As the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sharpens in Yemen and beyond, Turkey has begun edging closer to Saudi Arabia. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has openly acknowledged Saudi concerns, saying in a televised interview, on January 8, that “developments in the region — especially recent ones — pose a threat to Saudi Arabia.” Shortly afterward, reports emerged that Ankara was seeking to join the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact signed last September, which frames an attack on either country as “an aggression against both.” That “one for all, all for one” language — echoing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5 mutual defense clause — has fueled claims in Washington and the Middle East that a new regional order is taking shape: a Turkey-Saudi axis backed by a NATO-like defense architecture, implicitly aligned against Israel and the United Arab Emirates. This reading overstates the case. Turkey’s regional outlook does increasingly overlap with Saudi Arabia’s — from Yemen to Syria, Libya, and the Horn of Africa. Both Ankara and Riyadh favor strong central states as the foundation of a stable, integrated regional order, while the UAE has often backed actors that undermine those central authorities. Ankara also places a premium on a close alignment with Riyadh, believing that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman enjoys stronger ties with President Donald Trump than Emirati leader Mohammed bin Zayed — a dynamic Turkish officials see as potentially useful in addressing unresolved issues with Washington, according to a Turkish official the author spoke with. In part driven by those considerations, defense and financial ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia have deepened in recent years. But Ankara cannot afford an overtly anti-UAE posture. While Saudi Arabia’s ability to inject capital has helped President Erdoğan at critical moments, the UAE’s financial influence is far more deeply embedded across Turkey’s economic architecture — from currency swap lines and capital markets to corporate partnerships — giving Abu Dhabi greater structural leverage over Ankara. Turkey is also wary of the Abu Dhabi’s lobbying power in Washington, which Turkish officials believe damaged Ankara’s interests after the latter backed Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Turkey’s interests, therefore, lie in balancing its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not choosing between them. Nor is the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact — even with Turkey’s possible participation — likely to morph into a “Muslim NATO.” It is better understood as political signaling: an assertion of Muslim solidarity in response to what these countries view as the destabilizing actions of an increasingly reckless Israel. Crucially, Ankara would prefer the UAE inside this tent rather than outside it, despite persistent differences with Abu Dhabi.
What Ankara Sees in Riyadh — and Why It Still Needs Abu Dhabi – Middle East Institute
