From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Australia; China; China-India; China-Taiwan; Honduras-Taiwan-China; Russia; Taiwan; US; US-Gaza
Australia
(Meg Tapia – ASPI The Strategist) The decision by the Australian Secret Intelligence Service to feature its director-general and operational officers on the Seize the Yay podcast marks a deliberate shift towards public transparency, an unprecedented move for Australia’s most secretive intelligence agency. Coupled with a refreshed brand identity, the move is a recalibration in how ASIS seeks relevance, legitimacy and influence in an era of contested narratives and rising scrutiny of national security institutions. The new brand signals openness and modernity, positioning ASIS as a forward-thinking organisation and strengthening its appeal to top-tier talent seeking purpose-driven careers. The timing suggests an effort to shape perceptions amid intensifying geopolitical competition and fierce contest for skilled professionals in the national security sector. – Australian spy agency adopts new look | The Strategist
China
(Sam Roggeveen – Lowy The Interpreter) For most of my career, first as an analyst in Australia’s intelligence community and then in the world of think tanks, I have watched and written about the modernisation of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On every step of that journey, China has offered surprises. In fact, my experience in both the intelligence community (which, it should be emphasised, is now 17 years past) and open-source PLA analysis is that the pace of change and scale of ambition are generally underestimated. But even by that standard, 2025 has been a year of major revelations. In fact, I cannot recall a more dramatic year in my time as a PLA watcher. – A red banner year for the PLA | Lowy Institute
(William McDowall – ASPI The Strategist) A critical gap is emerging. China is publishing aggressively on satellite-independent navigation—bee-style path integration, salmon-like magnetic sensing and bio-hybrid drones. Yet the United States and its allies remain focused on satellite resilience rather than replacement. This silent edge matters. Swarms of Chinese aircraft, missiles and autonomous vessels guided without satellite signals would erode allied electromagnetic-warfare dominance and weaken deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. If left unaddressed, it risks becoming the decisive asymmetry of the next decade. – China is developing an edge in satellite independent navigation | The Strategist
(Chris Barrie and Paul Dibb – ASPI The Strategist) Now and foreseeably, the United States dominates undersea submarine warfare. No other country gets near to America in the quietness, performance and reliability of submarines on military operations. However, it has become common to assert in some quarters in the West that China is getting ready to overtake the US in such areas as quietening of submarines and their reliability when on potentially dangerous, distant operations. That is not a view with which we agree. Distant operations in potential enemy territory are the most demanding for China’s strategic nuclear ballistic-missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) and tactical nuclear submarines (SSNs). – China’s deep difficulty: nuclear-submarine and ASW inferiority | The Strategist
China-India
(Victoria Jones – Lowy The Interpreter) Late last month, an Indian citizen named Prema Thongdok, who was travelling from London to Japan, was detained for 18 hours on her layover in Shanghai. Chinese officials claimed her passport was invalid because it listed her birthplace as the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as part of its own territory. The woman also reported that she was told by the officials that she is not Indian, but Chinese, and that she could not travel on to Japan. The incident did not receive significant attention in mainstream media, instead representing merely the latest manifestation in disputes over Arunachal Pradesh between India and China. However, it is noteworthy in the respect that relations between the two Asian giants, which have other territorial disagreements stretching back decades, have somewhat thawed as of late. China refers to Arunachal Pradesh as Zangnan, or South Tibet, because Beijing does not accept the McMahon Line that was drawn by the British in 1914 as the northern border of the Indian state. – China’s dispute with India over Arunachal Pradesh | Lowy Institute
China-Taiwan
(Kitsch Liao, Nik Foster, and Santiago Villa – Atlantic Council) Taiwan’s official diplomatic partners play an important role in the island’s ability to directly engage the global community. Beijing is seeking to isolate Taiwan by peeling those partners away. Countering Beijing’s isolation campaign could bolster deterrence by forcing China to question how big of an international outcry it could face if it violates Taiwan’s security. This will require the United States to think seriously about the benefits it offers these partners and how it can team up with Taiwan to maintain the status quo. – Beijing pressures Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners. Here’s what the US should do in response – Atlantic Council
Honduras-Taiwan-China
(Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos – ASPI The Strategist) While the results of Honduras’s 30 November elections have not yet been finalised, both presidential candidates Salvador Nasralla and Nasry Asfura have signalled openness to restoring diplomatic relations with Taiwan. After years in which Beijing has steadily accumulated partners across the region, this indicates that China’s model of diplomatic engagement may be losing its persuasive power. No Latin American nation that has switched recognition to Beijing has voluntarily reversed course since Nicaragua, which recognised Beijing in 1985, switched back to Taipei in 1990, and most recently recognised Beijing in 2021. If Honduras were to switch recognition to Taipei now, it would mark a break in a long trajectory of Chinese diplomatic momentum. For China, that would represent more than a symbolic loss; it would expose a structural vulnerability in Beijing’s diplomatic engagement in Latin America and, by extension, across the developing world. – Honduras exposes the limits of China’s diplomatic leverage over Taiwan | The Strategist
Russia
(Atlantic Council) Russia’s oil and gas revenue dropped by 22 percent in the first eleven months of 2025. After sanctions hit Lukoil and Rosneft, Moscow is scrambling to reroute oil exports through smaller companies. Despite export controls, Russia’s military industrial base continues to expand. Moscow claims to have localized nearly 90 percent of drone manufacturing and assembly. Russia’s federal deficit continues to expand, and corporate debt has surged by 71 percent since 2022. To raise revenue in the face of a declining economy, the Kremlin has increased taxation and issued $2.8 billion worth of yuan-denominated bonds. – Russia Sanctions Database – Atlantic Council
Taiwan
(Thijs Stegeman – ASPI The Strategist) As Japan weathers pressure from China after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said last month that an attack on Taiwan would constitute a ‘survival-threatening situation’, Taiwan’s own opposition parties risk undermining that support. Two weeks after Takaichi’s comments, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te proposed a T$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion), eight-year supplemental package that would raise defence spending to 3.3 percent of GDP. The money would accelerate the military’s transition towards a porcupine force centred on small, mobile and easily hidden equipment. Yet opposition lawmakers blocked the plan. Cheng Li-wun, who was elected leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), in October, dismissed the proposal as ‘too high and too fast’. – Friends are stepping up for Taiwan. Its opposition is signalling retreat | The Strategist
US
(Seamus P. Daniels, Henry H. Carroll, Cynthia R. Cook, Oliver Buntin, and Sarah O’Rourke – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Growing the size of the Navy has been a bipartisan goal of successive administrations and Congress over the last decade. The service faces capacity limitations as it struggles to meet the demands of its current aggressive operational tempo with a fleet that is small by historical standards and faces delays in conducting maintenance. The demand to increase the Navy’s ship count has only grown as China’s navy has overtaken the U.S. fleet in terms of size with the blistering rate of production of its own shipbuilding industry. Despite the Navy’s plans for growing the fleet and bipartisan efforts and funding from Congress, the U.S. shipbuilding enterprise—including the Navy, Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and industry—has failed to consistently produce ships at the scale, speed, and cost demanded. These longstanding challenges stem from a series of interwoven, systemic issues within both the U.S. government and industry, as well as broader socioeconomic trends. This report outlines the challenges facing the U.S. naval shipbuilding enterprise, their underlying drivers, and some efforts the government has taken to mitigate them. – Outlining the Challenges to U.S. Naval Shipbuilding
(Erin D. Dumbacher – Council on Foreign Relations) The U.S. president can order a nuclear launch without consulting anyone, including Congress, and U.S. nuclear weapons have been prepared to launch within minutes since the Cold War. While reforms to U.S. retaliation policy seem unlikely, restraining a president’s ability to launch a first strike could be possible. – Who Can Start a Nuclear War? Inside U.S. Launch Authority and Reform | Council on Foreign Relations
US-Gaza
(The Soufan Center) Trump is pressing for key decisions and announcements that he believes will counter a perception that his Gaza peace plan is failing. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely continue to resist U.S. pressure to withdraw from additional areas of Gaza when he meets with Trump at Mar-a-Lago at the end of the month. U.S. officials assess that extensive U.S. involvement in implementing the peace plan will give regional leaders the confidence to provide personnel to the International Stabilization Force (ISF), which is to secure post-war Gaza. To encourage regional and global leaders to contribute forces to the ISF, Trump plans to appoint a senior U.S. military leader as the force’s nominal commander, and the U.S. military will hold a conference on Tuesday to brief potential donor countries on the scope of the ISF’s mission. – Trump Presses to Complete the Gaza Peace Plan – The Soufan Center
