political decline under Russian President Vladimir Putin, leaving Moscow with a diminished role in shaping outcomes of its war against Ukraine. Putin’s prolonged war has pushed Russia toward recession, shrinking oil revenues, and eroding energy exports. Sanctions, investor distrust, and tightening information control are deepening structural weaknesses in Russia and undermining prospects for postwar economic recovery. Ukraine appears to be an attractive target for future investment. Russia remains sidelined, unable to halt its isolation or reenter global markets without fundamental political change. – Putin’s Irrelevance at Davos Forum is Irreversible – Jamestown
Russia – Abkhazia – South Ossetia – Georgia
(Giorgi Menabde – The Jamestown Foundation) During the 65th round of Geneva International Discussions in November 2025, Russia and the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again demanded that Georgia sign a “legally binding agreement on the non-use of force” with the breakaway regions. Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for Georgia to sign this document, even though Georgian leadership, including former President Mikheil Saakashvili, committed not to use force to resolve territorial issues in 2010. Tbilisi believes that signing the non-use of force agreement would amount to indirect recognition of the independence of the Russian-occupied regions. – Russia Seeks Georgia’s Concession on Breakaway Regions – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) After months of a slogging advance against the Ukrainian army and the seizure of small villages in the east without significant territorial gains, Russia has expanded its drone and rocket attacks against major Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv. Moscow is trying to break the will of the Ukrainian people, government, and international community by inflicting harm on politically sensitive cities. There is evidence that this strategy is backfiring, with Russian attacks on cities making Ukrainians even more willing to fight and convincing the European Union to provide more assistance. – Moscow Targeting Ukrainian Civilians to Break Kyiv – Jamestown
Syria
(The Soufan Center) Despite the announcement of a ceasefire between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish militia said that fighting continues near Raqqa, and that clashes are leading to an “extremely dangerous development,” which leaves prisons and detention centers vulnerable. While it is unclear how many individuals have escaped from al-Shaddadi prison, Damascus has vowed to find and arrest those individuals. The fighting over the past few weeks saw Syrian military forces, augmented by tribal militias, capturing towns and villages long controlled by Kurdish forces. In online pro-Islamic State chat forums, there is both outrage about SDF abuses against children and women during the recent clashes, while excitement about the future of the different camps in Northeast Syria is also growing, with many calling to support those who have been able to escape al-Shaddadi prison. – Tensions Between Syrian Government and SDF Leave Syrian Prisons Vulnerable – The Soufan Center
US
(Mitchell Reiss – RUSI) Unpredictable. Unorthodox. Unprincipled. Foreign leaders, military officers, think tank experts, academics and prominent journalists have used these and far harsher words to criticise the Trump administration’s foreign policy during this past year. The main reason for this assessment, and what has most unnerved America’s friends and allies around the world, is the Trump administration’s enthusiastic disruption of the existing liberal international order. Previous American administrations, from both parties, constructed this order by embedding US power within international alliances, institutions, rules and norms, seeking to coordinate with like-minded states and build the widest possible consensus on key issues, while prioritising long-term stability. For all its shortcomings, this order is credited with helping win the Cold War, lift millions out of poverty, spread democracy, alleviate famine and manage great power conflict. Within a remarkably short period, the Trump administration has taken a sledgehammer to this old order, redefined America’s interests, and reframed its relationships with long-standing friends and great power adversaries. It is accelerating the old order’s demise and ushering in a new one with a very different set of behaviours and no rules. This shift has upset all those countries, most of all, those in Europe, that have come to depend on the US for its security assurances and guarantees, commitment to free trade and devotion to a rules-based international order. – Trump’s Foreign Policy After Year One: A Look Back, A Look Ahead | Royal United Services Institute
(David Lubin – Chatham House) The White House’s assault on the independence of the Federal Reserve appears to be driven by President Trump himself. Yet it is worth bearing in mind Leo Tolstoy’s effort, in War and Peace, to dump the ‘great man’ theory of history. For him, it is an illusion that world leaders are the cause of events. Rather, it is the mass of people, in their swarm-like nature, that drive the forces of history. A king, for Tolstoy, is ‘history’s slave.’. And those broad forces can be seen in the background of Trump’s desire to re-politicize monetary policy, especially when considering that all monetary regimes are, in the end, the children of history: none lasts forever. Two pillars of the monetary regime that much of the world finds itself in are central bank independence and inflation targeting. In different ways, it is possible to imagine historical forces bringing about the end of both. – What Tolstoy would have said about the Federal Reserve | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Robert D. Blackwill – Council on Foreign Relations) The United States faces the most dangerous international circumstances since the end of World War II, and perhaps in its history. An ever more formidable, authoritarian China remains determined to replace the United States as the leading nation in Asia and eventually the world. The need for an effective U.S. grand strategy to deal with that threat, among others, is accordingly urgent. Grand strategy refers to a nation’s collective deployment of all its relevant instruments of power to accomplish key strategic goals. Given the United States’ longtime material, institutional, and ideational strengths, American grand strategy involves projecting its great power for the survival of world order. To that end, sustaining prosperity, which derives substantially from the United States’ dominance in technological innovation, becomes the economic precondition for protecting its own homeland, the homelands of its allies, and its diverse national interests. It can achieve those goals through both military and non-military methods, but force is acceptable only if it represents an inescapable choice to protect vital national interests. Promoting democracy is never such an inescapable choice. This report analyzes five alternative schools of American grand strategy and then proposes a sixth school, resolute global leadership. The primacy school of grand strategy, which includes neoconservatism, asserts that the United States must remain the world’s unrivaled superpower in every region and, toward that end, prevent the reemergence of a peer competitor. The liberal internationalist school envisions a U.S.-led, open, rules-based world order that champions the rule of law, liberal democracy, and human rights, and accepts using military force as a last resort to safeguard U.S. vital national interests. The restraint school, often associated with realism and offshore balancing and scarred by recent unsuccessful wars, seeks to slash American global commitments and argues that U.S. military intervention is almost always ill-advised. The American nationalist school insists that the United States should concentrate its attention and strength on the Western Hemisphere, that previous presidents have foolishly agreed to trade and security agreements that hollowed out the nation’s economy, and that only U.S. power, not alliances and global organizations, guarantees enduring benefits for the United States. And Trumpism, a version of American nationalism that depends on the personal preferences of President Donald Trump, radically redefines U.S. vital national interests to emphasize bilateral and transactional trade relationships, business deals, and quick diplomatic successes over geopolitical considerations—without collaboration with traditional U.S. allies or fidelity to core American values, including human rights. This report argues that the competing strategies of restraint, American nationalism, and Trumpism all fail on different counts. Restraint presumes that abdicating the United States’ global military presence will enhance both prosperity and security, a claim that has not yet been corroborated and is dangerous to test. American nationalism discounts international legitimacy and complaisantly expects that the United States can uphold prosperity and security by focusing predominantly, if not exclusively, on the U.S. homeland and its hemisphere and on bilateral trade. And Trumpism risks undermining the nation’s prosperity, security, and legitimacy simultaneously because of its determination to advance American national interests at the expense of others. Drawing from the grand strategies of primacy and liberal internationalism, the grand strategy of resolute global leadership is superior to all other alternatives. Like primacy, it affirms the importance of American military might, especially potent instruments for deterrence and force projection, to parry varied threats and defend the United States and its allies as far forward as possible to preserve favorable balances of power in critical regions. But unlike primacy, resolute global leadership accepts that China has emerged as a peer competitor, and this grand strategy does not believe in using military force for ideological goals. Like liberal internationalism, resolute global leadership emphasizes the requirement to underwrite international institutions, both to increase U.S. and worldwide prosperity and to create an international environment conducive to U.S. national interests. Resolute global leadership recognizes, however, that military power is still central to geopolitics, and it treats global institutions as important but useful only insofar as they advance those interests. Although the current political landscape is unfavorable to resolute global leadership, it is the best grand strategy to sustain prosperity, enhance security, and cement the legitimacy of the United States as a powerful force in the international system. When the country confronts the implications of its experiment with Trumpism, resolute global leadership will offer the clearest route to a revival of American strength. – America Revived | Council on Foreign Relations
(Chatham House) Exactly one year has passed since President Trump returned to the White House. How has the first year of Trump 2.0 impacted global efforts to address climate change, and what might happen going forward? To discuss this, Anna and Bhargabi are joined by Gina McCarthy (former US National Climate Advisor, former EPA Administrator and Chair of the America Is All In Coalition). – What has the first year of Trump 2.0 meant for the climate? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – China
(Navin Girishankar, Mark P. Dallas, Sree Ramaswamy, Scott Kennedy, Philip Luck, Joseph Majkut, Ilaria Mazzocco, Erin L. Murphy, Matt Pearl, Richard M. Rossow, Sujai Shivakumar, Chris Borges, Ray Cai, and Ryan Featherston – CSIS) China is often portrayed as either unstoppable—dominating electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, and solar panels—or lacking the creativity to push the technological frontier. The United States is either celebrated as the unquestioned AI leader or criticized for losing its manufacturing base and becoming dangerously dependent on rivals. The reality is more complex—and more instructive. In 2025, China made AI progress under chip constraints, achieved breakthroughs in robotics and quantum computing, and weaponized its control of rare earth processing, yet it still cannot produce a certified jet engine or compete in high-end machine tools. The United States controls 90 percent of AI chip markets and produces far more advanced AI models than China, yet it has lost much of the manufacturing capacity needed to build at scale and depends on rivals for critical materials. These patterns cannot just be explained by looking at research and development (R&D) budgets or patent counts. The answer is technological dexterity—the ability to build strengths across different technology types, where advantages in one domain compound advantages in others. AI chips enable AI models, rare earth processing enables chip manufacturing, and machine tools enable precision aerospace components. These technologies reinforce each other, but only when the right ecosystems support them. The urgency is real: China has been playing the long game for decades—systematically building processing capacity in rare earths, scaling manufacturing ecosystems, and investing in the “missing middle” between lab and market—while the United States has too often lost focus on the ecosystem foundations that make technological leadership durable. Success depends on whether America can rebuild these capabilities faster than China continues compounding its advantages. – Tech Edge: A Living Playbook for America’s Technology Long Game
