From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: ASEAN; China; China-European Union; China-Maldives; Counterrorism (Southeast and South Asia); European Union; Global Economy; Malaysia; Middle East; Nepal; Russia; Russia-Ukraine; Transnational Repression; US-Israel; Yemen
ASEAN
(Tham Siew Yean – FULCRUM) The ASEAN Business Entity (ABE), initiated during Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2023, recently started a pilot programme in November 2025 under Malaysia’s watch. The ABE’s goal of increasing regional economic integration via greater intra-ASEAN investment concurs with the ASEAN Economic Community, but it will likely retain, if not reinforce, existing disparities in FDI flows. – ASEAN Business Entity: Integration at the Cost of Inclusion | FULCRUM
Joanne Lin, Jasmine Yeo-FULCRUM) Two complementary surveys in 2025 offer a synchronised read on Southeast Asia’s confidence at a time of transition. UOB’s ASEAN Consumer Sentiment Study (ACSS) 2025, conducted from May to June this year in partnership with global management consulting firm Boston Consulting Group, captures how consumers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam perceive the economy, their own financial position and their spending behaviours and intentions. The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) 2025 survey, by contrast, takes the region’s pulse from the top down: opinion leaders and thought leaders across all ASEAN countries assess regional priorities, strategic developments and major-power dynamics. Read together, these surveys draw the same contour lines from different vantage points. The region’s macro story remains one of resilience. Yet confidence is uneven and highly sensitive to external factors—particularly inflation, climate shocks and the evolving postures of the two biggest global powerhouses, the United States and China. – Reading ASEAN’s Sentiments in a Year of Crosswinds | FULCRUM
China
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) “New quality combat forces,” which refers to the integration of emerging technologies with military capabilities, are increasingly important to Chinese military modernization, according to authoritative policy documents and commentaries in Party media. The concept is important to the Party’s attempts to design a national system that fuses economic progress and military strength into an overarching “national strategic system and capabilities.”. Technological progress is undermined by ongoing issues within the People’s Liberation Army, such as corruption, political unreliability, and governance issues. – New Quality Combat Forces Underpin Military Modernization – Jamestown
China – European Union
(Antara Ghosal Singh – Observer Research Foundation) While “China’s success” in the trade war with the United States (US) and the China-Japan showdown dominate global headlines, significant changes are also emerging in China-Europe relations that deserve closer attention. On one hand, European leaders are lining up to make high-profile visits to China under the pressure of the US unpredictability, the stalemate in the Ukraine war, and the downward pressure on the European economy, Notably, a series of visits to China by the King of Spain, the Vice Chancellor of Germany, and the French President, among others, have taken place lately, reportedly to prepare ground for inviting China to attend the upcoming G7 summit in France and also to show goodwill and extend support for China’s hosting of the 2026 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. – Shifting China–EU Ties and Lessons for India
China-Maldives
(Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, Uditi Lunawat – Observer Research Foundation) On 30 November, the Maldivian government accelerated the Rasmalé project, a large-scale land reclamation initiative that will subsequently receive Chinese support for infrastructure development. This move underscores a broader shift in China’s economic presence in the Maldives under the presidency of Mohamed Muizzu. China’s modus operandi in the Maldives can be categorised into four broader trends: prioritising debt restructuring over new loans; focus on grants and donations; securing commercial contracts; and deepening economic and financial linkages. These engagements demonstrate that despite limited interest in offering new loans and funding mega-infrastructure projects, Beijing is enhancing its influence and creating long-term dependencies with the Maldives. – The Changing Nature of China’s Engagement in the Maldives
Counterterrorism (Southeast and South Asia)
(Kabir Taneja, Soumya Awasthi – Observer Research Foundation) Countering terrorism has become a Schrödinger’s conundrum in the global security space. Globally there is both a push, and apathy, toward guiding a fractured world order against one of the most persistent security challenges of our time. The war in Gaza and Hamas’s role in the October 2023 attack on Israel have brought terrorism back to the forefront as a security crisis that can inflict large-scale damage and derail positive geopolitical trajectories. These welcome developments include the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, the creation of the I2U2 (a grouping with India, Israel, the UAE and the US) in October 2021, and the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) on the sidelines of the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi. Indeed, terrorism has remained a constant in global security concerns. While major attacks, such as the airline hijackings by pro-Palestine groups in the 1970s and Al Qaeda’s strikes on the United States on 11 September 2001, have been fewer, the rise and fall of the Islamic State across the Levant underscores that the threat remains consistent. Beyond ideological and kinetic violence, a wide-ranging evolution has taken place since 9/11. This includes biological warfare, cyber terrorism, technology-led approaches using drones and Artificial Intelligence (AI), and a more fluid system of terror financing enabled by cryptocurrency. In short, policy is struggling to keep pace with the contemporary imperatives of counterterrorism. – The Enduring Challenges of Counterterrorism: Regional Perspectives from Southeast and South Asia
European Union
(Emiliano Alessandri – GMFUS) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put enlargement back at the top of the EU agenda. After a long hiatus—Croatia was the last country to join in 2013—the enlargement process is now being revived. Albania and North Macedonia finally opened accession negotiations in 2022, but only after a long wait. That same year, Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status, and Kosovo, Moldova, and Ukraine submitted applications for membership. The latter two have since started accession talks. – EU Enlargement and Democracy | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Global Economy
(Atlantic Council) Some people might say that six, seven was the most important number of 2025. But our global economic experts beg to differ. This was a year in which the world’s largest economy hiked its tariff rates to the highest level in a century, cryptocurrency usage surged across the globe, sanctions evaders found new ways to avoid detection, global public debt climbed ever higher, and low-income countries backtracked on gains made over decades. Below, our GeoEconomics Center experts take you inside the numbers that mattered the most in 2025. – By the numbers: The global economy in 2025 – Atlantic Council
Malaysia
(Lee Hwok-Aun, Adib Zalkapli – FULCRUM) Sabah’s voters delivered a stunning rebuke to Malaysia’s peninsula-based parties at the 29 November state election. The impact will extend beyond Kota Kinabalu; Sabah will likely play a more formalised and clearly defined role in the current and future administrations in Putrajaya. The locally based Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) coalition, which won 29 seats in the 73-seat assembly, has retained power as the linchpin of a ruling coalition with 48 state assemblymen. This includes 12 lawmakers from other local parties and independents. They are joined by the peninsula-based Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalitions, which bring a combined seven seats. Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan) will helm the opposition bench with 25 seats. – Beyond Autonomy: The Ripple Effects of Sabah Elections on Federal Power | FULCRUM
(Amalina Anuar – FULCRUM) Nuclear power is back on the table for Malaysia. The imperatives are clear: the country must increasingly feed energy-intensive sectors such as data centres. In addition, Malaysia risks becoming a net gas importer within 10 to 20 years despite producing oil and gas (O&G). But nuclear power’s revival is anything but straightforward. Malaysia is reopening its once-shelved nuclear file under much tighter political, environmental, and geoeconomic constraints than the public debate reflects. – Critical Mass: The Complexity of Malaysia’s Nuclear Reboot | FULCRUM
Middle East
(Jason H. Campbell – Middle East Institute) On October 9, the White House persuaded Israel and Hamas to agree to a cease-fire based on a 20-point peace plan initially unveiled on September 29. The plan specifically called for the formation of two multinational entities. A “Board of Peace,” chaired by President Donald Trump, would be composed of senior officials charged with setting an initial framework for the redevelopment of Gaza. Whereas an International Stabilization Force (ISF) would train and support newly formed Palestinian police forces, secure border areas, and enable the free flow of aid and other goods into the devastated coastal strip. While not specified in the plan, the United States established the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat, Israel, on October 17, to support stabilization efforts. Vice President JD Vance attended the opening and explained the objectives of the new entity: “US military personnel will not deploy into Gaza but will instead help facilitate the flow of humanitarian, logistical, and security assistance from international counterparts into Gaza.” Since then, the ISF has struggled to gain traction, compelling a reexamination of whether or even the degree to which US forces may need to become involved. Washington should approach any such notions very carefully. – For the International Stabilization Force, key questions abound | Middle East Institute
Nepal
(Shivam Shekhawat – Observer Research Foundation) On 7 December 2025, Nepal’s Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a chargesheet against 55 individuals and CAMC Engineering, Co., the Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), which undertook the construction of the international airport at Pokhara. The chargesheet is the biggest, but not the first bolt to the complicated history of the international airport, with discussions dating back to the 1970s. While the anti-graft body’s latest action has renewed hopes about seeking accountability from the state and private actors partaking in corrupt practices, the airport’s development trajectory raises broader concerns about the structural problems within Nepal’s polity. – The Fate of Pokhara: Allegations of Collusion and Corruption
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Residents of the Russian Federation are facing a growing tide of problems, and some are now taking to the streets to protest. There were more such actions over the last 12 months than in any of the previous four years. Those protests have occurred east of the Urals, take place only with permission from local officials, and avoid attacking Russian President Vladimir Putin, giving the Kremlin another way to gauge popular attitudes and control regional leaders. There are few signs that these protests will grow into a movement that might threaten the Kremlin leader or even lay the groundwork for solving Russia’s problems and radical change once he departs the scene. – Russians Protesting Mounting Problems, but Not Yet Against Putin – Jamestown
Russia-Ukraine
(Kartik Bommakanti – Observer Research Foundation) Russia continues to make only limited progress in its offensive to secure the Donbass region. While recent reports suggest Moscow may be close to capturing Pokrovsk, advances on the ground remain slow and incremental. An assessment of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine from 2014 to 2025 reveals a pattern consistent with its long-standing preference for attritional warfare rather than decisive battlefield breakthroughs despite holding the initiative. As the conflict nears the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, this trajectory underscores why Moscow’s gains, though measurable, have remained constrained. This analysis examines Russia’s campaign across three phases—Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III—corresponding respectively to limited aims, attempted blitzkrieg, and attrition. – Russian Success and Failure: Limited Aims, Blitzkrieg, and Attrition
(Casey Michel – Atlantic Council) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been, by any metric, a strategic nightmare for Moscow. Not only has Russia lost more soldiers in Ukraine than in any war since World War II—and might well end up losing more troops than the United States lost during the entirety of WWII—but the Russian economy has lurched between overheating and stagflation. All the while, the Kremlin’s decision to expand its invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a NATO both enlarged and enhanced; in Russia’s transition from regional hegemon to a “junior partner” (and even potential vassal) of China; in waning influence in places such as the South Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe; and the creation of a heavily armed, deeply resentful neighbor in Ukraine, which will see Kyiv nurse both an animus toward Russia and a desire to reclaim much of the occupied territories for years to come. The entire war has been an exercise in Russian myopia, accelerating Russian decline and leading to a broad range of self-inflicted wounds. Mirroring other neo-colonial wars—France in Algeria, the Netherlands in Indonesia, Portugal in southern Africa—the war has exposed Russia as a pretender to great-power status and a shell of a once-swaggering empire. While Moscow might yet gain more towns scattered throughout Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, any remaining victories will remain pyrrhic, with Russia continuing to sacrifice its future prospects for any present gains. Much of Russia’s failure rests on Ukrainians’ ongoing sacrifices, as well as on the broader West’s willingness to back Ukraine’s troops. But a great deal of this disaster also stems from a series of muddled narratives that Russia has peddled about precisely why it launched the expanded invasion in the first place. Pushing a sprawling, occasionally contradictory series of goals and rationales, and without a clear narrative push to consolidate either support or success, Moscow has flailed for years, lurching from one rationale to another—all while its troops continue dying en masse and its domestic population continues to feel escalating pain and stress as the war drags on. Given all of the competing claims Moscow has put forth to defend its invasion of Ukraine, it is worth analyzing how the Kremlin has justified its expanded war and how Moscow has tried to sell the deadliest war Europe has seen since the days of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Such analysis can not only help Western allies of Ukraine figure out how best to back Kyiv’s efforts but can provide a roadmap for sounder Russia policy in the West overall. In sifting and sorting these narratives, we can identify precisely what is motivating the Kremlin—and, better yet, how to stop it. – Narrating the war: Analyzing Russia’s narratives for its invasion of Ukraine – Atlantic Council
Transnational Repression
(Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter – Council on Foreign Relations) In 2025, incidents of transnational repression—efforts primarily by authoritarian governments to intimidate, harm, or even kill people they consider threats to their states, typically members of their diaspora, outside their borders—increased substantially worldwide. More powerful authoritarian states including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others have stepped up digital and in-person transnational repression worldwide, including in developed states in Asia, Europe, North America, and the United Kingdom. Some of these developed states clearly want to minimize the issue of transnational repression to boost trade ties to countries like China, India, and Russia, among others. These wealthy states wish to do so because global economic uncertainty and U.S. tariffs even on close partners are forcing richer countries to build economic resilience requiring less dependence on trade with the United States. – Transnational Repression Grew in 2025—and It Will Only Get Worse | Council on Foreign Relations
US-Israel
(The Soufan Center) Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pursuing a hard-power-based regional strategy at odds with the Trump administration’s preferences for negotiated solutions to the region’s conflicts. The differing approaches will likely produce contention when Netanyahu visits Trump at his Mar-a-Lago retreat on December 29. Israel’s post-October 7 strategy is intended to try to thwart threats before they emerge, no matter the perceived intent of Israel’s adversaries. Trump’s team has expressed concerns that Israel’s policies will lead to a restart of the conflict in Gaza and destabilize governments in Lebanon, as well as post-Assad Syria. – Trump-Netanyahu Differences Cloud the Regional Outlook for 2026 – The Soufan Center
Yemen
(April Longley Alley – The Washington Institute) The situation in Yemen shifted dramatically this month when southern separatist forces aligned with the United Arab Emirates swiftly captured two large governorates that comprise nearly half of the country’s territory: the oil-producing region of Hadramawt, which borders Saudi Arabia, and al-Mahra, which borders Oman. The offensive gives the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—which has been uncomfortably part of the internationally recognized government for three years—effective control over most of the former “South Yemen,” an independent state prior to 1990. It also moves the group one step closer to its own goal of independence. From a distance, this may appear to be a purely internal affair. It is not. Saudi Arabia views the 425-mile border and deep cultural ties it shares with Hadramawt as important elements of its national security, and Oman views al-Mahra in a similar vein. Riyadh is now demanding the withdrawal of UAE-backed forces, but the STC is refusing to comply. The standoff risks upending Yemen’s fragile three-and-a-half-year truce, renewing a war that has repeatedly played to the advantage of the Iran-backed Houthis. It could also further strain relations between key U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who are already at loggerheads in Sudan. – Yemen’s Seismic Shift Has Consequences Beyond Its Borders | The Washington Institute
