From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Arctic; Extremism-Terrorism-Counter Terrorism; G20; IMEC Corridor; India (White-Collar Terrorism); India-Comoros; India-European Union; India-Northern Sea Route; Pakistan-Afghanistan-China; Russia-Ukraine; Tanzania; Türkiye-Gulf; US (Global Health Strategy); US (War Department); US-ASEAN; US-China; US-Malaysia; US-Middle Powers
Arctic
(The Arctic Institute) As reported by the Barents Observers on November 28, the Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that Russia has formally withdrawn from a joint emergency response agreement with Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The agreement on Cooperation Within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response was part of the Barents cooperation, a set of multilateral partnerships between the four countries in the region. Since its signing in 2008, the agreement has facilitated cross-border rescue cooperation and nine joint rescue exercises. – The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 1 December, 2025 | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies
Extremism-Terrorism-Counter Terrorism
(Bibi van Ginkel, Tanya Mehra, Merlina Herbach, Julian Lanchès, Yael Boerma – International Centre for Counter-Terrorism) This study examines a pressing and highly topical challenge: how to assess online content that may undermine democracy, threaten national security and public safety, or infringe upon the rights of others—while safeguarding freedom of expression. The central question it explores, the specific challenges identified, and the recommendations it puts forward should not be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated within a broader and increasingly complex societal and political context. A range of systemic developments shapes the environment in which this work takes place: the rise of online radicalisation, particularly among children and young adults; the expanding influence of large technology platforms and the tensions this creates with rule-of-law-based democratic societies leading to a global trend toward both techno-libertarianism andtechno-authoritarianism; and the evolving role of governments as they seek to reconcile the imperatives of security, safety, and national interest with those of privacy, human rights, and minority protection. These challenges are compounded by the unprecedented speed and scale of online information dissemination, growing concerns about disinformation and foreign influence, and the urgent need to strengthen societal resilience and media literacy. While this study does not address each of these systemic issues in depth, they form the essential backdrop against which its findings and proposals should be understood. – Blurred Boundaries: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Limits in Detecting and Moderating Terrorist, Illegal and Implicit Extremist Content Online while Respecting Freedom of Expression | International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – ICCT
G20
(Joseph N. Sanate – Vivekananda International Foundation) The G20 (Group of Twenty) summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, between 22 and 23 November 2025, was among the most politically charged in the forum’s history. It was the first time the forum met on African soil. South Africa’s President, Cyril Ramaphosa, used his role as chairman to place the priorities of the developing nations at the apex of the summit’s agenda. He highlighted concerns of the Global South, including climate vulnerabilities and debt distress. He also sought to ensure that countries from the Global South are considered equal partners in global decision-making. Ramaphosa wanted to show that Africans could take a leadership role and achieve substantive outcomes in multilateral platforms rather than simply participating. The host nation framed the summit around the key themes of solidarity, equality and sustainability, signalling South Africa’s determination to participate in reshaping the global narrative on governance. G20 2025 became a platform for greater inclusivity and a more representative vision of international cooperation, particularly during the absence of the U.S. and China. The absence of the two largest global economies created an unusual diplomatic environment, one defined by tension, symbolic contestation, and questions about the future of the global economic order. However, despite these challenges, the G20 produced a lengthy consensus declaration and tried to reaffirm its commitment to multilateral cooperation. This essay examines the major themes of the 2025 G20 Summit, the diplomatic disputes surrounding it, the content of the adopted declaration, and the broader implications for global governance. It also analyses the impact of the U.S. boycott on its global standing, on G20 dynamics, and on relations with key states like India. The aim is to present a clear and structured account of the summit and its broader significance. – The 2025 G20 Summit in Johannesburg: A Test of Multilateral Cooperation and Global South Leadership | Vivekananda International Foundation
IMEC Corridor
(Lydia Powell, Akhilesh Sati – Observer Research Foundation) The IMEC corridor is one of the most ambitious transcontinental energy partnerships of the 21st century, linking continents, cultures, and markets in a dynamic new framework for shared prosperity. Envisioned as a transcontinental artery of energy trade, IMEC connects regions that together represent 40 percent of the world’s population and 50 percent of global GDP. Secure, reliable and affordable energy flows from IMEC partners are the lifeblood of economic growth and prosperity across the world. IMEC partners dominate the global energy landscape, collectively accounting for over one-third of world trade in crude oil and petroleum products. IMEC partners accounted for 27 percent of India’s crude oil imports in the financial year ending in March 2025. Secure and affordable energy is accelerating economic growth and improving quality of life in India, key IMEC partner and the largest growth market for energy in the foreseeable future. In the short-term, the composition of energy flows between IMEC partners will be dominated by conventional energy sources which are unmatched in terms of reliability, affordability and security. India’s fast-growing energy demand, combined with its proposal to invest in two greenfield refineries that will expand product export capacity make it a natural anchor for long-term energy partnerships. The resilience of conventional supply chains, supported by pipelines, tanker fleets, and established logistics infrastructure, ensures that IMEC’s energy linkages remain stable even amid global volatility. In the long-term, IMEC will attract hundreds of billions of dollars in large-scale investment, creating high-value jobs and unmatched prosperity in the region. While private investment will initiate projects, generous supplement from public funds will be required to reduce geopolitical risks and accelerate the construction of a future-ready energy network. Plans for increasing low emission energy flows in the longer term are gathering momentum but the pace of progress will depend critically on cost competitiveness and scale of supply and demand. Without incentives for low-cost production on the supply side and offtake guarantees on the demand side, low emission energy sources are unlikely to become affordable. If the affordability criteria are not met, adoption of low emission energy sources is unlikely to meet expectations. Initiatives to enable transcontinental electricity transmission, as envisioned by IMEC are advancing with notable momentum. UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India are working together towards the ambition of transforming regional energy trade and accelerating the integration of electricity grids across borders. IMEC partners are harmonising policies and regulatory standards to ensure technical interoperability. Transcontinental power pools will enable IMEC partner countries to meet their electricity demand through international trade while also substantially reducing electricity costs by developing the most suitable and least expensive low emission energy sites. By optimising resource use across time zones, shared electricity grids between IMEC partners will make conventional and low emission electricity available round-the-clock, reducing costs for millions of consumers. Progress in initiatives for transporting conventional and low emission hydrogen from low-cost production sites in India and the Middle East to Europe is evident. India and the Middle East, with their abundant low emission energy resources and strategic geographical locations, are poised to become major supply hubs, with ambitious production targets. The EU’s commitment to importing low emission hydrogen by 2030 provides a strong demand signal, but production will be curtailed by the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a discriminatory trade barrier disguised as an environmental measure, as pointed out by India. Given its developmental goals, India has deferred its net-zero emissions target to 2070, despite sustained diplomatic pressure from the Global North, particularly the EU advocating a 2050 timeline. CBAM, which unjustly shifts the burden of emission reductions onto the Global South, will further delay net zero achievement by India and the rest of the Global South as it will increase costs and slow down low emission energy flows as envisaged by IMEC. The implementation of CBAM contravenes the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” which allocates a greater burden of emissions reduction to the Global North—a concern prominently raised by India, one of the largest members of the Global South. CBAM poses a significant challenge to the energy trade dynamics with the Global South, specifically India within the IMEC framework. Products originating from India exhibit a higher embedded emission intensity compared to EU benchmarks. Imposing CBAM will result in elevated import tariffs, effectively internalising the cost of EU emissions under its Emissions Trading System (ETS). By subjecting imports to auction-based carbon pricing equivalent to the EU ETS, CBAM will introduce an economic disincentive for trade diversification, potentially leading to trade friction and impeding economic growth in partner nations. This mechanism fundamentally contradicts the central tenet of the IMEC initiative, which is predicated on fostering enhanced multilateral connectivity and economic integration through trade and infrastructure development. The resulting competitive disadvantage could undermine the strategic geopolitical and economic objectives of the IMEC corridor. IMEC partners must call for aligning trade and energy policies to unlock the corridor’s full potential. Coordinated action to defer the EU’s CBAM in energy trade among IMEC nations must be among the key priorities. Redirecting CBAM funds towards technology transfer and improving affordability of low emission technologies in the Global South is essential to ensuring that the transition towards low emission energy sources is fair and inclusive. – India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor: Potential for Increasing Energy Flows
India (White-Collar Terrorism)
(Kamal Davar – Observer Research Foundation) Terrorism, the scourge of the modern world, takes many forms and interpretations; one nation’s terrorist could be another’s freedom fighter or even social reformer. Regardless of the differing standards applied to categorise them, the deliberate use of violence, especially against innocents, at times reaching catastrophic levels, characterises the act of terrorism. Regrettably, despite the world having been gravely stricken by this plague for many decades, it has failed to even come to a universally accepted definition of terrorism. This curse continues to afflict mankind for prolonged periods and in newer forms, taking a toll on innocent people before a nation’s security and intelligence agencies can react to the element of surprise or comprehend the newer modus operandi of these terror acts. India’s western neighbour, Pakistan, has continually kept up the tempo of terror acts, primarily in India’s state of J&K, and even other parts of India, including in some of India’s NE states. That China, too, has, in the past, endeavoured to foment insurgency in the Northeastern states is widely acknowledged. – Confronting White-Collar Terrorism in India
India-Comoros
(Samir Bhattacharya, Shrestha Medhi – Observer Research Foundation) Situated at the northern tip of the Mozambique Channel, the small archipelago of the Union of the Comoros has emerged as an unexpected strategic void in India’s Indian Ocean strategy. Despite India’s robust engagement framework under SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and its recent evolution into MAHASAGAR, New Delhi’s diplomatic footprint in Comoros remains modest. The Standing Committee on External Affairs, in its August 2025 report on India’s Indian Ocean Strategy, explicitly identified Comoros as one of the only three littoral states where India lacks substantive diplomatic relationships among all 35 Indian Ocean coastal nations. This gap represents both a strategic vulnerability and an untapped opportunity that warrants immediate attention. The rationale for prioritising Comoros is anchored on two mutually reinforcing dimensions: geoeconomic considerations and geopolitical imperatives. Economically, Comoros offers access to substantial maritime resources through its 160,000 square kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a marine territory approximately 100 times larger than its land area. – The Case for Deepening India-Comoros Relations
India-European Union
(Jesse Scott, Sangeeth Selvaraju, Ignacio Garcia Bercero – Observer Research Foundation) India-EU relations are at a pivotal moment. PM Narendra Modi and European Commission (EC) president Ursula von der Leyen have committed to concluding negotiations this year on an FTA, and to holding a summit in Q1 2026 that sets a new direction for a bilateral strategic partnership. At a time when the US pursues aggressive unilateral policies and China dominates critical manufacturing sectors, EU-India action can be a catalyst for achieving global public goods that demand North-South cooperation. It would also contribute towards economic security by promoting more diversified green value chains. This requires putting the green economy at the centre of a more strategic bilateral engagement. India needs to embrace benefits for its economy of increased investments in the green economy. Likewise, the EU should avoid its excessive focus on unilateral action and inward-looking industrial policies. Both sides have a common interest to cooperate on a partnership that supports accelerating their transitions to net zero, and to build a common green value chain through win-win tech collaborations and through European investments. – Can India and the EU forge a successful green partnership amidst global challenges?
India-Northern Sea Route
(Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash – Observer Research Faoundation) New Delhi’s ambitions in the Arctic reflect a notable ideational shift in recent years. While India has long emphasised cooperation in science and climate research, its Arctic vision now carries a pronounced geo-economics dimension. This evolution stems from the accelerating thaw of Arctic ice and the growing prospect of year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route (with icebreaker assistance). Additionally, given Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West and the exit of Western investments, technology, and firms from the Russian Arctic due to sanctions, Moscow has welcomed the participation of Asian countries – China and India – in the Arctic. While Beijing has increased its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, India’s presence remains modest. Nevertheless, since the 2020s, bilateral cooperation with Russia in the Arctic region has gained prominence in official discourse. Against this backdrop, tracing the drivers of India’s Arctic engagement, assessing the scope of its presence in the Russian Arctic, and examining the centrality of the NSR in New Delhi’s calculus warrant closer scrutiny. – Theorising the Drivers of India’s Engagement in the Northern Sea Route
Pakistan-Afghanistan-China
(Shivam Shekhawat – Observer Research Foundation) Last month, when Pakistan and Afghanistan engaged in their most intense clashes in the last four years, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on both sides to exercise restraint and resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation. Urging them to focus on the ‘broader picture’, he also offered China’s mediating role to ameliorate their differences. For Beijing, this broader picture includes the security of its own strategic and economic interests in the region and its relationship with both Kabul and Islamabad. – Afghanistan-Pakistan Quagmire Reveals the Limits of China’s Leverage
Russia-Ukraine
(Kartik Bommakanti, Mohammad Mustafa – Observer Research Foundation) Russian drone warfare has undergone a drastic transformation since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Russian approach to drone warfare has shifted from drones being a peripheral unit of the military tactics to now being a part of the strategic calculus of its warfighting strategy. Its limited reconnaissance-heavy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) fleet has expanded into a multi-layered structure capable of performing critical tasks involving strategic strike, battlefield attrition and Electronic Warfare (EW) alongside traditional tasks of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). This transition has been shaped by constant change in battlefield dynamics, technological innovations, as well as operational insights gained during the war. The subsequent analysis chronologically analyses the Russian drone campaign in Ukraine. – The Evolution of Russia’s Drone Warfare in Ukraine
Tanzania
(Crisis Group) Campaigners in Tanzania are planning peaceful protests on 9 December, weeks after police killed hundreds in a brutal post-election crackdown. Authorities must desist from yet more wanton violence. Looking further out, they should embrace conciliatory politics, including long-overdue constitutional reforms. – Tanzania: Preventing Another Massacre | International Crisis Group
Türkiye-Gulf
(Abhishek Yadav – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Erdoğan’s October 2025 visit to Kuwait, Qatar and Oman produced 24 cooperation instruments, signalling a deeper push into defence, economic and industrial engagement with the Gulf. While outreach broadened partnerships, implementation remains the key test for creating long-term impact. – Türkiye’s Renewed Engagement with the Gulf – MP-IDSA
US (Global Health Strategy)
(Lakshmy Ramakrishnan – Observer Research Foundation) The beginning of 2025 and Donald Trump’s second term as US President brought abrupt changes to the global health landscape, most notably the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and steps to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO). In September this year, the administration released the America First Global Health Strategy (AFGHS), a document providing insight into the US’s approach to global health. Recent initiatives signal a recalibration of US engagement toward an interest-driven, commercially-aligned approach that leverages technological innovation, public-private partnerships, and diplomacy to advance US economic priorities. – America First in Global Health: Strategy, Selectivity, and Contradictions
US (War Department)
(Chaitanya Giri – Observer Research Foundation) The United States is a significant investor in research and development (R&D) across various sectors, and its military R&D is a key driver of its superpower status. As per 2022 statistics, the US Department of Defense (DoD) consumes 38 percent of the total federal R&D funds. In 2023, the US defence R&D spending saw a massive hike, from US$73 billion in 2022 to US$89 billion, signalling preparation for major conflicts. In 2024, the DoD accounted for nearly 40 percent of the world’s defence spending. For a long time, such extensive R&D spending drew science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) talent from around the world, reinforcing US technological, economic and cultural power. This “American Dream” drew talent to work at the cutting edge of STEM, which had a big indirect DoD imprint via universities, national labs, startups, and the big defence contractors. However, for many domestic and international reasons, it has now mutated into the Department of War. This shift comes at a time when the US polity is becoming inward-looking and illiberal with overseas talent, raising a question of whether global STEM talent would empower the Department of War as it did its earlier avatar, the DoD? – The US War Department and the STEM Recalibration
US-ASEAN
(Dmitry Grozoubinski, Felix Christian Haas – East Asia Forum) The United States is pursuing transactional, bilateral deals with individual ASEAN members, but this approach yields limited gains and risks undermining regional cohesion. ASEAN’s economic weight, deep supply-chain integration and growing consumer markets make it a far more valuable partner when engaged collectively. Constructive, bloc-level cooperation offers greater long-term benefits for Washington and avoids pulling ASEAN into geopolitical rivalry, while strengthening the region’s capacity to manage external pressures. – US–ASEAN trade is too important for short-term thinking | East Asia Forum
US-China
(Prateek Tripathi – Observer Research Foundation) Decoupling from China has served as one of the fundamental tenets of United States (US) tech and export policy for almost a decade, particularly in light of the growing strategic competition between the two nations. Given its increasing importance and integration across virtually all existing technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been a primary instigator in this regard. This has rendered AI export policy particularly significant. However, the Trump administration’s decision to potentially revert export bans on the sale of AI chips to China cast America’s existing stance on the issue into serious doubt. In light of China’s retort and its recent decision to rely on domestically manufactured chips for its data centres, the Trump administration eventually decided to ban the sale of Nvidia’s newly developed B30A chips to China. The whole episode highlights Trump’s confused and meandering tech policy. In addition to raising domestic opposition, it has become a cause of concern for US allies. The grand strategy of decoupling technology and critical mineral supply chains from China, initiated by the US, has had a sizeable — and, in many cases, detrimental — impact on multiple economies around the world. This has prompted many to question the efficacy of the strategy and the manner of its execution in the future. – Geopolitical Fallout from the US-China AI Competition
US-Malaysia
(Stewart Nixon – East Asia Forum) The US–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), signed during the October 2025 ASEAN summit, has sparked significant domestic debate in Malaysia. Its rushed negotiation process, limited transparency and uneven obligations raise concerns about its durability and compatibility with Malaysia’s long-standing open and non-aligned trade policies. Instead of rushing for bilateral deals, Malaysia and ASEAN must collectively pursue ASEAN-centred agreements that can defend rules-based trade and investment and offer mutually beneficial and sustainable economic outcomes. – The ART of the deal lost in US–Malaysia pact | East Asia Forum
US-Middle Powers
(Jonathan Ping, Umair Ghori – East Asia Forum) The shift from liberal hegemony to US transactionalism is reshaping middle power diplomacy. Middle powers such as Australia and Pakistan are blending domestic policy traditions with opportunities presented by global power shifts, opening new diplomatic niches. This ‘accomplice’ model rewards states that offer strategic value regardless of their liberal credentials. Yet as the United States turns inward, middle powers can still uphold liberalism through coalitions and regional leadership. – Middle powers adapt to US transactionalism | East Asia Forum
