From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: China-Arctic; Climate Action; Europe; Philippines; Russia-Europe; Syria; UAE-Saudi Arabia-Yemen; US
China-Arctic
(Juliana Rapper – The Arctic Institute) China’s Arctic strategy is a hybrid warfare campaign that combines overt and covert means to expand influence and reshape Arctic governance. This essay addresses the question: how is China leveraging International Organizations (IO’s) to expand its strategic and economic influence in the Arctic, and what implications does this have for regional security and governance? This analysis applies the Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) framework by elucidating how China’s hybrid tactics have been employed to undermine the Arctic Council’s governance efficacy, particularly following China’s implicit backing of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, it assesses alternative opportunities of IO’s through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structural constraints under Article 6 that limit proactive Arctic engagement, and proposes four comprehensive policy pathways. – China’s Arctic Strategy and Hybrid Warfare: Targeting Governance and Strategic Responses | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies
Climate Action
(Irene Mia – IIISS) As the 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) wrapped up in Belém, both its host, the Brazilian government, and climate-action advocates worldwide likely breathed a sigh of relief. The summit, the leading multilateral forum for climate diplomacy, had held together despite rising geopolitical fragmentation, growing disengagement by the United States, and the strengthening of vested interests tied to high-emission industries – not to mention major flooding in the host city, fires at the COP venue and indigenous protests. Brazil’s pragmatic, implementation-focused approach, emphasising adaptation, loss and damage and forest conservation, appeared to pay off, to a certain extent. Many deals on renewables and clean energy were concluded on the sidelines of the conference, while Brazil secured nearly US$7 billion in early pledges for its innovative Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), which aims to protect tropical forests by financially supporting the communities that safeguard them. Other achievements included an agreement to triple adaptation finance by 2035, the establishment of voluntary indicators to monitor progress under global adaptation goals, and recognition of the ‘just transition’ principle underpinning the Belém package, which spells out the need to combine inclusion, social justice and human development with climate-action objectives. Yet, the absence of binding commitments to phase out fossil fuels, the delivery of only 15% of the collective reductions in nationally determined contributions (NDCs) needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C by 2035, and the largely voluntary nature of most pledges, underscored the mounting challenges that confront the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its COP mechanism in the current geopolitical and climate-crisis juncture. – From multilateralism to mutirão: towards a polycentric climate diplomacy
Europe
(Tim Lawrenson, Ester Sabatino – IISS) The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, or ‘SAFE instrument’, is a mechanism that provides loans to European Union member states for investment in defence capabilities and to strengthen their defence industries. It was launched in March 2025 as part of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 and adopted by member states in May 2025. With EUR150 billion in available funds over the five-year period of 2025–30, it is set to have a significant impact on the European defence market, with an annual disbursement likely to equal at least 25% of the current annual total of EU members’ defence procurement, which is expected to just exceed EUR100bn in 2025 according to the European Defence Agency. – The SAFE Regulation and Its Implications for Non-EU Defence Suppliers
Philippines
(Justin Baquisal – IISS) Over the past decade, the Philippines’ perception of the military threat from China has become increasingly severe, driving the foundational concept of its defence planning towards ‘archipelagic defence’. The Marcos Jr administration’s ‘Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept’ (CADC) has laid the groundwork for major changes to Philippine military strategy, which include emphasising basing dispersion, ranged strike capabilities and the use of geography, as opposed to previous conventional, unfocused military build-ups. However, elements of archipelagic defence will highly likely lead to sharper military confrontations with China; in particular, the expansion of Philippine military positions along strategic border areas, particularly near Taiwan, and the CADC amounting to a ‘counter’ anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to China’s current military posture. This process will likely foster security-dilemma dynamics, and thus Manila needs to develop an effective strategic-communications plan on its foreign policy for its more neutral neighbours. – Forward and Seaward: Archipelagic Defence as a Military Strategy for the Philippines
Russia-Europe
(The Soufan Center) Yesterday, Britain’s Ministry of Defence unveiled its new plan — “Atlantic Bastion” — to counter Russian submarines in UK waters, just days after announcing a joint UK-Norway naval alliance, aimed at addressing the same challenge. EU and NATO Member States are working on improving their deterrence posture and resilience — often betting on high-intensity vigilance and kinetic deterrence — against escalating Russian hybrid threats without publicly responding to every, increasingly brazen, provocation. The Kremlin is almost certainly trying to destabilize Europe through more kinetic hybrid tactics — such as interfering with critical infrastructure — while also seeking to create social unrest and division and provoke a response from Europe or NATO that it can propagandize to its advantage. While the bureaucratic nature of the EU can complicate efforts to build a unified defense architecture, European cohesion is integral in countering Russian tactics that seek to divide Europe and undermine democratic processes and social stability. – Europe Builds Deterrence as The Kremlin Escalates Hybrid Warfare – The Soufan Center
Syria
(Kate Springs and Celeste Kmiotek – Atlantic Council) The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 created once-in-a-generation opportunities for the victims of all the actors in the conflict, not only to more easily pursue accountability for human rights violations but also to better assist those who suffered undue harm. While the transitional government’s plan for a comprehensive transitional justice process is still being developed, victim and survivor communities need immediate support. States and international organizations—including the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Gulf Cooperation Council, among others—have a vital role to play in Syria’s reconstruction and recovery, including for the hundreds of thousands of Syrians who suffered detention, torture, and abuse. But states have been responding to the conflict since its start in 2011 by initiating legal actions related to international law violations occurring in Syria. These included prosecuting companies for providing material support to terrorist organizations in Syria and imposing fines for breaching sanctions imposed in response to the conflict in Syria. From these settlements and judgments, states collected or seized significant sums—over $600 million in one instance. While the ongoing harms suffered by Syrians underpinned these cases, states have generally directed the recovered funds to their own treasuries, even as Syrians continue to desperately need international assistance to move on from over a decade of conflict. – States shouldn’t waste the chance to establish a Syria Victims Fund – Atlantic Council
UAE-Saudi Arabia-Yemen
(The Soufan Center) A sudden offensive by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) against rivals in southern Yemen reflects longstanding tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over Yemen policy. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its allies have gained significant leverage by gaining control of oil-rich territory and energy installations in Yemen’s sparsely populated Hadhramaut area. The Southern Transitional Council’s breakout will derail Saudi efforts to translate a four-year UN-backed ceasefire with the Iran-backed Houthis into a permanent peace, and could portend a resumption of ground conflict with the Houthis. A flare-up of fighting with the Houthis might cause the group to resume its attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Israel. – UAE-Backed Forces Expand Control in Southern Yemen – The Soufan Center
US
(Laurel Rapp – Chatham House) President Donald Trump’s national security strategy landed with a thud across Europe and to toasts in Beijing and Moscow. Saving the harshest critiques for Europe’s current trajectory, the 33-page grand strategy pushes commercial ties, strategic stability with Russia, and a strong US hand in Latin America. The document’s limited references to China – and only as economic competitor – abandons the president’s 2017 strategy, which called both Russia and China ‘revisionist powers’ seeking to ‘weaken US influence’. The new strategy is a bracing read for those who have centred the US–Europe relationship and commitment to democratic values at the heart of collective security arrangements. – Trump’s new national security strategy: Cut deals, hammer Europe, and tread gently around autocrats | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Rebecca Lissner – Council on Foreign Relations) Trump’s ideologically driven statement of strategic intent indicates that the United States could be willing to interfere abroad to promote an illiberal world—a stunning victory for the MAGA wing of the Republican Party. – The First MAGA National Security Strategy | Council on Foreign Relations
(Brookings) On December 4, 2025, the Trump administration published its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). Below, Brookings scholars reflect on the document’s implications for U.S. foreign policy. – Breaking down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy | Brookings
(Frederick Kempe – Atlantic Council) National security strategies, issued by US presidential administrations every four years or so, generally don’t get much news coverage. They are serious (and often ponderous) efforts to prioritize major US security concerns. At their best, they then describe a plan to deal with these concerns. So, it’s worth noting that much of the sideline talk at the twenty-third edition of the Doha Forum this past weekend—including from a piquant combination of Donald J. Trump Jr. and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—focused on the so-called NSS and its intentionally unconventional and provocative nature. The new NSS, which dropped late last week, is significant not only for the spicy specifics of its worldview. It’s probably even more compelling for the insights it provides into US President Donald Trump’s second-term psychology, when compared to his first NSS, released in December 2017 at the end of the first year of his first term. – Dispatch from Doha: A tale of two Trumps (constrained vs. unleashed) – Atlantic Council
